
NATIONALITY
AND THE WAR

NATIONALITY & THE WAR

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE



WITH MANY
COLOURED
MAPS

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PREFACE

THIS book is an attempt to review the problems of Nationality in the area affected by the War. My principal object has been to present the existing facts in their historical setting, and where these facts are of a psychological order, as they so often are, I have tried to reproduce sympathetically the different nations' conflicting points of view.

Some readers will regret that I have not confined myself to narrative altogether, and will resent the " will " and " ought " that punctuate the " was " and " is." I would answer them that this practical application is the justification of the book.

National questions are of absorbing interest at all times to the particular nations they concern; they are of occasional interest to the professional historian who touches them in the course of his research; to the world in general they are normally of no interest at all. " But what are we to do about it? " people exclaim when a problem is thrust upon their attention, and finding no answer they hark back to their own affairs.

This normal life of ours has suddenly been bewitched by the War, and in the " revaluing of all our values " the right reading of the riddle of Nationality has become an affair of life and death. The war has exploded the mine upon which diplomatists have feared to tread, and we are walking in a trance across ruins. *Solvitur ambulando*, or else we break our necks.

This is my apology for laying down the law, and it will clear up a further difficulty which might otherwise

cause trouble. "When you change from present to future," readers will say, "which do you mean to expound—what will happen, what may happen or what ought to happen?"

Certainly not what "will happen": "If we win" is the implied hypothesis of every sentence I have written, a hypothesis that baffles prophecy. If I become categorical, it is a lapse of style, not of standpoint.

Certainly not what "ought to happen" in the Utopian sense: political problems have no universal solutions. What does not meet the situation meets nothing: what meets it to-day will not meet it to-morrow, because the situation itself will have been transformed by being met.

My text is what "may happen," yet "may" partakes of both "will" and "ought": its meaning varies with its application. The problem of Nationality has come to concern ourselves, and so far as it concerns us it depends upon us for its solution—upon our intellectual judgments, the making up of our mind, and upon our moral judgments, the determination of our will. We "may" think this or that thought, feel this or that feeling, and each will give a different cast to the clay fate has thrust into our hands. We have to decide which way we "ought" to fashion it.

Yet the solution depends upon others as well. In "ourselves" we often include our allies, but the power of British will to influence Russian action is slight indeed, and when we deal with neutrals or enemies, our own will ceases to count while theirs becomes all-important. This will of other parties is for us an objective fact: we can conjecture what it is likely to be, and frame our own action either to thwart or to promote it, but we cannot determine their will from

within, and it is therefore idle for us to debate what they "ought" to do. In discussing what "may happen" on the European continent we have simply to discover what national ideals or ambitions will assert themselves if the war removes certain forces like the traditional regime in Prussia or the Dual System in the Danubian Monarchy, which hitherto have prevented large groups of population from exercising their will and working out their own salvation.

I thus repudiate Utopianism, and declare solvency for every draft I make upon the future. The only piece of Utopianism of which I am deliberately guilty is the suggestion that the U.S.A. might undertake the administration of the Black Sea Straits (Ch. IX. Sect. B.). Of course they will not, and of course Russia will, and again the reader will resent my inconsistency. "Better have left out the suggestion" he will say.

I have left it in because it crowns an argument. It is the *reductio ad absurdum* of that dearth of international organisation which is largely responsible for Europe's present pass, and possibly it will serve to bring out an underlying purpose of this book.

My review of problems does not pretend to be exhaustive—that would be beyond the scope of a single book and a single writer, and it would also be a weariness of the flesh. Problems are legion, and they have no individual significance in themselves: they are valuable only as illustrations of a phenomenon. By looking at Nationality in the concrete from successive perspectives, we may gain a clearer notion of what Nationality is than by the direct approach of an abstract definition. At any rate it is worth while making the experiment, for understand Nationality we must, now that it has proved itself the dominant political factor in Europe.

I have still to acknowledge my obligations. The chief source of this book is an ingrained habit of gazing at maps, and much of my material had been imbibed unconsciously in this way long before the war broke out and I sat down to write. My conscious debts are to Stieler's *Hand-Atlas* of the contemporary world, and to the wonderful *Historical Atlas* created by Karl Sprüner and Theodor Menke his apostle. Both of these I have consulted continuously while writing the book and compiling my own maps that accompany it, and I have also derived much profit from the little *Alldeutscher Atlas* published under the auspices of the *Alldeutsche Verband* by Justus Perthes, which plots out the distribution of languages in Central Europe with admirable exactitude, though it combines scientific execution with chauvinistic inspiration in a characteristically German fashion. The reader will note in passing that the other atlases cited are also of German authorship, and that conclusions based on their evidence are not likely to be biassed to Germany's disadvantage.

I am also indebted to books. Among works of reference I would single out two of Baedeker's handbooks, the eleventh edition of *Austria-Hungary* (1911) and *Konstantinopel und Kleinasien* (1905), but in this case the German source yields precedence to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (eleventh edition, published in 1911), which has proved the most indispensable of all my guides. My extracts from the official census returns of various states are nearly all derived through this channel,[1] and I have made especially diligent use of the

[1] The 1911 edition of the *Encyclopædia* takes its Austro-Hungarian statistics from the census of 1900: I might have rectified them by the more recent returns of 1910, but I have deliberately refrained from doing so. The figures of 1910 of course represent the present absolute totals of the various populations more accurately than those of 1900,

excellently arranged articles on "Austria-Hungary and "Hungary."

For what I have written on Hungary I am likewise in debt to the illuminating study on *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*,[1] by Professor Marczali, the Magyar historian, but above all to the work of Dr. Seton-Watson. So far as I deal with his subjects, my information is taken at second hand: I have learnt all I know about "Magyarisation" from his *Racial Problems in Hungary*, and all I know about modern Croatia from his *Southern Slavs*. I can do no better than refer the reader to these two books for the substantiation of my indictment against the Magyar nation.

The War and Democracy, written in collaboration by Messrs. Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, Zimmern and Greenwood, was only published after the relevant part of my own book was already in proof, and I have not yet had leisure to read it. Yet though I have been unable to borrow from the book itself, I owe an incalculable debt to another of its authors besides Dr. Seton-Watson. I have had the good fortune to be Mr. Zimmern's pupil.

So much for maps and books: they cannot compare with friends. Without the help of my mother and my wife, this book would never have grown ripe for publication, and I have to thank my wife's father, Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr. A. D. Lindsay and Mr. H. W. C.

but relative rather than absolute quantities are valuable for my purpose, and in this respect the figures of 1900 are undoubtedly more accurate than those of 1910. In 1900 the "official" proportions were doubtless already distorted by the Hungarian census-officials, and doubtless the real proportions have slightly shifted in the meanwhile, but both these margins of error are insignificant compared with the gross perversions of truth perpetrated by Hungarian officialdom in 1910. So rapidly is a nation demoralised when once it succumbs to chauvinism.

[1] Published by the Cambridge University Press.

Davis of Balliol College, and Mr. R. W. Chapman of the Clarendon Press, all of whom have read the book in whole or part either in manuscript or in proof. Their advice has enabled me to raise the standard of my work in every respect. When the critics tear my final draft in pieces, I shall realise how my first draft would have fared, had it been exposed naked to their claws.

Last but not least, I must express my gratitude to my publishers, Messrs. J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., for their unfailing kindness, especially for bearing with my delays and reproducing my maps.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE.

February 1915.

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

IN THE TEXT

IN COLOURS

NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

CHAPTER I

THE FUTURE

FOR the first time in our lives, we find ourselves in complete uncertainty as to the future. To uncivilised people the situation is commonplace ; but in twentieth-century Europe we are accustomed to look ahead, to forecast accurately what lies before us, and then to choose our path and follow it steadily to its end ; and we rightly consider that this is the characteristic of civilised men. The same ideal appears in every side of our life : in the individual's morality as a desire for " Independence " strong enough to control most human passions : in our Economics as Estimates and Insurances : in our Politics as a great sustained concentration of all our surplus energies, in which parties are becoming increasingly at one in aim and effort, while their differences are shrinking to alternatives of method, to raise the material, moral, and intellectual standard of life throughout the nation. From all this fruitful, constructive, exacting work, which demands the best from us and makes us the better for giving it, we have been violently wrenched away and plunged into a struggle for existence with people very much like ourselves, with whom we have no quarrel.

We must face the fact that this is pure evil, and that we cannot escape it. We must fight with all our strength : every particle of our energy must be absorbed

in the war: and meanwhile our social construction must stand still indefinitely, or even be in part undone, and every class and individual in the country must suffer in their degree, according to the quite arbitrary chance of war, in lives horribly destroyed and work ruined. We have to carry this war to a successful issue, because on that depends our freedom to govern our own life after the war is over, and the preservation of this freedom itself is more important for us than the whole sum of concrete gains its possession has so far brought us.

Thus we are sacrificing our present to our future, and, therein, obeying the civilised man's ideal to the uttermost. But we shall only be justified in our most momentous decision, by which we have put to the touch the whole of our fortunes at once, if the path we choose and follow is worthy of the sacrifice and the danger we are incurring for the sake of it.

At present we are all working, according to our individual capacities, for success in the war, but we have little influence, even collectively, upon the result. We have unreservedly put the control of it into the hands of experts whom we trust, and rightly done so, because it is the essence of this evil, war, whether the veiled war of Diplomacy or the naked war of military force, that its conduct must be secret and autocratic. Naturally our thoughts are with the fleets and armies, for we know that if they are beaten, we lose the thing they are fighting for, freedom of choice; but we are in danger of forgetting that, if we win, our object is not automatically attained. If we read in the newspaper one day that the powers with which we are at war had submitted unconditionally to the Allies, we should only be at the beginning of our real task. The reconstruction of Europe would be in our hands; but we should

be exposed to the one thing worse than defeat in the field, to the misuse of the immense power of decision, for good or evil, given us by victory.

This is an issue incomparably graver than the military struggle that lies immediately before us. Firstly, we are more personally responsible for it as individuals. The war itself is not only being managed by experts: it was brought upon us (the "White Paper" leaves no doubt in our minds) by factors outside England altogether. But our policy after hostilities cease will be decided by our own government relying for its authority upon the country behind it, that is, it will be decided ultimately by public opinion. Secondly, the state of war will have shaken our judgment when we are most in need of judging wisely.

The psychological devastation of war is even more terrible than the material. War brings the savage substratum of human character to the surface, after it has swept away the strong habits that generations of civilised effort have built up. We saw how the breath of war in Ireland demoralised all parties alike. We have met the present more ghastly reality with admirable calmness; but we must be on our guard. Time wears out nerves, and War inevitably brings with it the suggestion of certain obsolete points of view, which in our real, normal life, have long been buried and forgotten.

It rouses the instinct of revenge. "If Germany has hurt us, we will hurt her more—to teach her not to do it again." The wish is the savage's automatic reaction, the reason his perfunctory justification of it: but the civilised man knows that the impulse is hopelessly unreasonable. The "hurt" is being at war, and the evil we wish to bann is the possibility of being at

war again, because war prevents us working out our own lives as we choose. If we beat Germany and then humiliate her, she will never rest till she has "redeemed her honour," by humiliating us more cruelly in turn. Instead of being free to return to our own pressing business, we shall have to be constantly on the watch against her. Two great nations will sit idle, weapon in hand, like two Afghans in their loopholed towers when the blood feud is between them; and we shall have sacrificed deliberately and to an ever-increasing extent, for the blood feud grows by geometrical progression, the very freedom for which we are now giving our lives.

Another war instinct is plunder. War is often the savage's profession: "'With my sword, spear and shield I plough, I sow, I reap, I gather in the vintage.'[1] If we beat Germany our own mills and factories will have been at a standstill, our horses requisitioned and our crops unharvested, our merchant steamers stranded in dock if not sunk on the high seas, and our 'blood and treasure' lavished on the war: but in the end Germany's wealth will be in our grasp, her colonies, her markets, and such floating riches as we can distrain upon by means of an indemnity. If we have had to beat our ploughshares into swords, we can at least draw some profit from the new tool, and recoup ourselves partially for the inconvenience. It is no longer a question of irrational, impulsive revenge, perhaps not even of sweetening our sorrow by a little gain. To draw on the life-blood of German wealth may be the only way to replenish the veins of our exhausted Industry and Commerce." So the plunder instinct might be clothed in civilised garb: "War," we might

[1] The song of Hybrias the Kretan.

express it, "is an investment that must bring in its return."

The first argument against this point of view is that it has clearly been the inspiring idea of Germany's policy, and history already shows that armaments are as unbusinesslike a speculation for civilised countries as war is an abnormal occupation for civilised men. We saw the effect of the Morocco tension upon German finance in 1911, and the first phase of the present war has been enough to show how much Germany's commerce will inevitably suffer, whether she wins or loses.

It is only when all the armaments are on one side and all the wealth is on the other, that war pays; when, in fact, an armed savage attacks a civilised man possessed of no arms for the protection of his wealth. Our Afghans in their towers are sharp enough not to steal each other's cows (supposing they possess any of their own) for cows do not multiply by being exchanged, and both Afghans would starve in the end after wasting all their bullets in the skirmish. They save their bullets to steal cows from the plainsman who cannot make reprisals.

If Germany were really nothing but a "nation in arms," successful war might be as lucrative for her as an Afghan's raid on the plain, but she is normally a great industrial community like ourselves. In the last generation she has achieved a national growth of which she is justly proud. Like our own, it has been entirely social and economic. Her goods have been peacefully conquering the world's markets. Now her workers have been diverted *en masse* from their prospering industry to conquer the same markets by military force, and the whole work of forty years is jeopardised by the change of method.

Fighting for trade and industry is not like fighting for cattle. Cattle are driven from one fastness to another, and if no better, are at least no worse for the transit. Civilised wealth perishes on the way. Our economic organisation owes its power and range to the marvellous forethought and co-operation that has built it up; but the most delicate organisms are the most easily dislocated, and the conqueror, whether England or Germany, will have to realise that, though he may seem to have got the wealth of the conquered into his grip, the total wealth of both parties will have been vastly diminished by the process of the struggle.

The characteristic feature of modern wealth is that it is international. Economic gain and loss is shared by the whole world, and the shifting of the economic balance does not correspond to the moves in the game of diplomatists and armies. Germany's economic growth has been a phenomenon quite independent of her political ambitions, and Germany's economic ruin would compromise something far greater than Germany's political future—the whole world's prosperity. British wealth, among the rest, would be dealt a deadly wound by Germany's economic death;.and it would be idle to pump Germany's last life-blood into our veins, if we were automatically draining them of our own blood in the process.

But issues greater than the economic are involved. The modern "Nation" is for good or ill an organism one and indivisible, and all the diverse branches of national activity flourish or wither with the whole national well-being. You cannot destroy German wealth without paralysing German intellect and art, and European civilisation, if it is to go on growing, cannot do without them. Every doctor and musician, every scientist,

engineer, political economist and historian, knows well his debt to the spiritual energy of the German nation. In the moments when one realises the full horror of what is happening, the worst thought is the aimless hurling to destruction of the world's only true wealth, the skill and nobility and genius of human beings, and it is probably in the German casualties that the intellectual world is suffering its most irreparable human losses.

With these facts in our minds, we can look into the future more clearly, and choose our policy (supposing that we win the war, and, thereby, the power to choose) with greater confidence. We have accepted the fact that war itself is the evil, and will in any event bring pure loss to both parties: that no good can come from the war itself, but only from our policy when the war is over: and that the one good our policy can achieve, without which every gain is delusive, is the banishing of this evil from the realities of the future. This is our one supreme "British interest," and it is a German interest just as much, and an interest of the whole world.

This war, and the cloud of war that has weighed upon us so many years before the bursting of the storm, has brought to bankruptcy the "National State." Till 1870 it was the ultimate ideal of European politics, as it is still in the Balkans, where the Turk has broken Time's wings. It was such a fruitful ideal that it has rapidly carried us beyond itself, and in the last generation the life of the world has been steadily finding new and wider channels. In the crisis of change from nationalism to internationalism we were still exposed to the plague of war. The crisis might have been passed without it, and war banished for ever between the nations of civilised Europe. Now that the catastrophe has happened (it is childish to waste energy in incrimina-

tions against its promoters) we must carry through the change completely and at once: we cannot possibly afford to be exposed to the danger again.

No tool, machine, or idea made by men has an immortal career. Sooner or later they all run amuck, and begin to do evil instead of good. At that stage savage or unskilful men destroy them by force and replace them by their opposite: civilised men get them under control, and build them into something new and greater. Nationality will sink from being the pinnacle of politics only to become their foundation, and till the foundations are laid true, further building is impossible. But the bases of nationality have never yet been laid true in Europe. When we say that "nationality was the political ideal of the nineteenth century," and that 1870 left the populations of Europe organised in national groups, we are taking far too complacent a view of historical facts. The same century that produced a united Italy and Germany, saw out the whole tragedy of Poland, from the first partition in 1772 to the last revolt in 1863. Human ideas do not spring into the world full-grown and shining, like Athena: they trail the infection of evil things from the past.

In the Dark Ages Europe's most pressing need and only practicable ideal was strong government.[1] Strong government came with its blessings, but it brought the evil of territorial ambitions. The Duke of Burgundy spent the wealth of his Netherland subjects in trying to conquer the Swiss mountaineers. Burgundy suc-

[1] The expression "Strong Government" is used throughout this book in the quasi-technical sense of "Government in which the governed have no share." "Absolutism" and "Autocracy" are terms more usually employed, but both have acquired a sinister connotation, and it is better to use some neutral word that implies no judgment on what it denotes.

cumbed to the king of France. But the very factor that made the French kings survive in the struggle for existence between governments, the force of compact nationality which the French kingdom happened to contain, delivered the inheritance of the kings to the Nation.

The French Nation in the Revolution burst the chrysalis of irresponsible government beneath which it had grown to organic life, but like a true heir it took over the Royal Government's ideal: "Peace within and piracy without." France had already begun aggression abroad before she had accomplished self-government at home, and in delivering herself to Napoleon she sacrificed her liberty to her ambition. Napoleon's only enduring achievements outside France were the things he set himself to prevent, the realisation, by a forceful reaction against force, of German and Italian nationality. Nationalism was converted to violence from the outset, and the struggle for existence between absolute governments has merely been replaced by a struggle between nationalities, equally blind, haphazard, and non-moral, but far more terrific, just because the virtue of self-government is to focus and utilise human energy so much more effectively than the irresponsible government it has superseded.

Naturally the result of this planless strife has been no grouping of Europe on a just and reasonable national basis. France and England, achieving racial frontiers and national self-government early, inherited the Earth before Germany and Italy struggled up beside them, to take their leavings of markets and colonial areas. But the government that united Germany had founded its power on the partition of Poland, and in the second Balkan War of 1913 we saw a striking example of the

endless chain of evil forged by an act of national injustice.

The Hungarians used the liberty they won in 1867 to subject the Slavonic population between themselves and the sea, and prevent its union with the free principality of Serbia of the same Slavonic nationality. This drove Serbia in 1912 to follow Hungary's example by seizing the coast of the non-Slavonic Albanians; and when Austria-Hungary prevented this (a right act prompted by most unrighteous motives), Serbia fought an unjust war with Bulgaria and subjected a large Bulgarian population, in order to gain access to the only seaboard left her, the friendly Greek port of Salonika.

Hungary and Serbia are nominally national states: but more than half the population in Hungary, and perhaps nearly a quarter in Serbia, is alien, only held within the state by force against its will. The energy of both states is perverted to the futile and demoralising work of "Magyarising" and "Serbising" subject foreign populations, and they have not even been successful. The resistance of Southern Slav nationalism on the defensive to the aggression of Hungarian nationalism has given the occasion for the present catastrophe.

The evil element in nationalism under its many names, "Chauvinism," "Jingoism," "Prussianism," is the one thing in our present European civilisation that can and does produce the calamity of war. If our object is to prevent war, then, the way to do so is to purge Nationality of this evil. This we cannot do by any mechanical means, but only by a change of heart, by converting public opinion throughout Europe from "National Competition" to "National Co-operation."

Public opinion will never be converted so long as the present system of injustice remains in force, so long as one nation has less and another more than its due. The first step towards internationalism is not to flout the problems of nationality, but to solve them.

The most important practical business, then, of the conference that meets when war is over, will be the revision of the map of Europe. Merely to suggest such a thing is a complete reversal of our policy during the last generation. We in England have been steadily shutting our eyes to nationality, and minimising its importance. Our English national question was settled long ago. Our geographical situation as an island of manageable size gave our mediæval Norman and Angevin kings an exceptional opportunity for establishing at an early date a strong well-knit government. The nation became self-conscious when it expanded under the Tudors, and self-governing by the political revolutions of the seventeenth century, a full hundred years ahead of France. While France was realising her nationality, we were passing through the Industrial Revolution, and during the last century we have been working, with rapidly increasing success during latter years, to adapt ourselves to our new economic conditions.

If we do not think about nationality, it is simply because we have long taken it for granted, and our mind is focussed on posterior developments; but it is increasingly hard to keep ourselves out of touch with other countries, and though our blindness has been partly distraction, it has also been in part deliberate policy. We saw well enough that the present phase of the national problem in Europe carried in it the seeds of war. We rightly thought that war itself was the

evil, an evil incomparably greater than the national injustices that might become the cause of it. We knew that, if these questions were opened, war would follow. We accordingly adopted the only possible course. We built our policy on the chance that national feeling could be damped down till it had been superseded in the public opinion of Europe by other interests, not because Nationalism was unjustified, but because it endangered so much more than it was worth. Knowing that we had passed out of the nationalist phase ourselves, and that from our present political point of view war was purely evil, we hoped that it was merely a question of time for the Continental populations to reach the same standpoint. Notably in Germany, the focus of danger, we saw social interests coming more and more to the front at the expense of militarism. We threw ourselves into the negative task of staving off the catastrophe in the interim, by a strenuous policy of compromise and conciliation, which has been successful on at least two critical occasions. Now that the evil has been too powerful and the catastrophe has happened, the reasons for this policy are dead. Nationalism has been strong enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be reckoned with. It is stronger on the Continent than social politics. It is the raw material that litters the whole ground. We must build it into our foundations, or give up the task, not only of constructive social advance beyond the limits we have already reached, but even of any fundamental reconstruction of what the war will have destroyed.

Perhaps we might have foretold this from the case of Ireland immediately under our eyes. Failure to solve her national problem has arrested Ireland's develop-

ment since the seventeenth century, and imprisoned her in a world of ideas almost unintelligible to an Englishman till he has travelled in the Balkans. This has been England's fault, and we are now at last in a fair way to remedy it. The moment we have succeeded in arranging that the different national groups in Ireland govern themselves in the way they really wish, the national question will pass from the Irish consciousness; they will put two centuries behind them at one leap, and come into line with ourselves. The Dublin strike, contemporary with the arming of the Volunteers, shows how the modern problems are jostling at the heels of the old. Although "Unionist" and "Nationalist" politicians could still declare that their attitude towards the strike was neutral, the parliament of the new Irish state will discuss the social problem and nothing else.

Ireland, then, has forced us to think about the problem of nationalism; and our Irish experience will be invaluable to us when peace is made, and we take in hand, in concert with our allies, the national questions of the rest of Europe. To begin with, we already have a notion of what Nationality is. Like all great forces in human life, it is nothing material or mechanical, but a subjective psychological feeling in living people. This feeling can be kindled by the presence of one or several of a series of factors: a common country, especially if it is a well defined physical region, like an island, a river basin, or a mountain mass; a common language, especially if it has given birth to a literature; a common religion; and that much more impalpable force, a common tradition or sense of memories shared from the past.

But it is impossible to argue *a priori* from the presence of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a

nationality: they may have been there for ages and kindled no response. And it is impossible to argue from one case to another: precisely the same group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no effect. Great Britain is a nation by geography and tradition, though important Keltic-speaking sections of the population in Wales and the Highlands do not understand the predominant English language. Ireland is an island smaller still and more compact, and is further unified by the almost complete predominance of the same English language, for the Keltic speech is incomparably less vigorous here than in Wales; yet the absence of common tradition combines with religious differences to divide the country into two nationalities, at present sharply distinct from one another and none the less hostile because their national psychology is strikingly the same. Germany is divided by religion in precisely the same way as Ireland, her common tradition is hardly stronger, and her geographical boundaries quite vague: yet she has built up her present concentrated national feeling in three generations. Italy has geography, language and tradition to bind her together; and yet a more vivid tradition is able to separate the Ticinese from his neighbours, and bind him to people of alien speech and religion beyond a great mountain range. The Armenian nationality does not occupy a continuous territory, but lives by language and religion. The Jews speak the language of the country where they sojourn, but religion and tradition hold them together. The agnostic Jew accepts not only the language but all the other customs of his adopted countrymen, but tradition by itself is too strong for him: he remains a Jew and cannot be assimilated.

These instances taken at random show that each case

must be judged on its own merits, and that no argument holds good except the ascertained wish of the living population actually concerned. Above all we must be on our guard against "historical sentiment," that is, against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment. They are most easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as "recovering the soil of the Fatherland" because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexander the Great in the fourth century B.C., and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ohhrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A.D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep as the achievements of the "Emathian Conqueror," on which the modern Greek nationalist insists so strongly.

The national problems of Europe are numerous, and each one is beset by arguments good, bad, and indifferent, some no more specious than the above, some so elaborately staged that it requires the greatest discernment to expose them. Vast bodies of people, with brains and money at their disposal, have been interested in obscuring the truth, and have used every instrument in their power to do so. It is therefore essential for us in England to take up these hitherto remote and uninteresting national problems in earnest, to get as near to the truth as we possibly can, both as to what the respective wishes of the different populations are, and as to how far it is possible to reconcile them with each other and with Geography; and to come to the con-

ference which will follow the war, and is so much more important than the war itself, with a clear idea of the alternative solutions and a mature judgment upon their relative merits.

To accomplish this we need a co-ordination of knowledge on a large scale, knowledge of history, geography, religion, national psychology and public opinion. It is a case for the collaboration of experts, but meanwhile an attempt to review the whole question, even if there is no deep knowledge behind it, may, if honestly made, serve at least as a plea for more detailed and authoritative contributions.

The remainder of this book is an attempt to make such a beginning. We will take a series of actual political groups, some of them states with no national basis, some in which state and nation roughly coincide, some that are true nationalities at present prevented from realising themselves in concrete form, and we will start in each case by trying to understand the group's own point of view. We shall find that it nearly always has some justification, and is hardly ever justifiable in its entirety. This need not make us pessimistic: it is one of the commonest traits of human nature. Right and Wrong are always a question of degree, and our next step will be to criticise the case of the group under discussion, and estimate how far it is just and reasonable to give it what it asks. In reaching our conclusions we shall find ourselves evolving a scheme for the reconstruction of that particular corner of Europe.

Such a reconstruction must be guided by certain obvious principles.

(i.) It must be done with the minimum of territorial or administrative change. There is always a presumption in favour of the existing machinery, so long

as it works, varying in proportion to the civilisation of the people concerned. In a civilised country the plant of self-government is elaborately installed, not only in the material sense of public services and administration, business concerns with capital invested in them, which must in great measure be wasted if they are broken up and reconstituted on quite different lines, but in the more important psychological sphere of political habit. There is a certain political value, for instance, in the *esprit de corps* of the motley Austrian army, or even in the still callow constitutional tradition of the Austrian Crown-lands' parliament. It is very hard to make people work together, very easy to pull them apart again. If they work together so badly that they bring the whole organism to a deadlock, there is no course left but to part them, and regroup them on other lines which will enable the various elements to function more smoothly. But we must never forget that the negative work of demolishing what other men have spent their labour in building up, even if it be a Bastille, is at best a regrettable necessity.

(ii.) In the last resort there must always be minorities that suffer. This must be so if men are not to let difference of opinion prevent them working together, and co-operation in spite of disagreement is the foundation of politics. We can only secure that the minorities are as small and the suffering as mild as possible. This again is a question of degree. In Macedonia, until the year before last, one Turk with one rifle caused a " minority " of a hundred Christians with no rifles to suffer robbery, rape, and murder. Every one agrees that this was an abomination. In Great Britain at the present moment the numerically small Welsh-speaking minority of school children have

to learn English as well as their mother tongue, but the English majority do not learn Welsh. Here we have "suffering" or disadvantage to one party, without injustice: the Welsh child does not learn English because it is the English-speaking majority's interest that he should do so, but because it is his own. His only quarrel is with the fact that the English population is much larger than his, and its language much more widely spoken, and it is as useless to quarrel with facts as it is to beat the sea and bind it in chains.

The Irish question has produced a rich crop of misguided arguments on both sides. First came the skirmishes of "historical sentiment." The Unionists wished to keep everything as it was "because Ireland has been conquered by England, and united thereby to the English Kingdom." They were silenced by the outstanding fact that the Catholic Irish are a separate nationality, but not content with this, the Nationalists declared that the whole island was the heritage of the "Irish nation," with the deplorable result that the Ulster Protestants made good their objection by threats of force. Now the Protestants in turn are trying to grab more than their share by maintaining that Ulster is "one and indivisible," in defiance of the fact that the territory "Ulster" as such has no organic life, or in other words no nationality, of its own. This is mere encouragement to Nationalists to claim all Ulster counties complete where there are Catholic majorities, though one corner of them may be entirely Protestant in population.

The only way out is for both parties to face the fact that there are two nationalities in Ireland, English-speaking Protestants and English-speaking Catholics, which in the greater part of the island form uniform populations covering continuous territories; but that

there is an irreducible zone, especially in County Tyrone, where the two nations are inextricably mingled, not only Catholic village interspersed with Protestant, but Catholic and Protestant householders occupying alternate premises in the same town. Even here the territories justly belonging to each nation could be plotted out to a nicety on a big-scale map, but it would be quite impossible to draw a frontier of equal delicacy for the practical purposes of public service and self-government.

With the growth of civilisation the human and the territorial unit become less and less identical. In a primitive community the members are undifferentiated from one another: the true human unit is the total group, and not the individual, and the territory this group occupies is a unit too, self-sufficing and cut off from intercourse with the next valley. In modern Europe every sub-group and every individual has developed a " character " or " individuality " of its own which must have free play; while the growth of communications, elaboration of organisation, and economic interdependence of the whole world have broken down the barriers between region and region. The minimum territorial block that can be organised efficiently as a separate political unit according to modern standards is constantly growing in size: the maximum human group which can hold together without serious internal divergence is as steadily diminishing.

This would look like an *impasse,* were it not corrected by the virtues of civilisation itself. We started with the fact that the essence of civilisation was " Forethought " and its ideal the " power of free choice ": the complementary side of this ideal, on the principle " Do as you would be done by," is to allow free choice

to others when they are in your power. It is a virtue with as many names as there are spheres of human life: "Forbearance," "Toleration," "Constitutionalism." When we have drawn our frontier through Tyrone with all the ingenuity that Geography allows us, there will inevitably be a minority left on either side, a minority no map-making can further reduce. Savages wipe out minorities: civilised men take testimonials from them. The drawing of the frontier is only the first step towards the solution of the Irish question. It will truly be settled if the minorities find that the disadvantage to which Geography puts them is more than made up by the good-fellowship of the population with which it yokes them. Then they will become as strong a link between Catholic Ireland and Ulster, as the "colonies" of business men, that voluntarily take up their residence in Liverpool and Hamburg, are between Germany and England.

Having stated these principles, which once more draw our attention to psychological facts as being the really important forces to which all concrete, mechanical manipulations of frontiers and institutions must be referred in the end, we may now more safely plunge into the great sea of European controversy. Let us begin with the nation whose action has drawn us into the vortex, Germany.

CHAPTER II

PRUSSIANISM: OR GERMANY'S AMBITIONS

A. *The German Empire*

THE living generation of Germans is suffering for a thousand years of history. They started in the race to emerge from the Dark Age with a smaller fund of civilisation than France had accumulated by her thorough Romanisation, and than the Norman conquerors carried from France to England; and they further handicapped themselves by the only Roman tradition they did inherit, the ghost of universal empire. The Hohenstaufen dynasty, Germany's chance of a strong government, spent its strength warring in Italy, on the impossible quest of bringing this ghost to life again. When they failed, Germany fell to pieces into a débris of principalities, of every size and character: self-governing trading-cities, often more in touch with foreign traders across the sea than with the serfs at their gates; Imperial knights, the landlords of these serfs, ruling their estates with practically sovereign power; prince-bishops, who governed some of the most civilised districts of Germany in the valley of the Rhine; and lay princes small and great, from the Thuringian dukes, whose dominions were subdivided equally among the whole male issue of each generation, to the strong military lords of the marches, Brandenburg and Austria, and the compact, steadily-growing duchy of Bavaria. When the Reformation brought religious war, even unified France and England were riven by the conflict: German particularism fought out the issue to an incon-

clusive compromise in the devastating War of Thirty Years, which paralysed the growth of Germany for a century, just when England was working out her internal self-government and preparing for the immense development of her colonies and industry. During the Thirty Years' War Germany's consolidated neighbours began to fish in her troubled waters: in the eighteenth century she had become the plaything of the powers, her principalities pawns in their game: at the end of the century she fell completely under the dominion of France, and had to endure the merited ridicule of the conqueror for her particularism and its results, a "second-handness" and a helpless inert stolidity.

This was the more bitter in that she was not merely feeding upon memories of a past dawn that had never become day: she was conscious of an immense vitality in the present. While Napoleon was annexing or humiliating her principalities, Germany was giving Europe the greatest philosopher and the greatest poet she had yet known, Kant and Goethe, while the succession of German masters who were creating European music was represented by Beethoven. Germany was already a nation: the spark had been kindled by intellect and art. An intense desire followed to build up all the other sides of national life.

Germany's striking defect was her political disintegration: this delivered her into the hands of the French, who preached their creed with drums and bayonets. Civilised Germany turned again to the ideal of the Dark Age, which more fortunate nations had long realised and transcended, a strong military government. An organisation of just this type presented itself in the kingdom of Prussia. Its nucleus was the march of Brandenburg, the old frontier province against the

Slavs across the Elbe, which had grown by conquest Eastward and been united, after the Reformation, with the colonial territory carved out by the Teutonic knights among heathen Prussians beyond the Vistula. Its history expressed itself in the character of the population. The rather thin soil was well cultivated by a hard-working submissive peasantry of German settlers or Slavs conquered and Germanised, bound by a system of serfdom little modified from the extreme mediæval type, under a ruling class of landed proprietors who remembered that they had come in as conquerors.

The government had all the virtues of European absolutism. By the middle of the eighteenth century it had built up an administration and an army extraordinarily efficient for the size and wealth of the territory. Frederick the Great used this instrument to double the extent of his dominions and raise Prussia to the status of a European power.[1] The *débâcle* at Jena in 1806 and the unwise humiliations to which Napoleon subjected her, only roused the Prussian state to a thorough reconstruction: serfdom was abolished and universal military training invented. The rising of the Prussian population in 1813, when they cast out force by force and broke the French power, really stood for a national movement of the whole German people; and its success was achieved under the leadership of the Prussian government. 1813 marked out Prussia as the tool which was to fashion a new political structure for Germany.

The transition Germany went through in this generation may be illustrated by the career of Stein. Inheriting the sovereignty of an Imperial knight (his little

[1] Invasion of Silesia, 1740.

principality was absorbed in Nassau during his lifetime), he did not find his vocation therein, but took service in the Prussian administration. He came to the front after 1806, and was the inspiration both of the internal reforms and of the war of liberation they made possible. He was afterwards fired by the Romantic movement, and devoted his old age to promoting the collection and publication of documents for the origins of German history, a historical interest that really looked towards the future.

But the *débris* of the middle ages could not be cleared away in a moment, and the next fifty years were a period of flux and indecision. Two factors were striving to harmonise and never succeeding. On the one hand, the intellectual and artistic growth of Germany was gathering momentum : in music, philology, philosophy, and theoretical politics the nation had not only found itself but achieved the primacy of Europe. On the other side stood the political organism of Prussia, far stronger than before, for the Vienna congress had greatly increased her territory, and far more representative of Germany as a whole, for she had exchanged the greater part of her alien Polish provinces in the East for the German Rhineland on the West, which made her a Catholic as well as a Protestant state and the bulwark of Germany against France. She used the fifty years to unite all North Germany in her customs union ; but her ruling class kept within its mediæval traditions and only came into hostile contact with the spiritual movement in which German nationalism still concentrated itself. The Prussian governing class aspired to rule Germany, but it did not wish to merge itself in the growth of the German nation.

These two discordant elements were welded together

by a genius, Bismarck. He persuaded the German people that the Prussian machine alone could give them what they wanted, and that to make the machine work effectively they must conform themselves to its action: there must be no more liberalism. He persuaded the Prussian government that irresponsible absolutism could only survive by "giving the people what it wants," and that if it took the plunge, from which other obsolete institutions, like the Pope and the Hapsburgs, had shrunk to their ruin, it had a great future before it. He worked with titanic tools. In the blast-furnace of three great wars with Denmark, Austria and France, he poured the whole energy of the German nation into the Prussian crucible, and successfully drew out a solid mass of metal, molten in just the form he had intended, the German Empire.

To those who look at his work from outside after a generation has passed, it appears that the task was too gigantic even for his powers. The metal shows a flaw. The Prussian machine has not proved itself adaptable enough: it has not learnt to understand and work for the needs and tendencies of the German people. The nation on the other hand has lost in success some of the qualities it preserved in adversity, and taken a Prussian alloy into its soul. Bismarck's harmonisation was sovereign for achieving the immediate result he had in view. If his material had not been men but stone, the statue of Germany he carved would have been a monument to him for ever. But living material is always growing, and those who work in it must direct their eye less upon the present than upon the future.

Bismarck brought Germany into line with France and England. Her national question was solved at last, and she was free to throw herself into industrialism.

She threw herself into it with all that concentration of energy of which Bismarck had first mastered the secret. Here was a new sphere where intellectual activity and disciplined organisation might co-operate to give German nationality expression.

The commerce and manufactures that Germany has built up during the last forty-three years are among the most wonderful achievements in history: there is a vigour behind them that feels itself capable of inheriting the whole Earth. Perhaps if the Earth had lain untenanted for Germany to inherit, she would have found salvation in the achievement, and Prussian principles and German character might have hardened into steel of a temper that Bismarck, in idealistic moments, may have dreamed of.

But unfortunately the pleasant places of the Earth were occupied already. The tropical countries that supply Europe with raw materials her own climate cannot produce, were in the hands of England, France, and Holland: in the temperate regions capable of receiving the overflow of European population, new white nations of English, Spanish, or Dutch speech were growing up, one of them, the U.S.A., already a world power, the rest guaranteed an undisturbed development to maturity either by the United States or by Great Britain. In the partition of the waste places of Africa during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century Germany took her share, but she got little by it. Her tropical acquisitions seem not to pay their way from the commercial point of view, and the only colony with a temperate climate, S.W. Africa, was vacant simply because its soil was desert, while its one asset, the good harbour of Walfisch Bay, had been earmarked by Great Britain. In 1870 the Germans thought they

had at last buried their unhappy political past, yet here in the new chapter they had magnificently opened, they were suffering for history still. This has been more than they can bear, and explains, though it does not excuse, their foreign policy ever since. With the brilliant success of the Prussian military machine fresh in their minds, they turned to Prussianism once more to accomplish their desire. Instead of purging out the alloy when once the metal was cast, the new industrial Germany has become Prussianised through and through.

In hoping to cancel by the use of military force the grave initial disadvantage with which they started their industrial career, they have made a miscalculation that has brought evil upon themselves and all Europe. The machine is entirely unadaptable to the new task set before it. "Blood and Iron" could drive other nations off German soil; they could even, in Bismarck's handling, cause a great psychological revolution in the political feeling of the German people. They could not possibly be made fruitful for economic progress.

Economic advance can only be made by economic effort. We are deeply conscious of this in England. War as a constructive national activity is for us essentially a thing of the past: between our warlike ancestors and ourselves there is a great gulf fixed, the Industrial Revolution, which has put us into a new environment. In the effort to adapt ourselves to that environment we are increasingly absorbed; we more and more recognise the vital importance of succeeding in this, and resent the unremitting "burden of armaments," the distracting rumours of war, and now this destructive folly into which we have really been drawn at last.

The retort is easy: "England has all she wants.

She got it by war a century ago: now she wants to be let alone to exploit it." That merely proves that we have been more fortunate than Germany: it does not prove that the same military method will produce the same result now that the century has passed. The conditions have changed, and not, after all, in Germany's disfavour. In spite of her bad start, she has developed such immense industries that her town population has increased at a greater rate than that of the U.S.A. during the same period: she has won markets for her manufactures, not only in her own protectorates, but in the colonies of other nations, and even in the homeland of industrialism—Great Britain itself. The surplus of her population, whose growth has even outstripped her demand for labour,[1] has found outlets, entirely satisfactory from the individual's point of view, in North and South America, where they already form a very prosperous section of the population, and play an influential part in the self-government of their adopted countries. German enterprise has competed on equal terms with French, English, and American in China and Turkey, and obtained contracts that offer good investments for all surplus German capital for some time to come.

This has been Germany's true victory in the environment of modern civilisation, and she has done it all without moving a single gun against her neighbours. She has not yet got abreast of England in wealth: that is not the fault of living England or Germany, but of dead history: but, so far as she has thrown herself into

[1] This is true in the sense that the home market for *skilled labour* is glutted. But while the skilled German is seeking new openings abroad, the unskilled Pole is drifting into Westphalia to do the work for which the native German's standard is too high, so that the Immigration statistics at present outbalance those of Emigration.

the economic field, she has, by her own merit, gained upon us to the utmost extent possible. Her only avoidable handicap has been the great Prussian fleet and army which she has deliberately imposed upon herself. Their creation, upkeep, and increase have steadily taxed her economic growth, and their existence has tempted her, in her foolish trust in their efficacy for her ulterior objects, to risk all her real economic gains by bringing them into action.

This policy of Germany's has been an immense mistake. It can work her no good, but it has a vast potentiality for working both herself and the rest of Europe evil. There is the sum of all evil in the fact that by attacking the rest of Europe with arms, she has forced us all to take up arms against her. It is only our subordinate object to beat her, because we know that if she beats us her public opinion will become more convinced than ever that her militaristic policy was right. But the converse by no means follows, that if we beat her we thereby convince her of her error. Masses of people are only converted from ingrained opinions about complicated questions, if they have every opportunity given them to be reasonable. It is always tempting to refuse to be reasonable : if you are being harshly treated, and at the same time presented with unanswerable refutations of cherished beliefs, you inevitably prefer to go mad rather than be convinced. Our ultimate object is to prevent war for the future, and the essential means to this end is to convince Germany that war is not to her interest. We and the French disbelieve in war already, but a minority of one can make a quarrel, in spite of the proverb. The only way to convince Germany is first to beat her badly and then to treat her well.

If we humiliate her, we shall strengthen the obsolete ideas in her consciousness more than ever—perhaps no longer the idea of "Plunder," but certainly that of "Revenge," which is much worse: if we deal "disinterestedly" with her (though it will be in our own truest interest) we may produce such a reaction of public opinion in Germany, that the curse of aggressive militarism will be exorcised from her as effectively in 1914, as the curse of political paralysis was exorcised in 1870.

We have seen that Germany was led to pursue the policy which has culminated in this war, by the oppressive sense that her development was being cramped by the action of her neighbours. At first she conceived their action as of a passive kind, as the mere automatic, "dog-in-the-manger" instinct of effete powers to cling to possessions they had not the initiative to utilise, and in which nothing but historical chance had given them their vested interest: her own mission, she thought, was to bend all her youthful energy and resolution to the task of evicting them, in order to actualise all the golden opportunities that they had missed. More recently, however, since her methodical pursuit of her aim has roused her victims to a sense of their danger and stimulated them to concert measures for their security, she has viewed their behaviour in a more sinister light, as an active, though veiled, campaign of hostilities unremittingly carried on to compass her destruction; and now that her ambition has combined with this undercurrent of fear to precipitate her into an aggressive war, so that she finds herself actually engaged in a life-and-death struggle with these neighbours whom she has envied, despised, and feared in one complicated emotion, she is more firmly convinced than

ever that the aggression comes, not from her side, but from theirs.

We cannot dispel this obsession by discussions of the past: the only argument that has a chance of going home is our action in the future, that is, the attitude we adopt when we meet Germany at the congress that will follow the war. Assuming (what is the necessary presupposition of this book) that Germany has been defeated, and that the settlement, in so far as it depends on terms imposed by superior force, passes thereby into the hands of the Allies, on what principles shall we govern our clearance of accounts with the German Nation?

One thing is clear: whether Germany's feeling of constriction has good grounds or not, we must avoid deliberately furnishing it with further justification than it has already. It would be possible to maintain that the colonies and concessions Germany has already acquired give her room for expansion ample enough to deprive her of excuse for her envy, not to speak of the conduct by which she has attempted to satisfy it; but even this view would be rash in face of Germany's vehement conviction to the contrary. Germany is likely to judge her own plight more truly than we can, and even if she has judged wrongly, her opinion is more important for our purpose than the objective truth. To give the lie to this national belief by taking from her even that which she hath, would be the surest means of deepening and perpetuating her national bitterness.

Let us make the unlikely assumption that, before the end of the war, every fragment of German territory overseas will have come into our power: there will certainly be a body of opinion in this country in favour of retaining the spoils of war. "The retention of Ger-

man S.W. Africa," they will say, "is essential, firstly in order to round off the frontiers of the South African Commonwealth, and secondly to prevent for the future the fostering, from this hostile focus, of the disloyalty against the British Empire, unfortunately still rife in the Dutch element."

But it will be a perverse cure for Dutch disaffection to reinforce it by including a still more irreconcilable German population within the same community, unless we mean to abandon the liberal policy which has gone so far towards wiping out the memories of the South African War, and rule Dutch and German alike with a heavy hand. Such a disastrous course would lose us South Africa altogether, by a war of independence like that which severed from us the North American states, the finest colonies we ever had. If, on the other hand, we restore Germany her territory, and avoid disturbing the natural development of our own South African Commonweatlh by the problems involved in the annexation, we shall see a new South African nationality grow up, which will first blend Dutch and British into one people, and in process of time exercise an attractive influence upon the territories adjoining, when they too have filled up with a white population drawn from their respective mother-countries, and have evolved a separate life of their own. If German S.W. Africa is not subjected to the South African Commonwealth now as a conquered province, she is more than likely to join the Federation, when she is ripe for self-government, as an independent member of her own free will, and so enrich the new nationality by adding a German strain to the Dutch and English basis. When this happens, the South African federal state will take its place by the side of Great Britain on the one hand and

Germany on the other as a separate political unit, absolved from the control of either, but inheriting the tradition of cordial relations with each, and will become the strongest bond of good understanding between them instead of the bitterest cause of dissention.

The case of the other German possessions in Africa is simpler. They are not "white men's countries," and do not adjoin any great self-governing member of the British Empire, whose policy and interest must be considered as well as our own: they all lie within the tropical belt, and like most European protectorates in those latitudes, profit their owner, if at all, as fields for enterprise, sources for raw products, and markets for manufactures. Towards these too we may be tempted to stretch out a grasping hand. "They do not even pay their way," people will declare; "and she has not learnt the secret of governing natives: it would save Germany's pocket and her African subjects' hides, if we took over the business instead of her. Perhaps Togoland and Kamerun might be passed over; every country in Europe, after all, has some little claim staked out on the West African coast, and they are hardly worth picking up: but German East Africa is another question; and think how satisfactory it will be to obtain an 'all-red route' for the Cape-to-Cairo Railway."

Here we see the cloven hoof, and it is sufficient to answer that the profit and loss of Germany's African possessions is emphatically her affair not ours, that the skill to govern native races is only acquired by experience (we ourselves, for instance, blundered into our present more or less satisfactory Crown Colony system through an unhampered century of experiments in misgovernment), while the all-red route, even if it could be achieved without alienating Germany (and it would

be out of all proportion to obtain it at the cost of the alternative), actually presupposes the continuance of that national antagonism which it is our object to abolish. Not the monopoly of the chief trunk railway of the African continent, but the co-operation of all interested parties in its construction and utilisation, will open the way to the international *entente* we hope to call into being.

The most serious claim to German East Africa might be lodged by the Indian Empire. The population of India is suffering from congestion at least as acutely as that of Germany, and the East African coast that faces India across the Arabian Sea, offers the obvious field for her expansion. There has indeed been an attempt to convert into a "white man's country" the highlands that, both in the German and in the English territory, intervene between the coast and the great lakes; but the experiment seems to be in process of breaking down in both provinces. India, then, might conceivably ask, as a reward for her loyal aid in the present war, that both British and German East Africa should be assigned to her as a specifically Indian colonial area.

This, however, is asking for more than is in our power to grant. We shall be ill-advised if we do not in future offer the Indian citizens of our empire the most favourable openings we can, at least in regions whose climate renders them pre-eminently suitable for Indian immigration, like our own East African protectorate. We hope that our German neighbours on that coast will do the same, and we might even point out to them that the introduction of a civilised Indian population into a country where there is little question of their coming into competition with white settlers, will enormously increase its economic productiveness, which is its para-

mount asset to the white nation to which it belongs. Moreover, British government in India is building for the Future an immensely powerful Indian nation ; and the exclusion of Indians from this territory would involve Germany in the same conflict that already threatens Canada and the U.S.A., unless they modify their policy in the meanwhile. But we must let our action rest at that. The problem of Asiatic expansion must be met primarily by every state concerned on its own account. It is probable that they will find the difficulty of its solution so great that they will organise in time some international authority to co-ordinate their policy on this question, and voluntarily submit themselves to its direction ; but the solution cannot possibly be furthered by pressure of one individual state upon another, exercised as the result of a victorious war.

Germany has another group of possessions in the Pacific, and perhaps here she cannot succeed in coming out of the war unscathed. Her Pacific territories have little value as areas for settlement or commerce. Kaiser-Wilhelmsland in New Guinea is the only one of any extent ; several archipelagoes of small islands only useful as coaling stations, and the notorious fortress of Kiao-Chao, planted like a piratical stronghold on the Chinese peninsula of Shantung, constitute the remainder. They are not so much an Empire in themselves as a strategical framework laid down for a future empire of indefinite extent, and as such have caused considerable uneasiness to the maritime states in this part of the Pacific, especially to Japan our ally, and to Australia and New Zealand, two self-governing members of our empire. The anticipations of these nations with regard to Germany's designs are revealed by the energy with which they proceeded to attack

these positions as soon as war broke out. New Zealand struck at Samoa, Australia at Neu-Pommern, Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, and the Solomon islands, while Japan undertook the severest task in the reduction of Kiao-Chao. Japan will emerge from the war in possession of the latter place, and she has handed over the Caroline and Marshall Islands, which she occupied in the course of her operations, not to ourselves but to our two Pacific Commonwealths.

The disposition of Germany's Pacific dependencies will therefore not come into our hands at all. We may ensure that Japan keeps to her declared intention of consigning Kiao-Chao to its ultimate owner China, by offering to resign simultaneously Wei-hai-wei on the other coast of Shantung, which we only leased as an offset to Germany's *coup* in seizing Kiao-Chao; but in any event Kiao-Chao will not pass back into Germany's possession, and it is most unlikely that any of the other territories in question will be relinquished by their respective holders. Certainly Great Britain has no authoritative power to procure their retrocession to Germany, even did she desire it, and there is after all no reason why we should deplore Germany's loss of them. It will involve no corresponding loss to her industrial and commercial prosperity, a German interest that we mean scrupulously to respect and if possible to promote, but will only cripple her design of a militaristic world-empire, a German interest that we intend, in self-defence, to remove from the sphere of practical politics.

Great Britain's true policy, then, is to allow Germany to retain all openings for peaceable, as opposed to forcible, expansion afforded her by her oversea dominions as they existed before this war broke out,

and we shall have a particularly free hand in the decision of this question, because the command of the sea, and the world-wide naval operations it makes possible, fall almost entirely within our province, and not within that of our European allies. We must furthermore give just as great facilities as before to German immigration through all the vast portions of our empire that are still only in process of being opened up and settled, and we must urge our allies to adopt the same principle with regard to the territories in a similar phase of development which acknowledge their sovereignty. We must also respect the concessions which German enterprise has secured for its capital, with such fine initiative and perseverance, in neutral countries of backward growth. We shall find instances, similar to the coaling stations in the Pacific, where professedly economic concerns have an essentially political intention—certain sections of the projected Bagdad railway occur at once to our minds—and here we may be compelled to require Germany to abandon her title; but we must confine such demands to a minimum. Both we and our allies must take care that neither political panic nor economic greed induces us to carry them to excess, and in every case where we decide to make them, we must give Germany the opportunity of acquiring, in compensation, more than their equivalent in economic value.

If we meet Germany in this spirit, she will at least emerge from the war no more cramped and constricted than she entered it. This will not, of course, satisfy her ambitions, for they were evil ambitions, and could not be satisfied without the world's ruin; but it will surely allay her fears. She will have seen that we had it in our power to mutilate her all round and cripple her

utterly, and that we held our hand. Once her fear is banished, we can proceed to conjure away her envy: for to leave her what she has already would prepare the ground for an invitation to join us in organising some standing international authority that should continuously adjust the claims of all growing nations, Germany among the rest, by reasonable methods of compromise, and so provide openings for the respective expansion of their wealth and population.

Such an international organ would replace the struggle for existence between nations, in which each tries to snatch his neighbour's last crust, by a co-operation in which all would work together for a common end; but many tangled problems strew the ground in front of us, before we can clear it for such a construction. The national foundations of Europe must first be relaid; and just as in the question of territories over sea the decisive word will lie with ourselves, so in the case of European frontiers it will lie with our allies, because the war on land is their province and because the national problems at issue affect them even more directly than us.

This does not absolve us from the duty of probing these problems to their bottom: rather it makes it the more imperative that we should do so, inasmuch as our influence upon their solution will depend principally on the impartiality of our point of view and the reasonableness of our suggestions, and very little on any power of making our will prevail by mere intransigeance, or by the plea of paramount interests. Great Britain ought to come to the conference with very definite opinions about the details of these problems, even at the risk of annoying her allies by the appearance of meddling with what is less her business than theirs. The Allies

have proclaimed to the world that they will wage this war to its conclusion in concert, and that declaration will not be difficult for them to observe: but they have also implied that they will negotiate in concert the terms of peace, and it is here that the separateness of their positive interests, beyond the negative bond of self-preservation, will be in danger of manifesting itself. They have morally pledged themselves to a settlement that shall subordinate their several, and even their collective, interests to the general interests of the civilised world, and it is on this ground that they have claimed the sympathy of neutrals in the struggle with their opponents. To fulfil their promise, they will need all the wisdom, patience and disinterestedness that they can command; and the supreme value of Great Britain's voice will lie in the proposal of formulas calculated to reconcile the views of the Allies with each other and also with the relatively impartial standpoint of the non-nationalistic element that happily obtains some footing in all countries and in all strata of society.

The solutions we offer, then, for the national problems of Europe must not be conceived as demands which it is in Great Britain's vital interest to propound and in her absolute power to enforce, but rather as suggestions compatible with British interests, and capable of acceptance by our allies. The satisfaction of all parties on whom their translation into fact will depend, is, however, only a negative condition: they must further be governed by the positive aim of dealing impartial justice to ourselves, our friends and our enemies alike. We must follow the principle that a "disinterested" policy ultimately serves the truest interest of its authors.

The first problem that confronts us is that of the alien


nationalities included against their will within the present frontiers of the German Empire. The settlement after this war must bring justice to these populations by affording them an opportunity for choosing freely whether they will maintain their connection with Germany or no, and if not, what destiny they prefer. When we have estimated the probable results of their choice, we may proceed to consider what the effect is likely to be on German public opinion, and look for some means of cancelling the bitterness which cannot fail to be aroused in some degree. But this is essentially a secondary consideration. We have accepted the principle that the recognition of nationality is the necessary foundation for European peace; and peace is endangered far more by the unjust violation of the national idea than by the resentment due to the just reversal of the injustice, even if the wrongdoer be the most potent factor in Europe and his victim the most insignificant. We will proceed, therefore, to consider in turn the national problems within the German Empire on their own merits.

B. *The French Frontier*

The question of Alsace-Lorraine is insoluble if it is treated as a controversy between France and Germany. "This land," the Germans will say, "has legally remained German soil ever since Karl the Great divided his empire between his three sons. It is true that the French annexed it by a series of conquests in the 17th and 18th centuries, but the German speech of the major part of its inhabitants is a living proof of its true ownership."

"Granted," the French will reply, "that we won

I. The Franco-German Frontier.



DISTRICTS CONTAINING BOTH FRENCH AND GERMAN SPEAKING POPULATION

ENTIRELY FRENCH SPEAKING DISTRICTS

PROPOSED FRONTIERS

EXISTING FRONTIERS TO BE ABOLISHE

TRUNK RAILWAYS

CANA

SECONDARY RAILWAYS

our title by conquest, yet its recognition by innumerable German governments in innumerable treaties gave it a validity at least as great as that inherent in Charlemagne's testament, before you wrenched it from us again by no other right than a conquest of precisely the same character. If your present claims rest on ancient history, why did you still leave us half Lorraine in 1871, for you had no worse a title to it than to the half you took? You left it because you knew you could not hope to hold down by force so large a territory as that. No, force is your sole title now, as you say it was ours before, and the moment has come for our revenge."

The two nations have bandied historical arguments like these for forty-three years, without approaching any nearer to a conclusion, because their pleas, though mostly correct in fact, are none of them relevant to the situation. The question, indeed, only affects France and Germany in a secondary degree: the parties primarily concerned are the inhabitants of the disputed territory themselves, and their present will is the only solution. But the autocratic regime on the Prussian model, established in the "Reichsland" since its cession to the German Empire, has assiduously suppressed any attempts on the part of that will to declare itself, and our first business, once this pressure is removed, will be to organise some machinery for ascertaining what the people's will may be.

We must, in fact, insist that a plebiscite be taken throughout the Reichsland. Many people will treat this proposal with cynicism: "A plebiscite," they will say, "invariably confirms the desire of the authority that conducts it. A vote taken under the auspices of the Allies would as certainly decide for union with France, as one taken by the German regime before the war

would have declared for adhesion to the German Empire."

This, however, assumes a sinister intention, when the presupposition of the proposal is the desire on our part to deal justice to all nationalities and a belief that it is our interest to do so; and it is clear that we are capable of honestly conducting a plebiscite, if we will. A more valid objection would be that, however honest our conduct, our opponents would never credit the fact if the result issued to our advantage and to their disadvantage, so that even the reality of free choice by the voters would not modify the resentment of their former masters. The remedy for this would be that the victorious party should evacuate the districts in dispute altogether, and hand over the organisation of the voting to some neutral power. It might even then be objected that the foregoing decision of the war would necessarily influence the decision of the vote, and this is probably true; but it will certainly not influence it automatically in favour of the conquerors. All sorts of events, isolated incidents of the war itself and the varied memories of half a century before it, will affect the voters' judgment more than the total sum of past history drawn by the war's issue: in fact, this issue will be only one of many stimuli to the complicated motives that will go to make up the final desire of the voting population.

A plebiscite, then, need neither be an unreality to the voters nor seem so to the parties interested; and just as the will of the former is more important than that of the latter, so the moral effect upon the voters themselves of its true declaration is especially valuable. The great merit of the plebiscite is that it saves populations from being consigned like cattle from pen to pen, a treatment the more intolerable in proportion to the civilisation

of the people that suffer it, and little calculated, as the case of the " Reichsland " itself has proved, to conciliate them to the nationality with which they are thus arbitrarily yoked.

The mere taking of a plebiscite will always go far towards easing the situation : the real difficulty lies in determining the practical method on which it is to be conducted. Clearly the result will differ according to the size of the minimum unit within which a separate poll is taken. If the votes of the whole population of the Reichsland were polled, for instance, they would probably produce a balance in favour of the reunion of the whole unit with France, while at the same time a smaller unit or units could have been detached from the whole, which with almost equal certainty would have declared for standing by Germany. But it is obviously unjust that units capable of being separated out geographically and possessed of a local consciousness of their own, should be denied the expression of their will by artificial inclusion in a larger but inorganic mass. The most important preliminary, therefore, to the taking of a plebiscite is the definition of such minimum areas, and it is here that the impartial application of as much objective knowledge as we can muster is most essential. Many of the following pages are occupied by tentative experiments in this direction.

The Reichsland [1] is shaped like a T-square with its angle pointing North-East, and its two arms are sharply divided by the barrier of the Vosges.[2] The Western arm stretches across the gap between the Vosges and the Ardennes, and forms the transition between the

[1] The total population was 1,815,000 in 1905, the German-speaking element constituting 85 per cent. of the whole.

[2] See Map I.

plains of Northern France on the one hand and the Prussian Rhineland on the other.

This district includes both French and German-speaking populations, and a line drawn diagonally across it from North-West to South-East, and roughly coinciding with the watershed between the Seille and the Saar, would indicate the boundary between the two elements. It is certain that the French-speaking section of the district[1] would vote unanimously for reunion with France, while the German-speaking section, on the other hand, seems either never to have felt, or easily to have lost, political sympathy with France, and to have become conscious now of solidarity with its Northern neighbours of the same speech, further down the Saar and the Moselle. The areas respectively inhabited by the populations in question form compact blocks adjoining the countries with which each is likely to seek union, and the boundary between them follows a line quite suitable for a military and political frontier. Clearly, therefore, these areas present two natural units within which the vote should be taken separately, and the result of the polling should decide definitively the fate of each.

The town and district of Thionville (Diedenhofen) ought perhaps to vote by itself, because here the population is mixed and the decision correspondingly doubtful, while its geographical situation would equally permit its inclusion in either country. It is probable that it will vote for the connection with France, and this will certainly be the case with Metz, the great fortress of purely French population, at the junction of the Seille and the Moselle; with all the villages and townships of the Seille basin itself; and with the

[1] About 15% of the total population of the whole Reichsland.

upper valley of the Saar, as far North as, and including, Saarbourg. The rest of the district is almost equally certain to remain with Germany.

In the Western arm of the Reichsland, then, the solution is fairly simple, but the Southern wing presents more difficult problems. This district, once the province of Alsace, consists firstly of a long strip running North and South, bounded on the West by the summit of the Vosges, and sloping down on the East to the left bank of the Rhine, and secondly of two passes, leading through the Vosges, towards their Northern end, into that Western arm of the Reichsland with which we have already dealt. The more Southerly pass is commanded by Zabern at its Eastern exit and Phalsbourg at its Western, and is traversed by a railway and a canal, connecting Strasbourg near the Rhine with Saarbourg on the upper Saar, and ultimately with Lunéville, Nancy and Toul: the Northerly pass carries a railway from Hagenau in the Rhine basin through Bitsch to Saargemünd.

The speech of this entire district, except for a few communes high up in the Vosges, is German; but the sympathies of the population have remained persistently alienated from the German Empire. This does not necessarily mean that the Alsatians desire reincorporation in the French nation; there remains the alternative of cutting their connection with France and Germany alike, and during the last forty-three years there has been a considerable party in the country which favoured such a programme, pointing out that Alsace has suffered from the quarrel between the big political units on either side of her out of all proportion to her own local stake in the issue.

It is by no means certain, however, that they are

uncompromisingly determined to break loose from their present union with Germany. The notorious incident that occurred at Zabern less than a year ago, advertised the fact that Prussian military government was intolerable, and that, so long as Alsace was subject to it, the grant of constitutional self-government would remain an empty formality ; but it might well become a reality as a result of this war, and if Alsace had the opportunity of entering the German Empire as an independent member on an equal footing with the other states, still more if she could enter it as part of a united South German state, strong enough to hold its own within the Empire against the North, there is strong reason to expect that the bond of common speech would assert itself, and attract her strongly to her South German brethren only parted from her by the Rhine.[1]

On the other hand the crescendo and culmination of Prussian brutality may have alienated Alsace from Germany altogether, and made her feel that her salvation lies neither in a problematical reform of the German Empire's internal organisation, which she would have little influence in promoting, nor in a precarious autonomy, which she could never defend by her own resources, but solely in placing herself once more under the ægis of France, where the gratification afforded by her choice would ensure her a peculiarly benevolent reception.

The decision, then, of Alsace, or in other words her nationality, is quite unpredictable, and the question of method in organising the plebiscite accordingly assumes here a special importance. It is clear, in the first place,

[1] Economics, as well as language, draw Alsace towards Germany : all the markets for her manufactures lie down the Rhine, none of them West of the Vosges.

that the probable decision of North-Eastern Lorraine to remain within Germany would incidentally decide the fate of the northernmost strip of Alsace adjoining it on the East. If Saargemünd continued German, it would not be feasible either from the military or from the economic point of view that the railway connecting it with the Rhine valley should become French, so that if the rectified frontier of Germany crossed the Saar not far North of Saarbourg, it would have to include at least Weissenburg, Hagenau and Bischweiler on its way to the Rhine. The small minority of population inhabiting this strip would thus inevitably suffer the loss of their freedom of choice ; but the rest of Alsace, that is, the Southerly pass and the whole country South of it between the Vosges and the Rhine, would still decide its own fate.

The crucial question next arises : What units of voting should be adopted in this area ? Seeing that the decision is so delicately balanced, it might be argued that the units should be as small and numerous as possible, and that every commune should be allowed to make its own choice. Such a procedure, however, would involve us in difficulties. Suppose Phalsbourg voted, like Saargemünd, for Germany, while all the other communes voted for France, it would be impossible to give Phalsbourg its way, because its fulfilment would drive a German wedge across the extremely important railway and canal connecting French Saarbourg with French Strasbourg ; or again, suppose that, while Strasbourg voted for France, Colmar and Mülhausen voted for Germany, it would be geographically impossible to link both groups with their chosen fatherlands. In fact, Alsace itself is a minimum unit. There are no suitable lines for a frontier to follow

between the Vosges and the Rhine, or between Phalsbourg, Strasbourg and Mülhausen; so that, if we take the plebiscite by fragments of the district, we shall be compelled seriously to tamper with its result in order to reduce it to a workable shape, and so nullify the voting to the discontent of all parties. It is worse than useless to take a vote unless it is meant to be definitive, and the disappointment of a single large minority is a lesser evil than the disillusionment of many small majorities.


Alsace, then, within the limits defined, must vote as a single unit. We cannot foretell how the decision will go, and the importance of the result, both for France and Germany, is momentous. Only one thing is certain, that the accession of Alsace would profit either country little, unless it were compassed by the desire and the initiative of Alsace herself.

C. *The Danish Frontier*

The question of Schleswig-Holstein[1] has not yet been opened by this war, but we must not for that reason neglect it, for the seeds of future war are there. When the German Confederation fought Denmark on this account in 1864, the two provinces had long been united under the Danish Crown, and the prize of victory was their cession as a single unit to the conquerors; but the situation before the war, and the settlement after it, were alike unjust, because this political unity has neither a national nor a geographical foundation. It was monstrous that the whole territory should be in Denmark's hands, for 85% of the total population[2] is German; but it is equally outrageous that the Danish minority of 15% should have been violently wrenched

[1] See map on opposite page. [2] Total population 1,504,000 in 1900.

THE KIEL CANAL AND THE BALTIC SEA



away from their national state. The problem should now be solved by allowing either province to go its own way.

Holstein belongs entirely to Germany, by nationality, geography, and tradition. No Danish is spoken within its limits; it flanks the Right bank of the Elbe estuary below Hamburg; it contains the whole course of the Kiel Canal, a vital artery of Germany's commerce that gives her the necessary direct connection between the Baltic and the North Sea; and even while actually under Danish control, it always formed a juridical part, first of the "Holy Roman Empire" and then of the "German Confederation," through the darkest days of Germany's political history. To sever the connection of this province with Germany is unthinkable.

Schleswig, on the other hand, is predominantly Danish in speech, and the plebiscite will almost certainly show that the whole province (for it is one of those minimum units that are not susceptible of sub-division) is Danish in national sentiment. Geographically, moreover, its links are as strong with the Jutland peninsula as are those of Holstein with the German continent, and the present Dano-German frontier is as unnatural and meaningless a line as is the South-East boundary of Holstein against Hamburg, Lübeck and Mecklenburg. The true frontier of Germany and Denmark does not lie at either extremity of the two provinces, but between them. In sketching it, we must compromise between racial distribution and geographical necessity. The presumption in favour of an existing line would suggest that we should simply follow the historical boundary between Schleswig and Holstein, but unfortunately the Kiel Ship Canal

coincides with this along its Eastern section, and both banks of the Canal must clearly remain within German territory; so that while still taking the estuary of the Eider as the Western terminus of the frontier, we must draw its Eastward course further North, and bring it to the Baltic at the head of Eckernförde Bay, instead of the left shore of Kiel Haven.

This line, though it leaves to Germany a slice of Schleswig in addition to all Holstein, which is in itself by far the more populous and important of the two provinces, still assigns to Denmark a small German-speaking area, including the towns of Schleswig and Flensburg, which cannot be detached from the Danish-speaking unit.[1] The sympathies of this tiny minority will be revealed by the plebiscite. Probably the factor of language will be outweighed by historical tradition and by the rigour of Prussian administration, for which the German nationality of the Prussian state, in which Schleswig has been forcibly incorporated, is only a theoretical compensation; but even if these German-speaking Schleswigers would prefer to remain within a reconstituted Germany, they are one of those minorities that must inevitably be sacrificed[2] to the exigencies of geographical facts, for there is no natural, physical frontier to be found that corresponds more closely than the Eider-line to the actual frontier of speech.

In detail, then, and it is better to descend to detail, for concreteness' sake, the new frontier should probably run as follows: starting from the head of Eckernförde Bay, so as to assign the town of Schleswig to Denmark but to leave Eckernförde to Germany, it should make a

[1] With 19,000 and 49,000 inhabitants respectively.

[2] Without prejudice to a possible guarantee, on the part of Europe, of their national culture and individuality.

II. Poland.


BALTIC SEA
NORTH GERMANY
POLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
RUTHENES
KÖNIGSBERG
Danzig
Elbing
Stettin
BERLIN
Küstrin
Graudenz
Thorn
Bromberg
Soldau
Mlawa
Ostrolenka
Bialystock
Bielsk
Brest-Litowski
Posen
Gnesen
Plock
Novogeorgevsk
WARSAW
Praga
Kalisz
LODZ
Piotrkow
Radom
Ivangorod
Lublin
Krasnik
Kielce
Tchenstochovo
Zamosc
Glogau
Liegnitz
Breslau
Brieg
Oppeln
Neisse
Beuthen
Königshütte
Myslowitz
Kattowitz
Ratibor
Troppau
Cracow
Tarnov
Jaroslav
LEMBERG
Przemysl
Sanok
Sambor
Drohohysz
Brody
Tarnopol
Halisz
Colomea
VIENNA
Munkacz
Ungvar
Kovno
Vilna
Grodno
Suwalki
Canal
Lyck
WENDS
Kottbus
Bautzen
Reichenberg
Leitmeritz
Prag
Iglau
Olmütz
Brünn
Budweis
Znaim
R. Oder
R. Netze
R. Warthe
R. Warta
R. Vistula
R. Narew
R. Bug
R. San
R. Niemen
R. Dniester
R. Danube
R. Elbe
R. Moldau
Linguistic boundary between White and Little Russians
ROUMANIA
PROPOSED FRONTIERS.
EXISTING FRONTIERS TO BE ABANDONED.
WENDS & TCHECKS & SLOVAKS.
CANALS.
LITHUANIANS.
POLES.
G = GERMANS
M = MAGYARS.
MASURIANS.

straight course for Süderstapel on the North bank of the Eider, and follow the river the rest of the way to its estuary on the North Sea.

D. *The Polish Frontier*

There is yet a third alien nationality in Germany, the Poles, and, judging by numbers at least, the Polish problem is the most serious of all. There are over three million Poles within Germany's Eastern frontier. What is the national desire of this important population?

The situation in German Poland is different from that in Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine. There is no independent national state across the frontier for the subjected fraction of the race to join upon liberation: the whole nation is partitioned between three empires, Germany, Austria and Russia. The peaceful maintenance of the *status quo* in Europe meant for the Poles the perpetuation of this calamity for an indefinite period, perhaps for ever. The outbreak of war, the common disaster of their taskmasters, kindled for them a glimmer of fresh hope.

(*a*) The war brought offers of better treatment for the future from all three parties. In such an evenly matched struggle the decisive adhesion of the whole Polish nation to one side or the other became of importance, especially as their country was fated to be the actual area of hostilities.

(*b*) It brought them, however, no expectation of complete independence. Their oppressors are divided between the two camps, and the victorious party, whichever way victory declares itself, will certainly not relinquish its hold upon territory already in its possession before the war began.

(c) The Poles' possible gain from the war amounts, therefore, to the creation of a united national state, enjoying internal autonomy, but incorporated in a larger political organisation. Any of the three powers would be willing, if the opportunity arrived, to make concessions to the Poles already subject to it, in order to attract within its frontier upon the same terms the remaining sections of the nation.

The Poles, then, can make a bargain on much the same lines with either group. We have now to consider which group is in a position to negotiate most favourably with them.

Our ally Russia is the traditional enemy of the Polish nation. The two peoples have been rival leaders of the Slavonic world. Poland drew her culture from the Latin West, and her peasantry remained staunch to the Catholic Church [1] during the crisis of the Reformation : Russia took upon herself the inheritance of the Byzantine Empire. Since 1814 more than half Poland's territory and population, including the national capital, Warsaw, has been incorporated in the Russian Empire. Accordingly, the national revolts of 1831 and 1863 were directed primarily, and in effect solely, against Russian rule, and in the concerted repression which they provoked from the three powers, the Russian government has taken the lead. The most cruel symbol of Poland's humiliation is the flaunting Orthodox Cathedral planted in the chief public square of Warsaw.

The bitter hatred Russia had incurred from the Poles was an opportunity for Russia's enemies. Austria, realising that some day she would be drawn into a life-and-death struggle with Russia over the question of the Balkans, was clever enough to seize it.

[1] The history of Poland and Ireland has been parallel in many points.

The Hapsburg Empire, with its medley of races, could never convert itself into a "uninational" state, of the type to which nineteenth-century Europe was conforming: its true policy was to become a "happy family," in which various nationalities should live and let live side by side. When the disasters of 1866 forced internal reconstruction upon the government at Vienna, it miserably failed, on the whole, to realise this ideal:[1] only in the case of its Polish subjects did it carry its new policy to completion. In 1869 the province of Galicia, Austria's share in the Polish spoils, was granted a far-reaching measure of Home Rule, and Polish was declared the normal language of its administration and higher education.

These concessions[2] have made the Poles the most loyal citizens of the Empire. The Polish "club" or parliamentary block has practically become the "government party" in the Austrian Reichsrath, on which the ministry can always rely for the voting of supplies and the passing of army bills. The Austrian Poles have not, of course, abandoned the dream of national reunion, but they have learnt to seek it under the Hapsburg banner, and their propaganda in the Russian provinces serves Austrian foreign policy at least as much as the cause of Polish nationalism. When the Russians occupied Galicia towards the beginning of the war, the Polish population rose *en masse* against the invaders. Their own experience will never commend to them the change from Austrian to Russian allegiance. The only

[1] See Ch. III.

[2] It must be mentioned that this recognition of the Polish language in Galicia hit not only German, which was formerly the universal language of official business in the province, though it was only spoken by an insignificant proportion of the population, but also the Ruthene dialect of Russian, the native speech of nearly half the inhabitants. See Ch. VIII. C.

factor that may modify their feeling is the Polish policy of Austria's German ally.

Prussia, too, found her interest in fomenting the enmity between Russian and Pole, but since, till the last generation of the nineteenth-century, she was still Austria's rival and had not yet become her ally, she worked for the same object by supporting the opposite party. She consistently played second fiddle to Russia in the Polish concert, and at the same time contrived to call the tune. Prussian diplomacy at Petersburg thwarted all attempts at a Russo-Polish reconciliation, and then the Prussian military authorities lent a helping hand to the Russian government across the frontier to suppress those insurrections which the breakdown of conciliation had stimulated. By their machiavellian handling of the Polish situation, the Prussians secured that their Russian neighbour should have neither the will nor the power to menace themselves.

In 1879, however, the German Empire transferred its alliance from Russia to Austria, and the counter-alliance between Russia and France, finally consummated in the 'nineties, made the breach irreparable. Yet while she thus reversed her foreign policy, Germany entirely omitted to correct her behaviour towards the Poles at home, so as to bring it into line with that of her new Austrian ally. Instead, she succumbed to the obsession of nationalism, and began to chastise her Poles with scorpions instead of whips.

In 1888 the Prussian parliament established an "Ansiedelungs-kommission" (Colonisation Board) for buying up the land of Polish proprietors in the provinces of Posen and West Prussia and planting German settlers upon it. In 1908 the Board was even granted powers of compulsory expropriation. Since 1872 pressure of

the most extreme kind[1] has been exerted to make German instead of Polish the medium of instruction, not only in higher education, but in the local elementary schools. In fact, the whole Prussian administrative machine has been brought to bear against Polish nationality within the German Empire, and in this case its efficiency has been Germany's misfortune. Russia's intentions towards the Poles may have been equally sinister, but she lacked the means to carry them into effect, and national sentiments are determined less by motives than by results. Germany has robbed Russia of the premier place in Poland's hatred. Her Polish policy since 1871 has been as unintelligent as it was astute during the fifty years preceding. She has called down upon her head the enmity of both Poles and Russians at once.

At the outbreak of war, then, the Polish national consciousness hated the three powers in the following order of intensity: Austria, Russia, Germany. It remains to be seen whether the strong preference for Austria over Russia will be outweighed by the extreme detestation of Austria's German partner.

Several factors make it probable that this will happen. In the first place there are the events of the war. The war has already made it patent to the world that Germany is the dominant partner in the alliance, and Austria merely her tool. If, therefore, the Central-European powers win the war, it will be Germany's and not Austria's policy that will be imposed upon Europe in general and Poland in particular. Meanwhile, the Germans have shown beyond all doubt what that policy will be. They began, of course, like the other two powers, by proclaiming the unity and autonomy of the

[1] Not stopping short of corporal punishment.

Polish nation; but when they crossed the frontier to make their word good, they dealt with the Polish subjects of Russia, the nation's central core, not as friends to be liberated but as a hostile population to be terrorised. The treatment of the frontier town of Kalisch was on a par with the worst incidents in Belgium. Warsaw has been shuddering ever since at the possibility of the same fate overtaking her, and there has been something like a national rising of the country people against the German troops in occupation. Poles and Russians seem in process of being fused together in feeling by the fire of a common hate. They are stimulated now by the instinct to defend their united country against the invader, but when the Russian armies cross the frontier in turn, both the Polish and the Russian soldiers that march in their ranks will respond alike to the "Panslav" impulse of rescuing the Polish minority in Prussia from the jaws of Pangermanism.

If, then, we and our allies are victorious, the erection of an autonomous Poland within the Russian Empire is almost assured, and it will include not only the former subjects of Russia but the Polish victims of Prussia as well. This will come about not so much in virtue of the Grand Duke's proclamation, which under other circumstances might well have left the Poles cold, but because Germany's behaviour has put the Poles in a mood to respond warmly to her opponent's overtures, and to compromise with Russia in a spirit of "give and take." The chief obstacle to an *entente* between Poles and Russians was the memory of wrongs inflicted by Russia in the past. These memories will be eclipsed effectively by the direct action of Germany in the present.

There is also the permanent factor of Geography.

The Russian provinces by their central position and their great superiority in extent to the Prussian and Austrian fragments, are the necessary nucleus of a united national state. The same cause that made the Poles single out Russia for attack when they hoped to restore their nation to complete independence, will make them rally round Russia now that they have accepted the principle of autonomy within a larger Empire. The victory of our enemies would certainly ensure to the Austrian section of the nation the liberties it already enjoys; but in promoting such an issue, the Galician Poles would be sacrificing the one chance of national unity to the preservation of their local Home Rule.

In making her bargain with the Poles, Russia has the supreme advantage of being one and indivisible, while on the other side there are the ambitions of two parties to be satisfied. Whatever their professions, or even their wishes, Germany and Austria could never arrange between them the erection of a united Poland.

The reunion of the whole nation within the frontier of either one or the other is clearly out of the question, for neither would surrender its own Polish provinces to its neighbour. A second possibility would be the creation of an autonomous Poland under their joint protectorate, to which they should cede their respective Polish territories. But though the Galician Poles are perhaps a strong enough power in Austria to compel assent to their secession into the new national state, it is hardly conceivable that Prussia would of her own free will relax her grip upon her Polish districts. The German and Polish populations on her Eastern frontier are desperately intermingled, and she still hopes to simplify the tangle by the forcible Germanisation of the aliens. Moreover, much of the country in question is important to her

strategically. A Poland manufactured under Austro-German auspices would therefore be robbed from the outset of at least three million of its citizens, no less than 17 per cent. of the whole nation; and it is further probable that the government at Vienna, in order to maintain the balance of power between itself and its ally, would insist upon following Prussia's example, and successfully oppose the transference of the Galician Poles from their Austrian allegiance to the autonomous principality.

In the event of Austro-German victory, therefore, the promises of national restoration would result in nothing but the grant of autonomy to the present Russian provinces, which include no more than three-fifths of the total Polish population. The new Poland would start life a cripple, and even this maimed existence would probably be short, for the situation thus created could hardly be permanent. The emergence of a self-governing Polish state in their immediate neighbourhood would rouse the nationalism of the Prussian and Austrian Poles to fever heat. They would be obsessed by resentment at their arbitrary exclusion from it, and the autonomous principality, in turn, could not remain indifferent to their struggles. Gratitude towards Austria and Germany, its liberators from Russian rule and its official guarantors against the reimposition of it, would be eclipsed by indignation at these patrons' flagrantly inconsistent treatment of its brethren within their own borders. The national government at Warsaw would begin to bargain, behind its "protectors'" backs, with defeated and chastened Russia for a genuine reunion of the whole nation under Russia's banner. Berlin and Vienna would get wind of the danger in time, and they would forestall it by partitioning the principality itself

and adding its dismembered fragments to their subject provinces.[1]

Thus the failure to achieve national unity now would after all compromise the local liberty of the Galician Poles in the future. Austria's Polish policy would be degraded to the Prussian standard, not merely in her dealings with the Poles formerly subject to Russia, but in her relations with her own Polish citizens. The ideal of Polish nationality would be shattered more cruelly than it has ever been since the black decade that followed the Partition of 1795, and this time it could hardly hope to recover.

On the other hand, the victory of Russia achieved with the Poles' co-operation, would restore liberty and unity at once to all the Russian and Prussian districts,[2] and when such a large majority of the nation had been consolidated into a self-governing state, the reluctance of the Galician minority to commit itself could be removed by a guarantee that it should forfeit none of its constitutional liberties. It would then succumb to the attraction of the greater mass, and fall away from Vienna, with which it has no latent cohesion, to the national centre of gravity at Warsaw.

The positive terms on which the new Poland will be incorporated in the Russian Empire, must be the subject of a later chapter.[3] For the moment we may be content with reaching the negative conclusion that, if Germany is beaten in the war, her Polish subjects will

[1] The division of spoils would probably follow the precedent of 1795, when Poland was erased, for ten years, from the map of Europe. The Austro-Prussian frontier then delimited ran diagonally across Poland from South-West to North-East, following the course of the River Pilitza, and reducing Warsaw, the national capital, to the position of a Prussian frontier town.

[2] A territory roughly coincident with Napoleon's " Grand Duchy of Warsaw," as it existed from 1809 to 1813.

[3] See Ch. VIII. A.

vote to a man for liberation from her dominion, and will carry the Austrian Poles with them. It is one of the ironies of history that Galicia, the best governed province of Austria, should also be the province whose loss, in the event of defeat, we can most confidently predict. Austria will lose the reward for her righteousness in Galicia, in retribution for her ally's sins in Posen and West Prussia.

The exasperation of national feeling on this Eastern frontier makes it considerably easier to ascertain the will of the populations concerned than on the frontiers towards Denmark and France. We can assume, before any plebiscite is taken, that every Pole desires secession from Germany, and we must also keep it clearly before our minds that every German in the disputed zone will be still more eager to remain a citizen of the German fatherland.

In seeking to compromise between the wishes of the German and Polish inhabitants of these districts, we must not let ourselves be prejudiced by the atrocious policy of the Prussian government. A government's actions are no certain test of a nation's fundamental character: political systems come and go, and their ideals pass with them, while the nation's growth maintains its even course. Let us forget, for the moment, how the Prussian administration has treated the Poles, and refrain from conjecturing how a nationalist Polish regime might treat any German subjects it acquired, but compare with open minds the relative culture of the individual German and Pole. We shall probably receive the impression that the German would suffer greater disadvantage by being annexed to a community of Poles, whose standards would be lower than his own, than the Pole would suffer by enrolment as a German citizen,

which would be a kind of compulsory initiation into a superior civilisation.

Of course compulsory conformity to an alien system of life, even if the compulsion does not extend beyond the sphere of politics, is almost equally distasteful, whether the people whose citizenship you have been forced to adopt are relatively more advanced than yourself or more backward; but in the present instance we are in face of the situation that so commonly arises in questions of nationality: a minority must inevitably suffer.

The German and Polish populations along this frontier are intricately interlaced. This is not due to the modern activities of the "Colonisation Board": their result has been the stimulation of national feeling, not the modification of national distribution.[1] The racial confusion is the gradual effect of four centuries, the twelfth to the sixteenth, during which the superiority of German culture over Polish was so marked that German speech and nationality were continuously pushing out their advance-guards Eastward at the Poles' expense, less by violent conquest than by "peaceful penetration" at the summons of native Polish rulers. This movement died down as soon as the Poles began to overtake in civilisation their German teachers,[2] and

[1] During the generation since the Board's institution, the percentages of the population in Prussian provinces containing both nationalities have persistently shifted in favour of the Poles. The Poles' birthrate is much higher than the Germans', and this gives them a greater share in the total annual increase. A higher birthrate is, of course, symptomatic of a lower standard of life: in a sense the Germans are suffering for their superior civilisation, and this explains why they tolerate the barbarous methods by which the Prussian government attempts to right the balance.

[2] In the sixteenth century the Polish nobility was converted to Calvinism, and took a leading part in the cultural development of Europe. In the next century the Polish renaissance was submerged by the Counter-Reformation.

the "Colonisation" policy is an unjustifiable and impracticable attempt to set it going again by force; but by whatever process the various German enclaves have come to be established on what was originally Polish soil, their sole but sufficient title is their actual presence there now. In dealing with these awkward German minorities we must eschew all historical arguments, and simply start from the fact of their present existence.

Besides the intermixture of the two nationalities, there is a further factor which limits the possibility of rectifying the Eastern frontier of Germany in accordance with the wishes of the local population in the various districts affected.

Our object in changing the political map is to sift out as large a proportion of the Polish element as we can from the German, and free them from their present compulsory association. If the liberated territories were destined to be incorporated in an entirely independent Polish state, we could pursue this object without any secondary considerations, but we have seen that the Prussian Poles will break their association with Germany only to effect a new association with Russia. We have still to examine what form this partnership is likely to take, but we can prophesy this much with certainty, that the New Poland and Russia will have a common tariff-system and a common military organisation: in the economic and the strategical sphere, the Western frontier of autonomous Poland will be identical with the Western frontier of the whole Russian Empire.

No settlement would be permanent which left Germany's Eastern flank strategically and economically at Russia's mercy. Frontier-lines must be drawn so as to enable the countries divided by them severally to lead an independent and self-sufficient life of their own.

This is the first condition they must satisfy if they are to have any significance at all, and an essential part of "Independence" is the capacity for resisting by force of arms an armed attack on the part of the neighbouring state.

This fact is unquestionably true at the present time in Europe, and our reconstruction after the war is over will be Utopian if we ignore it. We are all hoping that revulsion from war will lead to disarmament, and that the military factor will cease to play in the international politics of the future the terribly dominant part which it has played in the past; we are all agreed that the positive impulse to disarm can come from no calculation of material advantage, but only from a change of heart; but we must recognise that this psychological conversion will not be produced automatically by shutting our eyes to the difficulties in its way. We must at least facilitate it by securing that it involves no material sacrifices of prohibitive magnitude.

We saw that we could banish the struggle for existence between nationalities only by solving national problems and not by neglecting them. This principle applies to the crudest form of the struggle, its conduct by the brute violence of war. Nations will have no ear for the gospel of Peace, so long as they feel themselves exposed to each other's arms. The present war was precipitated when several nations reached breaking-point in a long-drawn agony of mutual fear. We shall not cure them of militarism by placing them at each other's mercy more completely than ever. War will only become impossible when either party's frontier has been made so invulnerable that the other abandons all idea of violating it. If the frontiers of Belgium against Germany and France had been as invincibly fortified as the Franco-German

frontier itself is fortified on either side, there would have been no campaign in the West.

In delimiting, therefore, our new frontier between Germany and the Russian Empire, we must expose neither country to the other's strategic initiative (otherwise we shall only accentuate their fears, and open a new era of war between them, instead of closing the era that is past), and here we are confronted with a dilemma, for the existing frontier, though it grievously violates the national principle, was negotiated with the precise intention of producing a true strategic equilibrium.

This frontier dates from the Congress of Vienna, which resettled Europe in 1814 after the overthrow of Napoleon. One of the main lines of settlement, upon which all were agreed, was that Prussia should take her share of the spoils in Western Germany, while Russia should be paid off with those Polish provinces which had been seized by Prussia and Austria in the last partitions,[1] and subsequently erected by Napoleon into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Prussia stipulated, however, that this principle should not apply to the districts of Kulmerland [2] and Posen, and insisted upon their inclusion within her own frontier. She gained her point, because it was universally recognised that her demands in this quarter were based on considerations of strategical necessity, and were not prompted by territorial ambition.

The present frontier, then, was admitted in 1814 to be the minimum line which Prussia could defend successfully against Russian attack. We now propose to push this line still further back towards Breslau and Berlin in deference to the principle of Nationality, but we must

[1] 1793 and 1795.
[2] Situated on the Right bank of the Vistula, and containing the fortresses Graudenz and Thorn.

not allow our insistence upon true national frontiers to blind us to the strategic factor. Our final result must be a compromise between the two principles, and before we put the question of national allegiance to the vote among the inhabitants of the debatable zone, we shall have, like the diplomatists of 1814, to lay down a limit behind which the German frontier must not be driven, even though it may deprive considerable enclaves of Polish population lying within it of the right to choose for themselves their own political destiny.

This limit imposed upon the new frontier will seriously restrict the range of the Polish plebiscite. Theoretically the vote might still be taken in the strip of territory between the German minimum and the present frontier-line; but in practice there would be a one-sidedness about such an arrangement against which the victorious Poles and Russians would energetically protest. A minimum has always a strong tendency to become a maximum as well, and our allies will probably accept the principle of the minimum line only on condition that Germans on the wrong side of it shall suffer the same loss of free choice that the Poles must suffer who are left on the opposite side.

In this case the situation would be exactly opposite to that on the Franco-German border. There the tracing of boundaries by the parties to the conference will be simply a preliminary step towards constituting the local population into groups, and the free vote of these groups will then decide the fate of their respective districts. In Poland, on the contrary, the plebiscite would be eliminated altogether, and the new frontier definitively constituted by negotiations between plenipotentiaries of Germany on the one side and Poland and Russia on the other.

The actual course the new line will follow must depend largely upon the bargaining-power possessed at the close of the war by the two parties, and is to that extent unpredictable, but the transaction will not be conducted by Germany and Russia alone. All members of the Congress will take a hand in it, and Great Britain's influence as a mediator will be especially valuable in this question, because she has absolutely no direct interest in the issue. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to work out for ourselves a compromise which we can recommend, independently of bargaining power, as the best possible under the permanent geographical and racial circumstances, and we had better frame suggestions for a new frontier in some detail.

Our discussion will be clearer if we treat the extensive line from the Carpathians to the Baltic in several sections.[1] We will begin with Silesia.

(*a*) The province of Silesia occupies the whole upper basin of the River Oder. It forms a portion of the great North-European plain, and its only physical frontiers are the Riesen Gebirge Range on the South-West, which lies between it and Bohemia, and the Carpathian Mountains on the South, which divide it from Hungary. The country possesses two chief lines of communication with the rest of the world: North-Westward, the Oder descends to the port of Stettin at the head of a land-locked arm of the Baltic, the "Haff": S.S.W., the great Moravian Gap between the Riesen Gebirge and the Carpathians opens a route to the Danube basin which is traversed by several lines of railway leading to Vienna.

These geographical factors have determined Silesian history. Silesia was occupied about 600 A.D. by the

[1] See Map II. for all sections.

Polish wing of the Slavonic migration from the East, which found no obstacle to its progress across the plain till it struck against the mountains on the further side, but five centuries later [1] the province detached itself from the main body of Poland, and turned its face in the opposite direction.

The native princes were converted to German culture, and invited German settlers from the Saxon marches to ascend the valley of the Oder, just as the Gaelic kings of Scotland introduced Teutonic " Lowlanders " from across the Firth of Forth into the long coastal strip from Fife to Aberdeen. By the end of the thirteenth century Silesia, like Bohemia, had been drawn entirely within the orbit of Germany, and after the Thirty Years' War the two countries remained together under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, who could easily control Silesia from Vienna through the Moravian Gap. The Hapsburg's title to the province was challenged by the government at Berlin, which ruled the lower course of the Oder and so commanded Silesia's North-Western door. Exactly a century after the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Aachen [2] settled the destiny of the province in Prussia's favour by a partition, which left nothing to Austria but the Southernmost strip. The frontier then delimited between Prussia and Austria has never since been altered.

The Industrial Revolution has made Silesia one of the most important districts in Europe. The Erz Gebirge is rich in mineral ores, and there are immense coal-seams in the plain. These assets have enabled her to develop great manufacturing activities, and the new economics have further emphasised her essential geographical unity. The industrial area extends imparti-

[1] 1163 A.D.
[2] 1748, at the conclusion of the " Austrian Succession " War.

ally on either side of the Austro-Prussian frontier, while the focus of the coal-district[1] lies just within the Prussian frontier against Russia, near the point where the German, Austrian and Russian Empires meet, and is continuous with the mining districts of Russian Poland, from which it is only separated by an artificial boundary.

The existing frontiers, then, do not express economic articulation, but they correspond still less to the boundaries of Nationality. The German colonisation up the Oder never reached the head-waters of the river. Up to a point between Brieg and Oppeln, slightly above the confluence of the Neisse tributary, the Oder is flanked by a German population on either side; but above that point, though along the mountains the German element stretches still further South, and even spreads into the Moravian Gap as far as the water-parting between the Oder and Vistula systems, the native Pole has maintained himself astride the actual course of the Oder, and is in occupation of the river's Left bank as well as its Right. Above Ratibor, again, along the highest reaches of the Oder, the Pole is replaced by the Tchech. We have to devise a new frontier which shall do more justice than the present to national distribution, without running violently counter to economic facts.

The Western frontier of the Russian Empire and the New Poland, or in other terms the Eastern frontier of Austria and Germany, might start from the Hungarian boundary on the summit of the Carpathians, at a point just East of the pass through which the railway connects Sillein (Zsolna) in Hungary with Teschen in Austrian Silesia and thereafter with Ratibor in Prussian Silesia on

[1] The towns of Gleiwitz, Beuthen, Königshütte, Kattowitz, Myslowitz form one practically continuous urban zone skirting the frontier.

the Left bank of the Oder. From this starting-point it might run parallel to the railway, along the divide between the Oder and Vistula systems, and continue in a N.N.W. direction till it struck the Oder's Right bank a few miles below Ratibor. It might thence follow the Oder downwards to a point opposite the junction of the Hötzenplötz tributary from the Left bank, and then take a straight line, slightly East of North, to the Southernmost point in the province of Posen.

This frontier would exclude from the new Poland the Polish population on the Left bank of the Oder, but even along this section of the Oder's course it is only the rural population that is Polish: the towns on the river-bank —Oppeln, Kosel, and Ratibor—are predominantly German. If, moreover, we allowed Russia to cross the Oder, and extend the frontier of her Empire right up to the Erz Gebirge, we should be transferring to her the strategical command of the Moravian Gap, placing Vienna at her mercy, and cutting the direct communication, East of the mountains, between the Prussian and Austrian sections of Silesia.

We are proposing, on the other hand, to include in Poland the extremely important mining-district of the "Five Towns." Germany will doubtless protest against this, on account of the considerable German population that has been attracted to this area by the openings it offers for all kinds of employment; but we can fairly write off this German minority abandoned to Poland against the Poles across the Oder whom we have assigned to Germany. Moreover, the German element here is not merely a minority, but actually a small and a decreasing one. The mass of the miners and workers is recruited from the Polish countryside, and the growth of the Polish majority has already made itself felt in

politics. In spite of official pressure exercised upon elections, the "Five Towns" now return Polish Nationalist representatives to the Prussian Landtag and the Imperial Reichstag.

The economic issue raised by the transference of this district to Poland is not so simple as the national. By driving a political frontier between these coal-mines in the corner of Silesia and the industrial towns further North-West, which at present consume their output, shall we be ruining the prosperity of both? We may answer that a political frontier need not imply an insurmountable tariff-wall, yet if such a fiscal barrier were to be erected in this instance, all parts of Silesia would certainly suffer economically for the adjustment of the country's national problem. Even in the latter case, however, the dislocation would only be temporary. There are coal-seams in the German portion of Silesia, round Breslau, which could be developed to supply in sufficiency that region's industrial demand. This would of course deprive the "Five Towns" of their current market, but they would rapidly find a new market towards the East. A considerable manufacturing industry has already grown up in Russian Poland, notably in the neighbourhood of Lodz. It is capable of almost limitless expansion, because the huge agricultural and pastoral hinterland of Russia is its potential customer. If the produce of the frontier coal-fields were diverted from German Silesia hither, the expansion of Polish manufacture would receive an immense impetus, and would more than keep pace in its demand for coal with the output the "Five Towns" offered it.

The frontier-line, then, which we have suggested in the Silesian section, seems to stand the economic as well as the nationalistic test. We may now turn our attention to the section that follows.

(*b*) The province of Posen is shaped like a flint arrowhead, with its wings resting on the present Russian frontier, and its point directed inwards straight towards Berlin. Strategically, as we have seen, its control is vitally important to Germany for her security. A foreign power established in military possession of Posen City could, from this fortified base, strike South-Westward towards Glogau on the Oder, and cut the connections between Silesia and Berlin; or it could strike North-Eastward towards Danzig on the Baltic, and isolate from the rest of Germany the provinces East of the Vistula. If the Russian General Staff were given a free hand in Posen, Germany would virtually cease to be an independent power.

In Nationality, on the other hand, Posen is predominantly Polish.[1] It is a wedge of alien population driven deep into the German mass, and the considerable German minority is mostly concentrated on the Northern boundary, along the River Netze. Isolated German enclaves, however, are scattered over the whole area of the province.

These advance-guards are not the fruit of the "Colonisation Board's" plantations, which have hardly succeeded in affecting the racial map: like their compatriots in Silesia, they are descended from German burghers summoned by the native government in the Middle Ages to civilise the country. Their history, therefore, is above reproach, and even had the title of the original settlers been doubtful, that would not have warranted us in treating the present generation with less than justice.

Nevertheless, in so far as the destiny of Posen is to

[1] The population of the province totalled 1,987,000 in 1905: the Polish element numbered over a million.

be determined by the national factor, this dispersed minority of Germans is not sufficiently strong to retain for Germany any part of the province but its Northern fringe, and we find ourselves placed in a dilemma. If we give precedence to Nationality, almost the whole of Posen should be ceded to the New Poland: if to Strategy, then no portion of the country should be detached from its present connections.

There seems to be only one possible solution of the difficulty. The overwhelmingly Polish districts must be incorporated in the Autonomous Principality, and this means that they will come within the bond of the Russian Empire; but Russia in return must allow the fortifications of Posen City to be dismantled, and must undertake not to push forward her military line into the new territory, but to keep it within the limits of the present frontier.

Military conventions of this kind, which have no sanction behind them but the good faith of the contracting parties, are best secured by being made reciprocal, and the question of Posen might give occasion for a compact between the Russian Empire and Germany of a much wider range. Russia on her side might promise to construct no military works in any of the territories she may acquire from Germany along the whole line from the upper Oder to the Baltic: Germany might demolish, in compensation, all fortifications in her provinces East of the Vistula, and withdraw her strategical front to the line of the Vistulan fortresses.

Such an arrangement would greatly diminish the extent to which each country was exposed to an aggressive movement on the part of the other. Of course it would be in the power of either to break its word at any moment, and fortify the neutralised territory within its

own frontier, and this would give it a momentary strategical advantage over its more honourable neighbour; but fortifications cannot be built in a day, and the other would immediately retaliate by doing the same in its own neutralised area. If, as we have suggested, fear is a more potent stimulus of armaments than ambition, a General Staff would be very reluctant to increase their power of offensive against the rival nation, if they knew that the inevitable price would be similar action on the other's part, which would correspondingly diminish their own power of defence. A compact, therefore, which strengthens the defensive capacity of both parties, has the greatest possible chance of stability.

If such a compromise could be effected, the new frontier might run from the Southernmost corner of Posen along the whole Western boundary of the province, to the point where that boundary hits the River Warta. After crossing the river, the frontier should change direction abruptly to slightly North of East, and take a course midway between the Warta and the Netze, continuing in the same line till it struck the Vistula between Bromberg and Thorn. This would leave within German territory the whole course of the River Netze, and also the canal which links the Netze and Vistula systems through Bromberg, and is one of the principal inland waterways of Prussia.

(*c*) The lower course of the Vistula, from a point just above Thorn to its mouth, runs through the German province of West Prussia, which flanks the river on both sides. West Prussia, in spite of its name, is a comparatively recent acquisition of the Prussian kingdom. It was only incorporated at the first Partition of Poland in 1772. Before that date it had been Polish territory,

ever since Yagiellon [1] broke the power of the Teutonic Knights at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410 A.D.

In the manifesto addressed to the Poles shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Grand Duke made a pointed allusion to this historic victory,[2] and hinted that if the Russians and Poles in concert carry the present struggle to a triumphant conclusion, West Prussia will be one of the national heirlooms which he will restore to the new Polish state.

The Polish claim to the province has strong arguments in its favour. The Polish element is hardly less important here than in Posen.[3] The Germans are in a majority, but they are concentrated in the great port of Danzig, and only thinly scattered through the rural districts. On strict grounds of nationality, a strip of West Prussia on the Left bank of the Vistula, stretching all the way to the Baltic so as to include a small extent of coast immediately West of Danzig, ought to be detached from Germany, and added, just like the major part of Posen, to autonomous Poland.

Probably this would not content the Poles. For economic reasons they covet the fundamentally German city of Danzig, and would therefore insist on a " clean cut " of the whole province, Polish and German portions alike, although any such demand is of course refuted by the National Principle itself. Yet the " mangled slice," as well as the " clean cut," receives a categorical veto from Geography.

[1] The first king who ruled at once over the Polish and the Lithuanian nations.

[2] The reverse sustained a few weeks afterwards on this very spot by the Russian armies in their first invasion of Trans-Vistulan Germany, has made the name less auspicious.

[3] At the German census of 1905 the population of West Prussia totalled 1,642,000, of whom 567,000 (34%) were officially admitted to be Poles.

The seizure of West Prussia is the most pardonable theft Berlin ever committed. It brought the solid block of German population which had established itself further afield in East Prussia round the intensely German centre of Königsberg, into direct territorial contact with the main body of Germany. Even Napoleon, when he beat Prussia to earth, did not venture to reverse this inevitable outcome of the geographical situation. He cut off Danzig and made her a free city, but he left the land-bridge between Berlin and Königsberg intact. Now that the lapse of a century has cemented more firmly than ever the union between West Prussia and the German lands on either side of it, we should be ill-advised if we departed from Napoleon's precedent. The German majority in the country would never reconcile itself to Polish rule. They would hate the Russian Empire as bitterly as the "Reichsland" torn from France in 1871 has hated its German masters, and the German nation, on its part, would never rest till it had liberated its enslaved brothers and thereby restored its own geographical integrity. If every other question in Europe had been justly solved, West Prussia would suffice in itself to plunge all Europe into another war.

In view, however, of the Prussian Government's Polish policy in the past, the large Polish minority in West Prussia cannot be abandoned once more to the mercy of German chauvinism. Germany's retention of the province must be conditional upon a solemn pledge on her part, to respect the Polish language wherever spoken within her reduced frontier, and in general to allow such Polish citizens as still remain to her complete freedom in the development of their national individuality. This guarantee must be endorsed by all

the parties to the European conference. The national ideals of the West Prussian Poles are to be subordinated to a paramount interest of the German nation. It is Germany's part to see that the sacrifice entailed shall be as light as possible, and she must not be allowed to repudiate her obligation.

Moreover, the exclusion of this half million of Poles from their national state affects not only the disappointed fragment itself, but also the liberated Polish nation. The new Autonomous State has a claim to compensation for submitting to this national loss, and the account can best be settled by an economic concession.

The Vistula is Poland's river. It rises on the Polish flank of the Carpathians, both the national capitals, Cracow and Warsaw, lie on its banks, and it is the main artery of the country's communications. If the lower reaches of the river, and the numerous Polish population that dwells along them also, must definitively remain outside the new political frontier, there is no reason why Polish traffic on the river should be barred by a tariff-fence at this line. A further condition for the retention of West Prussia must be imposed on Germany. She must grant the new Poland free trade down the Vistula to the Baltic, and throw open to her Danzig, at the river's mouth, as a free port.

This provision is essential to Poland's future prosperity. Its extortion through military defeat may wound the pride of the German nation, but its most ardent advocates will be the great German business firms at Danzig itself, who will be fully sensible of the possibilities opened to them by this immense extension of their city's commercial hinterland.

(*d*) We have still to discuss the frontier East of the Vistula. The homogeneous German population of

East Prussia, compactly marshalled along the Baltic coast between the Vistula and the Niemen, does not properly come into question. In all Germany there is no more German land than this. We shall doubtless be reminded, however, that this inheritance was won for Germanism not by the peaceful penetration of burghers, like Silesia and the fringes of Posen and West Prussia, but by the sword of the Teutonic Knights. "The Germans came here," the fanatical Germanophobe will cry, "by brute force: by brute force let them be expelled again."

If historical arguments must needs be answered, we may point out that the folk they dispossessed were not Poles nor even Slavs. The original Prussians belonged to a separate branch of the Indo-European family, and were kinsmen of the Lithuanians across the Niemen; but the German crusaders who set themselves to root out heathenism from this secluded corner of Europe, did their work so thoroughly that they annihilated the heathen themselves together with their beliefs. No native Prussian now survives to claim his ancestral inheritance, and the title remains with his destroyers, who have robbed him even of his name, and raised it from an obscure tribal appellation to be the official style of the greatest political organism that Germany has yet created.

The German-speaking region in East Prussia, then, must be left on the same side of the frontier as before. Its natural boundaries are sharply defined towards every quarter, not merely by the Sea on the North and the rivers that guard its flanks, but by the chain of the Masurian Lakes, that stretches parallel to the coast, and divides the district from its hinterland.

The Slav advancing from the South-East has never

penetrated this barrier. It sheltered first the aboriginal Prussians and then their German namesakes from the Poles, and in the present war it is proving itself a formidable obstacle to the Russian armies; yet while Geography has made it the permanent strategical frontier of East Prussia, the political frontier has never coincided with it since the settlement after Tannenberg, but has kept to a quite artificial line drawn further inland towards the South.

The strip of country between this present frontier and the lakes could be detached from East Prussia without affecting the strategical situation, and it is inhabited by a Polish population, the Masurians.[1] This is perhaps the only unit in the whole of the Eastern frontier-zone of Germany to which the decision by plebiscite can be applied, and we must not neglect the opportunity, for we cannot predict *a priori* the choice the Masurians will make, as we can predict that of the other Poles. They have been united politically with their German neighbours beyond the lakes for considerably more than five hundred years, and in the sixteenth century they followed them in their secession from the Roman Church. They have shared since then in the Lutheran culture of Northern Germany. It is highly probable that tradition will prove a stronger factor than language in determining their nationality, but certainty will not be reached till that nationality declares itself in the vote.

(*e*) As far as the Left bank of the Niemen, East Prussia, with the possible exception of the Masurian unit, will thus maintain its present connections. We have still to consider the fragment of the province beyond the river's further bank. This is the only portion of East Prussia that ought undoubtedly to be ceded to the

[1] They number about 400,000.

Russian Empire. The majority of the inhabitants are Lithuanians, at present separated by an artificial line from the mass of their fellow-countrymen on the Russian side of the frontier. The only considerable German enclave is the port of Memel,[1] situated on the exit from the " Kurisches Haff " or lagoon, into which the Niemen debouches; but we can write off against Memel the Lithuanian enclaves on the South bank of the river,[2] which we propose to leave within the German frontier, and from the economic point of view Russia's claim to Memel is as strong as Poland's to West Prussia. The upper system of the Niemen provides waterways for the traffic of Russia's Lithuanian and White Russian provinces, and Memel is the natural point of connection between this internal trade and the sea.

We can now suggest how the frontier East of the Vistula should run.

Crossing the Vistula at a point between Bromberg and Thorn, it should assign Thorn to Poland. The possession of this fortress is strategically essential to the new principality, for the present campaign has already shown how a German force concentrated on the lower Vistula can from this base strike towards the interior in any direction. If Thorn remained in Germany's hands, Poland would be exposed perpetually to a German offensive, and communication between Posen and Warsaw might be cut at any moment. In Polish hands, on the contrary, Thorn would not be a menace to Germany, for the course of the Vistula below it is flanked

[1] Population, 21,000 in 1905.

[2] There are 107,000 Lithuanians in East Prussia altogether. In 1905 the total population of the province was 2,030,000. Since the Masurians and Lithuanians amount together to about half a million, the German block must total a million and a half.

by a series of German fortresses[1] all the way down. This is the one instance we have encountered in which the strategical factor outweighs the racial to Germany's detriment and not to her gain, for Thorn is inhabited by a German population.[2]

Beyond Thorn the course of the frontier will be determined by the Masurians' choice. If they elect to abide by Germany, the new frontier, after skirting Thorn to the North, will bend Eastward, and coincide with the present line a few miles East of the fortress: if they merge themselves in Poland, the frontier will head North-Eastward towards the line of the lakes. It will run just South of Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode and Allenstein, and parallel to the railway that connects them. Then, leaving Lötzen to Germany but giving Lyck to Poland, it will converge upon the present frontier where it is intersected by the 54th parallel of latitude.

From this point the new frontier will in any case follow the line of the old, till it hits the Niemen. Thence the Left bank of the river will form the remainder of its course.

E. *Prussian State and German Nation*

We have completed our survey of Germany's European frontiers, and have found that, however considerately we treat her, she cannot escape without very serious territorial curtailment. Can we reconcile her feelings to this necessary loss?

If we glance back at the cessions we have demanded from the German Empire, we shall see that nearly all of them are at Prussia's expense. In fact, our proposals might seem intended as a deliberate reversal of Prussian history. The acquisition of Silesia and the Polish

[1] Graudenz, Marienwerder, Marienburg.

[2] 43,000.

provinces first raised her to the rank of a great power. The campaign against Denmark in 1864 won her not only Schleswig but most of Northern Germany two years later. The territory taken from France in 1871 did not become Prussian soil, but as the "Reichsland" it symbolises the hegemony over all Germany, which Prussia attained through her French victory by the foundation of the German Empire.

Those to whom *væ victis* makes the paramount appeal will here find a fresh opportunity to interpose. "We are now prepared to grant you," they will say, "that in the Allies' settlement with the German nation, justice and mercy may prove the best policy. Your hopes of reconciling Germany are not so fantastic as might be supposed; but the facts to which you have just called our attention prove far more conclusively that you cannot possibly reconcile Prussia. We therefore offer you a general principle for your guidance. Spare Germany by all means, but humiliate Prussia without restraint. Destroy Prussia's hegemony in Germany by liberating all the German lands which she annexed in 1814 and 1866. Make them independent members of a truly federal Empire, and remove the diminished Prussia's last hold upon the remainder of the nation, by stipulating in the terms of peace that the Hohenzollern shall resign the dignity of German Emperor. You cannot make your peace with Prussia: then you must annihilate her with a ruthless hand."

Our first reply to this will be that the interference of foreign powers in a nation's internal affairs is the sovereign means of welding together that nation's most discordant elements.[1] If we ordered Hanover to secede

[1] The success of Bismarck's policy is a commentary on this fact. He induced foreigners to put spokes into Germany's wheel, in order to use them himself as levers for upheaving Germany's national sentiment.

from Prussia, the Hanoverians would for the first time realise their pride in Prussian citizenship, and if the Kaiser were bidden doff his Imperial Crown, Bavaria would for the first time acclaim him whole-heartedly as her war-lord. Instead of crushing Prussia by isolating her from the German nation, we should most effectively alienate the German nation by rallying it round Prussia.

So much is certain, but we can clear up the argument more satisfactorily by thinking out what meaning the name " Prussia " conveys to our minds.

Historically, the Prussian is the " Squire from beyond the Elbe,"[1] a character in which we divine the ferocity of the Borderer, the fanaticism of the Crusader, and the dogmatism of the Protestant, while behind the squire marches the peasant from his estate, who seems to have no life beyond obedience to his leader's commands, and to revert, whenever he finds himself leaderless, to the habits of his barbarous ancestors in the days before the squire appeared in the land.

Looked at from one point of view, the growth of modern Prussia is simply the story of how this sinister troop (hostility makes us distort their features beyond the truth) has imposed its domination progressively upon the whole German world, first stretching out its hands from Elbe to Rhine to swallow up the North, and then compelling the South to follow in its train. We picture the " Prussian drill-sergeant " forcing the too pliable Rhinelander into his iron mould, and we feel that we have been watching the deliberate depravation of a nation's character. " You may know Prussia," we exclaim, " by her fruits. Prussianism made the war, and the war is a disaster for Germany and for the whole of Europe."

[1] Ost-Elbischer Junker.

This account of the matter is not so much false in statement, though at best a gross exaggeration, as mistaken in perspective. The shadow from beyond the Elbe doubtless darkens the country, but the shadow will pass: the present situation is no more than a historical survival.

If we ignore origins for a moment, and look at modern Prussia as it actually is, we shall see that it is only another name for North Germany. The present frontiers of the Prussian state include samples of North German society in all its varieties: world-ports like Danzig and Kiel, scientifically developed agricultural districts like Brandenburg and Pomerania, centres of twentieth-century industrialism like Westphalia and Silesia. The remaining states of North Germany may be as important individually as the corresponding elements in the Prussian organism, but the total sum of their population and economic energy does not affect the balance in comparison with Prussia's weight, and territorially they are mere enclaves, emerging here and there on the map from the background of the Prussian mass.[1]

The most significant factor we have mentioned in modern Prussia is the new industry on the Rhine and the Oder. We have already explained that the national development of Germany during the last forty-three years is due to the amazing speed and thoroughness with which she has accomplished her industrial revolu-

	Present area in sq. miles.		*Population in 1905.*	
[1] German Empire	208,780		60,641,000	
North Germany:	166,141		49,804,000	
Prussia	134,616 80%	of N. G.	37,293,000 75%	of N.G.
Remaining N. G. States	32,525 20%	of N. G.	12,511,000 25%	of N.G.

The figures for North Germany are obtained by subtracting the totals of Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden from the totals of the Empire, but counting in the "Reichsland."

tion. These two Prussian areas have been the actual theatre of this German achievement. Looked at from the economic point of view, Prussia is not an incubus which has fastened itself upon the German nation's life, but the most vital element of that life itself, which has raised Germany to her present pitch of greatness.

The Prussian state may still be controlled by the "Agrarian Interest," but the squirarchy is not the factor in Prussia which enables her to control in turn the rest of Germany. The German Empire is held together by the hegemony not of the Eastern "mark" but of the Industrial North. Westphalia and Silesia are not merely typical elements of modern Germany: they are the country's core. Junkerdom, the traditional Prussia of the squire, may still call the tune, but no music would follow, if the resourceful, indefatigable Prussia of the industrial workers were not there to translate the demand into reality. Germany could never have borne the cost of her stupendous armaments, if the new Prussia had not all the time been disseminating her manufactures through the markets of the world and winning for her profits an ever-increasing proportion of the world's surplus wealth: she could not have outdone the armaments of Great Britain and France in quality and elaboration as well as in mere mass, had not Westphalia lent all her engineering skill to manufacture and improve Germany's armaments, as well as to pay for them. The new Prussia has virtually supplanted the old even in her own peculiar sphere: the works at Essen are the driving force behind the militarism which we are combatting in this war, and the Krupps have eclipsed as the exponents of Prussianism the von Blüchers and von Bülows.

The future character of Prussia, then, will in no case

be determined by the military caste which originally built her up. Already they seem to feel the reins slipping from their grasp, and to suspect that the creature will one day be impelled to deny his creator. The future, however, belongs to Herr Krupp as little as to his aristocratic godfathers. Behind the capitalist stand the myriads of his workers. All over Europe they are coming to realise the services of their class to the state, and its potential power in politics, and they are resolving to conquer the position in society which is their due; but in Germany the class-consciousness of the Workers is even stronger, and their resentment more bitter, than in the countries of the West, because they are here thrust more ruthlessly into the outer darkness.

It is certain that the German Workers will one day come into their own. Krupp may still claim all credit for the cannon and armour-plate, and hold his own against his employees; yet machines, however perfect, do not constitute an army: its essence is always its men. The German General Staff boasts far more loudly of its four million trained combatants than of its 42-centimetre guns, and the new industrial Prussia supplies the blood as well as the gold and the iron. The increase of 50% in the population of the Empire, between the years 1871 and 1905, has been entirely urban. The new industry of the Westphalian and Silesian towns produces the subsistence for these new mouths. The industrial centres have become the main reservoir on which the General Staff depends for its recruits.[1]

In a militaristic state, political power gravitates into

[1] Bernhardi, in *Germany and the Next War*, discusses this without appearing to realise its significance. He notes, and deplores, the fact that the townsman is not such sympathetic material for the Army as the peasant.

the hands of those who bear the military burdens. It has been hinted that the forces which now govern Germany, Capital and Privilege in coalition, actually precipitated the war in order to forestall the outbreak of the internal class-struggle and their own downfall. Whether there is any truth in this or not, the social problem in Germany will not be decided automatically in this sense or in that by victory or defeat. An army of workers, elated by a military triumph and convinced that it was due to their own organised endeavour and sacrifice, might well make short work, after the war was over, of the unscrupulous directorate which had deliberately involved them in this fiery trial. We have seen, on the other hand, that defeat followed by undiscriminating humiliation might reconcile the principal victims to the schemers who were ultimately responsible for both misfortunes. In either case the attitude of the industrial masses will be the important factor, and their state of mind, in the event of the Allies' victory, will depend much more upon how we deal with them in the settlement at the close of hostilities than upon the military results of the war itself.

Here the believer in external intervention will interrupt us again. "I discern," he will exclaim, "an infallible means of securing for ourselves the gratitude and sympathy of this industrial class, whom you have now proved to be the real Prussia of the future. I no longer propose to crush Prussia—I see that the Prussian hegemony in Germany is synonymous with the natural, unalterable economic supremacy of the North—but I do advocate intervention in the social evolution of Prussia herself. You say that the workers are bound to gain the upper hand, let them gain it by our good offices.

" The political monopoly enjoyed in Prussia by the present ruling class rests on the reactionary structure of the existing constitution. The direct manhood suffrage by which the Imperial Reichstag is elected is in striking contrast to the machinery of the Prussian ' Landtag.' The present system dates from the Reform Bill of 1910, but the reform was illusory. It was virtually a reissue of the constitution of 1851, and that in turn was introduced as a reversal of the truly liberal charter extorted from the autocracy in 1848.

" In a Prussian constituency the electors are stratified in three ' property classes,' equal to one another in their respective total taxpaying capacity, but most unequal in the number of individuals they include. Each of these numerically disparate groups chooses its own representative, but he does not sit in the Landtag : his function is to vote at his own discretion for the actual deputy, in conjunction with his colleagues. Thus the Prussian franchise is both narrow and indirect. The Prussian Landtag [1] is not a modern parliament : it is a mediæval estates-general.

" The European settlement," he will continue, " offers an excellent opportunity for sweeping away this political anachronism. Let us stipulate in the terms of peace that the Prussian constitution shall be liberalised at least to the standard already prevailing in the South, in Baden, Würtemberg and Bavaria. Thus we shall bring the true Prussian nation into belated control of its own political destinies. The standpoint of the Social Democratic Party, debarred from practical expression

[1] The House of Peers would be an almost better illustration of Prussian oligarchy. The hereditary members are reinforced by others created for life by the king, but a certain proportion of the latter are in the nomination of the landed aristocracy from the eight senior provinces, in other words the " East-of-Elbe Junkers."

heretofore, will make itself felt at last, and will inspire Prussian policy with a new spirit.

"Moreover, this 'change of heart' (your own phrase) will prepare the way for a further salutary modification of Prussia's equilibrium. Formerly I proposed to detach all the liberal parts of Prussia from her irreclaimable core: now I suggest that we smother and soften the core by reinforcing the fruitful fibres that surround it.

"You have pointed out that the non-Prussian communities in Northern Germany are isolated survivals, destined to ultimate absorption in their Prussian environment. Perhaps you have not sufficiently emphasised the effect their assimilation will have upon Prussia herself, for their importance cannot be measured by their territorial extent. There are the three Hansa towns for instance. Hamburg is the second largest city in the Empire, even Bremen is bigger than Danzig,[1] and the group as a whole conducts all the trade of the Elbe and the Weser. The barren naval bases of Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven and Helgoland are the only mark Prussia's advent has made upon the North Sea coast.

"You have related, again, how the German national consciousness was first fostered by German Intellect and Art; but if you call to mind the spiritual centres of Northern Germany, you will half fancy that they have purposely been boycotted by the Prussian frontier. Dresden, Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, Gotha—not one of them lies on Prussian soil. Berlin has striven for a century to array herself in their glories, but there is

[1] Populations in 1905:

Berlin	2,040,000
Hamburg	803,000
Bremen	215,000
Danzig	160,000
Lübeck	94,000

a tradition in their very names which she cannot plagiarise. Finally I will meet you on your own ground, and remind you that in the industrial world Silesia and Westphalia have not entirely outdistanced the older manufactures of Saxony. Chemnitz can still bear comparison with Beuthen or Elberfeld.

"The incorporation, then, in Prussia of the other North-German elements will immensely strengthen that industrial democracy whose triumph we wish to ensure, while they on their part will find no grievance in such change of status, if it coincides with a radical revision of the Prussian constitution, guaranteed by the hand and seal of Europe."

There is far more wisdom in these suggestions than in the programme they supersede. The "eradication of Prussia" hardly needed refutation, but the liberalisation of the Prussian constitution and the consolidation of all Northern Germany within the Prussian state are clearly essential steps towards a better future. In this instance the end is not at fault, but only the means. We shall have to insist once more in reply that even the mildest and most beneficial of internal transformations cannot be effected by external pressure, that a ready-made constitution has no more charm than a ready-made coat, and that even if Industrial Germany accepted the political costume we offered her, there would be no telling in what fashion our gift would be worn: she might even give it a militaristic turn, and disconcert us by aping the "drill-sergeants" from whom we had delivered her. Nevertheless, when these objections have duly been filed, we shall probably admit that we have sighted our desired goal, if only some road thitherward were apparent.

The upshot of our discussion is this. We hope for a

far-reaching change of equilibrium in Northern Germany, but we realise that if we meddle with the scales ourselves, we shall end by inclining the balance more heavily then ever in the present direction. The auspicious revolution can only be produced by a spontaneous internal movement.

Can we promote, or at any rate foresee, any issue which would rouse Northern Germany to cast out Prussianism on its own initiative?

We know the cause of Germany's devoted loyalty to the military caste in the present war. She sees in them the champions of her nationality, the leaders in her life-and-death struggle against a world in arms. One thing alone would utterly discredit the Prussian squirearchy in German eyes: if, on some grave question of state, the Junkers sacrificed the national interest to the interest of their own tradition.

We have seen that the keystone of Bismarck's policy was the creed that Prussia's and Germany's interests were identical. He equated the unification of Germany with the extension of Prussia's hegemony, but his doctrine had one stumbling-block to overcome: it involved the exclusion from the national Empire of one sixth part [1] of the nation's strength, the Germans of Austria.

The settlement between Prussia and Austria after the "Seven Weeks' War" of 1866 was a violation of German national tradition. Since the "Great Interregnum" into which the Holy Roman Empire fell after the reign of Frederick II. in the thirteenth century, German unity had been little more than a name; but the ghost of it that lingered on had attached itself during the last four

[1] Not counting the German-speaking Swiss, who, of course, cannot be reckoned German in nationality.

centuries to the House of Hapsburg, and haunted the imperial city of Vienna. In 1866 Austria was banished beyond the pale of the German world, and Prussia was left in possession. Prussia had entered the arena of History only a century and a quarter before, when Frederick the Great challenged the Hapsburg suzerainty inherited by Maria Theresa, and the state's subsequent career had been one long struggle with Austria for the hegemony of Germany. For Prussia, therefore, the events of 1866 were the consummation of her destiny: the rupture of the old German tradition set upon the new tradition of Prussia the seal of success.

Bismarck's genius reconciled Germany to the accomplished fact, and between the decade of Bismarck's three wars and the outbreak of the present struggle, the nation grew and prospered so exceedingly under Prussian shepherding, that it remained insensible to the Austrian brethren's absence from the fold; but if Germany is now defeated and shorn of her alien provinces, she will remember once more that the Austrians are of German blood.

We have seen that to the "traditional Prussian" the loss of Posen, Schleswig and Alsace would mean the end of all the glories, the levelling of the edifice built by his ancestors' valiant hands. Among the "modern Prussians," however, who constitute the industrial world of Northern Germany, the misfortune would awake no echo of sentiment, but only an anxious computation of forces. To them the forfeiture of these provinces would betoken the weakening of Germany's material power by so much territory, population and wealth, and the strengthening in the same degree of rival powers on Germany's flanks, who had already proved themselves more than Germany's match, and

who would be enabled by this heightening of the odds to hold her entirely at their mercy. They would respond to the militarists' call for still greater armaments, not from motives of revenge so much as in self-protection against a greater evil.

Such misgivings would be set at rest completely by the reunion of the Austrian Germans with the Empire. Even if every Alsatian, Schleswiger and Pole managed to extricate himself from Germany's net, the accession of the Austrian block would more than doubly compensate the loss. Germany would be placed beyond all danger from her neighbours, and the North German would have solved effectively the external problem of the nation, without seriously compromising his internal supremacy within it.

The economic primacy of Northern Germany is almost certainly sufficient to outweigh Austrian Germany in addition to the South, but to make the continuance of their hegemony sure, the Northerners would probably take of their own free will the steps we so intensely desire. The reinforcement of the Southern groups would give Prussia and the Northern "enclaves" a strong mutual interest of their own in consolidation, and this would necessitate a preliminary reform in the Prussian franchise, for Hamburg and Saxony would decline membership of the Prussian state on the present terms.[1]

[1] The consolidation of the North would probably evoke a similar movement on the part of the three Southern states. Their united population in 1905 was only 10,837,000 and their area 42,649 square miles. Singly, they would find themselves in a very weak position between the great Prussian and Austrian units. The natural line of division between the consolidated states of North and South would start from the Austrian frontier at the extreme North-West corner of Bohemia, and follow the present boundary between Bavaria on the one hand and Saxony and the Thuringian principalities on the other. Thence it would cut into what is now Prussian territory, passing slightly South of Fulda, till it hit the boundary of Hesse-Darmstadt (the

Thus the internal effect upon Northern Germany of Austria's restoration to the Empire would immediately prove fatal to the traditional Prussian ruling class. They would have the choice of letting the reins drop quietly from their hands, or of being overthrown ignominiously in the effort to deflect the nation from its natural course. The revision of the Imperial constitution would crown their discomfiture.

Under the present system the supremacy of Prussia is vested in the Imperial title and privileges of her Hohenzollern king, who is the war-lord and executive head of the whole nation; but if the Hapsburgs return, the Hohenzollern can be suzerain no more. Bismarck banished the Hapsburgs from Germany, because he knew that they could never take a subordinate place within it. Hapsburg and Hohenzollern can only come into partnership again on terms of absolute equality.

This does not mean the weakening of that unity with which Germany was endowed by Bismarck: it only means that unity will no longer be maintained by a monarchical bond. The Hohenzollern will sink to be no

Northern block of the principality). It would coincide with this boundary along its Southern segment, and break next into Prussian Nassau, following the crest of the Taunus Mountains till it reached the Rhine opposite Bingen.

This would assign to the South not only Hanau and Wiesbaden but Frankfurt, the centre of German railways and finance, which has been incorporated in Prussia since 1866. By Geography the whole basin of the Main belongs to the South as well as the upper basin of the Rhine as far as Bingen and the Taunus, for at this point the united stream formed through their junction pierces by a narrow defile a line of hills athwart its course, and enters a new stage when it emerges again into the open.

Beyond the Rhine the boundary-line would coincide with the present boundary between the Bavarian Palatinate and Rhenish Prussia, as far as the boundary of the "Reichsland" in the neighbourhood of Saargemünd, where it would take to the water-parting between the Rhine and the Moselle till it reached the frontier of France. The position of the Franco-German frontier would, of course, depend on whether Alsace united herself with France or with this new South German unit.

more than constitutional sovereign of the new North German state, consolidated under the Prussian title and governed from Berlin: the Imperial Reichstag will gain correspondingly in scope and authority by this relief from monarchical concurrence. The national unity that overrides federal particularism will thus receive in Germany the same parliamentary expression that it possesses in the U.S.A., and through this common democratic organ the various groups within the nation will be represented in the national counsels in strict proportion to their several importance. On this principle the North will preserve its leadership in Germany, Germany will be freed from fear of her neighbours, and Europe will be reassured as to Germany's policy in the future. The ejection of the Hohenzollern from the highest place in the Empire will be equivalent in European eyes to a renunciation of Prussianism.

These are great expectations, but as far as Europe and Germany are concerned, there is no apparent obstacle to their realisation. Germany, however, is no more in command of the situation than ourselves. Everything turns upon the reincorporation of Austrian Germany, and this lies in the hands of the Austrians alone. No one can compel them to re-enter Germany against their will, nor prevent them from doing so if they wish.

Will the Germans of Austria be moved to take this step or no? Certainly they will not take it to oblige Germany or Europe. Nations do not dispose of themselves upon altruistic motives. Austria will only seek membership in the German Empire if she finds her own interest in doing so, and obviously her interest will not point this way unless the result of the present war upsets the *status quo* even more momentously for her than for Germany.

The regime under which the Austrians at present live was established in consequence of the events of 1866. Nearly half a century has passed since then, during which they have been perfectly at liberty to change it and adopt some alternative form of political organisation. The fact that they have not done so seems to prove that they will uphold, or at least tolerate, the existing system until some stonger force intervenes.

The reasons for such an attitude are not obscure. In the first place there is the factor of inertia. The present Hapsburg Monarchy is organised so elaborately and on so large a scale that it possesses an incalculable momentum. Enormous energy must be mobilised against its mechanism before it can be brought to a standstill. Even such a catastrophe as this war might fail to shatter it, and one of its own elements would find the greatest difficulty in dissolving its structure by a deliberate, unstimulated exercise of will.

The change, moreover, would not only be difficult for the Austrian Germans, but also positively to their disadvantage. If inertia has been the only restraint upon their freedom of choice, it is because, during this half century, they have been one of the dominant factors in their own political environment, with power, as far as human will avails in politics, to bind or to loose. By transferring their allegiance from their present society to the German Empire, they would inevitably suffer in status, for we have seen that they would have to yield precedence to the consolidated state of Northern Germany.

We may therefore draw the negative conclusion that the Germans of Austria certainly will not enter the German Empire, unless the Hapsburg Empire has previously broken up, and that such a break-up could

only be caused by some external agency in their despite.

This definition of what a break-up of the Hapsburg Empire implies, may forestall an objection that must long have been in the critic's mind. "You talk very glibly," he will have been thinking, "about reconciling Germany by giving her two-fold compensation for her European losses, but perhaps her conquerors may find such conciliation dear at the price. Do you really suppose that the Allies, if they finally beat Germany by an exhausting war, will allow her to emerge even stronger than before from the subsequent settlement?"

It is of course obvious that they will not, and the objection is so far cogent. It is not relevant, however, to the case in question.

During the last generation, the states of Europe have tended to play a less and less individual part in the game of diplomacy and war. The coalition, not the single country, has become the unit of power. Germany's military strength can only be estimated in terms of the whole group to which she belongs, and, since the German and the Hapsburg Empires have now been partners in international politics for thirty-five years,[1] we must for this purpose treat them as a single block.

It is true that the standard of social efficiency in general, and of military organisation in particular, is considerably higher in the German section of the block then in the other, so that the transference within the block of an important element from the inferior Hapsburg system to the superior German would certainly increase the power of the block as a whole, given that its total composition continued the same. If the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire were merely nominal, and the

[1] Since 1879.

group which had formerly consisted of Germany and Austria-cum-Hungary were reconstituted as Germany-cum-Austria and Hungary, then our critic's comment would be quite in point. The coalition would indeed emerge stronger than before, with a margin of increase that would cover the loss of a few border provinces, and the Allies could not suffer events to take such a course.

This possibility is disposed of, however, by our conclusion that Austria will never merge herself in Germany unless the other elements of the Hapsburg Empire do break away from her in some real sense, and fly off at a tangent both from the Hapsburg state and from the German coalition. If this were to happen, it would of course immeasurably lessen the total offensive power of Germany and her group, and we could regard a considerable addition to the individual strength of Germany herself with perfect equanimity.

We are accordingly faced with the question: will the War produce a radical break-up of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and if it does, on what lines will the dissolution take place?

We shall then find a further question awaiting us. Dissolution, supposing we come to believe it probable, will certainly cancel the factors which at present render union with Germany undesirable to Austria, but it need not inspire her with a positive desire for it. If the Hapsburg complexus is loosened, Austria will find herself released from old ties. She may prefer to contract no new ones, and embark instead upon a phase of independent existence. This is a contingency we shall have to consider, before we can proclaim our Austrian solution of the German problem as a certainty; but we must not be over-hasty. We will try to deal with only one question at a time.

CHAPTER III

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA

CAN the Hapsburg Empire survive the present crisis? The question has been asked several times already during the past century, and has been answered invariably in the negative, yet the Empire still exists, and is playing a leading part in international politics at this moment.

Twice over Austria was utterly defeated and shorn of extensive territories by Napoleon, only to emerge in 1814 with wider frontiers than she possessed in 1792. For the next thirty-three years international statesmanship took its cue from the Austrian Chancellor Metternich. Then the international revolution of 1848 overthrew Metternich with bewildering suddenness, and it seemed as though the Monarchy would vanish with the diplomat who incarnated its ideals.

In this year it was buffeted from one quarter by the full storm of Italian Nationalism, which had been brewing for half a century, and now swept the people of every Italian principality into a common crusade against the alien master encamped on the Po. On the other flank Tchechs and Magyars renounced all participation in a Germanised state, and summoned the Hapsburg to accept the crowns of independent Bohemia and Hungary at Prag and Pószony, unless he were willing to forfeit their allegiance altogether. Even Vienna, the capital and core of the Empire, rejected her native sovereign. The fire of Liberalism set the Viennese population in a blaze: they made common cause with the Magyar Liberals further down the Danube, and the Emperor

Ferdinand retired to the loyal and conservative Tyrol. At one moment the army of Radetzky, whom the Italian volunteers were besieging in the fortresses of the "Quadrilateral,"[1] was the only rock of authority that still defied the flood.

Under these circumstances Ferdinand despaired of the Monarchy and abdicated.[2] The task of recovering for the dynasty its ancestral inheritance was undertaken by his nephew Francis Joseph as a "forlorn hope." Yet his venture met with such success that he has enjoyed a reign of almost unparalleled duration. Radetzky had already broken the Italian onset at the battle of Custozza, and the government had re-entered Vienna by force : the gage was now thrown down to the Magyars. During the winter months of 1849 the struggle in Hungary was bloody and indecisive ; but in March Radetzky's crushing victory over the Piedmontese at Novara enabled the Monarchy to concentrate all its forces on the Hungarian front, in May the Tsar Nicholas decided to succour his fellow-autocrat, and before the end of the summer the Hungarian army capitulated to the Austro-Russian commanders at Világos. Every foot of territory within the Austrian frontier was thus once more under the government's control, and towards the end of 1850 the Monarchy reasserted its hegemony over Germany by extorting a public apology[3] from Prussia for the countenance she had lent to the German national movement while Austria had her hands full on the South and East.

Austria thus succeeded in stifling the first birth-spasms of the new Europe : it is a still more remarkable achievement that she survived their inevitable renewal

[1] Mantua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnano.
[2] December 1848. [3] The Convention of Olmütz.

and consummation. Napoleon III. dealt her a hard blow in 1859, which led directly to the establishment of the Italian national state. In 1866 the new Italy and Prussia, drawn together by coincidence of resentment and ambition, attacked Austria simultaneously from two flanks, and ousted her completely from the Italian and German spheres. Yet the main body of the Empire did not dissolve under these strokes: external humiliation merely opened a new epoch of internal evolution.

The Hapsburg Monarchy, then, has resisted the shock of three titanic phenomena: Democracy, the Risorgimento and Bismarck. The earthquake carried away Lombardy, Venetia and the hegemony of Germany —two pinnacles and an ornamental façade—but the building itself stood firm. So, we might infer, the present catastrophe may detach Galicia, and possibly Bosnia as well, but still the Monarchy will not collapse: if it outlived the nineteenth century, it need have no fear of the twentieth.

Nevertheless, the prophets of death have reason, though not precedent, on their side.

The Hapsburg state, like the Prussian, has grown out of one of Germany's Eastern "marks." It is entirely the creation of the Hapsburg Dynasty, which established its hold on the duchies of Austria and Styria in 1282, when Rudolf of Hapsburg was Holy Roman Emperor. Round this nucleus successive generations of Hapsburgs have gathered the present collection of provinces by conquest, inheritance, feudal escheat, marriage-settlement, free gift, legal chicanery, and all the other methods which contribute to the growth of private estates. Austrian history has therefore been dominated likewise by the personal factor, but here the analogy with Prussia ends: both developments are

expressions of family character, but their comparison illustrates the marked divergence of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern temperament.

The Prussian collector has been systematic and self-controlled. Starting on the Eastern fringe of the German world, we have seen how persistently he shifted his land-marks towards the West, never grasping too eagerly but never relaxing his grip, till his estates coincided with Northern Germany in extent, and his administration was adopted for the government of the German nation.

The Hapsburg has shown no such consistent policy. He has pursued his hobby in happy-go-lucky fashion, gaining here and losing there with good-humoured indifference. There are few territories in Europe that have not passed through his hands. Before the great prize of Austria became his, he lived in a castle on the banks of the Aar,[1] from which he derives his family name. The warriors of the Five Cantons ejected him from his ancestral dwelling when they founded Switzerland, and at present not one rood remains to him of this land, nor of Alsace and the Black Forest, his earliest acquisitions. He has owned Spain and Belgium in the West, Venice, Milan, Naples and Sicily have been ruled by him; in combat with the Turk he advanced far deeper into Serbia during the eighteenth century than his armies have penetrated during the present war, and the occupation of the Danubian principalities once carried him to the Black Sea coast. All these bizarre properties have been lost to him, but there is variety enough in the assets that remain.

Prussia has made herself the exponent of German nationality: modern Austria is representative of no

[1] The chief Southern tributary of the Upper Rhine.

nationality at all. It is true that two[1] small nations, the Magyars and the Tchechs, are wholly contained within her frontiers; but these constitute no more than 18.9 and 17.5 per cent. respectively of her total population.[2] The majority that remains is composed of fragments detached from six nationalities: Germans, Italians and Roumans; Poles, Ruthenes and Southern Slavs. In all these six cases the main body of the race lies beyond the Austrian frontier, while in four of them it is organised into a national state immediately conterminous with it. Germany, Italy, Roumania and Serbia are each waiting to claim their Austrian "irredenta" when the favourable moment arrives.

The Hapsburg Monarchy has set Nationality at defiance, and that is why the prophets shake their heads over its destiny. What is the secret of its extraordinary vitality, which has falsified all the prophets' calculations and enabled it to survive both internal dissidence and pressure from without? An organism cannot thrive with complete disregard to its environment. If the Monarchy has not adapted itself to the national principle, it must have responded to some other factor of equal significance in the modern world.

We shall find this factor in Geography.

The political maps of mediæval and contemporary Europe produce quite different impressions. The former is complex and variegated like a mosaic, or like some rich window of stained glass, which has been shattered by cannon and pieced together again hap-

[1] We might bring the number up to four, if we treated the Slovaks as a nationality independent of the Tchechs, and distinguished the Slovenes from the Southern Slavs.

[2] Total population of Austria-Hungary, 45,405,000; Magyars, 8,589,000; Tchechs-Slovaks, 7,946,000. The figures are taken from the census of 1900.

hazard out of the fragments, without regard to the original design. The latter recalls the work of a skilled nineteenth-century restorer, who has taken the patchwork to bits, and patiently regrouped the fragments till the plan of their creator is once more apparent. If Nationality is one characteristic of the modern state, the second is geographical compactness and homogeneity.

The Hapsburg Monarchy has conformed itself with striking success to this geographical law. At the settlement of 1814 it abandoned its title to Belgium and the Black Forest in exchange for Italian territories immediately contiguous to its main mass, and the events of 1866, which expelled it from Italy and Germany altogether, completed effectually its geographical consolation.

The triumph of the Risorgimento and of Bismarck seemed the Hapsburg Monarchy's disaster: in reality it did the Monarchy good service by forcing it to accept its natural destiny as the Danubian unit in the European scheme.

We have seen that the nucleus of the Dynasty's dominions was the Mark of Austria. This province was founded in 976 A.D. by Otto II., the Holy Roman Emperor, to be the bulwark of Bavaria and all Southern Germany against the Magyars, a horde of nomads from the Eastern steppes,[1] who had forced their way up the Danube and raided Western Europe for a century as far as the Mediterranean and even the Atlantic. Otto's father, the Great Otto, had at last broken their power in a series of crushing victories,[2] and the new mark was

[1] The Magyar language belongs to the Ugro-Finnish group, but they must have assimilated an important Turkish element, for the Byzantine Emperor and historian Constantine Porhyrogennetos could write of them in the tenth century as the "Turks" *par excellence*.

[2] The battle of the Lechfeld in 955 was the final stroke.


intended to confine the chastened Magyars within iron limits. It was therefore similar in design to the Mark of Brandenburg, which was founded during the same period to protect Northern Germany against the Slavonic tribes likewise advancing Westward on the further flank of the Carpathians.

Austria, however, outstripped Brandenburg in its early development. Under the House of Babenberg, which ruled it from its foundation until their own extinction in 1246, it grew steadily in population and extent: when the Hapsburgs took possession of it in 1282, it included not merely Upper and Lower Austria up to their present boundaries, but the Mark of Styria as well, and was thus already one of the most important units in the German world.

This prosperity was due to the province's commanding geographical situation. Vienna, which has been its capital since the middle of the twelfth century, is the key to the Danube basin, because it lies at one of the principal breaks in the river's course.[1] At this point two great mountain-giants stretch out their arms towards the Danube from opposite sides. On the South-West the Alps press forward till their last spur, the Wiener Wald, plunges into the stream immediately West of the city: North-Eastward the Carpathians spread their wings fanwise, and one of them, the "Little Carpathian" ridge, descends as far as the North bank of the Danube immediately East of the March tributary and just above the Hungarian town of Pószony (Pressburg). Between these two lines of mountains there intervenes a strip of plain, the Marchfeld, in the angle formed by the junction of the March with the Danube.

Across the Marchfeld, Alp and Carpathian beckon to

[1] The "Iron Gates" are the other.



one another, and the river whispers to all human wayfarers from the South-East that they must slip through this gap if they wish to reach his source, since to left and right the mountains close their ranks and present an impenetrable barrier. Vienna, however, has seized control of this narrow gate. Ensconced between the Wiener Wald and the Danube, it commands the Marchfeld on the opposite bank. An army that traversed the plain from the East and sought to ascend the river further in Vienna's despite, would make the attempt at its peril.

Vienna has proved its strategic worth against more formidable enemies than the Magyar: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it shielded Germany [1] and Western Europe from the Turk. The two sieges laid to it by the invader, first in 1530 and then again in 1683, were the most critical moments in the protracted assault upon Christendom, but the Turkish tide found here its

[1] Albrecht Dürer's woodcut, the "Grosse Kannone," reveals how deeply a Turkish invasion was dreaded in Germany about 1500 A.D.

high-water mark. After the crucial year of the second siege, it ebbed steadily back, and Vienna ceased to be a military outpost, as the border between Christendom and Islam shifted further and further down the Danube again.

Thus ended the mediæval phase of Vienna's history. For seven hundred years the place was a fortress severing the upper from the middle basin of the Danube ; since then it has become an imperial city, the centre of a state formed by the union of both regions within a common frontier. Superficially, this looks like a complete reversal of character : in reality, Vienna has risen to be the capital of a great modern monarchy precisely because it has continued to be the point of contact and division between two worlds.

The portion of the present Hapsburg Monarchy that lies West of Vienna belongs to the industrial world of Central Europe. The manufacturing district of Reichenberg in the Northern corner of Bohemia is continuous with the Saxon Black Country immediately across the frontier. In Silesia we have seen how negligible the political boundaries are from the economic point of view : Austrian and Prussian Silesia constitute an indivisible economic unit, and this unit in turn is only one section of a vast industrial belt, which begins in Poland, and extends Southward through Moravia and Lower Austria as far as Styria beyond the Danube, on the Alps' South-Eastern slope.

The portion of the Monarchy that lies East of Vienna presents a striking economic contrast. The immense plain of alluvium deposited by the Danube and the Theiss, which opens out below Buda-Pest and is known as the " Alföld," specialises in the production of wheat and horses. The mountainous country between the Drave and the Adriatic is devoted to stock-breeding.

Both these districts belong to the South-Eastern group, which remains in a much lower stage of economic development than Central and Western Europe. Here modern industry has not yet struck root, and economic activity is still confined to the production of raw materials for the industrial world's factories and of foodstuffs for its multiplied workers. The Alföld is homogeneous in productive capacity with the Roumanian and Bulgarian plains in the lower basin of the Danube beyond the "Iron Gates": the live-stock trade of the mountains reaches its acme in Serbia, which is dependent entirely upon its export of swine.

The two sections of the Monarchy which meet at Vienna are thus economically complementary. Co-operation with the South-East assures to the North-Western worker that raw materials will not run short and that the cost of living will remain low: co-operation with the North-West guarantees the South-Eastern husbandman and shepherd a stable market for their annual surplus. Isolated, each section would be exposed to all the dislocations of shortage and over-production; combined, they constitute a self-sufficient economic unit.

We can now understand how the Hapsburg state, after centuries of territorial fluctuation, attained through the settlement of 1866 an equilibrium which has endured for nearly fifty years. From the standpoint of Nationality, the Monarchy in 1914 is as chaotic as it was in 1792 or 1618: from the point of view of economic geography, it has slowly but surely advanced from chaos to order. The Mark of Austria has forfeited its national significance as the bulwark of Germany, only to realise its economic destiny as the focus of the Danube Basin. The great river which Vienna commands runs from

head to foot of the Empire like a spinal cord, and the Hapsburg dominions have consolidated themselves round this central conductor of economic life. Hapsburg territories beyond the range of the Danubian "nervous-system" have inevitably fallen away and been absorbed in other organisms, while territories within its compass have been irresistibly drawn into the Hapsburg sphere, and vitalised into an organic whole.

The centripetal principle we divined in the Hapsburg Monarchy reveals itself, therefore, as economic. The Monarchy has accommodated itself to the current set going by the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, and this augurs strongly for its survival. The economic factor operated side by side with the national in the moulding of nineteenth-century Europe. The territorial simplification, which we have noted in general and traced more closely in the Hapsburg instance, was determined principally by the economic cause. Economics have been winning their way to primacy, and we may prophesy that in the future "international" phase of civilisation, they will play the dominant rôle.

The settlement of 1866, then, brought the Hapsburg Monarchy economic unity and equilibrium. A living organism cannot, however, remain static: to survive, it must grow. All states are in process either of growth or of decline, and they are inevitably reduced to the latter phase by failure to succeed in the former. Until 1866 Austria wasted her strength and jeopardised her future by failing to recognize her Danubian character: Bismarck and the Risorgimento taught her, by a rude lesson, that the true field for her expansion lay neither towards Italy nor towards Germany, but in the same direction as the Danube's current. Thenceforth Austria set her face steadfastly towards a South-Eastern horizon.

This "trend Eastwards"[1] has taken a very sinister complexion, and has even occasioned the present war; yet its motive force is not the dynastic ambition which governed Austria's development as recently as the Napoleonic period. It is only partly accounted for by that national chauvinism of the "Prussian" type, which during the last century has been superseding the rivalries of Autocracy and caricaturing them in its exaggerated egotism. The essence of the movement is not militaristic but economic. It is the penetration of an industrialised unit, in search of wider markets and wider sources of raw produce, into regions still on the far side of the Industrial Revolution.

The most striking expression of the Eastward Trend is the position won by the Austrian Lloyd Steamship Company in the traffic of the Levant. You can board these steamers bound for Trieste at every great port in the Nearer East. The express service from Alexandria has become the favourite route of British officials returning from Egypt and the Soudan on leave, and the Company has had the enterprise to run another service so far afield as Bombay and Ceylon, in order to capture the passenger-traffic from British India as well. Batoum, the port of Russian Caucasia, is another terminus of the line, and it serves the whole of Asiatic Turkey for the carriage of the European mail. In all the Ægean you will not meet finer ships than these, and they produce the sense of some strong, civilised power behind the horizon.

As soon as you have passed Corfu the impression deepens. Serious competition from the French Messageries Maritimes or from the various Italian lines ceases conspicuously at the mouth of the

[1] "Drang nach Osten."

Adriatic, and the whole trade up the East coast of this gulf is monopolised by the Lloyd.[1]

In Epirus and Albania the Lloyd stands for European civilisation. It provides the only means of transport, for no practicable roads have yet been constructed on land. Goods, mails and travellers depend upon it entirely for local as well as for foreign traffic: in the squalid coast-towns the arrival of the Austrian packet-boat is the event of the week, and even the hostile Montenegrins cannot afford to boycott it from their more imposing harbour of Antivari.

Montenegro is an improvement upon Albania. Here for the first time the steamer can come directly alongside a quay, instead of anchoring a mile out and transacting her business by means of lighters plying clumsily to and fro across the strip of shoal water inshore. When, however, you leave Antivari behind, and turn to enter Cattaro Fjord, you stumble suddenly into European civilisation. As the reaches of the "Bocche" open out, finely-metalled and graded roads, substantially built cottages and beautifully-terraced mountain slopes present themselves on either hand, and a general air of prosperity and good management pervades the scene.

Thereafter you touch in succession at the Dalmatian ports—Gravosa, Spalato, Sebenico—each busier than the last, and you wonder curiously in what this series will culminate, and what is the fountain-head of this continually intensified economic activity, the first symptoms of which you encountered in such distant quarters. In Dalmatia, as in Krete and the Morea, your imagination is fired by the majestic remains of

[1] The Ungaro-Croata line from Fiume is an artificial enterprise, with the same political intention as the recent attempt to make Hungary industrially independent of Austria by the development of Hungarian manufactures.

Venetian fortresses with the Lion of St. Mark sculptured upon their bastions, but you are aware that their significance has vanished. Your goal is not mediæval Venice, and you are not disappointed when finally you make Trieste.

If the Danube is the Hapsburg Monarchy's spinal cord, Trieste is the sensory organ through which it communicates with the rest of the world. Atlantic liners are moored at its jetties, and it is in direct railway communication with every part of Central Europe. Here you become fully conscious of the great industrial hinterland in Styria and Lower Austria, Moravia and Bohemia, which gives the Lloyd work to do in ports thousands of miles away, and you remember the grain and cattle of Hungary which feed the Austrian manufactures like fuel. Standing in Trieste, you at last behold the modern Hapsburg Empire in its true perspective.

You understand, too, how this racially heterogeneous state not merely holds together, but achieves a constructive and even aggressive foreign policy. Economic exploitation of semi-civilised areas demands a backing of political prestige. The Austrian Lloyd could not win and hold its ground without the constant aid of the Austro-Hungarian consul, and the ultimate guarantee of the "dreadnoughts" docked at Pola. The business of modern commerce can only be conducted with the capital, both material and moral, of a great power, and no single element in the Monarchy is strong enough to play this part alone. The populations of the Hapsburg Empire depend upon union for the maintenance of their present position in the world.[1]

[1] A recently-built Austrian dreadnought was christened "Viribus Unitis"—a tragically rational piece of Utopianism.

The economic solidarity of the Empire was strikingly illustrated during the crisis of 1908. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs had seized the opportunity of the Turkish Revolution to proclaim the formal annexation of the "Occupied provinces," Bosnia-Herzegovina. The inhabitants of the district are Southern Slavs, and the act was a much heavier blow to Serbian nationalism, which still aspired to incorporate the territory in the Serbian state, than to Ottoman Imperialism, which had long resigned itself to a merely nominal suzerainty. The announcement accordingly aroused the deepest resentment throughout the Slavonic world, and not least among the Slavonic citizens of the Empire itself.

The Slavs, however, could make no reprisals. Russia was paralysed by disaster in the Far East and revolution at home, pro-Serbian demonstrations within the Hapsburg Monarchy itself were vigorously suppressed by the government, and Serbia was impotent without external support. Turkey, on the other hand, was able to retaliate most effectively by boycotting Austrian shipping along her whole immense coast-line, and eschewing the use of Austrian manufactures. In particular the Turks abandoned the "fez," for they had come to depend for the supply of their national headgear almost entirely upon Austrian industry.

This Austrian manufacture of fezes happened to have become localised in Bohemia,[1] and so the Turkish retort hit the German and Magyar elements in the Monarchy, who were really responsible for the government's action, far less severely than the Tchechs, its bitterest opponents. Austrian "Official Circles" might therefore have been

[1] Reichenberg, the chief industrial centre of the province, lies in a German-speaking district; but the whole of Bohemia, Tchech and German portions alike, has become thoroughly industrialised during the last century.

expected to congratulate themselves on killing two birds with one stone. Yet the economic interaction of each part of the Monarchy with every other is so close, and Bohemian industry is such an indispensable element in this delicate rhythm, that the effects of the local blow made themselves universally felt. Instead of rubbing its hands, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was brought to its knees, and strenuously exerted itself on the Tchechs' behalf. The Turkish Government was able to extort more than adequate material reparation for the Monarchy's moral delinquency before it gave the signal for the boycott to cease.

The breach with Turkey in 1908 was an interlude. Since the Balkan crisis which culminated in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires have normally maintained a good understanding, and the birth of this friendship was followed immediately by the alliance with Germany in 1879.

This triple association, which has endured ever since, and has embarked in common upon the present war, is likewise explained by the economic situation. If Pangerman politicians dream of eventually consolidating a zone of territory "from Hamburg on the North Sea to Koweit on the Persian Gulf" into a single political unit, this is simply a hypothetical expansion of the grouping which already exists in miniature in the Hapsburg Monarchy itself. The Hapsburg state is built up out of the industrial districts West of Vienna and the agrarian districts East of it: the "Pangerman Confederation" would include the whole of industrialised Central Europe on the one hand, and a proportionate agrarian element in South-Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia on the other.

There is considerable economic justification for this

programme.[1] Geography has imposed the "Trend Eastward" upon the younger industry of Central Europe as inevitably as she summoned the older industry of the West to the Atlantic, and to the colonial areas which lay along its highways. Yet Pangermanism has set itself a difficult and perhaps a disastrous goal, in determining to convert this economic possibility into a political fact. It has begun by challenging the rest of Europe to a mortal duel upon this issue. We have good hope that the battle will end in the discomfiture of the aggressor and the frustration of his plans, but even if he were victorious in the war, he would find himself hardly nearer to his objective. He hopes to fashion a vast political structure upon his economic framework: he has first to learn whether this basis suffices for the execution of a less ambitious piece of craftsmanship.

Will the centripetal force of economics finally overcome the centrifugal force of Nationality in the present Hapsburg Empire? The programme of Pangermanism stands or falls by the answer to this question, and it is also a repetition, in more precise terms, of the question we asked ourselves at the close of the last chapter: Will the Hapsburg Empire break up as the result of this war? Our attention is recalled to the internal structure of the Hapsburg state, this time in its political aspect.

The countries which have coalesced into the present Hapsburg Empire are some degrees removed from the original centres of modern European civilisation, and

[1] The Germano-Austro-Turkish league has proved itself firmer than the official "Triple Alliance," of which Italy, not Turkey, is the third member. Italy joined the Central European powers in 1882 on account of a temporary economic clash with France, but her fundamental interests, as we shall see later, are entirely different from theirs.

mediæval conditions here continued almost unmodified until the middle of the eighteenth century.

The new leaven began to work rather suddenly in Maria Theresa's reign. She weathered the European storm which burst out upon her accession by arousing the national patriotism of the Magyars,[1] but the Empire had been in danger of complete dissolution, and the attempt to recover Silesia from the Prussians by alliance with France did not meet with success.[2] Maria Theresa was led by these misfortunes abroad to develop the Empire's latent strength by reorganisation at home. She initiated her dominions into the "Strong Government" phase, by a policy of centralisation on the model of contemporary Prussia and France.

Political evolution in the "Danubian unit" thus differentiated itself at the outset from the process in the West. There "Strong Government" and Nationality prevailed in succession, and the latter was enriched with the former's inheritance: here the two forces appeared simultaneously upon the scene, and it was not long before they came into violent collision.

In 1780 Maria Theresa was succeeded by her son Joseph II. Joseph was a devoted disciple of the French philosophers, and he attempted to carry out uncompromisingly in backward Austria that transformation of society which was accomplished a few years later in such partial measure in progressive France. The actual achievements of the French Revolution were none the less stupendous, however short they fell of their aim, and they were only made possible by the spiritual response of the Nation to the philosophers' gospel. Joseph undertook the mission of the "philosopher-

[1] "War of the Austrian Successon," 1740-1748.
[2] "Seven Years' War," 1756-1763.

king," and attempted by means of "Strong Government" to wrench unenlightened populations out of their cherished traditions and convert them forcibly by the accomplished fact. Neglecting all local differences of language, religion, and custom, he proceeded to refashion his dominions on a pedantically uniform plan.

Joseph's crusade was a disastrous failure. Reform was checkmated by revolt, and he was killed by ten years of unrelieved disappointments. Yet his short reign has determined the course of the Monarchy's internal history ever since.

He contrived to range Nationality and Enlightenment in opposite camps. His dogmatic disregard for national feeling awakened it into frantic life, and it arrayed itself for the battle not in the "Rights of Man" (of which it had never heard), but in the familiar harness of mediæval vested interests. The centres of nationalistic resistance were the provincial "estates," bodies representative not of peoples but of castes. They were dominated by the nobility and the Church, so that nationalism in the Hapsburg Empire started with a strong feudal and clerical bias,[1] which has left permanent effects. The movement has remained legalistic instead of becoming philosophic. It looks to the past rather than to the future, and has fallen a willing victim to the malady of "historical sentiment."

Joseph's death in 1790 concluded the first bout in the contest between enlightened despotism and nationalistic reaction, but the factors of success and

[1] This is true of the different movements in various degrees. Magyar nationalism, for instance, has been wholly aristocratic and not clerical: among the Slovenes, where the nobility was German, clericalism has till recently been supreme: national feeling among the Tchechs was fostered, in its earlier phase, by the Church and the originally German nobility in conjunction!

failure were too evenly divided between the two forces to allow a speedy decision. The struggle continued intermittently till the revolutionary year of 1848 brought it to a head.

We have already seen how Hapsburg autocracy was overthrown in one year only to rise again in the next, how the national principle was championed by the Magyars, who were willing to take up arms on its behalf, and how their heroic resistance to Francis Joseph's armies was overcome by the intervention of Nicholas, his accomplice.

From 1849 to 1861 Joseph's theories seemed to have triumphed, but in the bitterness of the conflict despotism had discarded its enlightenment. A uniform regime of absolutism was imposed upon the whole Monarchy, and the official use of German, the language of the Viennese bureaucracy, was universally enforced, without regard to the nationality of the governed. Such a system could not last, because its spirit was entirely negative. It was created to repress the evolution of nineteenth-century Europe, and was bound to succumb under the wave's return.

The external blows which forced the Monarchy to resign its Western ambitions and set it free to pursue the economic career of a Danubian unit, had an equally momentous effect upon its internal politics.

The war of 1859 induced the government to temper centralisation by the grant of a constitution. The provincial estates or "diets" were called into existence again, though their traditional institutions were now standardised to an official pattern, and each diet was empowered to elect representatives to a two-chambered parliament for the whole Monarchy; but the utter *débâcle* of 1866 followed hard upon this concession,

and the government found itself at its subjects' mercy.

At this crisis the initiative was seized by the Magyar nation. The relative weight of their numbers in the motley population of the Monarchy, the corporate feeling inspired in this mass by the tragedy of 1849, an inherited political tradition and able leadership in the present all combined to give them the mastery of the situation. They were able to dictate their own terms, and the "Ausgleich" or "Compromise" which they imposed upon the Dynasty has remained the basis of the Monarchy's internal organisation ever since.

The principal terms of the compact were as follows:

(i.) Hungary recovered her separate existence as a state, with the territorial extent traditionally claimed by the "Crown of St. Stephen," and with Magyar as its official language.

(ii.) This state was organised as a constitutional monarchy, and the sovereignty was declared hereditary in the House of Hapsburg. Francis Joseph and his heirs were to reign with the title of king after coronation at Pest.

(iii.) The new Hungarian Kingdom was made autonomous in every department of political activity, with three exceptions:

(*a*) Foreign Affairs, including the Consular Service.

(*b*) Naval and military organisation.

(*c*) The budget required for these purposes.

(iv.) The control of these three departments was vested in an organ of authority common to Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy, and the character of the common institutions was jealously defined:

(*a*) Hungary's allegiance to them was conditional upon the establishment and maintenance of a unified

system of parliamentary government throughout the remaining Hapsburg dominions.

(*b*) This parliament, and not merely the Dynasty, was to ratify the Compromise.

(*c*) The Hungarian and Austrian parliaments were each to elect annually a committee or "Delegation," and the two delegations were to share the control of the Joint Executive.

(*d*) The Joint Executive was to consist of three ministries: for Foreign Affairs, for War, and for Finance respectively.

The Magyars' ultimatum was accepted unconditionally. In 1867 a constituent assembly was convened to represent the remainder of the Hapsburg dominions, the Ausgleich was formally voted as the fundamental constitution of the whole Monarchy, and all relations between the new Hungary and the diminished Austria which were not covered by its terms, were settled more or less satisfactorily by direct negotiations.[1]

The "Dual System" created by these acts has remained in existence forty-seven years without being denounced by either party, and we can draw important conclusions both from its structure and from its permanence.

The Ausgleich was a compromise between unity and

[1] The following were the chief outstanding questions:

(*a*) There was the public debt which had been contracted by the centralised autocratic government. The Magyars repudiated responsibility for it, but guaranteed an annual contribution which amounted to somewhat less than a quarter of the total interest. The rest of the burden devolved upon Austria.

(*b*) A customs Union was formed between Austria and Hungary. All revenues derived from it were assigned to the Joint Budget, and the proportion was fixed in which the two states should contribute the deficit of the Customs-receipts on the joint expenditure. Both the Customs Union and the current quota were made terminable after periods of ten years, but the Customs agreement has been renewed in one form or another ever since, and the readjustment of the quota has always been satisfactorily effected.

independence. During the war of 1849 the Magyars had deposed the House of Hapsburg, denounced all connection with the other parts of the Monarchy and proclaimed Hungary a republic. This declaration of the national will had been nullified by brute force, for seventeen years the national freedom had been paralysed by a tyrannical regime, and now at last in 1866 the bonds were broken in sunder. After passing through such an experience as this, the Magyars might have been expected to assert their independence more vehemently than ever before. Yet in this supreme moment the nation was guided not by the violent "Kossuthists,"[1] but by the moderates under Deák: it chose constitutional monarchy within the Hapsburg complex instead of republican independence outside it.

The Magyars are strongly influenced by sentiment, and this choice involved the most severe sentimental sacrifices. Their constancy in abiding by it therefore proves that since 1848 they have become conscious of a higher necessity which impels them to maintain the Hapsburg unit unbroken.

The Austrians, on their part, made perhaps even a greater sacrifice in accepting the Magyars' terms. Sentiment they could not have saved, for it was bound up with the maintenance of the "Germanising" regime, and since the *débâcle* that was of course beyond their power; but it might appear that they would have consulted their material interests better by resorting to the other extreme, and breaking off from Hungary altogether. The compromise imposed upon them a disproportionate share of the common burdens: they must accordingly have found that co-operation with Hungary brought

[1] Louis Kossuth was the Magyar exponent of the ideals of '48, and he was president of the Hungarian republic in 1849.

them more than adequate material compensation in other directions.

The explanation lies in the economic structure of the Danubian unit which we have already analysed. The Ausgleich is simply the political expression of the economic situation. The Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy corresponds to the industrial region above Vienna,[1] the Hungarian half to the agrarian region below it. Their economic interdependence is recognised in the common tariff: Hungary abandons the possibility of building up an indigenous industry of her own, by protection against Austrian manufactures, in order to secure a virtual monopoly of the Austrian market for foodstuffs and raw produce. The value of political massiveness in the competition of international commerce is recognised in the three Joint Ministries: Austria helps Hungary to pay her way, because these common organs enable her to draw on Hungary's strength as well as her own for the diplomatic and military support of her commercial expansion.

The political powers, then, which control respectively the Austrian and the Hungarian half of the Monarchy, have reckoned with the economic factor, and have both concluded that it is the determining force in their political destinies. They see that neither of them is economically strong enough to stand alone, and that the alternative to "Dualism" is not independence, but the incorporation of each in another group or unit.

Yet why should such a change of grouping be essentially less desirable for them than the present arrangement? It need involve no economic loss: we

[1] The province of Dalmatia belongs to Austria, though it lies far down the Adriatic, on the other side of the "Crown of St. Stephen's" strip of coast-line; but it is an insignificant exception, due to chance rather than design.

can imagine conditions under which it would actually be advantageous. Suppose the Central Powers won this war and realised the Pangerman's dream by building their politico-economic confederation from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, this colossal complex would naturally articulate itself into two groups. The German Empire and Austria would coalesce to form the industrial half: the agrarian half would constitute itself out of Hungary, the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire.

It might seem that Austria and Hungary would both gain by such re-organisation. We have allowed that the Germans of Austria would be degraded to a secondary rôle in the German Empire; but meanwhile we have discovered that they cannot stand alone. For them it is merely a choice of yoke-fellows, and their mightier kinsmen of Northern Germany would be more sympathetic companions than the Magyars with their alien speech and inferior culture. Moreover, as members of a consolidated German block they would obtain much better terms in a new Ausgleich with the agrarian wing than they enjoy in their present Ausgleich with the "Crown of St. Stephen."

The Magyars, on their side, would gain considerably in political importance. In the Dual Monarchy Hungary is no more than an equal, if not actually an inferior partner: in a new South-Eastern group, her comparative population, wealth and culture would give her undisputed leadership.

The loyalty with which both parties have clung to the Ausgleich must therefore depend upon some further factor in addition to the economic.

We have seen that the Ausgleich takes full account of the economic facts. It is a compromise between unity and independence dictated by economic necessity,

but it has another and a less creditable side. It is also a compromise between compulsory uniformity and national devolution. It does not attempt to do justice to the facts of nationality in the Hapsburg Monarchy: it merely concedes a modicum calculated to shelve the discussion of national problems that are in urgent need of solution.

The Magyars drew the boundary of the "Kingdom of St. Stephen," and they claim to speak in the name of its people. Yet at the census of 1900 only 44.6 per cent. of the kingdom's total population was Magyar in nationality, while even in Hungary proper the Magyars only amounted to 51.38 per cent., a bare majority.[1]

The terms of the Ausgleich between the new Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy were thus formulated on the one part by no more than a fraction of the Hungarians, and the parliament which accepted those terms on the other part was even less representative of the "diminished Austria."[2] Nominally the Ausgleich was an arrangement between the whole people of one half of the Monarchy and the whole people of the

[1] Population at the Census of 1900:

Crown of St. Stephen	19,255,000
Hungary proper	16,838,000
Magyars	8,589,000

[2] The Tchechs refused to send representatives to this constituent assembly, and so the Ausgleich was passed without their voice, while all the non-German deputies who did attend were in opposition except the Poles. The latter were won over by the government at the price of important concessions to their nationality. Since the Germans formed hardly more than a third of the Austrian population, their supremacy could only be maintained by a coalition, if the least semblance of constitutional government was to be preserved. They chose to make terms with the Polish block rather than any other from motives of foreign policy which we have already examined. The internal parliamentary situation explains why the concessions to the Poles were so far-reaching, and also why they have never become a precedent for a general scheme of devolution. This piece of Austrian liberalism was palliatory, not constructive, in intention.

remainder: actually it was concluded between the Magyars of Hungary, a strong minority, and the Germans of Austria, who constituted no more than 35.13 per cent. of the extra-Hungarian or "Austrian" population in 1900.[1]

In this light the "Dual System" acquires a sinister connotation. It could fairly be represented as a conspiracy between the two strongest nationalities in the Hapsburg Empire for the concerted oppression of the rest. From 1849 to 1866 the entire population of the Empire was subjected to compulsory Germanisation, but the buffets the German master received from his enemies in 1866 so weakened him that he was driven to take one of his serfs into partnership. He struck a bargain with the Magyar, the slave with the most powerful fists. He raised him to be his peer, made over to him a large share of his land and chattels to deal with as he pleased, and obtained for himself in return immunity to exploit the remainder of his ill-gotten possessions just as unscrupulously as ever. The Ausgleich registers no real advance in political ideals. After its institution, no less than before, the population of the Monarchy has been divisible into two categories, oppressors and oppressed. The grouping has been modified, the system has endured.

This secondary compromise between uniformity and devolution makes not for stability but for disruption. The Germans and Magyars muster between them only 43.25 per cent. of the total population. They will not succeed in exploiting the majority for ever. If they rely upon economic solidarity to cover their sins, they are leaning on a broken reed, for we are in presence of a factor infinitely stronger than the economic. Man is

[1] Population of Austria, 26,107,000. Germans, 9,172,000.

no more exclusively "homo economicus" than he is "homo sapiens": his motives are determined neither by free choice nor by mechanical reaction, but by an incalculable combination of both, yet as he advances in civilisation his own will plays a more and more dominant part. No amount of economic pressure will stifle a growing nationality's revolt against injustice. The break-up of the Dual Monarchy would dislocate the economic life of oppressors and oppressed without discrimination, but the latter will assert their freedom at the cost of any sacrifice. Samson dragged down the pillar, though he knew he must perish with the Philistines.

The "Dual" phase of the Hapsburg national problem is therefore essentially transient, and since a return to the centralisation of the 'fifties is out of the question, the alternatives before the Monarchy are thorough devolution to all nationalities alike or a series of national secessions which will be equivalent to a break-up.

We have now defined our original question within narrow limits. To forecast the fate of the Empire after the present war, we have to examine whether the tendency towards devolution has been on the increase or on the decrease during the forty-seven years since the Dual System was established. A house that remains divided against itself must fall in the end. Has the rift grown so wide that the Hapsburg Monarchy must succumb to the first tremor of earthquake, or is it so nearly closed that the danger-point is passed, and the building can defy even the most appalling shocks?

To discover this we must review the internal politics of the Monarchy since 1867. There are two strands of development to follow, for under the Ausgleich the "Crown of St. Stephen" has disengaged itself from the

rest of the Danubian Unit, and led a separate life of its own. We will leave this junior Hungarian partner for the moment, and concentrate our attention upon the "Austrian"[1] half of the complex, which has continued in the direct line of the Hapsburg tradition.

The Ausgleich stipulated for the establishment of parliamentary government in the Austrian as well as the Hungarian state. The country thus re-awakened to political life found itself divided into two camps.

On the one side stood the Particularists who had beaten Joseph eighty years before. They championed the traditional rights of the provinces, and preferred the most conservative measure of local Home Rule to the most liberally-conceived centralist constitution. Democracy was indifferent to them, for their mainstays were still the nobility and the Church, and their influence was confined to the backward provinces.

They were not primarily nationalists. One of their strongholds was the Tyrol, a purely German district[2] more devoted to the Dynasty than any other part of the Empire. It was Particularist because the unsophisticated peasants had not emancipated themselves from clerical leadership, and because the province itself is mountainous and isolated. Another Particularist strong-

[1] Since 1867 the official style of the Hapsburg state has been the "Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy," yet the non-Hungarian half is not technically entitled Austria. The only official "Austrias" are the two Danubian arch-duchies, the old German mark, and the correct title of the non-Hungarian partner as a whole seems to be the "kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrath at Vienna." A convenient, though quite unofficial formula is "Cis-Leithania" and "Trans-Leithania." The Leitha is a Southern tributary of the Danube, which forms the boundary between the two sections of the Dual Monarchy for a few miles.

[2] Not counting the Italian-speaking Trentino appended to it on the South.

hold was Bohemia. Here the majority of the population was Tchech, yet the programme of the local diet was not conceived on racial lines. They did not agitate for the recognition of the Tchech nationality within Bohemia so much as for the segregation of the whole province, Tchech and German elements alike, from the undistinguished mass of the Dynasty's dominions. They demanded the restoration of the historical Kingdom of Bohemia. "The coronation of Francis Joseph at Prag" was their party cry, not "The acceptance of the Tchech language as a medium of secondary education and official intercourse."

If the various Slavonic groups in Austria tended, on the whole,[1] to range themselves on the Particularist side, it was because the general level of education and enlightenment among them was at that time lower than in the German section of the population. Bohemia was then only in the first stages of the Industrial Revolution, and her peasantry was as fast in the Church's grip as the Slovenes remained till a few years ago. They were not acutely anti-German in feeling: nationalism cannot flourish without the support of a national culture.

On the other side stood the Liberal Party, who were really Joseph's disciples. They had much in common with the party of the same name which had won its way to power in Great Britain by the Reform Bill of 1832, a generation earlier. They held the same rather narrow but intensely important doctrines, and acted with the same honesty up to their principles. Like the "Manchester School," they were zealous for material progress. They were determined to bring Austria into line with Western Europe, and transform

[1] We have already explained why the Poles were an exception.

her into a closely-knit, efficiently organised, industrial state.[1]

The Liberals found their chief support in the German element, especially in the provinces of Lower Austria and Styria. The reactionary sympathies of the Tyrolese were as exceptional among the Germans of Austria as they were normal among the Slavs, and the German nationality contributed an overwhelming proportion of the commercial and professional classes, by whom the new Austria was to be built up.

The Liberal Party accordingly envisaged its policy from a German point of view. They contemplated the Germanisation of the Austrian state, not so much through national chauvinism as because uniformity was part of their theoretical programme and was only conceivable on a German basis.

The Liberals of 1867 met with far more success than their imperial forerunner. The leaven had worked its way deeper since his time. The philosopher-autocrat had wrestled alone against all his subjects: now his ideas were being put into action by the best-educated and best-organised section of the population itself. Moreover, they were setting themselves a more modest task. Joseph had grappled with the whole Hapsburg Empire: the Liberals were loyal and convinced supporters of Dualism. By letting the "Crown of St. Stephen" go its own way, they had relieved themselves of the more backward and stiff-necked half of the Danubian Unit, and saved all their energies for dealing with the rest.

In the parliamentary struggle with the Particularists,

[1] The application of their political creed to economics led them to the same conclusions as their English predecessors. They were convinced Free-traders.

the Liberals won an easy victory. The Ausgleich itself gave them a preliminary advantage by stipulating for unified parliamentary government. A common constituent assembly had to be summoned, as we have seen, to ratify the Compromise on Austria's part, and this body proceeded in the same session [1] to frame a parliamentary constitution on centralist lines. On this occasion, and on many others, the Particularist Bohemian deputies played into their opponents' hands by refusing to take their seats as a protest against the rejection of their demands. With the assistance of the Polish group, the German Liberals were still able to muster a quorum and carry on the government according to the letter of the constitution. Bohemian abstention merely relieved the government of an opposition.

The Liberal ministry rallied to itself all the forces of enlightenment in the country by passing in 1868 a series of laws which uncompromisingly abolished the civil authority of the Catholic Church.[2] In 1871 the Tchechs made their supreme effort for the restoration of the Bohemian kingdom, and failed. In 1873 Centralism achieved its final triumph by carrying a law which took the election of parliamentary deputies from the provincial diets and transferred it to the direct vote of the constituencies.

The Liberals, however, had a short career. They had shot all their bolts. Austria was freed from her most galling mediæval handicaps and initiated into her industrial phase; the party had no more to offer the

[1] December 1867.

[2] Joseph had already done this work, but the ecclesiastical organisation had been swept back into power by the re-action against the Revolution. The concordat of 1855 between Viennese Absolutism and Papal Obscurantism had given the Church almost complete power over marriage and education in the Hapsburg Monarchy.

country, and its influence began to decline. A financial crisis in 1873 tainted it with discredit, and six years later it fell.

The era of Liberal reform was followed by a lull. For fourteen years [1] Austria acquiesced in the neutral ministry of Count Taaffe, who conciliated all parties by a policy of parliamentary inactivity. The Industrial Revolution, however, was producing its effect, and great changes were taking place beneath the surface.

(*a*) The first symptom was a dramatic reversal in the clerical position. The workers of the German-speaking industrial centres were beginning to achieve class-consciousness. They were profoundly hostile to the Liberal capitalism which had created and exploited them, and were determined to gain a hearing for their own point of view. The Clericals saw their opportunity. Their old enemies and conquerors were being attacked on the opposite flank: they did not remain passive spectators, but circled round the Liberals' rear from Right to Left, and joined forces with the new movement.

In 1882 the Catholic group had detached itself from the Conservative mass: during the next decade it began to be converted to Christian Socialism. The ideas of Joseph had triumphed by appealing to the middle class: the Church went one step further, and sought to re-establish its hold over the people by identifying itself with Industrial Democracy. In the course of the 'eighties the "New Toryism" achieved striking successes. Factory legislation was passed and National Insurance introduced. The clerical current was confirmed in its new trend.

(*b*) The general rise in economic prosperity had likewise affected the Austrian Slavs. Education had

[1] 1879-93.

spread, a cultured class had grown up,[1] and therewith the Language Question had made its appearance. So long as the Slavonic tongue remained a peasant patois, the use of German was unchallenged; but now Tchech students in the secondary schools and universities demanded instruction in their native medium, and Tchech lawyers and officials could claim with authority that their language should be placed on an equal footing with German in the administration of Bohemia.

The Language Question was taken up by a new party, the "Young Tchechs." The historical kingdom of Bohemia meant little to them, and they did not insist strongly upon Home Rule, much less upon secession. They vehemently disagreed with the "Old Tchechs'" parliamentary policy of passive resistance: they intended to extort the recognition of their national individuality by taking a vigorous part in the sessions at Vienna. Their ideal ran directly counter to the old Germanism of the Liberals. They were impressed by the fact that three-fifths[2] of the Austrian population were Slavs, they believed that with the advance of democracy numbers must prevail, and they conceived of Austria in the future as a Slavonic state. Instead of detaching themselves from the Austrian unit, its Slav citizens were to conquer it for Slavdom, and convert it into the chief focus of Slavonic culture in Europe.

[1] The native Tchech and Slovene aristocracy had been either Germanised or replaced by Germans in the later Middle Ages.

[2] At the Census of 1900 the population of Austria was composed as follows:

Germans	9,172,000	35·13%
Slavs	15,514,000	59·42%
Latins	958,000	3·67%
Others	463,000	1·78%
Total	26,107,000	100%

This programme was not Utopian. The Tchechs and Poles had entered the pale of European civilisation earlier than any other branch of the Slavonic race: Prag and Cracow had played a prominent part in history before the foundation of Petersburg or Tobolsk. Moreover, the emergence of the new Christian Socialist party among the Young Tchechs' German fellow-citizens offered hopes of racial reconciliation. Industrialism and the Catholic Church both overrode the divisions of nationality. The German Liberals had failed to remove the national problem: unity might still be attained by transcending it. The Promised Land, however, was still far off, and the path was so beset by dangers that it was doubtful whether Austria would reach her goal.

(*c*) Christian Socialism was not the only new movement among the Austrian Germans. The old Liberals had fallen because they failed to move with the times. They had lost control over the Industrial Revolution, and the clericals had snatched from them the initiative in social politics; but they had also mismanaged the assimilation of the Slavs, and the Young Tchechs had arisen in their despite. This Slavonic renaissance evoked a German party of a purely nationalistic character.

Austrian "Pangermanism" had its root in the German districts of Bohemia, which were threatened most immediately by the progress of the Tchechs in numbers and education. The alliance with the German Empire in 1879 gave the movement great impetus. In 1880 an association called the "German School Union"[1] was founded, to foster education in the German language throughout Austria. Bismarck became the party's hero, and Prussian methods their ideal.

[1] Deutsche Schul-verein.

They wished to direct all the resources of government to the Germanisation of Slovenes and Tchechs.

This German chauvinism thwarted the larger interests of the German nationality. The new "German Left" in the Austrian Reichsrath was obsessed by the nationalistic idea, and spurned all the factors that were making for progress and unity. Had it triumphed, the later conception of a German confederation from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf could never have taken shape, for the Danubian Unit, the central link in the chain, would have been shattered in pieces by German fanaticism.

The crisis came four years after Count Taaffe's resignation. In 1891 the Young Tchechs had completely ousted the old Bohemian Particularists, and thenceforward they were a power in the Reichsrath. By 1897 they had become strong enough to impose their will upon the government, and ordinances were promulgated which established Tchech as an official language side by side with German through all districts of Bohemia.

The result was a complete breakdown of constitutional government. The German nationalists made parliamentary procedure impossible. Obstruction developed into a physical struggle between the parties for the possession of the House. The resignation of the ministry and the repeal of the decrees eased the situation at Vienna, only to necessitate martial law in Bohemia. Both sides were intractable, and since they combined to prevent the conduct of any business in parliament, government had to be carried on for nearly nine years independently of it, by aid of an emergency clause in the Constitution. During this period national bitterness steadily grew, to the exclusion of all other political interests.

Such conditions could not last for ever. Austria was rapidly losing all political *morale*, and unless the non-nationalistic forces in the country could rally themselves sufficiently to make some great step forward, nothing could prevent the state from sinking through a phase of irresponsible government into utter disruption.

The situation was saved by a fresh appeal to democracy. In 1905 people began to discuss the introduction of Manhood Suffrage, in place of the old franchise of the Prussian type.

The proposal brought out the positive community of interest between the Slavonic national groups and the German socialists. Both had everything to gain by an electoral system based not on privilege, either of class or of race, but upon the numerical proportion between the various sections of the population, and there was no rivalry between them, because their aims did not come within the same plane of politics. The Slavs were still occupied by the preliminary question of nationality, the German workers were devoted to social problems. The satisfaction of the Slavonic nationalists could bring German Labour nothing but gain. National aspirations would pass out of the realm of politics as soon as they were realised, and their Slavonic devotees would be liberated to recruit the non-nationalistic ranks of Social Democracy and Christian Socialism.[1]

The projected Reform Bill produced a beneficent effect even before it became law. During the months when it was in debate, a fresh current of political interest swept through the mass of the population, and it did not disappoint the country's expectations when it was finally promulgated towards the close of 1906.

[1] Compare the relations between the Irish Nationalists and the Liberal Party in the British Parliament.

Besides distributing parliamentary seats between the different races in far juster proportion than before, the new electoral law made an admirable attempt to minimise racial friction in the details of its mechanism,[1] but its full significance was only seen in the first elections held in accordance with it at the beginning of the following year. For the first time the people of Austria had been free to return a chamber of deputies really representative of the country's national divisions, yet the actual result was a relative weakening of the various national groups, and an enormous increase among the advocates of social reconstruction. Out of a house of 516 members, the Social Democrats mustered 87 [2] and the Christian Socialists 67 [3]: together they amounted to 30 per cent. of the whole.

Thus between 1897 and 1907 the Austrian State braved and weathered the tempest of nationalism. During those years it achieved for itself a success we hoped to see shared in due course by the whole of Europe: it passed over, without suffering shipwreck, from the nationalistic to the post-nationalist phase of development.

As far as her own seamanship availed, Austria was out of danger. The session of 1907 revealed the influence of nationalism distinctly on the decline, and social-economic factors in the ascendant. The country needed nothing but a free hand to work out its own salvation. Austria, however, is more cruelly involved in external trammels than any other state in Europe. She is not affected merely by the international situation: her fortunes are at the mercy of her yoke-fellow Hungary.

[1] See Ch. VI. [2] Formerly 11.
[3] Formerly 27. They had by this time absorbed all the clericals down to the last of the Conservative rear-guard.

If the unity of the Hapsburg complex is essential to the maintenance of its members' position in the world, developments accomplished in one half of the Monarchy will be of little consequence unless they extend themselves ultimately to the other. Austria had transcended nationalism in vain if the same sinister force were still capable of precipitating catastrophe in Hungary; yet the Ausgleich rigidly debarred the Austrian people from any intervention in Hungarian affairs. There was only one power in the Empire to which an appeal from the Ausgleich could be made, and that was the Hapsburg Dynasty.

The Ausgleich had never challenged the Dynasty's supreme position. Francis Joseph had witnessed many transformations of his Empire before 1866, and he remained the living symbol of a tradition older and more enduring than the settlement of that year. It was to the King-Emperor's credit that he accepted the Dual System with whole-hearted loyalty, though the very sincerity with which he devoted himself to securing its success rendered him, as he advanced in years, less and less capable of seeing beyond it.

Francis Ferdinand, however, his nephew and his heir, held a very different opinion about the Dynasty's mission in the present. For him Dualism was no state of perfection, but only a passing phase in the Monarchy's long history. He saw with a clear eye that the Magyar-German compact was bound up with racial oppression, and that so long as it remained in force, the Danubian Unit went in danger of a devastating explosion of nationalism. What he would have accomplished had he ascended the throne, it is impossible to say. People are always apt to magnify possibilities that have been denied the chance of realisation, yet this much seems

certain, that he contemplated the abolition of Dualism, and the substitution of a " Trialism " in its place. The Slav was to be raised to an equality with the German and the Magyar, and to receive his just share in the political control of a state which depended upon him so largely for its wealth and population.

Had Francis Ferdinand lived to do his work, he might have created an epoch in Hapsburg history even more important than that of the Ausgleich. The forward movement which triumphed in Austria in 1906, might have conquered the remainder of the Monarchy within the next generation. Such hopes were cut short by his assassination at Sarayevo in June 1914. That crime was the tragedy of Austria. By plunging her into a European war, it cancelled in a moment all the constructive work of half a century and made the wound of nationalism break out again, to bleed more violently, perhaps, than it has ever done since 1848.

We have seen that this mortal disaster was due to no causes latent in Austria herself. To understand its antecedents, we must examine contemporary events in the other half of the Monarchy, the " Crown of St. Stephen."

CHAPTER IV

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS

In Vienna people like to say that "the East begins at the River Leitha": if we borrow the epigram with the modification that the "Balkans" begin there, we shall bring Hungarian history into its true perspective.

Vienna is not merely the dividing-point between two economic worlds: it is also the point of transition between opposite phenomena of racial distribution.

West of the Leitha, the nationalities of Europe are mainly grouped in compact blocks, which correspond with considerable accuracy to the physical and economic articulation of the continent.[1] The national basis would suggest itself naturally to the observer as a principle of political organisation, and this quarter of the world was in fact the cradle of the National State. South-East of the Leitha, however, the nationalities are interlaced in inextricable confusion over an area that extends to the Black Sea and the Ægean, and the international congress which will follow the war might well despair in this region of coaxing sovereign national states out of Geography, not to speak of reconciling their structure with the necessities of modern economic life.

The problem must be faced nevertheless. The populations of South-Eastern Europe are possessed by the idea of nationality to a morbid degree. Intimate contact has produced mutual exasperation instead of understanding and good-fellowship, while the difficulty of devising any compromise that would deal impartial

[1] For a visual presentation of this fact see Map VII.

justice to all has only made each faction determined to push its own interests recklessly at the expense of its rivals.

These nations contribute little to European culture. Hitherto they have been accustomed to take rather than to give, and their spiritual evolution has not the same intense interest for us as that of Germany or of Russia. Their importance to Europe lies in their immense capacity for doing her injury.

If the destructive power these elements have accumulated threatened nothing more precious than themselves with destruction, their fate would be comparatively indifferent to us, and a reader who had followed with patience our laborious diagnosis of German and Austrian complaints, and our minute prescriptions for their cure, might refuse attention to Magyar or Serbian pathology. Yet the physician comes to heal the sick rather than the comparatively sound, and if the sickness is an infectious plague, the interests of the whole community urgently demand his intervention.

The Nearer Eastern Question has been with us now for a century in continuously aggravated form. The Congress of Berlin tried to bury it underground in 1878, and succeeded in laying a mine where the slightest explosion threatened to blow up the European powder-magazine. Till this mine is thoroughly damped, we shall not have reached our supreme objective — the abolition of European war.

The whole of the unrestful zone beyond Vienna thus falls within our scope, and in the present chapter we shall not confine ourselves to the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy, but shall extend our discussion to Hungary's Balkan neighbours. The various national problems of the region are indeed so closely intertwined

that we could not deal with any one of them in isolation. We will therefore include Hungary with the rest under the common denomination of a "Balkan State," and we will approach her first, because she holds the premier place in the group both in geographical situation and in degree of spiritual and material development. We shall find that she displays all the characteristics of the Balkan type.

A. *Hungary*

The Kingdom of Hungary covers the major part of the middle Danube-basin. From the junction of the March tributary as far as the "Iron Gates" the river flows through Hungarian territory. The Carpathian Range, which circles from the former point to the second in a vast sweep towards the North and East,[1] constitutes both the watershed of the Danube-system and the frontier of the Hungarian state. Southwards alone the kingdom is bounded first by the Drave descending from the Eastern face of the Alps, and then by the Danube itself, from the point where it unites with the Drave and adopts the latter stream's Easterly course. The mountainous zone on the other side of this line, which intervenes between the Danube-basin and the Adriatic, has never been incorporated in Hungary directly.

The heart of the Hungarian land is the Alföld, an alluvial plain deposited in the hollow of a vanished sea. In shape it is roughly an isosceles triangle, with the Southern river-boundary of the kingdom as its base, and with its apex at the Vereczka Pass,[2] the midmost point of the Carpathian arc. The Danube flows through it from Buda-Pest to its junction with the Drave, and

[1] See map on p. 105.
[2] Immediately East of the Ujok Pass.

it includes the strip of country between the Danube and the Theiss, as well as a wide zone beyond the Left or Eastern bank of the latter river.

This central plain was occupied by the Magyars in the ninth century A.D. Bursting through the Carpathians by the Vereczka Pass, they entered the Alföld at its apex, flooded it with their settlements, and pressed still further up the Danube above Buda till they were checked, as we have seen, by the Austrian and Styrian Marks.

Yet the Magyars never made the whole of Hungary their own. On either flank of the Alföld there are stretches of hill-country, included like itself within the encircling wall of the Carpathians, but sundered from it by lesser mountain barriers. In two comparatively isolated regions the earlier possessors of the land managed to maintain their existence under Magyar dominion.

North-West of the Alföld a series of long, winding valleys descends from the Carpathians and opens upon the Danube between Pressburg and Buda-Pest. They have remained in the possession of the Slovaks, a Slavonic population hardly distinguishable in dialect from the Tchechs of Moravia and Bohemia on the other side of the River March.

East of the Alföld lies the district called Transylvania. Between the Vereczka Pass and the Iron Gates the main chain of the Carpathians makes an extremely salient angle towards the East, but a secondary branch of the range takes the shortest course from the one point to the other, and skirts the Eastern side of the Alföld in a North-and-South direction.[1] A considerable extent of

[1] In the thirteenth century this ridge was clothed in dense forest, and the settlers who penetrated it from the direction of the Alföld therefore gave the name of Transylvania to the country they reached on the other side of it.

tangled hill and valley is caught within this split in the mountain line, and is almost equally secluded by it from the more open country on all three sides.

The passes which lead through the outer Carpathian wall, North-Eastward into the Moldavian steppe and Southward into the plain of Wallachia, carry as many lines of railway as those which pierce the interior wall and debouch upon the levels of the Alföld. The province is rich in rivers, but the water-system hardly facilitates communication with the outer world. The countless streams have to concentrate their forces in three main channels before they can succeed in breaking through the mountain barriers, and even then they content themselves with precipitous gorges, barely wide enough for the current itself. Two of these channels,[1] however, find their way to the Alföld and only one[2] to the Wallachian plain, so that to that extent Transylvania may be reckoned to have closer geographical links with Hungary than with Roumania.

When the Magyars appeared in the Alföld, this sheltered province was already occupied by the Roumans, a population of Latin speech.[3]

The Kingdom of Hungary was thus heterogeneous in nationality from the beginning, and as her history developed the confusion increased.

After the conversion of the Magyars in the eleventh century A.D., German colonies were introduced to civilise the country. They opened up the mineral resources of the Slovak hills, and established themselves

[1] The Maros and the Szamos. [2] The Alt (Aluta).

[3] Probably they are descended from the Latinised inhabitants of Illyricum, the section of the Roman Empire between the Alps, the Drave and the Adriatic. When Slavonic immigrants from the North descended upon the Adriatic coast in the seventh century A.D. (see below), they would have been likely to press the native provincials Eastward across the Danube.

still more successfully in the no-man's-land of Transylvania. The seven Saxon towns of this province were chartered in the thirteenth century by the Hungarian Crown as practically autonomous communities.[1]

During the same period the Ruthenes,[2] the southerly wing of the Russian race, overflowed the Carpathian dyke, and following upon the heels of the Magyars, possessed themselves of the extreme fringe of the Alföld from the Vereczka Pass as far as Ungvar.

These two new factors added to the complication, but the present phase of the national problem in Hungary has been principally conditioned by a much later event.

An essential element in the modern Balkan type is a past experience of the Turk. The evolution of all the Balkan States might be stated in terms of a devastating Turkish conquest, which destroyed the previous tradition of native culture, and a hardly less devastating war of Liberation, waged with a depraved ferocity and an exalted heroism. The heroism seems to inspire the liberated populations with the spiritual energy to rebuild their national life from the foundations, the ferocity smirches the fresh page in their history with a Turkish stain, which it takes many generations to wash away.

Hungary suffered this characteristic Balkan calamity in common with her South-Eastern neighbours. In 1526 the Magyar Kingdom perished on the terrible field of Mohacs, and for a century and a half[3] the Alföld was ruled by a Turkish pasha established in the fortress of Buda. The Turk was expelled again, as we have seen, after the crucial siege of Vienna in 1683. Half a century of vigorous campaigns drove him back behind

[1] Hence the German synonym for Transylvania—"Siebenbürgen."

[2] Also known as "Little Russians" or "Ukrainians." See Ch. VIII. C.

[3] 1541-1686.

the line of the Save and the Iron Gates, and the Peace of Belgrade in 1739 delimited a frontier between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires which resigned the whole of Hungary to the latter.[1] Yet the ejected Turk had not failed to set his mark upon the land, and the victors found the Alföld a desert.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the Hapsburg Monarchy was entering the "Strong Government" phase, and the newly-acquired territories offered a magnificent field of experiment for the ideas of "Enlightened Autocracy."

The country was rich in natural resources: it lay waste through want of population to develop them, and the Government met the need by schemes of colonisation and town-building on an extensive scale. The re-construction of Hungary was the most striking success of Maria Theresa's and Joseph's policy. During their reigns the material traces of the Turk's presence were obliterated, and before the end of the century the Kingdom once more approached the standard of Central Europe, in acute contrast to the territories still blighted by Turkish misgovernment immediately beyond her frontier. Yet in restoring Hungary's material prosperity, her new rulers immeasurably aggravated the impending problem of nationality.

Before the Turkish conquest the Alföld had been the stronghold of the Magyar race, and the Magyars had therefore suffered more severely than any other element in the country by the devastation of the Turkish wars. The remnant of the nation that survived on the plain, and the fragment of it that lay West of Buda along the

[1] This frontier remained unaltered until the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. The only change in the interval was the annexation to Austria of the Dalmatian coast-province, formerly a Venetian possession, at the settlement of 1814.

Austrian and Styrian border, might perhaps have made good the losses by their own gradual increase under the regime of peace and security that had descended upon them at last. The process, however, would have been extremely slow, and the autocracy was neither patient nor far-sighted, while it would have ignored the factor of nationality on principle, even had it realised its bearing on the situation.

The Government therefore re-peopled the Alföld by the indiscriminate introduction of settlers from all the surrounding races. Roumans from Transylvania were allowed to encroach upon the plain till they had advanced half the distance between their mountains and the Theiss. Serb refugees from Ottoman territory were encouraged to settle on the Northern bank of the Danube. Enclaves of German colonists from Swabia were distributed all over the land to leaven the other elements with Western civilisation. By the time the work was finished Hungary had been reduced to such a racial medley that the Magyars no longer constituted more than a bare majority of the population.[1]

[1] An analysis of the census taken in 1900 for the Kingdom of Hungary (exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia) is the best commentary on the result:

Nationalities	*Numbers*		*Percentages*	
Magyars		8,589,000		51.00
Roumans . . .	2,785,000		16.54	
Slovaks	1,991,000		11.82	
Germans . . .	1,980,000		11.76	
Serbs	435,000		2.59	
Ruthenes . . .	423,000		2.51	
Croats	189,000		1.12	
Others	446,000		2.66	
Non-Magyar nationalities		8,249,000		49.00
Total population		16,838,000		100.00

Had historical continuity been broken as completely in Hungary as in other Balkan lands, this confusion of tongues might have proved harmless. Joseph's political genius might have steered the country into the wake of the Swiss Confederation, and initiated it into the European fraternity as a non-national state. The Turkish rule in Hungary, however, had been short, and it had never extended to the whole kingdom. The Slovak country in the North, Pressburg on the Danube, and a strip of territory between the Danube and the Drave along the Styrian boundary had all escaped conquest by electing the Hapsburg as their king and sheltering themselves beneath his strong arm. In the opposite quarter Transylvania had been saved by a vigorous line of princes, who secured the autonomy of the province under the suzerainty of the Turkish Empire. In a very considerable portion of the country the mediæval tradition thus maintained itself unbroken, and when the unconquered North-Western border, the Turkish pashalik, and the Transylvanian principality were united once more, the forces derived from the past were strong enough to challenge the Hapsburgs' schemes for the future.

We have seen that the Hungarian "Estates" took the lead in the struggle between Centralisation and Particularism which convulsed the whole Hapsburg Monarchy from 1780 to 1849. They were able to do so because mediæval Hungary had developed her parliamentary institutions more strongly than any other European country except our own.

The Hungarian nobility was abnormally numerous. The majority of the class consisted simply of the free proprietors in the Magyar-speaking districts, including almost everybody who was not a serf. Many were

naturally of quite low standing, but there was also a contingent of great landed magnates, and these were principally to be found on the non-Magyar territory. They were descended from barons established there by the kings to keep the subject races in hand or to guard the border against foreign powers. Some of these families were of pure Magyar blood, still more of them, perhaps, were of native origin and had been Magyarised by contact with the royal court, but the difference was immaterial: in tradition and culture all alike had become Magyar to the core.

Both these estates of nobility were represented in the Diet.[1] The magnates ordinarily overshadowed the minor gentry, but since they were equally Magyar in their point of view, they consistently directed the Diet's activities in the Magyar interest, and whenever less oligarchic tendencies prevailed, it was always the body of the Magyar freemen, never the unenfranchised mass of the subject nationalities, that made its voice heard in parliament. Thus the Hungarian Diet, unlike the diets of Bohemia and Tyrol, showed a strong national bias from the first, and particularist traditionalism passed over into nationalistic chauvinism more rapidly here than in any other part of the Hapsburg Empire.

Long before the struggle with absolutism was over the Magyars gave unmistakable proof of their intentions with regard to the other nationalities in Hungary. In 1848, when liberty seemed on the point of triumph, the Serb population in the South-Eastern part of the Alföld sent a deputation to the Hungarian Diet assembled at Pressburg. They expressed their determination to aid the Magyars in defending the

[1] As in England, the representation was based on a county-organisation.

new-found liberties of their common country, but required the recognition of the Serb language as the official medium in Serb localities. The Magyar ministry refused to consider their claim. Magyar, they declared, must be the only language of administration in the whole kingdom of Hungary, and when the Serb leaders refused their allegiance on such terms as these, Kossuth replied that "then the sword must decide between them."

The ruin of the Magyars' hopes in the following year was largely due to the dread with which the rest of the Hungarians looked forward to their success. All other nationalities in the kingdom sympathised with the Hapsburg cause, and the Serbs, at least, fought valiantly on its behalf. When the events of 1866 enabled the Magyars to snatch victory out of defeat, the forebodings of their alien fellow-citizens were more than realised. To the remaining inhabitants of the Hapsburg Monarchy the Ausgleich brought some measure of relief from the intolerable regime of the 'fifties: for the subject populations of Hungary it opened the gloomiest page of a precarious history.

The Compromise with the Germans of Austria and the Hapsburg Dynasty delivered Hungary into the hand of the Magyar Liberal Party. If the Liberals of Austria correspond to the English Radicals of 1832, we can only liken their Magyar namesakes to the men of 1688. The "Glorious Revolution" was heralded with a flourish of trumpets, and the tale has been continually enhanced by conventional eloquence; yet in Hungary, as in England, the "era of free institutions" merely established the ascendancy of a close oligarchy.

The Hungarian magnates, who in 1867 emerged victorious from nearly a century of political warfare,

reproduced both the virtues and the vices of the English Whigs.[1] They treasured an ingrained tradition of statesmanship that has been valuable to the backward majority of their countrymen, and experience had made them convinced haters of certain pernicious political ideals; but they were not concerned to practise their principles too pedantically, and in the last resort they subordinated all scruples to the retention of their power.

The Liberalism of the Magyar Whigs was more than a veneer. In questions of religion, for instance, Hungary remained true to her traditions of toleration.[2] But they were fanatical nationalists, and the whole political energy of the party rapidly became absorbed in a campaign of Magyarisation.

Magyar chauvinism has been of a different stamp from the policy of any German party in Austria. The Austrian Germans have always been content to dominate their fellow-nationalities. The Magyars, however, were less civilised than the Germans, and they bore a much larger proportion to the total population of their

[1] The conservation of the Whig families depended on the system of "Entail," which had developed in the seventeenth century. In Hungary the consolidation of landed estates was still more drastically promoted by a law forbidding any noble to alienate his land. This measure was introduced by Louis I. in 1351, and remained in force till 1848.

[2] Hungary is divided between many creeds. The Roman Church draws its adherents from three of the races—Magyars, Germans and Slovaks—and accounted in 1900 for nearly 49% of the population. Calvinism, the next strongest sect (14%), is confined to the Magyars. All the Serbs and a majority of the Roumans are orthodox (13%), while the remainder of the Roumans and all the Ruthenes are Uniats (11%), observing the Orthodox ritual but owning allegiance to the Pope. Lutheranism (7.5%) is common to Slovaks and Germans.

The era of Turkish rule in Hungary was contemporary with the Catholic reaction. While the Hapsburgs were savagely repressing Protestantism in the territories under their control, the Turks extended their toleration to all Christian sects in the Alföld, and the Magyar Calvinists in revolt against the tyranny of Vienna often made common cause with the Moslem across the border. In the autonomous principality of Transylvania Protestantism was the official religion.

country. They aimed at nothing less than the extirpation of other languages and cultures, and the ultimate conversion to their own nationality of every inhabitant of the Hungarian Kingdom.

The methods for obtaining this result which were inaugurated by the Magyar Liberals after 1867 were an imitation on a far larger scale of Prussia's policy on her Polish frontier. Nothing comparable to them has been perpetrated in Western Europe for at least a century. To find an English parallel we must hark back once more to the Whigs of 1688, and call to mind the repression of the Catholics by the British administration in Ireland during the black era that followed the Battle of the Boyne.

The Magyars, like the Russians, Ottoman Turks and other peoples on the outskirts of European civilisation, are ostentatious of theoretical enlightenment, but their borrowed idealism serves to cloak the survival of realities which have ceased to be possible further West.

By the new constitution all citizens of Hungary were declared equal before the law without distinction of race, and were expressly guaranteed the enjoyment of their national individuality. Yet the same constitution recognises Magyar as the only language of state, and the other tongues have been jealously excluded from official use.

This ordinance is perpetually in evidence. In purely Slovak or Rouman towns the names of the streets are posted up in Magyar, and the name of the place itself is Magyarised in official parlance. On the state railways the Magyar language has a monopoly: time-tables, notices, and even the tickets are printed in Magyar alone, and Magyar is the administrative language of the railway staff. The same thing applies to all other

public services. Magyar is the sole medium in which their business is conducted.

It might be answered that these are superficialities. "The meticulous enforcement of Magyar is childish rather than oppressive. Official formulas are easily learnt by rote. If Englishmen or Americans who know no foreign language can still travel without inconvenience on the Continent, the Slovak peasant ought not to be at a loss on a Hungarian railway. Moreover, some general measure of linguistic uniformity is essential if the various nationalities of Hungary are to be organised at all in a single state. The Welsh citizen of Great Britain and the Breton citizen of France are not outraged by the ubiquitousness of the English and French tongues. Why should not Roumans and Slovaks be as reasonable as they? In almost every European state there are minorities of alien speech, to whom the "national" language is merely a *lingua franca*. It is true that in Hungary little more than half the population inherit from their parents the ruling tongue; yet if the absolute majority of the Magyar-speaking element is slight, they are in a great relative majority over any other single linguistic group in the population. If Magyar were deposed from its supremacy, no other language current in Hungary would be qualified to take its place. It is unfortunate that Hungary is such a medley of races, but the fault lies with history, and not with the Magyar statesmen of the last half-century."

The Magyar would thus defend the Hungarian language-ordinances as a necessity of state, yet more than petty inconvenience is involved: the measure places half the population at a serious disadvantage in face of the other half. It gives those who speak Magyar as their native tongue an undue monopoly of public

service. The state itself must suffer by forfeiting the assistance of some of its most capable citizens.

Again the Magyar will have a ready answer. "We Magyars," he will say, "have a much higher standard of education and culture than the other inhabitants of our country. Power gravitates towards efficiency, and even if no language-ordinances had been passed, the Magyars would have found themselves in control of the Hungarian state."

This also is true. In 1867 the Magyars were ahead of the rest in education, and they have likewise maintained their lead in the meanwhile. Yet the history of education in Hungary during this period should put the Magyar apologist to silence.

The Magyars have ensured their superiority by paralysing their neighbours' progress rather than by progressing themselves. If the subject nationalities are more and not less illiterate now than they were fifty years ago, it is because the Magyar government has closed practically all their secondary, and the great majority of their primary schools, and has made it increasingly hard to obtain instruction in any but the Magyar tongue. The Magyars' political monopoly was originally justified by culture, but they have perverted politics to the monopolisation of culture itself by grotesquely uncultured means. Under these circumstances the relative degree of education attained at present by the Magyars and their fellow-citizens loses all significance as a standard of political value.

Hungary, however, is at least a constitutional country. Why, then, have the minor nationalities failed to redress their wrongs by constitutional pressure? They amount to little less than half the population. Surely they could return such a formidable contingent of representa-

tives to the parliament at Buda-Pest, that Magyar ministries would be driven to a compromise?

This door is closed because the government of Hungary is not constitutional in the modern sense: it is only called so by courtesy. The country still awaits its "Great Reform Bill," and the mediæval franchise, which Great Britain sloughed off in 1832, has here endured till the present day. We have said that the Magyar politicians of 1867 were Whigs: we shall discover their "rotten boroughs" in the non-Magyar constituencies. They were as well-versed in corruption as English politicians were in the eighteenth century, and they reinforced bribery by intimidation. In non-Magyar constituencies the precedent of overawing "opposition" voters by the presence of troops has become well-established, and the device has more than once led to bloodshed which would have been called "massacre" if it had occurred in Turkey.

No redress, therefore, is possible through parliament, because the leaders of the non-Magyar nationalities can never obtain a seat there. They are rigidly debarred from a political career, and even in the neutral sphere of literature, art, history, and all that is included under the name of culture, they are made to suffer for the privilege of leadership.

The Magyars have adopted the Greek tyrant's policy of "cutting off the tallest ears in the cornfield." Any form of distinction renders a Slovak, Rouman or Serb citizen of Hungary immediately suspect to his country's police. Personal liberty in Hungary suffers direly from the want of a Habeas Corpus Act. The laws of conspiracy are so comprehensive that arrest without specification of the charge and protracted imprisonment before trial are events of normal occurrence. When

it is remembered that, in virtue of the language-ordinances, all proceedings in court have to be conducted exclusively in the Magyar language, the picture of racial oppression is complete.

This atrocious system was eleborated by the Liberal Party which came into power in 1867.

The Liberal regime was protracted. Deàk, the statesman of the Ausgleich, was succeeded in 1876 by Count Coloman Tisza, the Magyar Walpole, who remained uninterruptedly in office until 1890. His resignation in that year started the party on its decline, but its fall was staved off for a dozen years longer by the raising of those ecclesiastical issues which Austria had settled as early as 1868. In 1902 the Liberals were first challenged on their real standing-ground, the maintenance of the Ausgleich.

A radical movement had been gaining strength, which aspired to pass beyond compromise to independence. The ideal of the "Left" was self-sufficiency. They wished to see Hungary take her place as a sovereign unit, on an entire equality with the other states of Europe.

In our analysis of the Danubian Monarchy we have noted that great economic difficulties stood, and always will stand, in the way of such a development. The only chance of overcoming them would be the enthusiastic co-operation for this end of the whole Hungarian people. The first object, therefore, of the Magyar Left should have been the conciliation of the non-Magyar nationalities. They should have driven their Liberal opponents from office on this issue, justified their own installation by a complete reversal of the prevailing chauvinism and a definitive solution of the racial problem on democratic lines, and then joined

battle with Austria and the Dynasty on the question of Independence with the whole country at their back.

Instead of this, they chose the language-question in its most inflammatory form as the chief plank in their platform. They demanded the substitution of Magyar for German as the executive language in all the Hungarian regiments of the Joint Army, with the avowed object of promoting the Magyarisation of the non-Magyar Hungarian conscripts.

This was a simultaneous challenge to the Liberals, the subject nationalities, and the Crown, for the Ausgleich had left the supreme control of the Army in the King-Emperor's hands, and Francis Joseph was convinced that the efficiency of the service and therewith the safety of the Monarchy as a whole depended upon strict uniformity of organisation.

The sovereign failed to maintain the Liberals in office. His persistent summoning of Liberal ministries was countered by obstruction on the Opposition's part. Count Stephen Tisza, the son of Coloman, who took office in 1903 as a forlorn hope, tried to meet the situation by revolutionising parliamentary procedure, but he merely provoked parliamentary anarchy as deplorable as the break-down at Vienna in 1897. At the beginning of 1905 he appealed to the electors and suffered utter defeat. The Liberal Party was dead, and a coalition of the radical groups had won the leadership of the Magyar nation.

The King-Emperor, however, refused to give in. He proceeded to govern without parliament's assistance, and towards the end of the year he took the offensive against the Coalition by engineering a bill for universal suffrage. Their attitude towards the national question made the Coalition defenceless against such an attack,

and they surrendered at discretion as soon as it became certain that a bill of identical purport was on the verge of passing into law in the Austrian half of the Monarchy.

At the beginning of 1906 a Coalition ministry which had renounced the "Magyar word of command" was at last called into office, but their quiver had been emptied of its arrows.

Towards the end of 1908 they introduced a carefully planned reform bill, which would have advanced the Hungarian franchise from the mediæval to the Prussian level. The electorate was to be increased very considerably in numbers, the qualification for suffrage was to be literacy, the electors were to be classified according to degrees of education, and the more highly qualified were to possess more than one vote. Political power was thus represented as the privilege of culture, but since the dominant Magyars had long been engaged in exterminating all non-Magyar culture within the borders of Hungary, the bill was calculated to produce a democratic impression without extending the franchise beyond the limits of the Magyar race.

It was of little consequence, therefore, that the ministry's main programme of independence eclipsed their perfunctory efforts towards internal reform before the franchise bill had time to pass into law. Its mere formulation proved once and for all that the subject nationalities had nothing to expect from Magyar Radicalism,[1] and in the trial of strength with Austria and the Crown to which the Coalition now committed itself, Francis Joseph was still able to wield his master-
on.

[1] Although one of the components of the Coalition was the "People's arty," a clerical group which had taken the cause of the nationalities nto its programme.

Early in 1909 the more extreme elements of the Left forced the Coalition premier, Dr. Wekerle, to open the campaign for economic autonomy with the demand for a separate Hungarian state bank. The Crown refused to consider the question so long as the franchise remained unreformed: such a momentous proposal, Francis Joseph declared, must be endorsed by a parliament truly representative of the whole Hungarian people.

This shrewdly-aimed blow broke up the Coalition into fragments. The moderates and the intransigeants were each strong enough to stalemate the other, no ministry could be formed, and in 1909, as in 1905, parliamentary government was suspended. At the beginning of 1910 Francis Joseph appointed a ministry of "king's friends" under the leadership of Count Khuen-Hedervary, a notorious political "boss" who had thoroughly learnt his trade during a twenty-years tenure of the Croatian vice-royalty.[1] The Hedervary cabal scattered promises broadcast to all aggrieved elements in the country, and the elections conducted under its auspices next summer surpassed even Hungarian precedent in their corruption. When the new parliament met, the Count had a docile majority at his beck, and the Magyars saw their constitutional tradition reduced to a farce.

The lesson sank deep. Khuen-Hedervary was too shady a character to serve as more than a stop-gap, and when he vanished from the scene all sections of Magyar opinion were more than content to accept Count Stephen Tisza once more. Tisza remains in office at the present moment, and his restoration means that the evolution of Magyar politics has come to a dead stop.

[1] See Section B.

He stands for a reaction to the programme of 1867: compromise with Austria and the Dynasty, war to the knife against the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary itself. The Magyars have realised that democratisation and Magyarisation are incompatible, and they have preferred to sacrifice progress to chauvinism.

Thus Hungary and Austria have diverged profoundly in their political history since the year of the Ausgleich. In 1867 Hungary possessed the more enlightened tradition of the two, and the initiative towards constitutional government came from the Magyar side. Then for a time they marched abreast; but when the problem of nationality emerged like a steep cliff athwart their path, Austria pressed forward, and after a hazardous struggle attained the summit: Hungary halted, and without even scanning the cliff's face for a handhold, turned about and began to retrace her steps.

Between 1867 and 1914 the political standard of the Magyar nation has grieviously deteriorated.

The results of our survey warrant the assumption that if the two Central-European monarchies suffer defeat in the present war, the subject nationalities of Hungary, when the plebiscite at last enables them to express their desire, will act like the Polish subjects of Germany, and vote to the last man for liberation from the Magyar state. We have to examine whether their secession from Hungary will involve the disruption of the Danubian Empire.

Just as in the case of Poland, their extrication will necessarily be incomplete. Geography has made Hungary a natural unit, sundered from her neighbours and knit together within herself by prominent physical barriers, and within this area the races are extraordinarily

intermingled. Certain minorities will therefore remain fast in prison, and it will be the first duty of the European Congress to convert their enforced abode into a house of liberty, before it discusses the destiny of their more fortunate companions who are able to effect their escape.

The parties to the European Conference must guarantee the observance of the excellent law regarding the rights of nationalities, which has nominally been valid in Hungary since it was passed in 1868, but has remained in practice a dead letter.

Critics will point out that such a guarantee would be an intense humiliation for the Magyar people, that they would only submit to it under constraint, and that every time a Slovak or German-speaking Hungarian appealed from Magyar injustice to the guarantors, there would be danger of racial war in Hungary and of a conflagration in Europe. This is true, but it is equally certain that the minorities will no longer submit to Magyar misgovernment, and that if the Concert of Europe does not help them, they will help themselves, and unhesitatingly appeal for intervention to the several states of their own respective nationality which lie immediately beyond the Hungarian frontier. The evil inheritance of the past cannot be charmed away in a moment, and no reconstruction of the Hungarian state will leave all parties content. In either event, therefore, the immediate future will be fraught with anxiety, and the most we can do is to initiate Hungary into a more promising career than she has followed in the immediate past. If some hearts must still be sore, it is better that the Magyars should chafe at restrictions upon racial persecution than that the minor nationalities should groan under exposure to it.

From the sentimental point of view, we need have little scruple in wounding the Magyars' pride. Individually they are an attractive people, and they have known how to keep the sympathies of Western Europe alive on their behalf by harping on the tragedy of 1849; but since the year of the Compromise they have behaved like the servant in the parable, who was forgiven by his lord and then seized his fellow-servant by the throat. They cannot altogether escape the hypocrite's retribution.

In the interests of common justice, therefore, Europe must guarantee the alien enclaves in Magyar territory. Yet a guaranteed re-organisation of the Hungarian state on still more drastic lines might well be in the best interests of the Magyars themselves, for it would be their one chance of inducing the much larger blocks of alien population which are not debarred from secession by geography, to hold fast of their own free will to their present allegiance.

The principal terms of such a guaranteed re-settlement should run as follows:

(i.) Local self-government should be re-organised. At present it is based upon the mediæval counties, which are very unequal in size and entirely out of relation to racial boundaries. These county divisions should be recast into new local units, standardised approximately in area and population like the French departments, and each department should be made racially homogeneous as far as possible. This would give every nationality in Hungary a number of local units more or less proportional to its percentage in the total population of the country. The department should employ its national language as its official medium of administration, and should

be the basis of electoral organisation for the central Hungarian parliament.

(ii.) There should be no parliamentary devolution to national blocks. The races are so interlaced that it would be impossible to carve out areas including all the Rouman or all the German inhabitants of Hungary, and endow them with extensive Home Rule. The various national territories are too scattered for effective organisation as unities.

(iii.) On the other hand, national education and all public activities that contribute to national culture should be placed under the exclusive control of national committees, consisting of the deputies elected to the central Hungarian parliament by the various departments belonging to each particular nationality. These committees should share between them the annual budget voted for public education by the parliament as a whole, in proportion to the percentage of the total population which they respectively represent.

(iv.) All questions of universal interest, such as communications and defence, social and economic development, fiscal relations with other countries, consular service and foreign policy in general, should remain as heretofore within the province of the central parliament,[1] now to be elected on the new departmental basis.

If the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary were assured some such reforms as these, it is conceivable that geographical and economic considerations would prevail with them over hatred of the Magyars and desire for incorporation in their own national states; but

[1] And therefore presumably subject to the conditions of the Ausgleich, unless other circumstances lead the Hungarian parliament to terminate the connection with Austria.

prediction is impossible, and we must reckon with the contingency that certain elements may in any event secede.[1] Will the cohesion of the whole Hapsburg Monarchy be endangered by their secession?

The German colonies in the Alföld and in the Slovak hills are too widely dispersed for extrication,[2] and the Slovaks themselves do not come into question from our immediate standpoint. They may be eager to secede from Hungary, but they would only do so in order to coalesce with the Tchechs of Austria. They have no blood-brethren outside the frontiers of the Danubian Empire, and the satisfaction of their national aspirations would affect the internal organisation of the whole unit rather than its solidarity towards the outer world. We are left with the Ruthenes, Roumans and Serbs.

(i.) The Roumans are the strongest non-Magyar nationality in Hungary, and we have seen that they are concentrated in Transylvania and the adjoining strip of the Alföld, towards the border of the national Roumanian Kingdom.[3] Their transference, therefore, from Hungary to Roumania would seem a natural

[1] In spite of Magyarisation, the Slovaks, Ruthenes and Roumans have steadily been disengaging themselves since 1867 from the Magyar toils. The growth of a native intellegenzia has heightened their national consciousness, and in recent years the current of emigration to the U.S.A. has brought wealth into their districts. Peasants who have made their little pile in America have been buying out the big estates of the Whig magnates, and thereby freeing their soil from the alien master's presence.

[2] Though the Germans of Hungary would escape from the Magyars if they could, for the Ausgleich has secured them no better treatment than the other nationalities. While the Magyars have been in alliance with the Germans of Austria, they have not hesitated to "Magyarise" the two million Germans in their midst. For the distribution of the latter see Map III.

[3] The free Roumans of the present kingdom are probably descended from Transylvanian settlers, who during the early Middle Ages pushed out through the Carpathians and established themselves in the open steppes.

application of the national principle to political grouping. Since Transylvania is hardly less isolated from the Alföld than from the Roumanian plains, the geographical objections would be comparatively slight, while Roumania on her part would gain immensely in territorial compactness by the incorporation of this region. At present she embraces Transylvania on two sides, as the young moon holds the old moon in its arms, and she is eager to grow to her full orb.

Unfortunately, however, the heart of Transylvania is tenanted by an important non-Rouman population. Three counties are almost exclusively inhabited by the Szekels, a flying column of the Magyar host which became entangled and isolated in the Transylvanian hills, when the main body of the nation pressed down into the Alföld. There are also the Saxon towns, which are the most important German enclaves in all Hungary.

The Szekel and Saxon districts cannot be separated from the Rouman zone which hems them in. The whole geographical block must be transferred or retained together, and if the *status quo* does injustice to two-and-three-quarter millions of Roumans, the alternative would merely reverse the parts, and put over a million Saxons and Szekels in an identical plight.[1] We are in presence of a case where a very considerable minority must be disappointed. The decision probably depends upon the action of the Roumanian Kingdom in the

[1] The census of 1900 revealed the following figures :—

Saxons	233,000	9.5%
Szekels	815,000	33.2%
Roumans in Transylvania	1,397,000	56.9%
Total pop. of Transylvania	2,445,000	100.0%
Roumans in the Alfold	1,388,000	
Total pop. of whole block	3,833,000 (of whom the Roumans constituted 72.43%).	

present crisis. If Roumania intervenes in the war in favour of the Allies, the prize will fall into her grasp: if she remains neutral till hostilities cease, her claims will not obtain preference in the subsequent settlement.

(ii.) The Serb settlements in the Alföld are conterminous with those of the Roumans. They skirt the Northern bank of the Danube from a point opposite the junction of the Morava tributary as far upstream as the junction of the Drave, but they are bewilderingly entangled with German and Magyar enclaves. The majority of them lie within the "Banat of Temesvar," a square field delimited in the South-Eastern corner of the Alföld by the Transylvanian mountains on the East, and the Maros, Theiss and Danube rivers on the other three sides.

The Banat was one of the principal theatres of eighteenth-century colonisation: the Roumans have established themselves in the Eastern half of it, and the Western half is divided between Germans and Serbs, while the Magyar element is almost negligible. If the Rouman section became detached from Hungary, the annexation of the remainder to Serbia would be a logical corollary.[1] The courses of the Theiss and the Maros offer a good frontier in this quarter for the Magyar state, and the Serbian national kingdom South of the Danube will be anxious to incorporate its "irredenta" on the river's further shore, in order to remove Belgrade beyond the range of siege-artillery planted on Hungarian soil. If, however, the Rouman part of the Banat fails to break away from Hungary, its fate will be decisive for the Serb districts

[1] This would involve the transference of the German enclaves in the Banat as well; but they are doomed in any case to be merged in a state of alien nationality, and any alternative would be a relief from Magyarisation.

as well. They are no more than a wedge driven in between the Magyar and Rouman populations of the Alföld,[1] and could not be excluded from the Hungarian frontier if the country on both sides of them remained within it.

(iii.) The Ruthenes occupy the opposite corner of the Alföld, round the head-waters of the Theiss. They number less than half a million, and are divided from their Magyar neighbours by no natural boundary, while the other twenty-five millions who speak the same dialect[2] live on the further side of the Carpathians. The geographical factor, therefore, strongly favours the existing political situation, yet the force of national antipathy and sympathy is more imperious still, and the mountain barrier is not impassable. Two lines of railway traverse that section of the range under the shadow of which the Hungarian Ruthenes dwell, and one of the routes is the famous Vereczka Pass, which gave entrance into the land first to the Magyars and then to the Ruthenes themselves, and has witnessed the passage of Russian invaders during the operations of the present war. It is therefore possible that the Ruthenes may set geography at defiance, and throw in their lot with the vast body of their race which stretches uninterruptedly Eastward from the Carpathians' further slopes to the upper waters of the Don.

These, then, are the three instances in which Hungary is liable to suffer territorial loss. Our discussion has yielded no certain conclusions,[3] but it has sufficed to show that secession in these quarters will not jeopardise the continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire. Even

[1] See Map III. [2] See Ch. VIII. C.

[3] Rectifications of the Hungarian frontier are indeed so problematical that we have not attempted to indicate possibilities in the maps attached to this book.

if all possibilities were actualised, the Magyar Kingdom would still be left with nearly twelve million inhabitants[1] in occupation of a compact and productive territory. The balance between Austria and Hungary would, of course, be destroyed, but the break-down of the Dual System might strengthen the inward cohesion of the Monarchy by opening the way for a federal re-construction of the whole on genuinely national lines. Even if the losses in Galicia and Hungary were serious enough to degrade the Danubian unit from the ranks of the Great Powers, it might survive as an essential member in the re-organised fraternity of European nations.


We have now examined the state of the national problem in the Kingdom of Hungary, as well as in the "Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Reichsrath at Vienna," without discovering any ulcer fatal to the life of the Hapsburg organism; but our examination of the Trans-Leithanian half of the Monarchy is not yet complete. In addition to the Hungarian realm, the "Crown of St. Stephen" comprises the "Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia" beyond the Southern bank of the Drave.

This Hungarian dependency has implicated the Hapsburg Monarchy in the national problem of the Southern Slavs.

[1] Population of Hungary within present frontiers (according to census of 1900)

[1] Population of Hungary within present frontiers (according to census of 1900) .		16,838,000
Possible losses after the present war, calculated at a maximum—		
(*a*) Roumans, Szekels and Saxons .	3,845,000	
(*b*) Serbs .	435,000	
(*c*) German enclaves among Serbs, approximately	250,000	
(*d*) Ruthenes .	423,000	
Total of possible losses		4,953,000
Minimum remainder		11,791,000

III. The Southern Slavs.



B. *The Southern Slavs*

Hungary is not co-extensive with the Middle Danube Basin:[1] it is bounded by the Drave, and the Danube drains a considerable area South as well as North of that line.

The tributaries which reach the river from the Right bank in this section of its course, take their rise in a chain of limestone mountains linking the Alps with the backbone of the Balkan peninsula. The chief affluent is the Save. Its source is close to that of the Drave, in the angle between the main chain of the Alps, where they bend North-Eastward towards Vienna, and this "Dinaric" branch, where it falls away in the direction of the Adriatic coast. The two streams follow a parallel course. The Drave draws its one auxiliary, the Mur, from the Eastern face of the Austrian Alps on its Left hand: the Save is enriched by several large rivers from the Right,[2] which spring from the Dinaric watershed and pursue their tortuous way through the hilly country that intervenes. Swelled by the united volume of these waters, the Save finally enters the Danube at a point between Semlin and Belgrade, nearly a hundred and fifty miles below the confluence of the Drave.

The second affluent is the Morava, which flows into the Danube from the South, about fifty miles further down. Its drainage-area extends from the Drina on the West to the extremity of the Balkan mountains on the East, a chain which continues the line of the Carpathians on the other flank of the "Iron Gates," and completes the partition of the Lower from the Middle basin of the Danube.

[1] See Map on p. 105; also Map III. [2] Una, Vrbas, Bosna, Drina.

The system of the Morava and the Save, and in fact the whole region between the Drave, the Iron Gates, and the sea, was occupied in the seventh century A.D. by a swarm of the great Slavonic host, which found its way through the Moravian Gap and the Marchfeld, and drifted down upon the Adriatic coast.

This flying column of the Slavonic invasion did not remain undifferentiated within itself. Its rearguard tarried under the lea of the Alps, and is represented by the modern Slovenes. Its vanguard crossed the watershed of the Middle Danube, spread out fanwise towards the Ægean and the Black Sea, and has developed into the Bulgarian nationality. Both these detached groups have evolved racial and dialectical characteristics which distinguish them sharply from the main body which lies between.[1] We will leave them aside for the moment, and concentrate our attention upon the latter, for whom we will reserve the title of " Southern Slavs."

The " Southern Slavs," in this specialised sense of the name, speak an absolutely homogeneous dialect, and occupy a compact geographical area, extending from Agram (Zagreb) to Uskub (Skoplye), and from Belgrade to Salona. They have thus become immediate neighbours of the Magyars, who two centuries later descended upon the country on the further bank of the Danube and the Drave, and at the present time the two races are approximately equal in numerical strength,[2] but in every other respect their history has been strikingly different.

The rich, unbroken levels of the Alföld offer a natural cradle for a strong, unified national state : the Southern

[1] The Bulgars derive their name, but nothing else, from a non-Slavonic caste of nomad conquerors off the steppes.

[2] Either language is now spoken by between eight and nine millions of people.

Slavs, on the other hand, have been grievously handicapped by their physical environment. The gaunt ribs of the Dinaric Alps, which shoulder the Danube-system away from the Adriatic, are not kindly to Man. The rock-surface cropping out through the scanty soil sets a rigid limit to the growth of population, while the scanty communities that maintain their existence are isolated from one another by the parallel ranges of mountains and the rushing rivers which carve their way among them. Even the Adriatic coast-line, which rivals Norway in the maze of its fjords and islands, is of little avail for internal communication. The land opens towards the Danube, and the watershed rises hard above the shore. The rivers invariably flow inland, and only one, the Narenta, drains South-Westward to the sea.

Such a land could never have become an independent focus of human life. Its physical function as a link between the mountain-masses of Central and South-Eastern Europe has conditioned the history of its inhabitants, and doomed them to be the victims and the spoil in the warfare of alien worlds.

The country of the Southern Slavs has been debatable ground from the beginning. Christianity penetrated it simultaneously from opposite directions. The Croats in the North-West were converted from the Catholic centres of Aquileia and Salzburg: Orthodox missionaries from Byzantium mounted the valley of the Vardar and secured the allegiance of the Serbs in the Morava-basin.[1]

[1] Croat and Serb were in origin two kindred tribes, identical with the Chrobat and Sorab who remained North of the Carpathians. The names have gradually been adapted to denote all South-Slavonic speakers who belong respectively to the Catholic and the Orthodox Church, irrespective of political grouping or local habitat.

The independent career of both these tribes was brief. The Croatian principality flourished in the eleventh century, but in 1102 it was annexed to the expanding realm of the Magyars, and for the next three centuries Hungary and Venice fought for the sovereignty of the land, till the dispute was settled by a compromise. About 1420 Venice finally established her rule along the Dalmatian littoral, while Hungary retained her suzerainty over the hinterland.

The fortunes of Serbia were grander. In 1159 the House of Nemanya came to the front, and steadily built up a national state which attained its zenith in the fourteenth century. Stephen Dushan, Tsar of the Serbs from 1336 to 1356 A.D., ruled from the Danube to the Ægean, and threatened to besiege Constantinople itself, but disaster followed close upon his triumphs. The year before Stephen's death, the Ottoman Turks had occupied Gallipoli on the European shore of the Dardanelles: thirty years later [1] they fought the Serbs in the heart of their country on the field of Kossovo,[2] and their crushing victory made an end of Serbian independence.

The advance of the Turks aggravated the disunion of the Southern Slavs by introducing another creed. In the twelfth century the Paulician heresy from Armenia had obtained a footing in the region,[3] and the nobility of Bosnia, a Hungarian dependency on the banks of the Bosna River, embraced it as their national faith. Their choice isolated them from their neighbours, and

[1] 1386.

[2] Kossovo Polye=" Field of Blackbirds."

[3] It was brought by Armenian subjects of the East Roman Empire, whom the Byzantine government had failed to convert to Orthodoxy, and had punished for their contumacy by exiling them to the opposite border of the Imperial territory. The Slavonic converts they made in their new home took the title of Bogumils (" theo-philoi ").

the breach was only widened by the stubbornness with which they clung to it during three centuries of indiscriminate persecution: when the enemies at their gates succumbed successively to the Turk, the Bosniaks welcomed him as a deliverer. Their creed had originated on the borders of Islam, perhaps under Moslem inspiration, and there was much in common between the two religions. When the conqueror offered them the traditional alternative between conversion and helotage, they did not hesitate. Before the close of the fifteenth century the Bosniak landowners had adopted Islam *en masse,* and were transformed at a stroke from oppressed outcasts to equals and comrades of the ruling race. The change in their position, however, was not really fundamental. Their new-found prosperity was destined to flow and ebb with the Turkish tide, but they have held to their second "apostasy" as tenaciously as to their first, and have remained sundered in sympathy from their South-Slavonic kinsmen who share the same speech.

In the sixteenth century the Southern Slavs were drawn into the supreme struggle between Christendom and Islam. The Bosniaks had given their allegiance to the Ottoman cause, and broken away from Hungarian suzerainty, but their example was not followed by the other South-Slavonic dependencies of the Hungarian Crown. When Hungary herself was prostrated in the fatal battle of Mohacs,[1] and the remnant of the Kingdom elected the Hapsburg as its sovereign, the principalities of Croatia and Slavonia [2] followed their suzerain's

[1] 1526.

[2] Croatia is a strip of territory extending from the Drave to the Sea in the extreme North-West of the South Slavonic area, along the Slovene border. Slavonia is the "Mesopotamia" intercepted between the Drave and Danube on the one side and the Save on the other.

example. From 1527 to the present day, the Dynasty has ruled this section of the South-Slavonic world by hereditary right.

The battles between Austrian and Turk were decided on the banks of the Danube, but the Dinaric mountain-zone was the scene of fierce and continuous subsidiary warfare. During two centuries of inconclusive strife the Turkish cavalry sometimes penetrated right up the Save, and ravaged the Venetian plains at the head of the Adriatic, while for nearly twenty years [1] the Hapsburg standard was planted in Belgrade and the Austrian frontier pushed far up the valley of the Morava. Neither power, however, proved strong enough to wrest from the other the undisputed dominion of the whole South-Slavonic region, and the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 terminated the struggle by a partition.

The whole of Croatia and Slavonia fell to the Hapsburg: the Ottoman retained Serbia and Bosnia. The new frontier started [2] from the Iron Gates, and followed the course of the Danube upwards as far as the junction of the Save. Belgrade, in the South-Eastern angle between the two rivers, remained a Turkish fortress, and the Hapsburg frontier proceeded along the Save's Northern bank, till it reached the point where the latter river is joined by the Una. Thence it turned South-Westward, first conforming to the Una's windings, and then taking an irregular course of its own across the mountains, till it struck the coast opposite the island of Pago.

This made the Hapsburg Empire immediately conterminous with the province of Dalmatia, which the Venetians had managed to defend against Ottoman

[1] Following upon the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1718.
[2] See Map III.

aggression, ever since it finally passed into their hands in the fifteenth century. Napoleon made an end of the Venetian Republic and cast her territories into the melting pot. In the general re-settlement of 1814, Dalmatia and Ragusa were definitively incorporated in the Hapsburg dominions, and the whole Eastern littoral of the Adriatic, from Trieste to the fjord of Cattaro, thus came to be united under the same Austrian government. With this exception, however, the territorial arrangements of 1739 still remained in force when the events of 1866 forced the Danubian Monarchy into the most recent phase of its history.

In the year of the Ausgleich the Monarchy's position with regard to the Southern Slavs almost exactly reproduced its relation towards the Italian nation after the settlement of 1814. In both cases one section of a nationality was included within the Hapsburg frontier while the remainder lay beyond it, and the Monarchy's Italian experience had proved that such a situation was essentially unstable. A divided nationality was bound to attain unity in time. It might achieve it within the compass of the greater Empire, if the latter succeeded in advancing its frontier to include the whole race, but the frontier could not remain stationary. If it failed to advance it must retire, and national unity be realised at the Empire's expense by the total secession of the nationality from its organism.

In the Italian case we have seen that such secession could occur without vital injury to the Monarchy's structure: in the present instance failure involved far more serious consequences. The Monarchy had just been forced to accept its geographical destiny as a Danubian state, and in the new development of its history the South-Slavonic region offered the necessary

avenue for expansion. Excluded from Germany and Italy, Austria-Hungary must grow Eastward, or else resign herself to paralysis, diminishment, and final dissolution.

Since 1867, therefore, the attention of the Joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs has become increasingly concentrated upon the South-Slavonic problem. The Monarchy has never been faced by a graver issue, but on the other hand it has seldom enjoyed conditions so favourable for a successful solution.

The South-Slavonic population within the frontier included Orthodox as well as Catholic elements, and the Dynasty had a strong traditional hold over both its Serb and its Croat subjects. Each regarded the Hapsburg as their saviour from the Turk. The Croat's loyalty was reinforced by religion, for he was a devoted clerical, and Austria has never abandoned the rôle of the leading Catholic state: the Serb was conciliated by an exceptional measure of toleration. Imperial rescripts of 1690 and 1691 granted the Serb refugees in Hapsburg territory complete freedom in the practice of their ritual, and allowed them to organise an autonomous church under the presidency of a patriarch established at Karlowitz.

The erection of the "Military Frontiers" along the Save, towards the close of Maria Theresa's reign, transformed the South-Slavonic borderers into regular soldiery, and in the struggles against Napoleon and the Risorgimento, the Croat regiments were the flower of the Austrian armies. To their enemies they were merely notorious for the savagery they had acquired in their warfare with the Turks, but the Dynasty they served was deeply indebted to their admirable constancy. In 1848 Croatia was the only non-German province

which never wavered in its loyalty, and in the Autumn of that crucial year Jellačić,[1] the "Ban"[2] of the kingdom, led across the Drave the first army that attacked the Magyars in Francis Joseph's name.

The relations between the Monarchy and the Southern Slavs within the frontier were thus on an excellent footing, and the situation on the further side of it was not incompatible with Austro-Hungarian interests.

In this quarter the chief event since 1739 had been the emergence of an autonomous Serb principality in the basin of the Morava. The population of this region revolted against Ottoman government in 1804, and after a long, fluctuating struggle, in which it received support from Russia and Austria in turn, it extorted the Sultan's consent to Home Rule in 1817. The Treaty of Adrianople, imposed on Turkey by Russia after the war of 1828, stipulated for the confirmation of this status, and the Sultan acknowledged Serbian autonomy by a formal proclamation in 1830.

This development in South-Slavonic history had left the Danubian Monarchy at a disadvantage. For nearly a century after the second siege of Vienna, Austria had been able to monopolise the part of sympathiser, protector and possible saviour for all the Turk's Christian subjects in Europe, till the crushing blows inflicted upon Turkey by the Empress Catherine enabled Russia to intrude herself as Austria's rival. The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 prepared the ground for a general Russian protectorate over all Christian populations in the Ottoman dominions. The Serb revolt offered Metternich an opportunity for reasserting Austrian influence, but his extreme dread of nationalism made him averse to supporting any mani-

[1] Pronounced Yellachit. [2] "Viceroy."

festation of it against any constituted authority whatsoever. By his over-logical policy he played into Russia's hands. Russia followed up her advantage with decision, and when Serbia started her new life under Russian auspices, the Danubian Monarchy found its rival established on the very threshold of its Balkan doorway.

Ever since the turn of the Turkish tide in 1683, it had been obvious that the ebb would never cease till all Europe was free of the flood. The Turk's presence might be protracted, but it had become provisional, and sooner or later he must vanish out of the land. The Treaty of Adrianople taught Austrian statesmen that in playing for the Turk's inheritance they must reckon with Russia henceforward.

In 1867, therefore, the Monarchy's road Eastwards was already overshadowed by the Russian cloud, but the danger, though formidable, might still be braved with impunity. The cloud might pass without a storm.

The Balkan drama was not yet played out. The Serbs who had won their freedom with Russia's aid were only a fraction of the race. The majority still remained under Turkish rule, and the principality in the Morava valley aspired to liberate a "Serbia irredenta" of greater territorial extent than itself. West of the River Drina lay the South-Slavonic province of Bosnia, where more than half the population was Orthodox in religion: Southwards round the upper waters of the Morava and its tributaries, the district of Kossovo, once the focus of the national life, still awaited its redemption. Serbia and the Danubian Monarchy were both under a vital necessity to advance in the same direction, and both were obstructed by the same Turkish occupant of the land. Why should they not advance in unison to satisfy their common need at the Turk's

expense? Serbia had one supreme desire, the accomplishment of her national unity. Russia had left the work half-done, and had alienated her protegée into the bargain, by intriguing to strengthen her influence over her. Serbia was ready to throw herself into the arms of any great power that would help her to complete the realisation of her ideal. The refugee-communities North of the Danube, which had become the chief centres of modern Serb culture, afforded a spiritual link between the Hapsburg Empire and the autonomous principality. If the Hapsburg Government had profited by the experience of 1830, and espoused the cause of Serbian nationality, it might still have rallied the whole South-Slavonic race under its own banner.

The breakdown of the reactionary regime in 1866 offered the occasion for such a change of policy towards the Southern Slavs. Some concession to the principle of nationality was essential if the internal cohesion of the Monarchy was to be saved: liberalism in this particular instance would bring positive gain as well, by setting the salvaged " Danubian unit " upon its new path towards expansion under the most auspicious circumstances.

Unfortunately, however, reform was baulked by compromise. We have seen that the Ausgleich of 1867 was no reconstruction of the Hapsburg Empire on the basis of nationality, but simply a deed of partnership between Germans and Magyars for the continued oppression of the rest. It made the Magyar oligarchy a power in the Monarchy. That was the only new factor it introduced, and its effect upon the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary as a whole has been even more disastrous than the internal race-conflict to which it has given vent within Hungary itself.

The Magyars were reckless, egotistic and well-organised. These qualities gave them an undue influence in the Dual State, and their geographical situation made that influence paramount on the South-Eastern frontier. After 1867 the South-Slavonic problem, and therewith the fate of the "Eastward Trend," passed more and more completely under Magyar control, at the very time when it was becoming of extreme importance to the whole Danubian Unit.

The terms of the Ausgleich assigned to the Crown of St. Stephen almost all the Southern Slavs within the Hapsburg frontier.[1] The struggle of 1848–49 had inspired the Magyars and their Slavonic neighbours with mutual fear and resentment, and the memory of it did not promise well for the future of the Hapsburg Croats and Serbs, now that they were abandoned to the Magyars' mercy.

We have already examined the case of the Serbs in Hungary: we have now to consider the relations between the Magyar government and the vice-royalty of Croatia-Slavonia.

The Magyars secured this province for the "Crown of St. Stephen," basing their claim upon their mediæval suzerainty over it. Such a "historical argument" was of course without value, yet the terms Croatia obtained seemed generous enough to compensate her for incorporation with her larger neighbour.

The Croato-Hungarian Compromise was voted by the Hungarian parliament and the Croatian diet in 1868. It conceded at once to the Croats and Serbs beyond the Drave fundamental rights which the nationalities in Hungary itself have been struggling vainly for half a century to obtain. There was no

[1] The Dalmatians were the exception.

attempt at Magyarisation, and South-Slavonic was constituted the official medium of all administration within the limits of Croatian territory The administration itself was organised in a liberal spirit. In the spheres of education, justice, and local self-government Croatia obtained complete Home Rule: defence, finance, and questions of economics and communications were made common affairs of the "Crown of St. Stephen," but the Croatian Diet was entitled to send deputies to the parliament at Buda-Pest to discuss and vote upon these subjects. The deputies had the right to debate in their native language. Their numbers were not quite proportional to the population they represented,[1] but on the other hand the Croatian contribution to the "Crown of St. Stephen's" common exchequer was rated disproportionately low.

Nothing could have been fairer on paper. In practice the Magyars have taken advantage of their partnership to exploit Croatia systematically in their own economic interest.

The province is important to the Magyars simply because it offers the only access from Hungary to the sea. In the settlement of 1868 the Magyar negotiators succeeded in excluding from the boundaries of Croatia the port of Fiume, which lies close to the Austrian frontier in the extreme Western corner of the country, and the town was organised as an "autonomous municipality" under a governor responsible to the Hungarian ministry. The trunk-railway from Buda-Pest to Agram and Karlovatz was pushed on over the Dinaric range, and reached Fiume in 1873.[2]

[1] The proportion was fixed in 1881 at 40 deputies out of a total of 453 (8.8%). In 1900 Croatia contributed to the "Crown of St. Stephen" a population of 2,416,000 out of 19,256,000 (12.5%).

[2] See Map III.

By the terms of the Croato-Hungarian "Compromise" this state-built and state-owned railway was common property of the "Crown of St. Stephen," and the control of it fell within the province not of the Home Rule government at Agram but of the central government at Buda-Pest. If the "Compromise" had any meaning, the railway administration should have taken due account of both Croatian and Hungarian interests, but the fashion in which Buda-Pest interpreted its trust revealed the "Compromise" as a fiction.

The Magyars have used their political predominance in the common parliament to govern the Fiume railway exclusively to Hungary's economic advantage, and deliberately to the economic detriment of Croatia. Freightage-tariffs are manipulated so as to favour through-traffic from the Alföld to Fiume at the expense of local traffic in Croatia itself,[1] and every effort is made to focus at Buda-Pest all railway connection between Croatia and the rest of the continent. Where more direct routes are already in existence, not only tariffs but time-tables are distorted to induce goods and passengers to travel to Vienna or Belgrade by way of the Hungarian capital: where the railways have yet to be built, the Magyar government does everything in its power to obstruct their development. While Hungary itself is covered with a network of lines, the section of the Fiume railway between Agram and the coast has never been extended by a single branch, so that Croatia is deprived of independent communication with her natural market in Austria on the one hand, and with her

[1] In 1911 the goods-tariff from Essek on the Drave to Agram was lower than the tariff from the same place to Fiume, though the distance in the former case is only three-fifths as great as in the latter.

South-Slavonic neighbours in Dalmatia and Bosnia on the other.

The Croats could not be expected to submit gladly to such a system, and the attitude of the Magyars towards them has been governed solely by the determination to force it upon them. For this purpose it was necessary to hold Croatian politics well in hand, and the settlement of 1868 offered facilities for the task.

Croatia possesses her own autonomous legislature, but the "Ban" or viceroy, the supreme executive authority, is appointed by the ministry at Buda-Pest. The Magyar government perceived in this office an instrument for keeping Croatia to heel, and they found the right man for the post in Count Khuen-Hedervary. The Count governed Croatia for twenty years [1] by a "Tammany" regime which he worked out almost to perfection. He paralysed the opposition in the Diet by fomenting the rivalry between the Croat and Serb sections of the population, and secured a safe governmental majority over the disorganised nationalist votes by the Magyar method of electoral corruption.[2] Official pressure was not difficult to exert, for the entire political patronage of the country belongs to the Ban, but if the polling turned out against him, Khuen-Hedervary was always prepared to dissolve the newly-elected diet and repeat the process till he obtained a house of a more satisfactory complexion.

Such were the effects of Magyar domination upon the South-Slavonic communities under the "Crown of St. Stephen": meanwhile, Magyar influence had

[1] 1883–1903. In the latter year he lent his services to Francis Joseph and accepted the Hungarian premiership. See above.

[2] Even the Diet of 1868, which voted the "Compromise" with Hungary, had been "packed" with safe men by illegitimate means.

asserted itself in the relations between the Monarchy and the Southern Slavs beyond the frontier.

In the summer of 1875 there was a general rising of the Christian peasants in Bosnia. The Ottoman Government failed to suppress it, and in the following summer the Serbian principality in the Morava valley intervened in favour of the Bosnian Serbs, and was followed by Montenegro, a little community of Serb mountaineers above Cattaro fjord which had never forfeited its independence to Austrian, Venetian or Turk. In a few months the Ottoman armies crushed Serbia to earth, and a sympathetic insurrection of the Bulgar population along the Danube was quelled with appalling savagery, but the only result of these Turkish successes was to bring Russia into the field. The Tsar declared war in Turkey in the spring of 1877: before the close of the year the Tchataldja lines were forced, and the Russian troops within striking distance of Constantinople. In March 1878 the Turkish government signed the Treaty of San Stephano.

Thus once more salvation had come to the Balkan Christians from the Muscovite, and the Danubian Monarchy had missed another opportunity. This time the fault lay not with the authoritarian principles of Vienna but with the Magyar chauvinism of Buda-Pest. While Russia was hesitating in 1876, the Monarchy might have forestalled her by championing Serbia in her desperate straits. The Croats and the Hungarian Serbs were watching with intense anxiety the vicissitudes of their Slavonic brethren's struggle for liberty, yet so far from being guided by the feelings of such an important element in the "Crown of St. Stephen," the Magyar government brutally trampled upon them. Not only were Hungarian subjects rigorously debarred

from crossing the Save to join the Serbian ranks, but demonstrations of sympathy with the Slavonic cause were suppressed in various Hungarian towns, while pro-Turkish demonstrations were officially encouraged at Buda-Pest.[1]

By the end of 1877 the Monarchy had alienated from itself the sympathies of all Slavs, and when Russia emerged triumphant, it was as profoundly alarmed about its own future in the Balkans as Great Britain was about the security of its route to India. At the congress called at Berlin in the summer of 1878 to revise the San Stephano Treaty, the two powers acted in co-operation, and Disraeli assisted Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary, to secure his share of the spoils.

The Congress gave the Dual Monarchy a mandate to occupy and administer Bosnia. The mandate was acted upon immediately, and the military task was completed before the autumn.

Superficially, the occupation was an unfriendly act to Turkey, and the Moslem Bosniaks offered a stout resistance to the Austro-Hungarian army, but the province was in any case irretrievably lost to the Ottoman Empire, and the blow was really directed against South-Slavonic nationality.

The history of eighteenth-century "paternal government" in the Alföld has curiously repeated itself in Bosnia during the last generation. Baron Kallay, who administered the "Occupied Provinces"[2] from 1882 to 1903 on behalf of the Austrian and Hungarian govern-

[1] The leading Magyar politicians were bound by ties of personal gratitude to the Turkish Government, which had given them asylum during the dark years after 1849.

[2] They are accurately described as Bosnia-Herzegovina, but "Bosnia" alone is used in practice to cover the whole.

ments,[1] has produced remarkable results. In striking contrast to the policy pursued in Croatia during the same period by Magyar statesmanship, the material prosperity of the country has been conscientiously fostered. Law and order have been established, roads and railways have been built, education has been provided for. On the other hand, the development of national self-consciousness has been uncompromisingly resisted.

The hostility of the Moslem Bosniaks was quickly overcome. Left stranded by the ebb of the Turkish tide, they found their existence threatened once more by the Orthodox and Catholic majority of their fellow-Slavs, among whom they had lived a life apart, as pariahs or taskmasters, for more than seven centuries. Naturally they turned for protection to the German and the Magyar, to whom the Christian Slavs were as alien as to themselves. The Joint Administration, on its part, espied in this powerful but denationalised element the very ally it needed, and set itself with success to win the Bosniaks' support. Although the Moslems constitute barely a third of the Bosnian population,[2] they were encouraged to regard the country as their own, and to stimulate their particularism still further, Kallay even attempted to create the consciousness of a separate "Bosniak language," differentiated from the standard South-Slavonic idiom of Croat and Serb by a few insignificant dialectical peculiarities:

[1] The administration of Bosnia was assigned to the department of the Joint Ministry for Finance.

[2]

Total population of Bosnia in 1895 . .		1,568,000	
South-Slavonic element about		1,554,000	
Consisting of	Orthodox Serbs	670,000	(41.38%)
	Moslem Bosniaks	550,000	(33.97%)
	Catholic Croats	334,000	(20.63%)

For their distribution see Map III.

the Serb element in the province, which amounts to two-fifths of the total population, was correspondingly discountenanced.

This deliberate discrimination in treatment between the various sections of the population has marred the Administration by giving it an illiberal cast, and in one important sphere it has hampered the policy of material improvement. To conciliate the Moslem landowners the pressing agrarian problem has been indefinitely shelved.

The occupation of Bosnia thus sowed seeds of dissention between the Serb nationality and the Dual Monarchy, yet these seeds might still have withered without bearing fruit. The excellence of the Bosnian Administration worked potently for stability, and the step might plausibly have been explained as the final act in the Danubian State's geographical evolution. Ever since the Hapsburgs had added Dalmatia as well as Slavonia to their dominions, the ultimate incorporation of Bosnia had been a geographical necessity. The province is shaped like a triangular wedge, and its apex presses upwards, perilously close to the lines of communication between the centres of industry and agriculture in the Danube-basin and their ports on the Adriatic seaboard. The occupation of the triangle gave the Monarchy its short base-line for a frontier, instead of the combined length of the other two sides. The General Staff might have vindicated it as a defensive measure of purely military import.

Unfortunately, however, the Berlin Conference did not confine its mandate to Bosnia. Serbia and Montenegro were both granted considerable increases of territory,[1] but their frontiers were carefully held

[1] Serbia obtained in addition complete independence from Ottoman suzerainty—Montenegro had never submitted to it.

asunder. The Turkish Government was left in possession of the Sandjak[1] of Novi-Bazar, a strip of mountainous country which ran from South-East to North-West in the general direction of the Dinaric Range, and served as a land-bridge between the Dual Monarchy now in occupation of Bosnia and the Ottoman Empire still established in the interior of Macedonia and along the littoral of the Ægean. To make the maintenance of this bridge secure, the two powers concluded a convention, under which the district was garrisoned by Austro-Hungarian troops, without prejudice to the Ottoman civil administration.

The garrisoning of the Sandjak revealed the occupation of Bosnia as the first step in a new movement of offence. The "Trend Eastward" was to find its realisation in territorial expansion to an Ægean seaboard, but instead of proceeding in unison with South-Slavonic national aspirations, the Dual Monarchy had made up its mind to march over the Southern Slavs' dead bodies.

Ever since 1878 Austro-Hungarian statesmanship has been paving the way for a fresh advance. During the Hamidian regime the garrisons in the Sandjak looked on while the Serb population of the Kossovo district, a few miles away, was being exterminated by bands of Moslem Albanians, armed and incited by the Ottoman Government. Austria-Hungary refused to interfere: she professed scrupulous respect for Ottoman sovereignty, yet all the time she was spreading her propaganda among Ottoman subjects in the immediate neighbourhood. She established a virtual protectorate over the Catholic Albanian clans in the hinterland of Skodra,[2] a mountainous region between Kossovo and

[1] "Province."

[2] Skutari.

the coast. She kept them supplied with arms, and exploited their lawless instincts in order to harass Montenegro, their traditional enemy, and even to coerce, if necessary, the Turkish government itself.

The Danubian Monarchy had thus leagued itself with the Southern Slavs' most deadly foes. Overshadowing Serbia and Montenegro already on the West and North, she was remorselessly turning their flanks, and threatening to surround them on the South and East as well. Magyar ideals had involved her in a struggle to the death with the principle of nationality in the Balkans.[1] She had thrown in her lot with the dying Turk, and made herself both his physician and his executor. The Turk's own death would have set the natural term to his outworn system of government: Austria-Hungary showed her intention of perpetuating it for ever.

The Monarchy had thus committed itself to a very serious contest. To reach its goal, it must overcome the opposition of the Balkan nations and the Russian Empire simultaneously. In this undertaking common-sense dictated two guiding principles: the Southern Slavs must be kept divided,[2] and Russia must be "squared" by an adequate compromise.

[1] The mandate to occupy Bosnia was the achievement of the Magyar Andrassy, plenipotentiary at Berlin and Joint Foreign-Minister, and he was supported whole-heartedly by Coloman Tisza, leader of the Magyar Liberal Party and Hungarian premier. It is true that the apparently anti-Turkish tendency of the *coup* aroused violent opposition among the rank and file. Magyar public opinion compelled Andrassy to retire, and Tisza only forced the measure through parliament by playing his last card and tendering his resignation. Yet the two politicians had shown their statesmanship by anticipating the maturer judgment of the nation itself. As the true import of their policy revealed itself, Magyar opinion veered round, and Tisza and Andrassy were both national heroes again before their deaths.

[2] At the close of 1878 they were partitioned between no less than seven political regimes. In Dalmatia they were Austrian citizens, North of the Danube they were Hungarian, in Croatia they were autonomous

At first the statesmanship of 1878 seemed likely to be justified by success. The supersession of the San Stephano Treaty by the diplomats at Berlin went far to cancel the prestige which Russia had won by her military victory, and the new principality of Bulgaria, which the Powers had grudgingly allowed to come into existence within reduced limits, did not prove a source of strength to its Russian creator. Like the Serbs after 1829, the Bulgars found Russian tutelage a doubtful blessing, but they displayed far more vigour in shaking themselves free. In an incredibly short time they ventured to steer an independent course of their own. Flouted by Bulgaria, Russia looked to Serbian loyalty for consolation, but Serbia had been mortally offended by the erection of a rival Slavonic state in the Balkan area, and had entered on a new political phase.

The throne of the principality was occupied at this time by Milan Obrenovitch,[1] the most notable statesman modern Serbia has produced. He saw that Serbia was not strong enough to achieve her destiny unaided, and that to invoke the assistance of greater powers was merely to offer herself as a pawn in their game. It was clear that the Berlin settlement would not be upset in a day, and Milan determined to take advantage of the inevitable lull for the development of his country's material prosperity. Geography has made the Morava valley a natural appendage of the Middle Danubian Basin. The Danubian Monarchy spreads its bulk between Serbia and Western Europe, and the little state could not begin its economic growth unless it had secured

under the Crown of St. Stephen, in Bosnia they were under the joint protectorate of the Dual Monarchy, in Serbia and Montenegro they were members of independent national states, in Kossovo they were still subject to Turkish misgovernment.

[1] He ascended it in 1868.

its big neighbour's good-will. Moved by these considerations, Milan did not hesitate to sacrifice national ideals and turn his kingdom into a satellite of Austria-Hungary.

The next ten years witnessed a struggle between the king supported by the Liberal or "Progressive" Party on the one hand, and the Russophil Radicals on the other. Milan succeeded in carrying out his programme. Railways were built and the finances reorganised, in spite of the opposition aroused by increased taxes without any immediately visible returns. In 1885 an opportunity presented itself for striking at Bulgaria, and jealousy prompted Serbia to seize it. She declared war only to suffer a severe defeat, and nothing but the Dual Monarchy's veto prevented the Bulgarian army from marching upon Belgrade. This intervention marked the zenith of Austro-Hungarian ascendency over Serbia,[1] yet Milan actually survived the bankruptcy of his foreign policy. It was not till 1889 that he was driven to abdicate, and allow Alexander his son to reign in his stead.

Alexander was a minor, and the Liberal regency found itself unable to cope with the growing Radical block in parliament. In 1893 the young king took the reins into his own hands, and attempted to govern through a Radical ministry, but the experiment soon broke down. The Radicals endangered the understanding with the Dual Monarchy, and wrought havoc with the public

[1] And also the lowest ebb of Russian influence in the Balkans. At the outbreak of the war, Russia had immediately withdrawn her military staff which was engaged in building up the Bulgarian army. She hoped that this step would at once conciliate Serbia and teach the wayward Bulgars that they could not dispense with Russian assistance. When the Bulgars improvised victorious generalship out of their native resources, and Serbia applied to the Dual Monarchy to save her from the consequences of defeat Russia was dealt two staggering blows.

finances: a political catastrophe was imminent, and the country recalled the only man who could avert it. Five years after his exile, the old king returned to Belgrade in triumph. His policy had conquered. Serbia submitted herself to his guidance, party rancours cooled down, and the national energy concentrated itself in economic channels.

King Milan's success did not fail to produce its effect upon the Russian Foreign Office. Deserted by two of her protegées, Russia found herself left with no friend in the Balkans but Montenegro, and was forced to reconcile herself to an abatement of her ambitions.

Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans were not essentially incompatible. Russia's objective was the Black Sea Straits: the Danubian Monarchy coveted an Ægean seaboard. There was no geographical obstacle to the partition of the Balkan peninsula by the two powers into an Eastern and a Western sphere,[1] and Russia was now prepared to consider Austro-Hungarian overtures to this effect. The advent of the next phase in Turkey's dissolution precipitated a compromise.

The Berlin Congress had stipulated for administrative reform throughout the territories abandoned to Ottoman sovereignty in Macedonia,[2] and the Porte had published a pretentious scheme of enlightened government, but the project remained a dead letter, and the Christian populations at last determined to help themselves. The situation, however, was complicated by their disunion.

[1] The idea had already commended itself to Joseph II. just a century before. In 1789 he made an alliance with Catherine of Russia for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but the Turks defended themselves stoutly, and the vultures soon diverted their attention to the Polish carcase.

[2] An unofficial name employed to cover the three Ottoman vilayets (" governments ") of Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonika.

Macedonia is the meeting-place of Southern-Slav, Bulgar, and Greek. In this area the three races are inextricably intermingled, and their territorial claims mutually incompatible: the bitterness of each against the other exceeded their common hatred of the Turk.

In 1893 the terrible revolutionary propaganda began. Macedonia became infested by armed bands, equipped and controlled from the national states immediately beyond the Ottoman frontier. Their activity was only secondarily directed against the Turkish government: their principal function was to exterminate villages of alien race in districts claimed by their own nationality, and in this they were more successful than in protecting their own nationals from a similar fate, for to harbour a band exposed the village to Turkish reprisals. The Macedonian peasant had to choose between the scourge of the Anatolian soldier or of the Balkan brigand.

The crisis developed rapidly from bad to worse, and in 1897 the two interested powers arrived at an understanding with regard to their eventual policy. In February 1903 this found expression in an "identic note" to the Porte. In the summer of the same year events were hastened by a general insurrection of the Bulgarian element,[1] and its brutal suppression by the Turkish troops. In the October of the same year the two Emperors met at Mürzsteg, and their Foreign Ministries elaborated a concrete programme, which they compelled the Porte to accept. The civil administration of Macedonia was placed under the supervision of Russian and Austro-Hungarian commissioners, and the gendarmerie service was organised in local zones of inspection, which were severally assigned to all the Great Powers.

[1] Which constitutes the great majority of the Macedonian population.

The Mürzsteg Programme seemed to have started the Dual Monarchy upon the last stage of its advance towards Salonika without committing it to the dreaded conflict with Russia. In 1904 Russia was diverted from the Balkans by her war in the Far East, and its disastrous close in the following year gave Austro-Hungarian statesmen cause to congratulate themselves. Apparently the "Eastward Trend" had an absolutely clear field before it: their good fortune had exceeded their expectations.

At the very moment, however, when Russia retired from the lists, South-Slavonic nationality was coming of age, and preparing to champion its own cause.

In 1900 Alexander of Serbia made an unfortunate marriage, and broke away from his father's influence. His action was bitterly resented by the country, Milan died before he could recover his authority, and his loss increased the general misgiving. A conspiracy was formed among the officers of the army, and in 1903 King Alexander and Queen Draga were murdered in their palace under the most brutal circumstances.

This atrocity did not strike the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry as important at the time,[1] but Austro-German and Magyar hatred has battened upon it during the struggle between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia which has supervened. In the October of 1908 the writer happened to be dining in an Oxford college where a distinguished Magyar was a guest. He was an owner of vineyards in the Tokay district, a major of Honved[2] cavalry, and a professor of mathematics into the bargain, in fine, he was a typical representative of the cultured

[1] Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Montenegro were the only foreign states which did not temporarily withdraw their diplomatic representatives from Belgrade as a protest.

[2] "Yeomanry."

Whig oligarchy. The Balkan War had just broken out, and the name of Serbia was mentioned in the conversation, when suddenly the table was startled by an exclamation : " The Serbs ! Liars and thieves ! They killed their king and queen with bayonets. Thieves and liars ! " During the hush which followed, a graduate of the college, who was by birth a Galician Jew, was heard remarking aside that " in our part of the world you can always guess a man's nationality by the people he abuses."

The comment hit the mark. The hate was primary in the professor's mind, his justification of it an afterthought. In arriving at his estimate of the Serbs' national character, he had never consulted his reason : had he done so, it would have shown him the absurdity of judging a young nation by the scandals in its high places. The history of Serbia since 1878 is not to be divined in the intrigues of a handful of politicians at Belgrade, but in the industry of the peasants, who have been purging from the Morava-basin the traces of Turkish misrule. The success with which they have overcome their initial handicap, and brought their country into line with more fortunate parts of Europe, is sufficient to vindicate their capacity for civilisation.

When Alexander was murdered, his father's economic policy was already bearing fruit. Serbia had developed her agrarian resources to the point of producing an annual surplus : she was now in a position to enter the field of international commerce. Her natural market was the industrial world of Central Europe, and the direct line for the export of her produce accordingly lay through the Danubian Monarchy. So long, however, as she monopolised all Serbia's economic outlets, Austria-Hungary could impose on Serbian exports

whatever prices she chose: economic independence could only be achieved by opening up an alternative route. Alexander Obrenovitch was succeeded on the throne of Serbia by Peter Karageorgevitch, the heir of a rival dynasty, and the first important act of the new reign was the negotiation in 1906 of a tariff-convention with Bulgaria, which promised Serbia access on reasonable terms to a port on the Black Sea.

This sudden change in the relations of the two principalities caused considerable consternation at Vienna and Buda-Pest. Not only did it threaten to relieve Serbia from her economic thraldom to the Dual Monarchy: it portended a political entente between the rival Slavonic groups in the Balkan Peninsula. More ominous still, it coincided with a similar movement among the South-Slavonic citizens of the Monarchy itself.

When Khuen-Hedervary resigned the Croatian vice-regency in 1903, he left no competent successor behind him, and the political life of Croatia began to revive. The prolonged parliamentary crisis at Buda-Pest, which followed the overthrow of the Magyar Liberal Party, produced its echo South of the Drave. In the Autumn of 1905, a conference of Croat deputies from the Croatian Diet and the Austrian Reichsrath was held at Fiume.[1] A resolution was adopted, expressing sympathy with the Magyar Coalition in its struggle against the Crown, but demanding that the liberties for which the Coalition professed to be fighting should be extended to Croatia as well: the Compromise of 1868 was to be observed in spirit as well as in letter, and constitutional

[1] The initiative came from the Croat leaders in Dalmatia, who as citizens of Austria had been able to develop a more untrammeled political activity than their less fortunate brethren under the "Crown of St. Stephen."

autonomy to be made a reality. The union [1] of Croatia and Dalmatia was to be achieved under the "Crown of St. Stephen."

Before the Conference dissolved, an executive committee was appointed to give effect to its intentions. They at once opened negotiations with the Serb members of the Croatian Diet.[2] Less than a fortnight later a Serb congress met at Zara, endorsed the "Resolution of Fiume," and proclaimed the need for political co-operation between the Croat and Serb elements in the Dual Monarchy. During the winter the two groups actually combined to conduct a vigorous political campaign, and in the spring of 1906 the same elections that brought the Magyar Coalition into office at Buda-Pest, returned to the Diet at Agram a formidable block representative of the new coalition between Serbs and Croats.

Within the Monarchy as well as outside it, the Southern Slavs were thus beginning to close their ranks. Austro-Hungarian statesmanship had counted on its ability to play off against one another the several victims of its "Eastward Trend": the events of 1906 threatened it with the forfeiture of its most effective weapon, when the last and most hazardous step in the advance was still to take. A strong personality was required at the Joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the appointment of Baron Aerenthal followed before the end of this critical year.

Aerenthal was fully alive to the danger: he resolved to forestall it by a determined offensive. Russia was still paralysed by her disaster in the Far East: the

[1] Or the "reunion," as Croat nationalists prefer to express it, harking back to the "Triune Kingdom" of Dalmatia-Croatia-Slavonia which flourished for its brief moment in the eleventh century A.D.

[2] About one quarter of the total population of Croatia is Serb.

Danubian Monarchy must seize this opportunity to realise its ambitions, or else abandon them for ever. Aerenthal deliberately embarked upon the death-struggle with the Southern Slavs.

The first bout in the conflict did not result in his favour. During 1907 he retaliated upon Serbia for her effort towards economic liberty by waging a remorseless tariff-war against her.[1] The Serbian peasantry suffered severely, but they showed unexpected obstinacy: instead of coming to terms, they developed new outlets and markets with such enterprise that Aerenthal had to abandon his campaign as a failure.

Next year, however, he returned to the charge. In January 1908 he concluded a convention with the Ottoman Government for the construction of a railway through the Sandjak of Novibazar, which was to link the Austro-Hungarian railway system in Bosnia with the Turkish railhead at Mitrovitza. His object was to "side-track" Serbia by diverting to this new route the through-traffic between Central Europe and the Ægean littoral, which had utilised hitherto the line through Belgrade and up the Morava valley to Salonika.[2] He paid dearly for this move, for it drew Russia once more into the Balkan arena.

Russian opinion regarded the railway scheme as a direct violation of the Mürzsteg agreement: it portended the consummation of the Danubian rival's "Eastward Trend." The Government shook off its lethargy, and determined upon a counter-stroke. In

[1] Nicknamed the "Pig War" in Austria-Hungary, swine being Serbia's chief article of export.

[2] The Mitrovitza line traverses the Kossovo district and joins the Salonika Railway at Uskub. Like the Bosnian system and the proposed connecting link, it is narrow-gauge, while the Belgrade-Uskub-Salonika Railway is built on the regular Continental standard. See Map III.

June 1908 the Tsar entertained King Edward VII. at Reval, and Great Britain and Russia announced in conjunction a new and drastic scheme of Macedonian reform.[1]

The effect was momentous. A "Young Turk" committee had been planning for years the overthrow of Abd-ul-hamid's absolute government. Educated by exile in Western Europe, they had imbibed its national chauvinism as well as its liberal ideals. The "Reval Programme" convinced them that Turkey would forfeit the sovereignty over her European territories altogether, unless she could accomplish immediate reform from within. They resolved to risk everything to save the integrity of the Empire. The revolution was started among the troops in Macedonia before the next month was out, and in a few days Turkey was converted into a constitutional state.

The duel between Aerenthal and Serbia had thus set all the Balkans and the Nearer East in commotion before the autumn of 1908. Meanwhile, the South-Slavonic problem had rapidly been assuming more serious proportions within the borders of the Dual Monarchy.

The Spring of 1907 witnessed the inevitable breach between the Serbo-Croat Coalition Party and the Magyar Coalition Ministry. In a bill submitted by Francis Kossuth[2] to the parliament at Buda-Pest, Magyar was declared the sole official language for the railway-system not merely of Hungary as heretofore, but of all territories included under the "Crown of St. Stephen." This was a clear contravention of the Compromise of 1868, by which the South-Slavonic

[1] Common fear of Germany had led these two powers to compose their outstanding differences the year before.

[2] The son of Louis.

tongue had been guaranteed official status within the limits of Croatia. In proposing it the Magyar Radicals had shown their hand. Their Liberal predecessors had confined the policy of Magyarisation to Hungary: this bill was an attempt to extend it to Croatia.

The Serbo-Croat deputies in the parliament at Buda-Pest at once resorted to obstruction. They were defeated by a tactical manœuvre and the bill became law, but the struggle was only continued the more fiercely at Agram. At the beginning of 1908 the Magyar government dismissed the "Ban" then in office as unequal to the situation, and specially appointed Baron Paul Rauch to superintend as viceroy the impending elections in Croatia; yet Rauch, though he strenuously applied Khuen-Hedervary's methods, did not obtain from them his gifted predecessor's results. The Croato-Serb coalition secured an absolute majority in the new Diet, and all that Rauch could do was to prorogue the session for an indefinite period, and govern in defiance of the constitution.

During the months, therefore, that followed the Turkish revolution, Aerenthal found all sections of the South-Slavonic race in a dangerous state of agitation. Being a man of courageous temper, he resolved to crush the spirit of Serb and Croat alike by an overwhelming blow. In October 1908 he repudiated the sovereignty of the Porte over Bosnia, and declared the annexation of the "Occupied Provinces" to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.[1]

This act at once provoked a European crisis, but Aerenthal showed himself not unequal to the occasion.

[1] The *coup* was effected in collusion with Bulgaria, which simultaneously denounced Ottoman suzerainty and proclaimed the "annexation" (in a similar sense) of Eastern Rumelia.

By January 1909 he had compounded with the "Young Turk" government. Serbia and Montenegro, whose interests were much more vital than Turkey's in Bosnia, had mobilised and threatened war, but this was provided for in Aerenthal's programme. He met it by a vigorous counter-mobilisation along the Save and the Drina, and uncompromisingly rejected all claims to territorial, economic or moral compensation. When Russia took steps in support of the two Balkan principalities, he appealed with success to the Monarchy's German ally. In the last week of March Berlin addressed a virtual ultimatum to Petersburg, the Russian protest against the Annexation was withdrawn, and Serbia composed a palinodia in the form of a note to the Austro-Hungarian foreign office, in which she renounced all stake in the destinies of Bosnia.

Aerenthal had carried his manœuvre through, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. Common adversity had linked Serbia fast to Montenegro, and her latent loyalty to Russia was re-kindled by the championship she had received from the diplomacy of Petersburg. Russia on her part was stirred to the depths by the humiliation she had endured.[1] The Far Eastern disaster and the revolutionary convulsion which followed it had left her still too greatly disorganised to fight; but she was well on the way towards recovery, and she needed but this stimulus to dispel her paralysis altogether. Determined to be ready "next time," she devoted herself to preparations. The South-Slavonic question became once more the focus of her foreign policy, and was promoted thereby to be the crucial issue between the

[1] The Kaiser's speech in which he imaged himself as "standing beside his ally in shining armour" rankled especially deep in the Russian mind.

two camps into which the European powers were divided. Aerenthal had unchained forces beyond his control. He had asserted his will in a problem of vital importance to the Danubian Monarchy, but he had done so at the price of transferring the initiative for the future to the dominant partner in the Central-European alliance.

The aftermath of the crisis within the Monarchy itself was hardly less embarrassing. Baron Rauch had rid himself of the Croatian Diet for the moment: he was resolved to ruin the Croato-Serb Coalition before he faced it again. During the early summer of 1908 his official press worked up a scare of "Pan-Serb" conspiracy; in July the first arrest was made on the charge of High Treason, and before the end of January 1909 no less than fifty-eight Serb citizens of Croatia, all people of obscure station, were in prison pending their trial on this account. The judicial proceedings at Agram did not open till March, when the external crisis was approaching its *détente*, and the attention of Europe was concentrated upon them before they dragged to their belated close in October. Thirty-one of the victims were sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from twelve to five years, but Rauch had failed in his real objective: all attempts to implicate the Coalition members of the Croatian Diet had broken down, and the party was able to follow up this negative success by a triumph of a more startling character.

During the same month of March in which the Bosnian crisis ended and the Agram trial began, the *Neue Freie Presse* newspaper had published at Vienna an article on the relations of the Dual Monarchy to the South-Slavonic problem by an eminent Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung. This article was written in an authoritative tone: it specifically charged the Serbo-

Croat Coalition with being the exponents and tools of agencies in Belgrade, and supported its assertions by quotations from documents. Some of the documents purported to be official correspondence of the Serbian Foreign Office, others were minutes of a semi-official revolutionary society, but Dr. Friedjung, when challenged, refused to reveal their provenance, and the Coalition deputies accordingly entered a libel action against him at Vienna.

The hearing of this case only came on in December 1909, after the treason trial was over, but this time the proceedings lasted no longer than a fortnight. The trial at Agram had cast a lurid light upon the methods of espionage employed by the Austro-Hungarian Administration in Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia : now at Vienna Dr. Friedjung's documents were revealed as forgeries concocted within the walls of the Austro-Hungarian legation at Belgrade, communicated to Friedjung as genuine by the Joint Foreign Office, and utilised by him in all good faith.

The action was hastily stopped by a compromise, before these results could be registered in the verdict of the court, but the evidence of the witnesses had created an immense sensation. Dr. Spalaikovitch, the incriminated Serbian official, put in an appearance and brilliantly vindicated himself and his country: The Tchech *savant* Professor Masaryk of Prag, who counted among his pupils men of the rising generation in all the Slavonic countries of the Danubian Monarchy and the Balkans, proved himself still more formidable. Implicated as a witness in the trial, he refused to let the matter drop. He was a member of the Austrian Reichsrath, and when the Delegations next met in November 1909, he was elected as one of the Austrian

representatives. This gave him an opportunity for a direct passage of arms with the Joint Foreign Minister: Aerenthal hardly attempted a defence, and Masaryk proceeded remorselessly with his interpellations till he had pieced together and exposed the whole official conspiracy. Aerenthal aspired to be the "Austrian Bismarck" without possessing the capacity of his Prussian ensample. The exposure was as damning as that of the "Ems Telegram," and it had overtaken him with disconcerting speed.

Thus ended the first bout in the conflict: before the next began Baron Aerenthal had been removed from the scene, but during five short years of office [1] he had fixed the lines on which it should be fought to its conclusion.

Baron Rauch did not survive the Friedjung incident: early in 1910 he was superseded, and the Croatian Diet was convened once more. The respite, however, was brief. The ideals of the Serbo-Croat Coalition and of Magyar nationalism were not compatible with one another. So long as Magyar ministries could control the politics of Croatia, it was possible to observe in outward form the Compromise of 1868: now that the majority in the Diet was possessed by a party truly representative of the Croatian people, co-operation between the parliaments at Agram and Buda-Pest had become impracticable, and the Compromise inevitably broke down. A fresh deadlock led once more to the suspension of constitutional government in Croatia in the spring of 1912, and almost immediately afterwards the Serb Church in the Hapsburg dominions was deprived of its charter, which had been consistently respected since its original grant in 1691.

[1] From October 1906 until early in 1912. He died soon after his retirement.

At the height of this internal crisis, the Monarchy was suddenly faced by that external event which its statesmen had dreaded beyond all others. During the same summer the four independent states in the Balkans,[1] upon whose rivalry Austro-Hungarian policy depended, contrived to effect an understanding, and in September 1912 they declared war upon Turkey simultaneously.[2] Within two months the Turkish armies were driven off the field, the Balkan allies were assaulting the Chataldja and Gallipoli lines, which cover the Black Sea Straits, and only three fortresses still held out further West. Negotiations opened at London during a winter armistice proved abortive, but they were renewed after the fall of all three fortresses in the spring. By the resultant treaty the League corporately acquired from Turkey all her European territories beyond a line drawn from Ainos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea.[3]

Serbia had joined the League for two objects. The first was to recover her " irredenta " in Kossovo, before it was overtaken by the same fate as Bosnia : the second was to obtain direct access to the Adriatic.

A country without a seaboard is economically at the mercy of its neighbours. Serbia had experienced this in 1907, when the Danubian Monarchy had closed against her trade the land-route to Western Europe. The nearest seaboard to the Morava-basin is the

[1] Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece.

[2] They were given their opportunity by the Turco-Italian War, which began in the autumn of 1911 and dragged on for a year. The signature of peace by the Turkish and Italian plenipotentiaries at Lausanne and the declaration of war by the Balkan League were practically simultaneous, and until that moment the Italian fleet's command of the sea locked up in Tripoli some of Turkey's most serviceable troops, and paralysed communications between the Turkish military establishment in Macedonia and its Anatolian reservoirs of men and supplies.

[3] See Map IV.

Dalmatian coast, and nationality as well as geography supports Serbia's title to an outlet in this direction, since the whole territory that intervenes between Belgrade and Spalato [1] is occupied by a homogeneous South-Slavonic population. Yet here, too, Serbia's ubiquitous neighbour blocked the way: the crisis of 1908 had shown that Austria-Hungary was established just as permanently West of the Drina as North of the Save, and that Serbia's dream of concessions in this quarter had been Utopian.

A casual glance at the map suggests that, after the annexation of the Kossovo-district, Serbia might have engineered a railway across it to the Montenegrin port of Antivari, and thus obtained an outlet only slightly further to the South; but with a map that represents the relief of the land, the idea will be dispelled by closer examination. Antivari possesses a tolerable harbour but an impassable hinterland. The *massif* of the "Black Mountain" rises immediately behind it, and the very physical qualities that have safeguarded Montenegro's liberty have denied her the possibility of railway development. The Dinaric barrier between

[1] Spalato lies approximately at the mid-point of the South-Slavonic coast, half way between Fiume on the one hand and the mouth of the Boyana River on the other. It is destined by geography to be the principal port of the South-Slavonic area, but at present its capacities are neutralised by the lack of railway connections with its hinterland (see Map III.). The Bosnian Railway has not yet opened its way to any port further up the coast than Metkovitch on the estuary of the Narenta, though a branch diverges from that point in the opposite direction to Ragusa, and continues still further South-East as far as Castelnuovo, at the entrance of Cattaro fjord. To link the Serbian railway system with these actual or potential ports on the Dalmatian coast, little further railway construction is required. A Serbian line ascends the valley of the Western Morava and its tributary, the Tzetinya, as far West as Ujitze: a branch of the Bosnian Railway starts from Sarayevo, crosses the Drina at Vishegrad, and runs right up to the Serbian frontier at Vardishte. The distance between the two rail-heads is less than twenty-five miles (see Map III.).

the Danube-basin and the sea is at no point more difficult to surmount.

Serbia was thus driven to look further South. As soon as the Turkish resistance in Northern Macedonia had been overcome, she despatched a column by forced marches across the Albanian mountains, and occupied a stretch of the Turkish coast-line extending from Alessio at the mouth of the Drin as far Southward as the port of Durazzo.

At this point the Dual Monarchy intervened. Count Berchtold, who had succeeded Baron Aerenthal at the Joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, set his veto upon the establishment of Serbian sovereignty at any point on the Adriatic coast. Once more the Monarchy had to mobilise her troops in support of her diplomacy, and this time against Russia on the Galician frontier, yet by Sir Edward Grey's efforts the catastrophe was once more averted, and Serbia yielded to Berchtold's demand.

Berchtold's action was not defensible. He made play with the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over the North-Albanian clans, and posed as the champion of a small nationality against its unscrupulous neighbour, yet in a precisely similar case the Magyars had avowedly been sacrificing the interests of the Southern Slavs in Croatia to their own need for railway communication with the sea. The hypocrisy of Berchtold's plea was enhanced by the fact that Serbia, unlike Hungary, could have found a seaboard in Dalmatia without doing any violence at all to the national principle, had not her way been barred by the Dual Monarchy itself.

Even the occasion for this stroke seemed ill-chosen. Feeling in Croatia and Bosnia was already inflamed against the government by the internal situation: the Serbian successes had further agitated it by a wave of

sympathetic enthusiasm, and the morale of Serbia herself was very different in the spring of 1913 from what it had been in the Spring of 1909. Berchtold's diplomacy, however, had an ulterior object. He divined that Serbia, now entirely debarred from the Adriatic, would insist on obtaining an Ægean outlet in compensation. This would bring her into collision with Bulgarian claims in Macedonia, the Balkan allies would quarrel over the division of their Turkish spoil, their formidable harmony would be destroyed, and after they had exhausted one another by an internecine war, the Monarchy's path towards Salonika would once more be open.

In starting this train of events, Berchtold overreached himself. Serbia duly enlarged her Macedonian claims, the tension between the Balkan allies increased, and towards the end of June 1913 Bulgaria opened the Second Balkan War by a treacherous night-attack upon the Serbian outposts along the line of the Vardar. Yet the result of this secondary contest was an even greater surprise than the collapse of the Turks. The Greek and Serbian armies almost immediately assumed the offensive, and cleared Macedonia of Bulgarian troops; Roumania declared war, and invaded Bulgaria from the opposite quarter: hardly more than a month had passed before the Bulgarian resistance was completely broken. The Treaty of Bukarest, which defined the terms of the re-settlement, was a proclamation of Berchtold's failure.

Serbia's gains were far greater than they would have been if the Treaty of London had remained in force, and the four allies had settled their claims by peaceful compromise. The Dual Monarchy's discomfiture was proportionately aggravated. In the autumn of 1913

the " Eastward Trend " had indeed lost all prospect of realisation.

(i.) In the first place the gateway through the Sandjak had been walled up, and a continuous belt of Serbian and Montenegrin territory now extended all the way from Belgrade to Antivari. This was a legacy from the Bosnian *coup* of 1908. Part of Aerenthal's indemnity to the Ottoman Government had been the withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian garrisons from this district, and the bargain had proved a bad one for both parties. In effect the Monarchy made way not for Turkey but for her Balkan heirs, and after brief service as a sop to " Young Turkish " pride, the Sandjak went to swell the booty of Serbia and Montenegro.

(ii.) In the second place Serbia had triumphantly achieved her economic independence. The elimination of Bulgaria left Serbia and Greece in joint possession of the Salonika Railway, and while Greece incorporated the Southernmost section of the line, as well as its terminal port, within her political frontier, Serbia retained complete equality with her in the economic utilisation of both. She had thus secured an immediately available outlet to the sea without expenditure of time or capital, whereas the task of pacifying Northern Albania and constructing a new railway through its mountains from the Morava-valley to Durazzo would have absorbed her energy for years. She had reason to thank Count Berchtold for saving her from a false step !

(iii.) Worse still, Serbia and Montenegro had both almost doubled their population and their territorial extent. When they had assimilated these new tissues, and had shaken off all traces of their two wars except the prestige of victory, they would develop into a

formidable military power. They would be strong in themselves, and, worst of all, they would be strong in their friends.

Berchtold's diplomacy had exorcised the first Balkan Confederacy only to conjure up a more dangerous *entente* in its place. The alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria was essentially directed against Turkey: once the Turks were driven behind the Chataldja lines, its positive stimulus would in any case have vanished. Roumania, however, was as disinterested in respect of Turkey as Bulgaria was towards the national problems of the Middle Danube-basin, and her new understanding with Serbia could have but one meaning. Just as Serbia had made common cause with Bulgaria to liberate the Slav populations under Ottoman rule, so she would fight shoulder to shoulder with Roumania to wrench away from the Hapsburg complexus the "irredenta" coveted by each of them in this quarter. The cherished dream of a "Trend Eastward" was fading away, and the foreboding of a "Westward Trend" at the Monarchy's expense was beginning to take its place.

Thus ended the second bout in the conflict between the Dual Monarchy and the South Slavonic nationality.

Could the Monarchy retrieve its position before the drama was played out? Yes, if the face of Europe were changed by a trial of strength between the opposing camps into which the European Powers were divided. If the central group triumphed, the Danubian partner could snatch success out of failure, and lay hands upon Salonika after all.[1]

Would Germany, the dominant member in the partnership, be willing to stake her all upon this issue?

[1] See the British White Paper, No. 82.

Yes again, for while the events of 1908–9 had already endowed the South-Slavonic problem with international significance, the solution of the Moroccan question after the crisis of 1911 had promoted it to be the supreme test of the "Balance of Power."

These considerations counselled the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs to precipitate a *dénouement* at the first opportunity, and the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarayevo in June 1914 presented him with the initiative.

The crime was perpetrated by a South-Slavonic subject of the Monarchy, a Bosnian Serb. It is idle to brand a whole race with an individual's misdeed: Orsini's attempt to assassinate Napoleon III. in 1858 did not stain the honour of the Italian people, still less did Napoleon tax the Sardinian Government with responsibility for the act of a man who was not a Sardinian subject. There is no shadow of proof that King Peter's ministers were implicated in the present affair any more than Cavour was in the other: the facts can only be established when the trial of the murderers has run its course, yet before the proceedings were opened at Sarayevo, Count Berchtold had exploited the occasion to force war upon Serbia against her will.

German and Magyar apologists represent this unprovoked attack as a "punitive expedition." They remind us that when the Afghans massacred Sir Louis Cavagnari and his suite at Kabul, Lord Roberts retraced his steps and exacted a bloody vengeance: "Suppose," they argue, "that the Viceroy of India or the Prince of Wales were sniped at his camp-fire during a tour along the North-West Frontier, you would carry fire and sword through the hills without remorse."

We will accept the comparison, if we may carry it to

a sustained conclusion. If we suppose so much, we must likewise suppose that the inhabitants of Ireland and the Scottish Highlands happen themselves to be Afghans in race, that the Welsh and the Cornishmen, if they are not actually Afghans too, speak some closely allied Persian dialect, and that Afghan is recognised as an official language in the British Navy :[1] add to this an inflexible system of universal conscription, and we shall be able to picture our Afghans from Ireland and Scotland being mobilised in company with their English-speaking neighbours and marched across the Indian frontier to slay their " barbarous " brethren who had sniped an English grandee.[2]

Whatever the German and the Magyar may feel about their onslaught upon Serbia, for their South-Slavonic fellow-citizens it is compulsory civil war.

This abominable culmination of the " Dual System " is the Third Act in the South Slavonic drama, but the plot has broadened out. This time we are participating in the action ourselves, and playing for life and death. If we and our allies succeed in dominating the *finale*, in what guise will the original actors emerge from their protracted ordeal ?

If the Dual Monarchy suffers defeat in the present struggle, its South-Slavonic subjects will find themselves for the first time at liberty to consult their own interests, instead of being exploited in the selfish interest of other nationalities. We can be sure beforehand of their

[1] Every officer in the Austro-Hungarian Navy is required to show proficiency in the South-Slavonic tongue, because the crews are drawn almost entirely from the Croat population of Dalmatia and Istria, and are apt to understand nothing but their native language, beyond the bare Italian words of command.

[2] To make our comparison exact, we must imagine that the Afghan who fired the dastardly shot proved to hail from Ireland.

choice. Dalmatia, Croatia, and Bosnia will break away from the toils of Austria-Hungary, and form some kind of union with Serbia and Montenegro. The European fraternity will be enriched by a new national state.

What political organisation will the South-Slavonic nation adopt? Will the provinces merge themselves into a centralised kingdom, like the states of the Italian peninsula half a century ago, or will they preserve their individuality and content themselves with federation, like the Swiss cantons or the U.S.A.?

The Italian precedent might suggest the former alternative. In Italy there was the same utter lack of a common historical background,[1] accentuated in this case by the marvellous evolution of local politics and culture, yet here the miracle was achieved. Florence and Venice gladly humbled themselves to exalt their common country: why should not Agram and Uskub do likewise?

If the Southern Slavs fall short of their Italian forerunners, we shall find the reason in two differences of circumstance.

The contrast between Sicily and Lombardy in 1860 was striking enough, yet Italy had been spared the worst degree of spiritual disunion. The Turk has never set his mark upon half her territories. The disparity between Milan and Palermo was as nothing compared to the gulf between Agram, which has never submitted to the Ottoman conqueror, and Uskub, which ejected him hardly more than two years ago.

[1] The Roman Empire was the first and last political organism that had united all Italy before 1870, and the Empire was not a specifically Italian institution. Like the Roman Church it was a common possession of Western Europe, and its tradition persisted more strongly in Germany than South of the Alps.

This gulf will take many years to bridge, and here again circumstances have placed the Southern Slavs at a disadvantage: they have been compelled to begin the work of construction from the wrong end.

In Italy the initiative came from the most advanced community in the country. Starting from Piedmont on the borders of France the movement proceeded methodically towards the East and South: Lombardy, Emilia, and Tuscany were consolidated into a national state before Garibaldi sailed for Sicily with his Thousand.

If Piedmont had shared the fate of Venetia and Lombardy, and had been assigned to Austria at the settlement of 1814, the course of events would have been very different. By 1860 the North would have been consolidated not as an independent kingdom but as a complex of provinces jumbled together in the Hapsburg collection. Italian Nationalism would have been forced to abandon Tuscany and Romagna, and would have found no standing-ground North of the Marches. If at this stage the Pope had identified himself with the Risorgimento, and had incorporated the South in his dominions, as Serbia incorporated Macedonia after her Balkan victories, he might have preached a crusade against Austria and liberated all the North from her yoke with the assistance of her European rivals, yet when the oppressor had been driven beyond the Alps, his highly-civilised victims and their Papal champion would have been left in an embarrassing position. The Pope would have become the hero of the North, but the clerical ideals which had inspired his victorious armies would not have commended themselves to Italians the other side of the Apennines. The Northerners released from Austrian "strong government" would have hesitated to accept a clerical parliamentarianism in its place.

This fantastic analogy may serve to indicate the attitude of patriotic Croats towards the "Orthodox" nationalism of the Morava-principality. When Serbia prostrated the Turkish and Bulgarian armies in two successive campaigns, her triumph reacted upon the South-Slavonic provinces of the Dual Monarchy. The Serbs of Hungary and Croatia turned their eyes in earnest towards Belgrade, and the Croats took pride in their kinship with the victors. This spiritual exaltation brought the South-Slavonic nation to self-consciousness, but we must guard against over-estimating its effect. The spell of the Hapsburg is broken, and Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia are ready to transfer their allegiance to the Karageorgevitch, yet they will not do so at the sacrifice of their "historical sentiment."

We have noted the strength of tradition in this part of Europe. When Croatia and Dalmatia are set free, their first impulse will be to restore the "Triune Kingdom"[1] as it existed in the eleventh century A.D., and they will insist on entering the South-Slavonic Union on this basis. The national state will thus take shape as a federation of at least two members.

In Bosnia the Serb element predominates over the two others, and Serbia will doubtless incorporate the whole country. The Bosnian problem involved her in her struggle for life and death, and the possession of the province is the stake of victory: as the protagonist in the national cause, Serbia is worthy of her reward.

Whether the federation will contain more than two members depends upon the choice of Montenegro. No South-Slavonic community cherishes so glorious a tradition as she, but her history is bound up with the national adversity. She remained a virgin fortress of

[1] Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia.

liberty when all her brethren had succumbed to alien masters: when they are free once more, her isolation will have lost it significance, and if she clings to her particularism, she will be holding her friends at arm's-length instead of her foes. She will be cutting herself off from the social and economic development upon which the South-Slavonic world will enter as soon as the "preliminary question" of nationality has been solved. When Bosnia gravitates towards Belgrade, the moment will have come for Montenegro likewise to merge herself in a "Greater Serbia."

The South-Slavonic Union, then, will articulate itself into a "Triune Kingdom" of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia on the one hand and a "Greater Serbia" on the other, with an autonomous Montenegro as a possible third partner.

Its geographical frontiers [1] are determined already by the boundaries of the several provinces. On the North-West it will inherit the former frontier between Austria and the "Crown of St. Stephen," on the North-East it will be divided from Hungary by the line of the Drave [2] and the Danube, on the South-West it will take possession of the Adriatic coast-line from Spizza to Fiume.[3]

[1] See Map III.

[2] The triangular enclave between the Drave, the Mur, and the Styrian border is inhabited exclusively by Croats, and should therefore be assigned to Croatia in addition, instead of being included, as at present, in the kingdom of Hungary.

[3] The coast should be distributed between the members of the Confederacy. At present it is entirely monopolised by Dalmatia, but the "Triune Kingdom," as the price of its particularism, should cede to Serbia and Montenegro such parts of the Dalmatian littoral as lie South-East of the Narenta estuary, including Metkovitch and Ragusa, the termini of the Bosnian Railway, as well as the shores of Cattaro fjord, which is the natural doorway of the Montenegrin Highlands. The "Triune Kingdom" should be compensated in the opposite quarter by the addition of three islands—Veglia, Cherso, and Lessin—at present included in the "Küstenland" province of Austria.

Its constitution can only vaguely be surmised. The individual states are certain to retain a very wide sphere of sovereignty for themselves: what powers will they consent to delegate to the Federal Government?

Last summer, on the eve of the war, Serbia and Montenegro were negotiating a military and customs union. The provisions of this convention will obviously be extended to the wider federation: the defensive organisation of the South-Slavonic Unit will be centralised under the presidency of King Peter, and the common military frontier will coincide with a common tariff-wall. This, however, is a minimum, and the federal authorities will probably obtain control over the more important financial and economic departments of government as well. The administration of the railways will assuredly pass into their hands.

At the same moment Serbia was concluding a *concordat* with the Pope regarding the status of the Roman Church in Serbian territory. This agreement will likewise extend itself to the whole Union, and will suggest an essential clause in the federal constitution.

The Federal Government must proclaim the complete civil equality of the three creeds current among its citizens—Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam—and it must guarantee the observance of this principle by the governments of the individual states. The transformation of the South-Slavonic race into a self-governing nationality depends on religious toleration.

The new regime will stand or fall by its success in conciliating the Moslems in Bosnia. While Serb and Croat will rejoice whole-heartedly at their escape from the Magyar yoke, the Bosniak alone will regret Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, as he regretted the Ottoman

anarchy it superseded. He will regard the national idea with suspicion, and the long-deferred but inevitable solution of the agrarian problem will seem to confirm his fears, by singling him out from the Christian peasants and impoverishing him to their advantage. Yet the spread of education will break down even the Bosniak's sullen tradition. As the consciousness of his Slavonic language grows upon him, the barrier of his oriental religion will melt away. Nationalism will ultimately heal the breach between the descendant of the Bogumils and the men of his own blood from whom he has been alienated for eight centuries by religion.

C. *A Balkan Zollverein*

The secession of the Southern Slavs will dislocate the structure of the Danubian Monarchy more seriously than any mutilations on its Carpathian border. The Hungarian member of the Dual Partnership will be cut off from the sea by an independent state of its own calibre,[1] occupying the whole region between the Morava-basin and the Austrian frontier. The Magyars will find the tables turned upon them. They will experience henceforth the geographical disabilities they imposed upon Serbia heretofore. Deprived of a coast-line of their own, they will be compelled to make terms with one of their neighbours to secure access to a port.

Satisfy this vital need they must, yet they will still

[1] A reduced Hungary will still number nearly twelve million inhabitants: a South-Slavonic Union will muster somewhat under nine, viz.:

Serbs . . .	5,000,000
Croats . . .	3,000,000
Moslems . . .	600,000
Total . . .	8,600,000

be free to choose between two alternative means of doing so. They may address themselves either to Austria or to the South-Slavonic Union, and the issue will probably be taken up by the two political parties which have been struggling for the allegiance of the Magyar nation.

Tisza and his following will press for closer union with Austria. They will take advantage of the national animus against the Slavs, which will have been embittered immeasurably by the result of the war. and they will appeal to the national pride never to acknowledge defeat. "Fate," they will say, "has robbed us of our railway to Fiume, and of the harbour to which we have devoted so much money and labour, yet Fiume is only sundered by the Istrian peninsula from the Austrian harbour of Trieste, and the one port is hardly more remote from the Alföld than the other. Through Laibach, Marburg, and Steinamanger Trieste can be brought into direct railway communication with Buda-Pest. Why humiliate ourselves by begging favours of the enemy, when we can fall back upon the loyalty of our Austrian partners, who have passed with us through the terrible ordeal of war?" Thus Tisza will argue for the maintenance of the Dual System.

The secession of the Southern Slavs, however, will upset that economic balance on which Dualism depends.

When either half of the Monarchy stretched from the Carpathians to the sea, Austria controlled Hungary's access to her markets in Central Europe, and Hungary in like measure controlled Austria's access to her source of raw material in the South-East. Each was in a position to inflict equal economic damage upon the other, and both would have been left losers by fiscal warfare, while fiscal co-operation brought them mutual

gain. It was therefore in their common interest to compromise on a joint tariff, which gave each the monopoly of the other's custom.

Under the new conditions, on the other hand, the operation of the Dual System would place Hungary at Austria's mercy. So long as the Southern Slavs on the Austrian border were under the Magyar yoke, Austria was debarred by Magyar policy from opening up relations with them : once they are independent, she will be able to deal with them as principals, and the long-delayed railway connections will at last be established between Salzburg and Vienna on the one hand, and Agram on the other.

After this, Hungary's co-operation will no longer be indispensable to Austria. Austria will be able to turn Hungary's flank at any moment by putting her industry into direct communication with the Balkan area in Hungary's rear along this new land-route South of the Drave. Hungary will be "side-tracked" as effectively by the completion of the Croatian railway system as Serbia would have been by Baron Aerenthal's abortive railway schemes in the Sandjak.

This would give Austria a crushing tactical advantage in the decennial readjustment of the Joint Tariff. By threatening to abandon the existing partnership, and to contract a new one with the Southern Slavs instead, she could force the Magyars to unconditional surrender. If the threat were carried into effect, Hungary would be powerless to disturb Austria's communications with the South-East, while the Austrian tariff-wall would debar her from her sole remaining egress to the sea. Austria's economic life would be unaffected, Hungary's would be completely paralysed.

Under these circumstances the equality of the two

states would be reduced to a fiction, and the Magyars would discover that " Dualism " was compatible with a thraldom worse than that from which they escaped in 1867.

This would give the " Party of Independence " their opportunity.

The Magyar " Left " will issue from the war stronger than it has ever been before. In 1906 the " Coalition " ruined itself over Magyarisation, but the European settlement will loose this millstone from the Party's neck. When the majority of the non-Magyar population has been detached from Hungary altogether, and the status of the remnant has been placed under an international guarantee, the racial problem will be expunged from practical politics, and the " Left " will actually be able to make party capital out of this blessing in disguise, by casting the whole responsibility for it upon their opponents.

" Tisza," they will say, " has been Hungary's evil genius. He involved us in a European war ; he sent our soldiers to their death in Poland, while he let the Russians invade our homes across the unguarded line of the Carpathians ; to ransom half the land from the ravagers he signed away the other half to the diplomatists: now, not content with his disastrous war and his still more disastrous peace, he has handed us over bound hand and foot to Austria, in order to enshrine our disasters in a permanent settlement.

" Let us look facts in the face. Tisza tells us to hate the Southern Slavs in the future, because we have struggled with them for the mastery in the past. That struggle is over : thanks to Tisza's own policy, it has been concluded by our defeat. Why foster our hatred any longer, when the conclusion is unalterable ? He

bids us be loyal to the Austrians, who at this very moment are taking advantage of our difficulties to exploit us in cold blood. Why sentimentalise over a partnership solely recommended by opportunism, when loyalty to it quenches the last glimmer of hope for our national future?

"Let us shake off our paralysis, and help ourselves. The secession of the Southern Slavs has destroyed the equilibrium between Austria and our own country, but it has also cast the South Slavonic Confederation as an independent weight into the balance. The equilibrium may still be righted, if we can incline this weight to our side of the scales. Let us take the initiative out of Austria's hands by denouncing the 'Ausgleich' ourselves, and forestall her by securing the partnership of the Southern Slavs for Hungary."

This hypothetical disputation between two political parties stands in effect for the contest between national fanaticism on the one hand and economic necessity on the other. Let us assume that a short experience of "Dualism" under the new conditions converts the Magyar nation [1] to the "Independence" point of view,

[1] The Slovaks are the only important element in Hungary that is likely to cling to the Austrian connection. Their country is linked by nature with Pózsony, Buda-Pest, and the Alföld: their dialect is identical with that of the Tchechs in Austria. Geography and nationality thus draw them in opposite directions, and their one hope of reconciling the two factors lies in some form of national devolution within an unbroken "Danubian Unit." If Austria and Hungary part, the Slovaks must sacrifice one factor or the other. The Tchechs will urge them to vindicate their nationality by seceding from Hungary to Austria. This would benefit the Tchechs themselves by cancelling their numerical inferiority to the Austrian Germans and giving them the prospect of a majority in the Reichsrath at Vienna, but it is doubtful whether the Slovaks would be influenced by this consideration. Their brotherhood with the Tchechs extends to language alone: they have never shared a common tradition, and there are few indications at present of a common national consciousness. The Slovaks will probably defer to geography, and work out a national life of their

and suppose that the "Left" supersedes Tisza in office to carry out its rival programme: what response will its overtures receive from the Southern Slavs?

The Southern Slavs will be torn between the same two motives as the Magyars themselves. Their national hatred of their neighbours is at least as strong as their neighbours' hatred of them: with distant Vienna they have always been on friendly terms. When they find themselves in the proud position of being wooed by Austria and Hungary in competition, prejudice will certainly incline them to favour the Austrian suit. Their economic interest, on the other hand, will really be identical with the interest of Hungary.

At the first glance their new economic position might appear invulnerable: the territorial resettlement that excluded Hungary from the sea will have assigned to the Southern Slavs an extensive Adriatic seaboard, and the possession of open ports is a guarantee of economic independence. Yet so long as the new Confederation stands alone, the settlement will not essentially have improved the nation's continental situation.

Before the war Serbia was isolated from Central and Western Europe by the whole bulk of the Dual Monarchy: after the settlement, the Austrian half of it will still present a narrower but no less impenetrable barrier to the united South-Slavonic nation, and the game will be in Austria's hands more completely than ever. She may start by playing off the Confederation against Hungary, but she will be free to reverse her

own within a regenerated Hungarian state. Prophecy, however, is impossible. The relation of the Croats to the Serbs remained precisely parallel till as recently as 1912, and with this precedent before our eyes we can only say that if the Slovaks are inspired to identify themselves with the Tchech nationality, they must be granted perfect liberty to carry their choice into effect.

tactics whenever she pleases, and play off Hungary against the Confederation. The Southern Slavs will discover, like the Magyars, that Austria is mistress of the initiative, so long as they attempt to cope with her single-handed. By the time the Hungarian Independence Party makes its overtures, the Federal Government will be ready to welcome them. Experience will have prepared both nations simultaneously to compose their feud and adopt the alternative policy of co-operation.

If the negotiations are crowned with success, the geographical structure of the "Danubian Unit" will have proved itself a stronger force than national chauvinism. The political edifice of "Dualism" will have collapsed under the tempest, yet the Transleithania which perished with the breaking of "St. Stephen's Crown" will have reasserted its economic function in a Zollverein between two independent national states.

The new Zollverein will prove in turn that the national and the economic principles of articulation are not fundamentally incompatible. A reconciliation on this basis between the Magyars and the Southern Slavs will win for both parties what they really want. The Southern Slavs will enjoy national unity, the Magyars economic freedom. The port of Fiume will become the common property of the two states, and the railway that links it with the Alföld through Agram will be administered conjointly in the interests of both.

The South-Slavonic Question has been the most difficult problem in the Balkans. If we have found its solution, can we not apply our discovery to solve the rest? The "Transleithanian Zollverein" will already cover a wider area towards the South-East than was

ever included in the frontiers of Hapsburg "Transleithania": cannot its limits be extended still further in the same direction?

The friendships as well as the enmities of Serbia will be inherited by the South-Slavonic Federation, and since the Second Balkan War Serbia has maintained a close understanding with Roumania and Greece. This *entente* has been inspired in part by the fear of Bulgarian reprisals, but chiefly by the discovery of mutual economic interests of an enduring character. No better means of providing for these interests could be found than the incorporation of Serbia's two friends in the Zollverein.

(i.) Immediately after the settlement at Bukarest in the autumn of 1913, Roumania began to negotiate with Serbia for the construction of a railway-bridge across the Danube at Turnu Severin,[1] which was to link the railway systems of the two countries. Roumania possesses a coast-line of her own on the Black Sea, but traffic through this door is condemned to make the circuitous passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and may at any moment be brought to a complete standstill by the caprice of the Ottoman Government. The railway convention with Serbia was Roumania's first step towards an open port on the Adriatic, and in the present struggle between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy Roumanian as well as South-Slavonic interests are at stake. If Bosnia becomes Serbian soil and the present Serbian railhead at Ujitze is connected through the Bosnian system with a port on the Adriatic, the new route will serve not only the basin of the Morava, but the whole Wallachian plain beyond the bridge at Turnu Severin.

[1] See Map III.

The freedom of this economic highway will be as important to Roumania as the freedom of the Fiume Railway is to Hungary, and it will be open to her to secure it by the same method. Roumania will almost certainly apply for membership in the " Transleithanian Zollverein," and the two original members will consult their best interests by granting her request. Roumania will win her outlet on the Adriatic: Hungary and the Southern Slavs will gain in return free passage over the Roumanian railways to the port of Costanza on the Black Sea.[1]

(ii.) By another railway convention the Bukarest settlement linked Serbia to Greece.

Before the Balkan Wars, Greece was practically in the position of an island: for communication with continental Europe she was as dependent upon the sea as Great Britain and Ireland. By 1908 she had constructed a railway of standard European gauge from Athens as far North as Larissa, and before 1912 she had extended it through the pass of Tempe to the point where the Græco-Turkish frontier struck the coast of the Ægean. The undertaking had involved great engineering difficulties and a proportionate expense, yet just when the arduous part of the task had been accomplished, and no physical barrier remained between the Greek railhead and the terminus of the European system at Salonika, the Ottoman Government cheated the Greek nation of its object by refusing to allow the prolongation of the line through Turkish territory.

[1] Hungary and Serbia already enjoy free communication with the Black Sea down the channel of the Danube. By a series of European treaties—1856, 1871, 1878, 1883—the river was thrown open to free navigation from its mouth as far upwards as the " Iron Gates." Sea-going craft, however, cannot ascend above Braila, and the greater part of this international section is only available for barges and river steamers.

In 1912-13 this obstacle was removed by force. The Treaty of Bukarest left Greece in possession of Salonika itself, and the construction of the last link in the railway from Athens was immediately taken in hand.[1] With its completion, the orientation of Greece will be changed. Heretofore the traffic between Greece and Europe has centred at Patras on the Corinthian Gulf, the terminus of steamship routes to Brindisi and Trieste: hereafter the primacy will pass from steamer to railway, and Patras yield precedence to Salonika.

The connection of Athens and Salonika, however, is of little use in itself, unless Greece can secure free passage for her commerce along the route leading from Salonika to Central and Western Europe. This necessity has given Greece an economic interest identical with that of her new Serbian neighbour.

While Salonika and the seaboard of Macedonia was assigned to Greece, the whole hinterland was incorporated in Serbia, and from the frontier-station of Yevyeli[2] Northwards the trunk-line up the Vardar valley to Uskub and down the Morava valley to Belgrade now runs exclusively through Serbian territory. Beyond Belgrade the Dual Monarchy shut out Greece and Serbia alike from Central Europe, just as it barred Roumania and Serbia alike from the Adriatic beyond the railhead at Ujitze.

Greece therefore had as strong an interest as

[1] See Map IV. The section under construction is about seventy miles long. Starting from the old railhead beyond Tempe, it skirts the Ægean shore in a Northerly direction, below the Eastern spurs of Mount Olympus, bridges the River Vistritza ("Haliacmon"), and effects a junction immediately beyond it with the old line connecting Salonika and Monastir. From this junction the Athens Railway will use the existing bridge over the Vardar and the existing permanent way across the Salonikan "Campagna."

[2] See Map IV.

Roumania in seeking economic partnership with the South-Slavonic state, and she negotiated a railway agreement on very similar lines. She gave Serbia free access to the Ægean, and received in return the freedom of the continental route as far as the Austro-Hungarian frontier. Like Roumania, she speculated on the eventual removal of the Austro-Hungarian barrier: in the present struggle the Southern Slavs are fighting the Greeks' battle as well as their own, and any policy that enables them to succeed in their endeavour must commend itself equally to Greece. If the South-Slavonic federation can only cope with Austria by joining Hungary in a Zollverein, then it is the interest of Greece to enter the Zollverein too. Her application will not be refused, for she has as much to give as to receive. The admission of Roumania will extend the Zollverein to the Black Sea: the admission of Greece will realise the "Trend Eastward" by bringing it down to the Ægean.

This twofold increase in its membership will have expanded the Zollverein from its Transleithanian nucleus to the opposite limits of the Balkans. Four national units will already be included within its boundary: will it succeed in federating the two that remain? If Albania and Bulgaria can be induced to enter the fold, the Zollverein will become co-extensive with the whole Balkan area.

(iii.) Albania will not find it easy to stand out of a combination to which both Greece and the South-Slavonic Federation belong. The country consists of a strip of coast fronting the heel of Italy across the narrowest part of the Adriatic and backed by a zone of barren mountains, through which several passages lead Eastward into Macedonia and descend eventually to the

Northern littoral of the Ægean. This hinterland is encircled by Greek and South Slavonic territory on all sides.

Albania has no history. The principality was created by the fiat of the Powers; its limits were laid down by the conference of ambassadors that supervised the making of the Treaty of London; its frontiers were drawn out in detail by an international boundary-commission. It was called into existence not because it had the will to exist as a national state, but simply as an alternative to a vacuum that would inevitably have been filled by the encroachment of the Greek and Serbian frontiers. Its function is to "hold the ring," while the native population develops from a barbarous aggregate of clans into a civilised nationality.

Meanwhile, Albania has started life destitute. Her population is uneducated and her material wealth unexploited. Her only immediately available asset is her geographical position. She is mistress of two ports which have recently won notoriety in Europe.

The direct transit from Brindisi [1] leads to the Southern extremity of the Albanian coast. Here lies the mountain-locked basin of Avlona, which disputes with Spezzia Bay the claim to be the finest harbour in the Mediterranean, but suffers more than Spezzia from the high mountains that hem it in on the landward side. In spite of the limestone barriers, Avlona is likely to become the terminus of a narrow-gauge railway,[2] which will work its way up the valleys of the Viosa and Dhrynos to Greek Yannina, and thence descend to Arta and Agrinion, whence a line of narrow gauge runs already to a point opposite Patras on the North coast of

[1] The crossing occupies most of the night in an ordinary mail-steamer.
[2] See Map IV.

the Corinthian Gulf. This route will probably compete with the Salonika Railway for the express-traffic between Paris and Athens.

Durazzo, the other port, lies half-way up the Albanian coast-line. The transit from Italy is accordingly longer, and the harbour itself is wretched beyond description. The town lies huddled under the Southern lee of a group of sand-dunes, which are linked to the mainland by a malarial waste of marshes and lagoons. The deposit of the swamp has silted up the sea far out beyond the actual shore-line, and the smallest steamer cannot approach within half a mile of the jetty. Durazzo has nothing to recommend it except its communications with the interior, which are as excellent as those of Avlona are poor.

Since the Roman period Durazzo has been the terminus of a route [1] which ascends the valley of the Skumbi to Elbassan, penetrates by a pass to the valley of the Black Drin, crosses the stream at Struga, where it issues from the Lake of Ohrida, and then, after skirting the lake shore and passing through Ohrida itself, breasts a second mountain range and descends at last into the basin of Monastir.

To compensate Serbia for the renunciation of territorial sovereignty over Durazzo, the Powers bestowed on her the freedom of the port, and gave her the right to construct a railway through Albanian territory in order to connect this outlet with her own railway system. The route we have described will probably be chosen for the final section of the new Serbian line. From Monastir a railway already leads South-Eastward through Greek territory to Salonika: it will only be

[1] See Map IV. The Romans improved the track into a metalled road, their "via Egnatia."

necessary to construct another section Northwards from Monastir to Uskub,[1] and the whole of Macedonia will have been brought into direct communication with the Adriatic seaboard.

Albania thus possesses two commercial highways of potential value to her Greek and South Slavonic neighbours, and her future prosperity depends upon the development of traffic along them. It is therefore of vital importance for her to obtain entrance into the Balkan Zollverein. If she remains outside it, Greece and the South Slavonic Federation will dispense with her ports, and open up equivalent routes to the Adriatic within their own frontiers. The iron tariff-wall of the Zollverein will ring Albania round on the landward side, and since there is no local traffic in the principality itself, Avlona and Durazzo will never be awakened by the stir of commerce. If she decides upon isolation, Albania will be condemning herself to death : if she joins hands with her neighbours, she will be laying the foundation of that economic progress which is her first necessity.

Incorporation in the Zollverein will also solve several problems raised by the delimitation of the Albanian frontier.

(*a*) Towards the North-East, the diplomatists assigned the whole " Metoya " district to Serbia and Montenegro.[2]

The award did justice to the principle of nationality, for the South-Slavonic element in the local population still preponderates over the Albanian intruders licenced for years to exterminate it by the Turkish Government.

[1] See Map IV.

[2] See Map IV : the district coincides with the basin of the White Drin.

On the other hand, it inflicted considerable hardship upon the clans inhabiting the mountainous country immediately West of the Metoya, who had been accustomed to deal with the outer world through Ipek, Jakova, and Prisren, the three towns of the plain, and now found themselves barred out from their only available market-places by the new Serbian frontier. The Zollverein will eliminate the new injustice without restoring the old. The Serbo-Albanian frontier will remain where the commissioners drew it, but since it will no longer constitute a customs-barrier the clansmen from the Albanian side will once more be able to visit the towns in the Serbian plainland as freely as when plain and mountain were yoked together politically by Ottoman misrule.

(*b*) The mountains of Northern Albania verge on their other flank towards the Lake of Skodra,[1] and half the clans descend to market at Skodra town, which lies at the lake's South-Eastern extremity. Geography has destined Skodra to be a focus of traffic. The lake discharges itself past her walls into the channel of the Boyana River,[2] and for the small steamers that ply upon the lake the Boyana is navigable from this point to the sea. The sea-going steamers employed in the coastal trade find good ports of call at Dulcigno, a few miles North of the Boyana's mouth, and at San Giovanni di Medua, a few miles South of it. Both these harbours (if they may be dignified by the name) are connected with Skodra across level country by good high-roads.

If all the shores of the lake were Albanian, no problem would arise, but unfortunately its North-Western

[1] Skutari.

[2] A branch thrown off by the united stream of the White and Black Drin, after it has wound its way through the Albanian mountains, and won a clear passage to the sea. See Map IV.

extremity passes beyond the Albanian frontier, and penetrates deep into the mountain-mass of Montenegro. Physically, Montenegro and Northern Albania constitute a single region, of which Skodra is the natural capital: historically, this homogeneous hinterland has been partitioned between two hostile races, which can never merge themselves into one political organism. An open door at Skodra is equally vital to Albania and to Montenegro, yet the town cannot be included in the political frontiers of both at once.

The rightful ownership of Skodra is not in doubt. The Southern Slavs extend to the head of the lake, but an Albanian population dwells along its lower shores, and Skodra itself, at its opposite extremity, is a purely Albanian city. The struggle for Skodra is the history of Montenegrin encroachment upon alien territory.

The Montenegrins have been forced in this direction through the fault of Austria-Hungary, which has debarred them from their lawful outlet to the South-Slavonic coast. Had the Montenegrins been at liberty to reach the sea through Cattaro fjord, by incorporating the kindred villages that fringe the waterside, they would never have tried to reach it through Skodra by subjugating an Albanian population almost as numerous as their own.

In 1878 the Congress of Berlin assigned to Montenegro the harbour of Antivari, beyond the extremity of the Austrian littoral. Antivari is not a convenient port for the Black Mountain. A high range of hills blocks the way thither from the head of Skodra Lake, yet the Montenegrins have striven with success to overcome this physical disadvantage by the construction of a mountain-railway across the barrier.[1] Austria-

[1] It starts from Virpazar, on the lake-shore.

Hungary, however, grudged her South-Slavonic neighbour even this hard-won economic liberty. By a corollary to the Berlin Treaty she secured for herself powers of control [1] over the traffic of the new Montenegrin port, and to win an untrammeled outlet Montenegro was forced to go still further afield. After the Berlin settlement had produced a revulsion of feeling in Great Britain, Gladstone succeeded Disraeli in office to undo as far as possible what Disraeli had done, and one of his first acts [2] was to extort the transference of Dulcigno from Turkey to Montenegro.

Gladstone's gift was more beneficent in its intention than in its result. The only practicable route between the Montenegrin hinterland and Dulcigno lies through Skodra. So long, therefore, as Skodra remained in other hands, Dulcigno was of no economic value to its new masters, while Skodra was deprived of its natural port. In 1913 the Balkan War gave Montenegro the opportunity to annex Skodra as well, but when the fortress capitulated the Powers rightly intervened, and the inclusion of Skodra in the new Albanian principality put an end for ever to Montenegrin hopes.

Skodra and Dulcigno can now never be reunited under Montenegrin sovereignty: the logical alternative is their reunion within Albania. Baulked of Skodra, Montenegro will lose nothing by the retrocession of Skodra's port, and her whole title to Dulcigno will fall to the ground as soon as Cattaro fjord and the Austrian littoral on either side of it have passed into her possession. Yet no amount of compensation on the opposite flank will induce Montenegro to yield territory to Albania without some equivalent return on Albania's part.

[1] Waived by Baron Aerenthal in 1909 as part compensation for the annexation of Bosnia.

[2] 1880.

The present territorial arrangement renders Dulcigno economically useless to both states: Montenegro will not barter away her political rights except on terms which restore Dulcigno's economic utility not only for Albania but for herself, and it is easy to see how the bargain must run. If Montenegro on her side is to renounce all claims to territorial sovereignty over Dulcigno as well as Skodra, Albania on hers must grant Montenegro complete freedom of traffic through Skodra as well as Dulcigno.

By joining the Balkan Zollverein Albania will fulfil her part of this compact. Economic co-operation with her neighbours will thus win for her a most desirable extension of her territorial sovereignty, and will heal her long feud with Montenegro by reconciling here also the claims of nationality and economics.

(*c*) Beyond Avlona, the Powers assigned to Albania the country known as Epirus.[1]

Their decision set Geography at defiance. With Avlona Epirus possesses hardly a single link: with the Greek territory towards the South and East her communications are well established. In this instance maps are misleading. The rivers of Epirus certainly debouch upon the Albanian coast, but they force their way through gorges where no road can follow. To travel from Koritza to Europe you do not descend the valley of the Devol to the Adriatic but cross the watershed into Macedonia and board at Florina the train to Salonika. If you follow the road inland from Santi Quaranta, the only port of call on the Epirot coast, it does not lead you Northwards to Berat, but South-Eastwards to Yannina, the principal town of North-Western Greece. From

[1] See Map IV. The name has been coined to cover the three districts of Himarra, Argyrokastro, and Koritza.

the geographical point of view, Epirus and Greece are inseparable.

The Powers took their stand upon nationality. "The country," they argued, "may be Greek, but the people are Albanian. They speak an Albanian dialect."

This argument betrays a misconception of what nationality means. Nationality is not an objective attribute but a state of consciousness which depends for its stimulus upon a certain degree of civilisation. We have seen that among the majority of the population included within the principality's frontiers it is conspicuously absent: they have no group consciousness beyond the clan. The Epirots alone are civilised enough to possess it, and their civilisation and nationality are both drawn from the same external source.

The significant fact about the Epirot is not that he speaks Albanian at home, but that he learns Greek at school,[1] and finds in his adopted language a passport to a wider life. The Epirots are the only Albanians who can boast a history, and their history consists in the casting off of Albanian barbarism and the putting on of European culture in its Greek form. After the Turkish conquest the majority of the Albanians were converted to Islam: the Epirots alone followed the example of their Greek neighbours, and remained loyal to the Orthodox Church. In the eighteenth century the Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition developed into a national Greek renaissance: the Epirots were fired by the new movement, and welcomed the Greek school that grew up beside the Greek church. They looked forward as eagerly as the Greek of Macedonia or

[1] The village schools in Epirus have mostly been endowed by natives who made their fortunes in Greek commercial centres like Smyrna and Alexandria.

Mitylini to the day when nationality should find expression in political liberation and unification. When Yannina fell in the spring of 1913, the day seemed to have dawned. The Powers thrust them into the outer darkness of the Albanian principality just when they were on the threshold of the promised land.

The Epirots have not submitted tamely to the ruin of their hopes. The Powers could prevent their annexation to Greece, but they could not compel their adhesion to Albania. In the summer of 1913 they raised a national militia, and have successfully resisted all attempts on the part of the Albanian Government to assert its sovereignty. If Albania is to secure the friendship of Greece, she must abandon a claim which she cannot enforce. The Epirots have proved that common language is in this case no national bond, by taking up arms for the right to merge themselves in a nation of other speech.

When she has solved the frontier problems of the Metoya, Dulcigno, and Epirus, Albania will be free to face the task of internal construction. The new government will here find the exercise of its authority hampered by the very lack of that national consciousness the presence of which in Epirus has made it altogether impossible. Its writ will run where the Ottoman sultan's ran, in the ports and the plains, but if it is wise it will follow the Ottoman policy of leaving the mountains to themselves. To the clansman it will make no difference that the government is " national " : he will still view its action simply as a menace to the liberty of the clan, and he will feel no greater obligation to pay taxes to an " Albanian " exchequer at Durazzo than to a Pasha who collected them at the same " konak " for transmission to Constantinople. The Albanian

revenues will depend not upon the contributions of the Albanian population but upon the customs levied on the trade of Avlona and Durazzo : that trade in turn will depend upon the admission of the principality to the Balkan Zollverein.

(iv.) The Zollverein will not be complete until it has secured the adhesion of Bulgaria.

Since the Balkan Wars the Bulgarian territory has extended to the Ægean as well as to the Black Sea,[1] and the Bulgarian frontier thus blocks every land-route from the remainder of the Balkan area to the Black Sea Straits and to the Anatolian continent that lies beyond.[2] The Zollverein would suffer grave injury from Bulgaria's economic hostility, and in her present mood Bulgaria is prepared to inflict as much injury upon her neighbours as she can.

The latest liberated of all the Balkan nations, she devoted herself with fierce singleness of purpose to the realisation of her national destiny. In the Balkan Wars she staked all to win all, and issued the loser. For her misfortune she has chiefly herself to blame. By her murderous attack upon the Serbian outposts she deliberately provoked the disastrous struggle with her allies, and her tactless diplomacy was responsible for the intervention of Roumania. Yet the victors sacrificed the righteousness of their cause to a most unrighteous exploitation of their victory.[3] In the division of spoils at Bukarest they stripped Bulgaria naked, and unless

[1] See Map IV.

[2] The most important of these routes is the "Oriental Railway," which strikes Eastward out of the Morava valley at Nish, enters Bulgarian territory just beyond Pirot, and passes through Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople to Stamboul. The line is continued on the opposite side of the Bosphorus by the Anatolian Railway, which starts from Stamboul's Asiatic suburbs.

[3] Bulgaria is the Germany of the Balkans : the Treaty of Bukarest is a warning to the Allies.

they are prepared to bring their settlement more into accord with justice, they must not expect forgiveness from their victim.

The treaty left Bulgaria with a heavy score against each of them.

(*a*) Between the Danube and the Black Sea Roumania took a strip of territory which had belonged to Bulgaria since her creation and contained no Rouman inhabitants.[1] Her object was to lengthen her cramped coastline and to open a direct route through Silistria between Bukarest and the sea, and she regarded her act as a rectification of frontier, not as the recovery of a sacred national inheritance.

The difference between the two states should thus be capable of adjustment. If the present war brings Roumania accessions of territory in other quarters, she might modify the Dobrudja frontier again in Bulgaria's favour :[2] if Bulgaria enters the Zollverein, she might retrocede the whole strip, for the political frontier will then no longer constitute an economic barrier.

Negotiations on this subject are already on foot between Bulgaria and Roumania, and there is every reason to anticipate their success.

Greece and Serbia did not mulct Bulgaria of territory she possessed before the war, but they took the lion's share of the Turkish spoils. The settlement of Bukarest practically excluded Bulgaria from Macedonia, although the majority of the Macedonian population is Bulgar in nationality.

(*b*) The Bulgar race borders upon the Greek along a line extending from Salonika Eastwards as far as the Black Sea.[3] Throughout this zone the coast is pre-

[1] The population is composed of Bulgars and Bulgarophil Tatars.
[2] At present the line runs from Turtukai to Baltchik.
[3] See Map IV.

dominantly Greek and the hinterland predominantly Bulgar, but there are large areas where the two nationalities are inextricably intermingled, village alternating with village in the same valley.

It is impossible to draw a political frontier in strict accord with the racial distribution. If Bulgaria claimed every Bulgar village, it would not be feasible to sift out the Greek enclaves, and the whole debatable zone down to the coast-line itself would be drawn within the Bulgarian frontier: on the other hand, if Greece asserted her title to every patch of Greek population, she would have to incorporate not only the whole coast but extensive portions of the Bulgar hinterland.

It is clear that the problem can only be solved by a compromise, and during the negotiations which were interrupted by the Second Balkan War, Venezelos, the Greek premier, worked for the partition of the zone into two sections.

The Eastward or Thracian section was to be coextensive with the lower basin of the River Maritza: here he proposed to resign the coast as well as the hinterland to Bulgaria. The Westward or Macedonian section was to include the lower courses of the Vardar and of the Struma, and here he claimed for Greece a sufficient hinterland to cover the coast.

When the negotiations were superseded by war, and victory put the initiative entirely into Venezelos' hands, he interpreted his principle in the sense most favourable to Greece, and extended his "Western section" as far as the River Mesta.[1]

From the racial point of view the settlement was still a compromise. If Venezelos annexed to Greece the Bulgar hinterland West of the Mesta, he honourably

[1] See Map IV.

abandoned to Bulgaria the Greek littoral between the Mesta and the Maritza. The Bulgars demand a modification of the present frontier on economic and not on national grounds. The natural route from Sofia, their capital, to the sea follows the valley of the Struma down to the port of Kavala, a short distance East of its mouth. The Treaty of Bukarest left the greater part of this route in Bulgaria's hands, but barred her out from its terminus. Bulgaria repudiates reconciliation with Greece till this economic wrong is righted : Greece refuses to satisfy Bulgaria at the cost of territorial cessions which would violate Venezelos' racial settlement.

Bulgaria's entrance into the Zollverein is thus the only means of composing the quarrel, for it will satisfy Bulgaria's economic need without necessitating the change of political frontier. Kavala, like Salonika, will remain under Greek government, but Bulgaria will be as free to make commercial use of it as Serbia is free to trade through Salonika.

In this instance the benefits of the Zollverein accrue to Bulgaria, and by refusing to enter it on this account she will be inflicting more harm on herself than on her neighbours.

(*c*) Bulgaria's differences with Roumania and Greece have proved to be not irremediable : her last and most serious difference is with Serbia, and this time the parts are reversed. Bulgaria claims territory on national grounds : Serbia refuses to cede it for economic reasons.

The Vardar rises on South-Slavonic soil, and Uskub, at the junction of its head-waters, is as truly a Serb city as Nish or Belgrade. Below Uskub, however, the whole basin of the river is occupied by a Bulgar population which extends as far Westward as the Albanian frontier. The nationality of this population is not in

doubt: it is as Bulgar in sympathy as in dialect,[1] and it regards the Serbian regime as a foreign domination. Serbia gave witness against herself in the treaty she concluded with Bulgaria in the summer of 1912 before their joint declaration of war against Turkey. She admitted Bulgaria's exclusive right to the region South of Uskub, and even left the allotment of Uskub itself to the arbitration of the Tsar.

By extending her sovereignty down the Vardar from Uskub to Yevyeli, Serbia committed a crime against the principle of nationality which can only be atoned by the retrocession of the whole territory in question to Bulgaria.[2] Before the outbreak of the present war such a suggestion would have been Utopian: without compensation, Serbia would never have consented to disgorge the greater part of the spoils for which she had fought two desperate campaigns. If Bosnia falls to her at the impending settlement, and her strength is further increased by the incorporation of the "Triune Kingdom" in a South-Slavonic Federation, she will be in a position to do full justice to Bulgaria on her Macedonian frontier without being crippled by the territorial loss. Should she still persist in her refusal, she would

[1] There is no truth in the Serbian contention that the Slavonic dialect spoken in Central Macedonia is a variety of "South-Slavonic" in the narrower sense. It is not even an intermediate link between "South-Slavonic" and Bulgar. The two languages are sharply differentiated from one another, and there can be no ambiguity in the classification of the Macedonian patois under one head or the other. Linguistically, the Macedonian Slavs are as unmistakable Bulgars as the Slavs of Sofia or Plevna, and the Bulgarian propaganda of the last twenty years has roused in them a keen sense of national brotherhood with the speakers of their tongue who live beyond the Bulgarian frontier.

[2] The moral obligation contracted by her treaty in the Summer of 1912 was cancelled by Bulgaria's treacherous attack in the Summer of 1913. On the other hand, if she secures her national unity as a result of the present war, her obligation to respect the principle of nationality in Bulgaria's case will be proportionately increased.

be influenced by economic considerations that are not affected by the racial and territorial factor.

By renouncing her sovereignty over the Vardar-basin Serbia would put herself out of touch with her Greek and Albanian partners in the Zollverein. Astride the Salonika Railway from Yevyeli to Uskub, Bulgaria would sever Serbia from her outlet on the Ægean and deprive Greece of her continental railway-connection with Western Europe through the territory of the South-Slavonic Federation. Established West of the Vardar in the basin of Monastir, Bulgaria would block Serbia's prospective route through that point to an Albanian port on the Adriatic.

Unless they are guaranteed against these economic disasters, it is certain that neither Greece nor Serbia will allow Bulgaria to recover an inch of Macedonian territory, and the only effective guarantee is the entrance of Bulgaria herself into the Balkan Zollverein.

The situation, therefore, will stand thus: Bulgaria will make her entrance into the Zollverein conditional upon territorial compensation: Serbia and Greece will only grant her this compensation on the condition that she enter the Zollverein.

It will not be difficult to mediate between these two points of view, and as soon as Bulgaria has redintegrated herself into the Balkan brotherhood she will find the way open for a rectification of the Macedonian frontier. This definitive line of cleavage between the two Slav nationalities will coincide in general with the line laid down in the abortive convention of 1912.[1]

Starting from the Eastern frontier of Albania as delimited by the International Commission, it will probably follow the old boundary between the Ottoman

[1] See Map IV.

" vilayets " of Kossovo and Monastir in an Easterly direction, till it strikes the River Vardar at a point below the junction of the Peinya tributary but above the town of Veles.[1] After crossing the Vardar, it might run along the river-bank up-stream, and continue its course up the Left bank of the Peinya to a point due East of Uskub. Here it might turn Eastward once more and mount the watershed between the Peinya and Bregalnitza valleys till it reaches the summit of Mount Osigova on the present Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.

This line would leave to the South-Slavonic Federation both Uskub itself and the railways that connect Uskub with Mitrovitza, Nish, and the Egri Palanka Pass : to Bulgaria it would assign Ohrida,[2] the basin of Monastir, the middle course of the Vardar, and all the country between the Vardar and the Struma.[3]

We have now discussed the economic federation of the six Balkan units : Hungary and the Southern Slavs, Roumania and Greece, Albania and Bulgaria. We can abstract our conclusion in the following formula:—

" The political deadlock between national aspirations in the Balkan area is due to economic individualism : economic collectivism is the necessary condition of national self-realisation."

[1] Better known under its Turkish name as Köprülü (" bridge-place ").

[2] The capital of the Bulgarian Empire in the eleventh century A.D.

[3] To begin with, Bulgaria will depend for railway communication with her new territory upon the Serbian line through Uskub and the Greek line through Salonika ; but she will certainly follow up her incorporation in the Zollverein and the rectification of her frontier by the construction of two new railways :

(i.) From Kostendil down the valley of the Struma to Serres, which will give her a connection along the Greek railway system through Drama to Kavala.

(ii.) From Kostendil to Kodjana in the Bregalnitza valley, over a pass South of Mount Osigova, and thence through Ishtip, Veles, and Prilep to Monastir. This will give her an independent connection with her Macedonian territories.

In the environment of a Zollverein Hungary and the Southern Slavs, the Southern Slavs and Bulgaria, Bulgaria and Greece, Albania and Montenegro — all alike can compose their respective feuds and arrive at a mutually satisfactory territorial reconstruction on a national basis. The Zollverein seems to be the instrument that will eradicate the seeds of war from the Balkans, so far as those seeds are sown by the Balkan nationalities themselves.

Our discussion, however, has also shown us that the Balkan peoples are only responsible in a secondary degree. They have erred in leaving their field unfenced: their stronger neighbours are the enemy that has scattered the tares.

If we recall the outstanding factors that militate against Balkan peace, we shall find the root of them all in the machinations of the Great Powers. If Serbia has fallen out with Bulgaria and Montenegro with Albania, it is because Austria-Hungary excluded both Serbia and Montenegro from the Adriatic. If Albania is at enmity with Greece, it is because Italian diplomacy robbed Greece of Epirus. If Roumania and Bulgaria are in dispute over the Dobrudja, it is because Russia in 1878 swindled Roumania out of her coast-line North of the Danube. If Albania is still likely to be convulsed within, when she has settled her differences with her two neighbours, it is because Austro-Hungarian propaganda has incited the Catholic clansmen to make the task of the Moslem government impossible. By the building-up of a Zollverein these standing tares may be pulled out by the roots: how can we hinder their replacement by others more devastating still?

The Balkan area has been a menace to peace because it has been a no-man's land, an arena flung open to the

strong nations of Europe, to tempt them to turn aside from the strait and narrow way of social advance and tear each other in pieces for the proprietorship of a wilderness.

Once Germany has been what the Balkans are now. In the seventeenth century she was dismembered by the "Thirty Years' War," and in the eighteenth century the Powers fought over her carcase, as they have been fighting over the Balkans during the century that has just expired: Sweden drew the sword to hold Pomerania, France to seize the Left bank of the Rhine. Bismarck did one good service to peace. By raising Germany from the dead and making her the peer of the Powers instead of their prey, he closed the German arena to the conflicts of Europe.

No Bismarck will arise to weld together the Balkan states and enrol them in the front rank of the combatants: that possibility need cost us neither hope nor fear. Inspiration will come not from Central Europe, the shadow from which the Balkans are being delivered by the present war, but from America, the land of promise to which Balkan immigrants are finding their way in ever increasing numbers.

On the American continent during the last century the Latin Republics have lived through their "Balkan phase" without disturbing the peace of the world at large, because the United States have held the ring and have prevented the big dogs outside from taking part in the little dogs' scuffle. The Balkan situation in Europe calls even more urgently for a "Monroe Doctrine," and if it is to be directed impartially against all the European Powers, its sanction must proceed from the Balkan peoples themselves.

In co-operative movements it is the first step that

is hard. If the Balkan states succeed in organising themselves in a Zollverein, the Zollverein will almost automatically develop into a defensive league.

Many dreams will be shattered when the Balkan world presents a united front to the rest of Europe. Turkey will realise that her tide is not destined to return from its ebb; Russia will understand that there is no longer a high-road to Constantinople on the further side of the Danube-delta; Italy will recognise that the Straits of Otranto are a national frontier; and Austria will avert her gaze at last from the East, and knock for admission at Germany's door. •

CHAPTER V

TRIESTE AND ITALY

WE are now in a position to solve the problem raised at the close of our chapter on Germany. We had concluded that if Germany were beaten by the Allies in the present war, she would have to relinquish her subject provinces of alien population, French, Danish, and Polish; and we had argued that it would be in the best interests both of Germany herself and of her present opponents if this loss were compensated by the gain of "German Austria."

We admitted, however, that this solution of the German question, convenient though it might be to us all, depended upon the wishes neither of Germany nor of Europe, but solely upon the initiative of the Austrians themselves; and we saw that we could only conjecture the Austrian point of view by making clear to ourselves the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. Our survey showed that the Austrian Germans would never amalgamate with the German national state unless the Hapsburg Empire had previously been laid in ruins, but that in that event no other alternative would be left them, since they were incapable of standing alone.

We then proceeded to discuss the Hapsburg Empire's strength and weakness. We found that the Southern Slav question was the determining factor in its fate: if the Southern Slavs won their national unity outside, and in despite of, the Dual Monarchy, the Monarchy would inevitably be shattered in the process: but the very victory of the Allies, which would make the in-

corporation of the German Austrians in the German Empire desirable from the general point of view, would incidentally dissolve the Dual Monarchy by solving the Southern Slav question on just these lines, and would thereby indirectly cause the special interest of German Austria itself to coincide with the universal interest of Europe.

If, then, our forecast comes true, and the present Austro-Hungarian organism is superseded in South-Eastern Europe by a Balkan Zollverein or Entente, built up in harmony with Nationality instead of in defiance of it, we may fairly confidently assume that the "New Germany" which will simultaneously come into being will include within its frontiers the Germans of Austria.

We have now to define what territories and populations this "New Austrian" member of the "New Germany" will include. Large portions of the present Hapsburg dominions have already been eliminated from consideration. We have prophesied that all Galicia beyond the Carpathians will gravitate, under some status or other, to the Russian Empire ; and all "Transleithania," both the territories of the Crown of St. Stephen, and the outlying Austrian province of Dalmatia, enter the vortex of the Balkans. There remains only the section of the Austrian Crown-Lands situated to the West of Hungary's Western frontier.

Will the whole of this region rally to Germany *en bloc?* It is hardly conceivable that it should do so, for there are several most important non-German elements still entangled in it. The German population in Austria, like the Magyar population East of it in Hungary, ceases on the North bank of the Drave, and Slavonic speech reigns South of the river as far as the

sea; but the situation is not so simple here as in Croatia. The Croats, we saw, have been atrociously treated by the Magyars, and, moreover, they are only one fragment of a larger homogeneous population, the Southern Slavs, with whose other sections they can federate as soon as they have thrown off the Magyar yoke. The Austrian "Slovenes" are an isolated little branch of the Slavonic family, speaking a dialect distinctly different from Southern Slav.[1] They have been well treated by their German masters; and, what is more important still, they have no independent tradition or civilisation of their own. Laibach, the chief town of Krain,[2] has a thoroughly German character, and Gottschee, in the extreme South of the country, is a genuine enclave of German population.

If Krain were a unit by itself, it would probably vote for continued union with the Germans across the Drave, with whom politics have knit the district for five centuries. But unfortunately Krain is inseparably linked by geography with the province of the "Küstenland," and the Slovene population, neglecting the artificial boundary between the two administrative districts, spreads evenly to the sea. This coast, however, has had a very different history from its hinterland. Here, too, the Slovene has adopted civilisation second-hand; but it has come to him from the opposite quarter, and the ports have taken a completely Italian colour. Trieste, indeed, was an early acquisition of the Hapsburgs,[3] but the Western half of Istria belonged to Venice till the extinction of her independence in 1797, and did not pass definitively to Austria till 1814. More-

[1] They numbered 1,193,000 at the census of 1900.
[2] The Slavonic for "March," Italianised as "Carniola." See Map III.
[3] It has belonged to them since 1382 A.D.

over, the Slavonic substratum in the Southern parts of the Istrian peninsula does not even speak the Slovene dialect, but belongs to the neighbouring Southern-Slav group.[1]

It is clear, therefore, that the coast, at any rate, will seize the opportunity to detach itself from its present German connections. But this coast and hinterland form together just one of those geographical minima, which are the limit of practical political subdivision. They must share the same political destiny, whatever it is to be.

This brings us to the claims of Italy. The Italian nation re-arisen has picked the mantle of Venice out of the dust, and adorns her ambitions with an extensive "terra irredenta" across the Adriatic. We have passed over her aspirations in Dalmatia without a word, because here the Venetian regime is a mere memory, and has resulted in no living racial fact, as any one who travels up this coast can see. Educated Dalmatian Slavs still speak Italian as a second language, as educated Greeks do in the Ionian Islands; but the current speech of the shops, streets and even the quays, and the exclusive speech of the country-side, is the native South Slavonic, and Italy has as little justification for coming here[2] as she has for ruling in Corfu or Zante.

In the Austrian Küstenland her case is better. The little Istrian ports still possess a purely Italian population, and so did Trieste a century ago; but in sharing the economic movement of the nineteenth century and

[1] In 1900 the province of Istria had 334,000 inhabitants, of whom about 33.3% were Italian and 66.7% Slav: the Istrian Croats number about 200,000: so that 30,000 is the highest estimate we can give for the remaining Slavs in the peninsula, *i.e.* the Slovenes.

[2] Zara is the only place in Dalmatia where Italian is in any sense a native speech.

becoming a world-port, Trieste has vastly increased her size, like other European cities, by drawing into herself the rural population from a wide zone of attraction. Modern urban concentration takes no account of mediæval race-divisions, and the nucleus of Italian Triestini has been alloyed with a mass of Slovene immigrants who have come to stay. Encouraged by the Austrian government, the new Slovene element has been struggling for some years with the Italian to share the control of the municipality and seems likely to make good its claim : at any rate Trieste is no longer a purely Italian city.[1]

This brings us to the negative conclusion that the "Slovene Unit" must not be incorporated politically either in Italy or in the new Germany. Laibach and Gottschee would veto Italian annexation, Parenzo and Abbazia German, the Slovenes who are making themselves a power in Trieste would veto both. It remains that it should either enter the "Southern Slav United States" or become an independent political unit guaranteed by Europe.

The latter alternative is undesirable. Tiny states in occupation of important and intensely-coveted economic assets are not likely to possess the resources for administering these assets on the increasingly large scale to which modern life is tending, or for defending them against the aggression of bigger organisms that think they could use the opportunity better. But it would be still worse to force a political destiny upon a population of this size against its will. It is probable, however, that

[1] The total population of Trieste is 229,000, including about

170,000 Italians	=	74.24 %
43,000 Slovenes	=	18.77 %
11,000 Germans	=	4.8 %

the general sense of the various elements, as expressed in the plebiscite, will reveal itself in favour of federating the unit with the Southern Slavs as a third member of their Union. Guaranteed independence would hardly relieve the Italian and German minorities from the alternative fear of being engulfed respectively in the German and Italian national state; and such a possibility would be far more repugnant to them than the prospect of loose co-operation, more or less on their own terms, with a Slavonic nationality. The Slovene majority has recently been roused to active consciousness by that wave of national enthusiasm which the Serbian victories over Turkey and Bulgaria sent vibrating through the Southern Slavs. While a few years ago it would have followed in the Italians' or the Germans' wake, it will now take an initiative of its own. Nevertheless, where wishes are divergent, the negative proposition often wins, and if the plebiscite decides for separatism, there is no more to be said about the political question.

The economic issue is quite independent of the political and far more clear. We saw that the Dual Monarchy, in its present shape as a political structure, was a negation of natural grouping imposed upon more than half its total population by force; and that to safeguard the peace of Europe we must allow the imprisoned elements to burst their artificial bands asunder, and fundamentally reconstitute themselves on the national basis. But we noted first of all that it had a cogent *raison d'être* as an economic organisation. The raw production of the South-East, the manufacture of the North-West, and the sea traffic up the Adriatic coast, are complementary to each other; and our political reorganisation, so far from dislocating this

economic relation, will actually emphasise it on a grander scale. Austria-Hungary as a political group will perhaps have disappeared; but the economic interplay between its sections will thereby extend itself to the whole Balkan Zollverein on the one hand, and to the whole rehabilitated German Empire on the other, and the port of Trieste will still remain the node of this larger rhythm.

Trieste has a great future before her, and it is very important for the prosperity of Europe to keep unbroken all her economic links. Whatever its political disposition, the state of "Slovenia" must remain an open market where the new Germany and the Balkan Zollverein can meet, that is, it must have free trade with both at once. But there is no economic connection between Trieste and Italy. Italian manufactures are developing along the Northern rim of the Po basin where they can avail themselves of Alpine water power; but the port of Lombardy is Genoa on the Riviera coast. Italian industry faces South-West, and belongs to an economic sphere in which the centre of gravity verges towards the Mediterranean, and not towards the Adriatic.

This is perhaps the strongest reason of all for not putting Trieste into Italy's hands. Even if the exclusion of the Slovene territory from the Italian tariff-wall were guaranteed as a condition of its incorporation within her political frontier, she could hardly fail to use her political control to deflect Triestine trade in her own interest. To abandon her claim to Trieste will be a grievous disappointment to her; but she will receive compensation in other directions.

(i.) Though she must throw no covetous glance upon Canton Ticino, which is Swiss in soul, yet further East

the Italian-speaking population of the Trentino is eager to assert its true nationality. The rectified frontier between Italy and the Austrian Tyrol would diverge from the present at the summit of the Ortler,[1] run Eastward along the Northern watershed of the Noce valley, and then South-East till it crossed the Adige just South of Neumarkt. Thence it would again take a more Northerly direction along the Northern watershed of the Avisio valley, and rejoin the old line again on the summit of Monte Marmolata.

(ii.) If Alsace-Lorraine elects to reunite itself with France, the French could well restore to Italy the Italian population of Nizza, whose session was part of the price for French aid in 1859. The town has a sentimental value for the Italian nation as the birthplace of Garibaldi. Italy would doubtless wish to receive Corsica as well; but sentiment of exactly the same kind will make the French always cling to Napoleon's native island, though strategically and economically it is an unprofitable possession in spite of its size. The Corsicans speak an Italian dialect, but they have no feeling of national affinity with the peninsular state, because their horizon has never extended beyond their own coasts. They are a lawless people, still in need of strong government from outside; and this the French, with more than a century's experience, can continue to give them much better than a new Italian administration untrained to the task.

(iii.) Italy's chief gain, however, will not be these minor territorial pickings, but the undisputed naval command of the Adriatic, for which she is at present driven to compete with the Dual Monarchy. The disappearance of the latter power as a political unit will

[1] See map on p. 260.

leave the Eastern coast of this sea in less formidable hands.

At least two of the Austrian naval bases, Sebenico and Cattaro, will fall to the inheritance of the Southern Slav Union, which will have neither the interest nor the resources to initiate a policy of naval adventure. The headquarters of the Austrian navy are at the fortress of Pola, the key of the whole Northern Adriatic, which juts out into the sea on the tip of Istria, and menaces a large stretch of Italian coast including Venice on the one hand and Ancona on the other. Pola is destined to form part of the Slovene unit, and if the latter inclines to a guaranteed autonomy, the natural corollary to the grant of such a status would be the razing of all fortifications within the guaranteed area. But even should Slovenia elect to throw in her lot with the Southern Slavs, Italy would still be quite justified in insisting upon the dismantling of Pola as the condition of her consent to the loss of Trieste, while the other parties to the conference could not deny her such a logical compensation.

While Pola controls the bottom of the Adriatic bottle, its neck is potentially dominated by the bay of Avlona [1] in Albania, whose future we have already sketched as a part of transit and a railway terminus. Under the Turkish regime its strategical possibilities were never exploited, but in the hands of an efficient naval power it could be converted into a position strong enough to seal up the Adriatic, and it is obvious that it would threaten Italy's vital interests if such a strategical asset passed into the possession of any other nation than herself.

The fall of Yannina in the Spring of 1913, during the

[1] See Map IV.

course of the Balkan War, brought Greek armies into the neighbourhood. The Greek government politicly refrained from proceeding to the occupation of Avlona itself, but Italy's susceptibility with regard to the fate of the town was so extreme that, as we have seen, she created an international complication by insisting upon the inclusion of Epirus, a district of Greek nationality, in the new principality of Albania, in order to interpose a broad zone of territory between Avlona and the new Greek frontier. Events have already shown that the artificial severance of Epirus from Greece cannot be maintained against the will of both; but since Avlona lies beyond the Epirot border, and her Moslem Albanian population will under no circumstances incorporate itself in the Greek national state, there is no reason why any step the Epirots may take with regard to their own destiny should involve the permanent presence of Italy at Avlona,[1] a state of things that would virtually reduce Albania to an Italian province, and would hopelessly compromise the "Monroe doctrine" which we formulated for the whole Balkan region as one of the necessary safeguards of European peace. Italy's interests can be completely satisfied by another alternative, the perpetual neutralisation of Avlona, under a guarantee, similar to that we have proposed in the case of Pola, containing the following provisions:

(*a*) Avlona shall always remain part of Albania.

(*b*) It shall never be fortified, either by Albania herself or by any larger political group with a unified military organisation, of which Albania may at any time hereafter become a member.

[1] In November 1914 Italy virtually occupied Avlona itself, and formally announced her occupation of Saseno, the island that ‹ the entrance to the Bay.

The general effect, then, of these various proposals will be to leave Italy the control of the Adriatic by the disarmament of its whole Eastern coast. Sympathisers with Italy will probably declare that this is after all a negative gain, and hint that a great power like Italy cannot in the re-settlement of Europe be treated in so cavalier a fashion. To this we would reply that we have taken our lead from Italy's own policy. Her decisive adoption of neutrality at the beginning of the present war proved that she herself realised what was already patent from the facts, that she had no vital interests at stake on the European continent.

If the ultimate reunion of Trieste had been to her not merely a cherished object of national sentiment, but a necessity of life, she could not have abstained from intervention now. In reality, if she were to yield to sentiment and insist on the assignment to her of Trieste by the conference that will meet after the war, she would deliberately be involving herself in intimate relations with Central and South-Eastern Europe: every phase in the policy of the great German and Balkan groups would thenceforth seriously affect her, and she might finally bring down upon her head the combined force of the two groups in a concerted effort to oust her again from the possession of a port which, though of no economic interest to herself, would be the centre in which their own respective interests met and coincided.

The relief from naval competition in the Adriatic would, on the contrary, be a very positive advantage to her. Instead of the promissory notes of continental ambitions, it would yield her the immediate gain of millions of *lire* struck off from her annual budget for naval construction, and enable her at once to reduce her naval estimates and yet spare greater force than

before for the pursuance of interests beyond the mouth of the Adriatic on which her future development depends.

Italy, like Germany, has come late into the field, and like Germany she needs above all things to obtain reservoirs of markets and raw materials for her growing industry, and unexploited spheres of activity for her enterprise. The manufactures of Lombardy shipped from Genoa have recently secured a destination in Tripoli; but the war with Turkey in which Tripoli was won opened up the prospect of more fruitful expansion in the Levant. Italy's future beckons her across the Mediterranean, and it will occupy our attention again when we come to consider the problems of the Nearer East; but it does not call her to Trieste, and we can discount the Italian factor in turning our minds once more to the relations between the "Slovene unit" and its hinterland on the North.

We have now defined the "New Austria" still more closely, by detaching the Trentino and "Slovenia" in the South: we have only to determine her frontier against the latter in detail,[1] before we pass on to the consideration of her internal constitution.

We have seen that the unity of "Slovenia" is primarily geographical rather than racial; so that, in settling its exact extent, while we must satisfy as far as possible the claims of the Slovene substratum and majority, after which we have named the whole territory, we must subordinate them in the last resort to geographical considerations. Slovenia is a junction of economic arteries, and the disposition of these arteries must be the decisive factor in its delimitation. We are creating Slovenia in order to give Austria, and the whole of Germany behind her, a free communication with the Adriatic that shall pass neither through Croatian terri-

[1] See Map III.

tory on the one hand nor through Italian on the other, and there are two existing lines of railway along which such communication can be effected :

(i.) The "Sudbahn" from Vienna, that skirts the Eastern flank of the Alps, passes trough the heart of Krain at Laibach, and proceeds thence to Trieste, which it thus links to an industrial hinterland towards the North-East in Bohemia and Moravia.

(ii.) The Tauern Railway, only opened in 1909, which has yielded Trieste a new hinterland in Southern Germany by giving her a direct Northward connection through the Alps themselves.

This line, in its Southern section, skirts the present Italian frontier, keeping just outside Italian territory. Starting from Trieste, it runs to Görz on the East bank of the Isonzo, crosses the river, follows up its West bank to the junction of the Idria stream, and then penetrates by a tunnel into the upper valley of the Save, crosses this river too, and next pierces the Karawanken mountains by another tunnel, to emerge on the Drave at Villach. Hence the Tauern tunnel, the biggest engineering feat on the line, carries it through the main chain of the Alps into the Danube lowlands, which it enters at Salzburg. It is clear that this railway sets a limit to the advance of Italy's Eastern frontier against Slovenia. All that we can give Italy here is a tiny strip of territory on the West bank of the Isonzo below Görz, where the population is Italian in nationality, and which possesses a sentimental importance as containing the little towns of Aquileia and Grado, with their beautiful cathedrals and their splendid ecclesiastical memories so closely bound up with Italian history.


The North-Western extension of Slovenia in turn is limited by the trunk line from Vienna to Italy, which

passes by Leoben up the valley of the Mur, crosses into the Drave valley at Villach, and proceeds thence into the Tagliamento basin at Tarvis. It is equally clear that this line must run entirely through Austrian and Italian territory, and pass outside Slovenia altogether.

This further suggests the limits of Slovenia on the North. The Slovene population overflows the watershed between Save and Drave, and occupies the whole Southern bank of the latter river along its upper course, even passing beyond it in places; but the Northern bank is predominantly German, the towns, such as Klagenfurt and Marburg, being completely German in character, and the whole valley forms an indivisible geographical unity, which is linked by its railway connections with the German mass towards the North rather than with the Slovene mass towards the South. Slovenia must therefore abandon her frontiersmen in the Drave valley to Austria, and accept the Southern watershed of that river as her Northern limit.

We are now in a position to designate the whole frontier between Slovenia and Austria. It should start from the present Italian frontier at Mount Kanin (thus leaving the railway junction of Tarvis within Austrian territory as before), and follow the Southern boundary of Karinthia along the Karawanken mountains till it reaches the point where the Karinthian boundary turns North. Here it should part from the latter, and continue the Easterly direction of the Karawanken range, cutting through Styria till it reaches the Bacher mountains on a line that leaves Windischgratz and St. Leonhard to Austria. Thence it should turn South-East, run along the watershed between the Sann and Drann systems over the Cilli-Marburg railway tunnel to the Wotsche mountains, and then follow their summit till it hits the frontier of Croatia.

This is a rough attempt to sift Slovene from German along a line corresponding with geographical structure, and it will succeed approximately in shaking German Austria free from her Slavonic accretions on the Southern side. But the Austria that is left, though now a compact geographical unit, has a last and most bitter national problem buried in her heart; she has still to settle her relations with the Tchechs.



THE TRENTINO.

CHAPTER VI

TCHECH AND GERMAN IN THE NEW AUSTRIA

BOHEMIA is a four-square block of primitive mountains, the relic of a Europe older than the folding of the Alps and Carpathians. Like the Baltic plain and the Danube valley North and South of it, it was occupied in the Dark Ages by the Slavs in their Westward surge. About 1000 A.D. the Germans, expanding with the impetus of civilisation, began to roll the tide back. Meissen and Brandenburg, the Saxon marches, turned the Bohemian Slavs' flank on the one hand, the Bavarians pushed their settlements down the Danube to build Austria on the other, and when, during the thirteenth century, Silesia, the province of the Upper Oder, was cut away from the body of Poland and Germanised by settlers from the North-West, Bohemia was isolated on the East as well, and Germans from Vienna, pressing up the Right bank of the March River, almost joined hands with Germans from Breslau through the Moravian gap.[1] Even the thickly-forested mountain-dykes did not keep out the flood, and a German population oozed far into the interior of Bohemia on the West and North.

But Geography still saved the native Slavs from destruction. Their mountain-shelter gave them time to adopt from the Germans the armament of Latin civilisation by which they were being conquered, and the Kingdom of the Tchechs began to hold its own as a recognised, independent member in the family of

[1] See Map II.

Western Christendom. In the fourteenth century its ruler, Charles of Luxembourg, attained the (by this time shadowy) dignity of Holy Roman Emperor, and his Slavonic capital Prag became for a generation the political focus of Central Europe.

The cosmopolitan university of Prag, founded in 1348 and organised in four "nations," which was Charles' most enduring legacy to the country, linked it still closer to the great world, and wandering students from England sowed seeds of Wyclif's ideas from which sprang two leaders of European importance, John Huss and Jerome of Prag, the fore-runners of the Reformation. They were both burnt at the Council of Constanz in 1415, but their followers took up arms for the rights of the Laity against the Clergy, and repelled the crusades of all Catholic Europe.

In this democratic uprising, half a universal religious movement, half a local revolt of the peasant against his lord, the Tchech nation found itself and defied the world. But the glory of the Hussites was brief. They were ruined, not by the power of the Roman Church, but by the bitterness of their own internal factions. In 1436 the moderate "Utraquists" crushed the fanatical "Taborites," who were the really vital element in the movement, and proceeded to make a concordat with Rome, in which they abandoned their actually achieved religious independence in return for a formal acknowledgment of the Laity's right to communicate in both kinds, the empty claim enshrined in the party's title. The star of Huss had set before Luther's sun rose: in the seventeenth century, while the Dutch were asserting their national independence against the Hapsburg dynasty, the Tchechs fell under its autocratic rule, and have never extricated themselves since; but tradition

lived on, and fed the flame of nationalism, which the nineteenth century kindled in the Tchechs as in all other European populations, to a white heat.

No settlement of Austria is worth considering that does not satisfy the Tchechs' aspirations, but their claims are likely to be extravagant. At first they will probably demand the erection of the two provinces, Bohemia and Moravia, where they form the preponderant element of the rural population, and the substratum of the urban masses, into a completely independent national state. It would be a close parallel to this claim if the Irish Nationalists proposed the complete separation of the whole island from the British Empire and the absolute supremacy in the new state of the Catholic population; except that to the Tchechs' programme the objections are graver still.

(i.) In whole districts along the borders there is a solid German population, and a German element has established itself permanently in most of the towns, especially in the more accessible province of Moravia.[1] In the streets of Prag, riots between Tchech and German mobs often lead to bloodshed; and the present war, in which the Austrian government has forced the Tchech conscripts to fight against their Slavonic brethren, the Russians, and shot them down when they hesitated to obey, will have immeasurably embittered the race-hatred. This German minority cannot be abandoned to Tchech nationalism, enjoying power for the first time, and schooled, as a victim, in Austrian methods of using it.

	Tchechs.	*Germans.*
[1] Bohemia . .	4,107,000 (65%)	2,211,000 (35%)
Moravia . .	1,738,000 (71%)	679,000 (28%)
Total pop. of both	5,845,000 (68%)	2,890,000 (31.5%)

(ii.) Bohemia and Moravia are great manufacturing and mining districts, depending for their prosperity on good communication with markets.[1] If they separate themselves politically from the New Germany, they put it in her power to build a tariff wall against them which will cut them off from the outer world. The interior of the Bohemian bastion is drained by the upper system of the Elbe, and its trade is tending more and more to flow down with the river to Hamburg through the gorge where it breaks the Erz-gebirge ; while the arteries of Moravia focus at Vienna, where the Austrian trunk line starts for Trieste. In both directions exit and entrance can only be made through German territory.

(iii.) The Tchechs possess a third door to the East, of which Germany does not own the threshold, the Moravian gap that leads to Poland. But none of their trade passes in that direction to the vast Russian markets that lie beyond, because these are already monopolised by the important Polish manufacturing districts that intervene, and the Polish Black Country and the Russian corn-lands form a closed economic system of their own.

On the old political scale, then, Geography decreed

[1] These two provinces are in fact the centre of gravity of Austrian industry, far outdistancing both Lower Austria and Styria in their mining activity and their textile manufactures, while the provinces South-West of Vienna, the strongholds of pure German nationality, lie astride the Eastern section of the Alps, and are handicapped economically by their geographical character. A comparative table of populations (taken from the census of 1900) will make this clear :

Germano-Tchech Provinces.		*Pure German Provinces.*	
Bohemia .	6,318,000	Lower Austria . .	3,100,000
Moravia .	2,435,000	Styria . . .	1,356,000
Silesia .	681,000	Carinthia . . .	367,000
	9,434,000	Tyrol (including the Italians of the Trentino)	980,000
		Salzburg . . .	193,000
		Upper Austria . .	810,000
			6,806,000

that the Tchechs should be a nation: on the new economic scale it has brigaded them inexorably with the German group. But though her common frontier with the Russian Empire would give an independent Tchech state no economic advantage, it would have political effects most dangerous to the peace of Europe. The inevitable persecution of the German minority by the Tchech nationalists would provoke economic retaliation from the German Empire, and the Tchechs would then ask for the intervention of Russia in a fit of Panslav passion. The Bohemian bastion is the strategic key to the New Germany,[1] and Russia could throw as many troops into it as she pleased through the Moravian gap, which, though it would be strategically Germany's most vulnerable spot, would be entirely out of Germany's military control. Such a situation would be intolerable to Germany. She would have to insure herself against its occurrence by a system of alliances like those till now in vogue, and the result would be another universal war.

An independent Tchech state, then, would be against the ultimate interest of the Tchechs themselves (for neither the German boycott nor the Russian suzerainty that broke it would please them), and against the direct interest of all Europe. On the other hand, if the Tchechs are to enter, as a tiny minority, the vast corporation of the new German Empire, their nationality will have to be safeguarded energetically, and they will probably propose in the second place that Bohemia-Moravia enter the German Empire as an individual unit, a fourth member by the side of the North, the South, and Austria, with a special international guarantee behind her.

[1] Bismarck once said that the military power which controlled Bohemia controlled Europe.

Guarantees to a weaker partner that outsiders will uphold his interests are a poor alternative to a capacity for upholding them himself, and they gall the stronger partner, whose free action they limit and whose honesty they put in doubt. They are an occasion for bickerings, and we had better do without them if we can. A guarantee can perhaps be avoided in this case by letting the whole of Austria, within the limits to which we have reduced her, enter the German Empire as a single unit,[1] on condition that she grants Home Rule within this district to the whole Tchech nationality. The Tchechs, possessing more than a third [2] of the total population and equipped with national self-government, would easily hold their own within the Austrian state, and the whole Austrian unit, representing proportionately the interests of all its components, would hold its own in turn within the German Empire.

By such an arrangement the Tchech nationality would assert itself through co-operation with the German neighbour, and not by making war on him, and two further advantages will appear when the formula is worked out in practice.

(i.) The existing political machinery will suffer the minimum amount of disturbance. In the Crown-lands Parliament which at present sits at Vienna, representatives elected by manhood suffrage from populations speaking half a dozen different languages, have made

[1] To which "North Germany," for compactness' sake, might cede the fragment of Silesia, which our proposed Polish frontier would leave her beyond the Right bank of the Hötzenplötz stream.

[2] Reckoning by provinces on the basis of the last census (1900) the total population of our "Reduced Austria" will be about sixteen millions; while in the same year there were 5,955,000 Tchechs and 9,172,000 Germans in the whole Austrian Crown-lands, all of whom will remain, according to the present scheme, within the Austrian unit, though practically all populations of other nationality will have been detached from it.

the effort to do legislative work together, and in spite of scenes that the tension of the racial atmosphere almost excuses, have begun to acquire the constitutional habit. It would be a pity if Germans and Tchechs (the other nationalities will have simplified the situation by dropping out) should deprive themselves of this field for collaboration and mutual understanding.[1]

(ii.) The pattern for Tchech Home Rule already exists in the Constitution of the Austrian Crown-lands, under which the several provinces, besides being represented in the Vienna parliament, enjoy a modicum of local self-government under diets of their own.[2] This system, and the present British government's bill for Home Rule in Catholic Ireland, would be good precedents for the scope of the new Tchech parliament to be established at Prag. As in Ireland, the chief difficulty will lie in settling, not the powers to be delegated, but the geographical limits within which they are to be operative; and this problem brings out the most decisive advantage of the scheme for Home

[1] The following table shows the respective strengths of the different nationalities within the Austrian Crown-lands, according to the census of 1900, and the number of seats assigned respectively to each nationality in the parliament at Vienna by the electoral law which introduced Manhood Suffrage in 1906.

	Population.	*Representation.*
Germans	9,172,000	233=1: 39,365
Tchechs	5,955,000	108=1: 55,093
Poles .	4,252,000	80=1: 53,150
Ruthenes	3,382,000	34=1: 99,471
Slovenes	1,193,000	37=1: 51,459
Southern Slavs	711,000	
Italians	727,000	19=1: 38,263
Others .	715,000	5=1: 143,000
Total . . .	26,107,000	516

The representation of certain nationalities is thus still very far from being proportional to their real numbers.

[2] Galicia has secured more complete Home Rule than any other province.

Rule within Austria as against separate membership in the German Empire.

In the latter case just as much as if she became a completely independent state, Bohemia-Moravia would have to be organised as a compact geographical unit, so that the German minority in the country would in both cases be forced to take its government from Prag, and would need an external guarantee against the Tchechs of just the same kind as the Tchechs themselves would be requiring against the whole German nation. But in the event of Home Rule within a united Austria, the total population, Tchech and German alike, would be represented in the Vienna parliament already; the plebiscite to ascertain what sections wished to avail themselves, in addition, of the proffered devolution, could be taken parish by parish; and the area the Tchech Nationalist administration should control from Prag could be determined to a nicety by its result.[1]

We can, in fact, state the general principle that the less absolute the sovereignty, that is, the power of uncontrolled, irresponsible action, demanded by any

[1] The materials for drawing out the map of the Tchech Home Rule area are already to hand, in the electoral districts constituted in 1906 for the Austrian Central Parliament. Some districts are purely Tchech in population and return only Tchech deputies: these would certainly choose Home Rule. Others contain a mixed population of Tchechs and Germans, and are organised in two constituencies of identical local extent but different nationality, each provided with its own register of voters and returning its own national candidate to parliament: the fate of these would be decided by whichever nationality was in the majority. The Tchech constituency, if its register contained more voters than the German constituency for the same area, would outvote the latter in favour of devolution for the area in question, while the German constituency in the opposite case would retain the area for centralisation; but of course every racial constituency, those which fell within the Home Rule area and those which remained outside it alike, would continue to send representatives to the general parliament at Vienna on the same excellent system as before.

given political group, the more exactly we can draw its frontiers in harmony with the national feelings of the local populations; while the more complete the independence it demands, the more we shall be compelled to sacrifice the wishes of minorities to considerations of administrative, economic and even of strategical geography. But it is not yet time to discuss the conclusions to which this will lead us. We have so far surveyed only the first of our main problems, namely, what gains and losses an honest relaying of national foundations will bring to Germany, and before we turn our attention elsewhere, we will attempt to give a clear summary of our present results.

(i.) We have detached from Germany the following populations, estimated at maximum figures, on the basis of the census taken in 1905:

Alsace-Lorraine .	1,815,000	(Supposing that the whole of the Reichsland elects to separate itself from Germany.)
Schleswig . .	300,000	(Approximate estimate to include both the 139,000 Danes and the German minority.)
Poles in Silesia, Posen and W. Prussia .	3,086,000	(Assuming that all Poles subject to Germany are detached from her, though we have actually left considerable minorities in Silesia and W. Prussia.)
Total detached .	5,201,000	

(ii.) In compensation we have added to Germany a reduced Austria with a population (on the basis of the census taken in 1900) of approximately 16,000,000.

We have ultimately, therefore, increased the population of the whole German Empire, which numbered 60,641,000 in 1905, by 10,799,000, raising it to a total of 71,440,000. Statisticians calculate that the popula-

tion of Germany, within its present limits, has risen in the interval since 1905 to 65,000,000, an increase of 7.5 per cent.: if we add this percentage to our total for the United Germany,[1] we shall find that the population of the new German Empire within the proposed frontiers would amount at the present moment to no less than 76,798,000 souls, distributed into the following groups :

(α) North Germany .	46,501,000	(Of whom[2] 36,135,000 would formerly have belonged to the present kingdom of Prussia.)
(β) South Germany .	13,097,000[3]	
(γ) Austria .	17,200,000	(Including about 10,320,000 Germans and 6,880,000 Tchechs.)
Total . .	76,798,000	

If, at the Conference which will meet at the end of this war to attempt, like the Vienna Congress a century ago, the lasting settlement of Europe, we could succeed in reconstituting the German Empire on some such lines

[1] The rate of increase among the added Austrian population is certainly lower than the average within the present limits of Germany; but on the other hand the German census was only taken in 1905, while the census on which our figures for Austria are based was taken five years earlier.

[2] *pop. of Prussia in 1905* *less* *total of Schleswigers and Poles in 1905*

$$37{,}000{,}000 \times \frac{107.5}{100} - 3{,}386{,}000 \times \frac{107.5}{100} = 36{,}135{,}000.$$

[3]

Bavaria	6,524,000
Wurtemberg	2,302,000
Baden	2,011,000
Hessen (the Southern block only) . .	912,000
Frankfurt	334,000
Other territories detached from Prussia on either side of Frankfurt	100,000
Total (by census of 1905) . .	12,183,000 × 100
	= 13,097,000.

as these, we should have accomplished most of the objects with which we started this discussion, and avoided most of the dangers which we saw ahead of us.

We should have relaid the foundations of Nationality in Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and Poland, where Prussian policy has deliberately broken them up, and we should have restored the superstructure of European peace endangered thereby for many years and now finally shattered; yet by honourably applying the principle of Nationality to Germany's advantage as well as to her detriment, we should have left her with a considerably larger territory and population than she possessed before this war. This just aggrandisement would primarily benefit Germany herself, but ultimately it would further the best interests of all Europe, because it would be more likely than any other measure to produce that change in German public opinion which is the only possible keystone of peace in the future.

If Prussian militarism be refuted by the issue of this war, the German nation will assuredly be alienated from the Prussian system for ever, unless either or both of two consequences follow: either the humiliation of the national honour, or such a rearrangement of frontiers as would leave Germany at the mercy of her neighbours, and reduce her to a state of permanent fear.

Were the Conference to create such a situation as this, the German nation would be thrown into the arms of Prussianism, and would serve its unsympathetic ideals with greater enthusiasm than it has ever yet lavished upon them. But if the settlement takes the line of our proposals, both these consequences will be avoided. The German Empire will emerge more majestic and less vulnerable than before. The element that is not Prussian, but is Germany's true soul, will regain free

play, take the lead in the nation's life which it held till Bismarck wrested it away, and swamp Prussianism not merely by the greater vitality of its ideas, but even by the weight of superior numbers.

We can readily discern the policy which the New Germany will follow. Her first task will be the rebuilding of that magnificent commerce and industry which it took forty-three years to conjure up, and one season's campaign to spirit away again. She will have a bitter moment when she gazes at its ruins, but her emotion will be regret and not despair. Our settlement offers her once more the promise of a great economic future. Hamburg, Danzig and Trieste will be secured to her as open doors for her commerce, and mutual interests will bring her to an understanding with the Balkan Zollverein, more stable and of wider effect than the present precarious customs-union between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. This labour of good hope will occupy the New Germany's best energies for many years to come.

CHAPTER VII

PANSLAVISM, OR GERMANY'S FEARS

We have now completed half our task, the reconstruction of Central and South-Eastern Europe. We concluded the last chapter with a summary of our results. A recapitulation of the steps by which we reached them will be the best introduction to the problems that still lie before us.

(I.) The first necessity of primitive societies is "Strong Government," external to the governed, because they have no organic links with one another in themselves.

(II.) Within this chrysalis of mechanical union, a natural, organic unity grows up between the governed among themselves, expressing itself through diverse common factors: language, geography, religion, tradition.

(III.) It is a necessary phase of political growth that this common self-consciousness or Nationality should become the principle of political structure, and the self-government of natural human groups replace the arbitrary grouping of "Strong Government" as the ideal of the State.

(IV.) This ideal of self-governing national states with natural frontiers (frontiers, that is, whose sanction is not external force, but the respective common desires of the populations on either side of them) has been realised in the West of Europe so thoroughly that the national states so formed have been able to turn all their energies to new phases of development based on this achievement.

(*a*) All of them (Holland, Belgium, England, France,

Spain, Portugal) have expanded over the less civilised parts of the Earth, and have divided between them both the regions producing the best tropical raw materials, and the temperate regions outside Europe best suited to European colonisation.

(*b*) Two of them, France and England, have become " Great Powers " by leading the way in the " Industrial Revolution " which has transformed the environment of human civilisation; and they are now with all their energies and with increasing success adapting themselves to these new conditions.

(V.) In Central Europe, on the other hand, owing to a less favourable start in civilisation and to subsequent misfortunes, Nationality did not assert itself till 1866-1870, and then only by a compromise with " Strong Government " typified in the policy of Bismarck. This has caused several serious flaws in development here as contrasted with the West:

(*a*) Only two nationalities, the German and the Magyar, have here attained self-government, and they have been using it ever since (following " Strong Government " tradition), to maim and stunt the development of weaker nationalities behindhand in the race: Frenchmen of Lorraine and Alsatians, Danes of Schleswig, Poles, Tchechs, Italian Trentini, and Southern Slavs.

(*b*) They have also entered with vigour the " post-nationalist " phase of expansion and Industrialism, but here they have been handicapped by coming late in the race themselves, as compared with the Western powers, who have already " inherited the Earth."

(*c*) Germany is bitterly conscious that she has not found for herself " a place in the Sun," but in order to win it she has not concentrated all her efforts upon

economic and social construction, though this is the normal activity of the present phase of European civilisation. During the last forty-three years she has displayed amazing ability in this direction, and already won for herself a very large niche at the expense of her rivals in the field, and to their advantage as well, for the whole world in the industrial phase profits by the success of any one member of it. Nevertheless, she has chosen to foster her Militarism, the obsolete weapon of "Strong Government," which Bismarck partially adapted to the solution of the national problem, but which is entirely unadaptable to the conquest of industrial supremacy.

(VI.) The present war is Germany's attempt to "hack her way through" the Western nations to the best "place in the Sun," by military force. The best commentary on her action are the results she hopes to achieve by it.

(*a*) She hopes to annex Belgium, and possibly to force Holland into a disadvantageous zollverein, in order that she may have more convenient ports for her industrial districts in Westphalia and the Rhineland; and so to break the power of France that she may cease to be an independent factor in European politics. If she succeeds in this, she will have reduced the West to a chaos of "robbery under arms" such as it has not known since the "Hundred Years' War" and the career of Charles the Bold, and have swept away the work of four centuries, not merely the "national self-government" inaugurated by the English and French revolutions, but even the preliminary "national consolidation" accomplished by Louis XI. and Henry VII.

(*b*) She threatens to seize the transmarine possessions of all the Western nations alike, great powers and small,

belligerants and neutrals. The attitude of Portugal and Spain shows what they fear. This would destroy the whole vigorous colonial development of the nineteenth century, which only began after the result of the Napoleonic wars had definitively settled the ownership of these territories.

(VII.) We may fairly conclude that in this piratical attack Germany stands for reaction to a crude ideal that European Civilisation has consciously transcended, while the Western powers that are defending themselves against her represent the new activities by which European Civilisation is opening a better chapter. In this struggle, therefore, it is the World's vital interest that Germany should fail.

We have reached these propositions through a survey of the facts, starting for fairness' sake with the fact that is at once the most important of all and the most difficult for us to appreciate justly: Germany's attitude towards her own ambitions. But we found that "tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner peut-être, mais ce n'est point tout permettre;" and we made up our minds that we must refute German force by force, in order that we may bring it into our power to reorganise the political structure of Central Europe on the basis of the West, instead of suffering the West to succumb to the level of the centre. We have therefore approached the task of reconstruction on a national basis, and painfully striven to right the injustices the German system has perpetuated from Alsace-Lorraine to the Western frontier of Poland and from Schleswig to Macedonia.

But we have also recognised that this recasting of Europe, based though it be on the living will of populations, has no virtue in itself, and that it is merely the

preliminary condition for a change of heart, the sole effective cure of the evil. Our objective is to convert the German nation from the Prussian idea to our own, and we can only do this by first crushing their hopes of military victory, and then convincing them that we are striving for a settlement on impartial lines. We have to show them that we find our own interest in the peaceful industrial development of all the nations, Germany included, side by side with ourselves.

If we have taken all the factors into consideration, we ought to succeed in this, but we have not yet considered them all. Germany is at war not merely with England, France and Belgium, but with Russia, and if we are concerned with the German nation's psychology, here is the factor that dominates its present disposition.

At this moment the German nation is as united in feeling as our own, and every individual in it as prepared to make the extreme sacrifice for the national cause. People do not rise to this temper for a cause which they know to be bad in their own hearts, and which they are aware the public opinion of the World will condemn. Such a cause may be the ultimate or preponderant object for which they are fighting: they may deliberately have been concentrating all their national energies upon it for years: but in the supreme stress it will not inspire them. The Bulgarians lost the second Balkan War because in a bad cause their spirit failed them. If the nation rises to the occasion nevertheless, as the Germans are doing now, it will be because they are looking at the struggle of forces in which they are engaged from a wholly different point of view.

The Germans are not now thinking of ambitions to

be realised at the expense of the Western nations, although that is the real issue at stake. The conscious idea that spurs them is substantially identical with the conviction that governs our own minds. They feel themselves to be the champions of European civilisation, "whose cause Great Britain has basely betrayed," against the many-headed hydra of Panslavism, "whom envy has moved Great Britain to aid." For them Russia is the principal and we are merely her seconds: German defeat spells the abasement of civilised Europe beneath the barbarous Russian idea.

The whole policy of Prussianism, which we have weighed and found wanting, transforms itself to German eyes under this light.[1] If Germany is attacking the Western nations, it is because they have sold their birthright, and the champion of civilisation must exact from them the power and wealth they have prostituted to make it bear fruit again in civilisation's cause. If Magyardom persecutes the Slovaks, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Vienna ruthlessly represses Southern Slav nationality, it is because these are new heads of the hydra reared suddenly from an unexpected quarter, and must be crushed before the vaster fangs of Russia have time to fasten upon the German world from the other flank. If German policy maintains the scandalous misgovernment of the Turkish Empire over large alien populations, it is not simply in order to coax a market for German enterprise, but to close the Russian monster's Southern sally-port. We can understand Germany's frame of mind most easily from this last instance, for if we had not kept the same disgraceful

[1] This, of course, explains why the official justification of their action published by the German government after the catastrophe had happened, bears the title "How Russia made the War."

guard over Turkey all through the nineteenth century, Germany would not have been able to relieve us of it in the twentieth.

The arguments with which we defended our conduct then read like first drafts of the German arguments now : " Russia's expansion threatens our position in India, where our rule stands for civilisation and progress and where Russian conquest would bring darkness and reaction. The most vulnerable point in our position is our line of communications through the Mediterranean, which is at present screened from Russia by Turkey It will be laid bare to her if Turkey collapses. We must therefore bolster up the 'integrity of Turkey,' and if the Berlin Treaty brings a generation more of misery to the Balkans, only to be terminated by a bloody war, that does not weigh in the balance against the harvest of civilisation that the respite, perhaps permanent, will have enabled India to reap."

We pass our verdict on this argument in the shame with which we recall it. The lacquer of idealism, deposited upon it by a school of Victorian statesmen with such good faith, has worn away, and we can see the base metal of unenlightened self-seeking beneath. Our own error in the past will help us both to excuse and to correct the strongest and most conscious element in Germany's feeling at the present.

We must come to grips with Panslavism. Germany's fear of it is a psychological fact. In her belief she has been driven by deadly peril to put her whole fortune to the touch. In the light of our own attitude towards Russia, which we began to abandon less than a dozen years ago, this creates a presumption that some real fulcrum exists to sustain such an immense spiritual leverage, and if Germany's presentment of the Russian

national character is true, all our labours will have been of no avail. England and France may be "disinterested," and Germany may come to believe it; but it is no use bringing Nationality into its own in Central Europe, and preserving it in the West, if West and Centre alike are thereby delivered over to be the prey of Russian militaristic ambitions as bad as, or worse than, those we are now combatting in Germany.

If the Allies win this war, Russia will probably have a more decisive voice than any of us in the European settlement that must follow. It is our imperative task, therefore, to analyse those forces immanent in the Russian Empire, which may so greatly modify the realisation of our own intentions, and the remainder of this book will be devoted to different aspects of the same question. In Eastern as in Central Europe, we will approach our problem from the standpoint of Nationality.

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND NATIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

A. *The Risorgimento of Poland*

THE last chapter left on our hands the question: What will be the attitude of a victorious Russia towards the National principle in Europe? Will she respect it or will she trample upon it?

The German conceives "Panslavism" as a vast conspiracy on Russia's part, in which the minor Slav nationalities are her tools, and the domination of Europe her object. He will argue that it is simply a specious name for "Pan-Russianism." The Russian will probably exclaim that the very meaning of the word is sufficient vindication of his honest intentions. "The only Panslavism," he will say, "that the Russian People has ever taken to heart, is the impulse to release any and every Slav population in Europe from alien oppression, precisely in order that each may work out for itself its own national salvation;" and he will point out that Russia has committed herself to a life-and-death struggle at Serbia's call. But the German will return to the charge, and, waiving for the moment the case of Serbia, will put the Russian to silence by the mention of the Poles.

"If Russia is the leading Slav nation, Poland is the second: indeed, she may claim priority over her more backward Easterly neighbours as a focus of Slavonic culture. Yet while Russia has been preaching Panslavism in Bohemia and the Balkans, she has been

persistently endeavouring to blot out from the roll of nations the noblest member of the Slavonic brotherhood. It is irrelevant that we Germans have aided and abetted her Polish policy. We are not now concerned to disprove our own guilt, but only to demonstrate that Russia's is at least as great as ours. The history of Russia's past relations with Poland does not augur well for the sincerity of her new homage to the National Idea. Woe to any nationality in Europe which refuses to subordinate its destiny to the destiny of Russia, if Russia emerges omnipotent from this war."

This formidable retort offers us a definite field for our disputation. In our second chapter we saw that Germany's action during the present war is transforming the feeling between Russian and Pole with almost miraculous completeness, so that, when the re-settlement of Europe is made, the Polish nation will almost certainly be prepared to accept its restoration as a gift from the Tsar, and try to realise its aspirations as an autonomous member of the Russian Empire. But such a compact demands good faith from both parties, and the autonomy of Poland will indeed put Russia's to the test. It may be a piece of Utopianism, and the Grand Duke's manifesto simply the vow extorted from the sinner by the menace of God's thunderbolt: in that case the suppression of Poland on the morrow of the settlement might well herald the successive ruin of the other European nations: or Russia may really abide by her word, and respect Poland's new-found liberty.

The latter event would serve as an immediate guarantee of Russia's good intentions towards the nationalities less closely involved with her and situated altogether outside her political and economic frontiers;

but it would also have a momentous effect upon the internal structure of the Russian Empire itself. The leaven of Liberalism would not confine itself to Poland. It would steadily penetrate the whole lump, and produce a Russia that might lead the van of European civilisation, instead of straggling in its rear.

We must discover, then, whether Polish and Russian Nationalism are indeed capable of reconciliation. We will begin by attempting to acquaint ourselves with the Polish point of view.

The history of Polish Nationality really begins with the partition[1] of the old Polish Empire during the last generation of the eighteenth century by the three vulture powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria, which had established themselves on its flanks.

Their work was not so gross a crime as it is often painted. Vultures devour carrion, never living creatures; and the disappearance of the Polish state was the old story, a long-accepted commonplace further West, of efficient "strong government" imposing law and order by force upon a society in chaos.

The Empire yoked together diverse nationalities and national fragments. Its nucleus was the union of two Catholic populations, the Poles on the Vistula and the Lithuanians North-East of them, between the Niemen and the Düna. They were linked first in 1386 by the acceptance of a common dynasty, and were subsequently fused into a single constitutional kingdom by the Act of Lublin in 1569. From that date the strong monarchy gradually degenerated into an inept oligarchic republic. The Polo-Lithuanian noble caste was paralysed by family feuds, and more inclined, when its

[1] In three stages: 1772, 1793, 1795.

members met in diet mounted and armed, to relieve its feelings in bloodshed than to carry on the business of government.

If the Polish nobility had reduced merely their own country to anarchy, it would have been bad enough; but they were visiting their incompetence upon large alien populations as well, and the eighteenth-century Partitions, while they opened the Polish national question, closed once and for all several others of long standing.

(i.) In the fourteenth century, after the Mongol invasion had shattered Russia into fragments, Poland and Lithuania incorporated by conquest vast districts stretching South-Eastward into the Cossack steppes towards the Black Sea. The population of all this region was Russian by language, creed and tradition. It included the White Russians, who lay North of the Pripet marshes, and were hardly distinguishable from the Muscovites in dialect, and the Ruthenes or Little Russians, extending South and South-East of them from the Carpathian mountains to Kieff half-way down the course of the Dniepr. The eighteenth-century partitions reunited these peoples with the national Russian state, except for a Westerly fragment of the Ruthenes in Galicia, which fell to Austria in 1772. We shall find later on that the relation between the Russian Empire and these branches of the Russian race still requires adjustment, but their transfer from Poland to the Muscovite state at least advanced the problem many stages nearer solution.

(ii.) Besides these Russian-speaking regions, which became a more or less integral part of the Russian national organism, the Russian Empire had incorporated by 1795 the whole Lithuanian nation. No

problem, however, arose in this case, because the Lithuanians are the most backward race in Europe. They were not converted from their primitive paganism till the fourteenth century, and since then they have drawn their civilisation at second hand from other people, instead of creating a national tradition of their own.[1]

(iii.) The highly-civilised German townspeople of West Prussia were annexed by the Berlin government in 1772, and have never since been severed again politically from the entirely German-speaking provinces between which they lie. We have already explained the reasons, racial and geographical, why West Prussia must remain part of the German national state.

Having disposed of Poland's alien subjects, let us turn to the fate of the Poles themselves. The Partition gave them, no less than their subjects, the much-needed strong government in place of the extreme chaos under which they had suffered for more than a century; but in doing so it deprived them of the one priceless possession they had won and kept, their national unity. There was no question for them, as for their former Russian subjects, of rejoining a larger national unit. They did not even pass, like the Lithuanians, under the dominion of a single State. The carcase of Poland herself was shared by the two Western vultures, for Russia, though, reckoning by mere extent of territory, the lion's share of the spoils had fallen to her, had not acquired a single Polish-speaking district. Warsaw, the Polish capital on the middle Vistula, became a Prussian frontier fortress; Cracow, the second city of the country near the river's source, was assigned

[1] Even during the period of independence, White Russian was the official language of the Lithuanian state.

to Austria. The Poles drank the cup of national humiliation to the dregs.

The nationalist movement to which the Partition gave birth had hardly time to gather force before the deliverer came from France. Napoleon overthrew Austria and Prussia in succession,[1] and imposed on them, in the territorial re-settlement that followed, the cession of all their Polish acquisitions except the first of 1772. He reconstituted the territory disgorged into the "Grand Duchy of Warsaw." The reversal of fortune was complete. Not only was the whole Polish population, with insignificant exceptions, rescued from the foreign yoke, but for the first time it experienced the benefits of self-government. To Heine, the lonely Jew spurned by a Germany with a still unsoftened mediæval heart, the French armies came as the bringers of good tidings to the individual soul. In Poland, which had seen native aristocratic anarchy succeeded by alien bureaucratic repression, the "principles of the French Revolution" became the gospel of a whole nation. The advanced political system of Western Europe, suddenly introduced and applied for seven years with the intense energy of the Napoleonic spirit, left a tradition in the nation which never died out, and which differentiated them from their neighbours on all sides, on whom the French had impressed other memories.

With Napoleon's fall the flood of misfortune did not return upon the Poles at once. We have seen how the Congress of Vienna shore away the province of Posen, to give victorious Prussia a strategic frontier, and met Russia's claims by erecting the remainder of the Duchy into a "constitutional kingdom of Poland" under the

[1] At Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena in 1806. Austria did not forfeit her share of the spoils till after the second war of 1809.

Russian Imperial crown, with the exception of Cracow, which was cut off and permitted to be a "free city" on its own account, to satisfy the strategic susceptibilities of Austria. For fifteen years the diminished nation retained its liberal constitution and even its French-organised native army, but its position between the three vulture powers, risen again from the dust with beaks and talons sharper than ever, was too precarious to survive the first spasms of that birth of nationalism in Central Europe, which the shock of the Napoleonic wars inevitably precipitated. The July Revolution of 1830 in France stirred Poland to an ill-considered revolt in the following year, which gave Absolutism its opportunity. The constitution was abolished, and the country organised in Russian military governorships, while in 1846 the Austrians marched into Cracow. The desperate revolution that broke out again in 1863 was suppressed by the cool co-operation of the three interested powers. It had come too late. The crisis of Italy's risorgimento was already overpassed; in Prussia Bismarckianism was on the point of triumph. With the strangling of this last convulsion, the life of the Polish nation seemed to be extinguished for ever.

But the nineteenth century saw a more important event than the ups and downs of national aspirations—the spread over Europe of that Industrial Revolution which takes no account of the political ordinances of men. Poland's rich mineral deposits turned her into a stronghold of the new economic regime, and during the blackest years of political persecution her population has grown steadily in numbers and wealth. There are now at least eighteen million Poles in the world: within the shelter of the Imperial tariff-wall, the manufactures of the Russian districts have a preference in the vast rural

market that stretches East of them into Asia; while Polish unskilled labour has supplanted the native German in Westphalia, permeated to Odessa on the Black Sea, and found its way in increasing volume to the United States.

Thus the majority of the Polish nation under Russian rule has actually benefited economically by its subjection, and economics have gone far towards settling the political destinies of the whole reunited Poland, for whose creation we now hope. Even her eighteen millions [1] cannot stand by themselves, with no coast-line and no physical frontiers.[2] She must go into partnership with one of her larger neighbours.

The Carpathian barrier shuts her out from the Balkan Zollverein. The course of the Vistula and the free navigation down it to Danzig that we have stipulated for her, point to union with Germany; but the bulk of Poland's exports do not flow down this natural route to the Baltic. Her real commercial links are with the great Russian continent. If Galicia becomes Russian soil up to the Carpathians, the trunk railway connecting Warsaw with the Black Sea will pass through Lemburg to Odessa without encountering either political frontier or customs' barrier, and Poland will turn her face South-Eastwards once more, but this time in co-operation with Russia, and not in rivalry with her as during the Middle Ages.

Mutual economic interests, then, favour the idea of

[1] According to the last censuses of the respective Empires, there are 7,931,000 Poles in Russia, 4,252,000 in Austria, and over 3,000,000 in Prussia. This gives a total of 15,183,000: but there has been no census in Russia since 1897, and in 1907 the Russian Poles were unofficially estimated at 10,740,000.

[2] Except for a short section of the Carpathians, the boundaries of the Polish nation are demarcations of the Baltic plain as arbitrarily drawn as the outlines of the prairie states in the U.S.A.

incorporating the new Poland within the Russian Empire by a federal union. Till the outbreak of the present war, the growing economic bond, which pointed to co-operation in the future, had no opportunity of asserting itself in face of the political enmity inherited from the past by these two rival leaders of the Slavonic World. But now that the war has miraculously broken down the barriers of tradition, the economic factor will obtrude itself in full force. If the war is won by the Allies, the experiment of federation, which will almost certainly be attempted in the subsequent European settlement, will have been made possible by this sudden sentimental reconciliation; but in nations as in individuals, violent emotions pass as abruptly as they come. The psychological crisis of the war is important in the present case, just because the economic motive is there to deepen its effect into a friendship and understanding durable enough to survive the psychological *détente* of Peace.

The scheme of federation will have to be framed in the most liberal spirit. The national self-consciousness of the Poles has been almost morbidly hypertrophied by generations of repression, and though the removal of the evil will gradually weaken the memory of it, the Catholic Polish nation will still be sundered by language and religion from the Lutheran Prussians and Orthodox Russians on either side of it. Moreover, the capacity for self-government will be present, as well as the desire for it (the modern Polish people has travelled far from the Polish aristocracy of a century and a half ago) and this capacity will have the highest demands made upon it by the industrial problems with which the new state will be confronted. Poland will take her share with the other nations of Europe in the search after a new

harmony between Man and his changed economic environment, and this effort cannot be guided to success by an alien "strong government" imposed from without, but only by a national democracy of the Workers evolved from within.

If, then, the new Poland is to be a healthy organism, she will require the maximum measure of Home Rule and the minimum of external control consistent with membership of a wider political group. The local autonomy of Galicia, the most liberally-treated province of Austria, will fix a level which the Russian government's concessions will have to surpass. We have seen that if Russia is in a position at the end of the war to reunite the Polish nation, the Galician fragment will be irresistibly attracted by the possibility; but it will also be full of apprehension at exchanging the certainty of Austrian toleration for a dubious reception into the bosom of Russia, and probably it will refuse to commit itself without a guarantee from all the parties to the European settlement that the autonomy of the whole nation within the new state shall be at least as far reaching as that which this favoured section already enjoys.

The Russian Government would certainly chafe at such a proposal, and deny the right of other nations to intervene in Russia's internal politics. If the proposal concerned merely the Poles already included within the Russian Empire, this protest would have weight; but it would actually arise as the corollary to a large extension of the Russian frontier, made possible by the joint action of the Allied Powers, and Russia must admit the authority of France and Great Britain to assert their point of view in the settlement of questions raised by the war in the East, unless she is willing to resign all share herself in the settlement of the West.

Without derogating from the dignity of Russia, the Western Powers might well define a certain measure of Home Rule as the indispensable condition for the re-union of the Austrian and Prussian fragments to the main body of Poland within the common frontier of the Russian Empire. They could not, of course, bring more than moral pressure to bear upon Russia either to admit or to endorse the guarantee; but if Russia withheld her pledge, the Galician plebiscite would give her a rude shock by declaring itself for federation with the Balkan Zollverein or with the New Germany, and, deprived of the support of her friends, she would find herself compelled to yield subsequently with a bad grace what she might have granted beforehand as a bounty.

The federal relation, then, between Poland and Russia should be as secure as material interests and treaty-stipulations can make it; but we have still to define the geographical limits of the future autonomous state against the main body of the Russian Empire. It goes without saying that the Poles must abandon the memory of their past dominion. The New Poland must include no districts but those of Polish nationality; and, since the line to be drawn will simply be an administrative boundary, not a tariff wall or a strategic frontier, it can follow with some accuracy the convolutions of the linguistic border. Determined on this principle, it will exclude from Poland not merely a strip of the present "Vistula-governments" of Russia, but also the major part of Galicia inhabited by a Little Russian population. At the moment when they are regaining their own liberty, the Poles cannot grudge neighbour nationalities the same boon.

The course of the new boundary should be more or less as follows:

Starting[1] from the South-East corner of the East-Prussian frontier, just West of the point where the Lyck-Bialystock Railway crosses it, it should run South-East to the North bank of the River Narew, hitting it near the junction of the Augustowo Canal, that links the Vistula and Niemen systems. Hence it should follow the river's course upwards to a point due South of Bialystock. Here it should leave the river and take a S.S.W. direction, excluding Bielsk towards the East, till it reaches the Bug. Crossing the latter river about fifty miles below Brest, it should continue in the same direction till it hits the Wieprz, and should then follow up the course of this stream in turn towards the S.S.E., as far as its most Easterly bend, thus including Lublin but excluding Cholm. After leaving the Wieprz, the line should run due South, excluding Zamosz, till it hits the present Austro-Russian frontier, whence it should bend South-West, till it meets the River San at its great angle from East to North-West, between Yaroslav and Przemysl. Thence it should follow the course of the San upwards, thus assigning Yaroslav to Poland, but excluding Przemysl, which lies on the river's Right bank, till it reaches the other great bend from North to East between Przemysl and Sanok. At this point it should leave the San, excluding Sanok, run due South-West till it strikes the Hungarian frontier along the summit of the Carpathians, and proceed to follow the mountains Westward, till it reaches the point on the summit of the range, just East of the Ratibor-Sillein Railway, which we took as the starting-place for our western frontier.[2]

[1] See Map II.

[2] The boundary which we have just sketched between Autonomous Poland and the main body of the Russian Empire practically coincides with the Eastern border of the territory *continuously* inhabited by Poles;

Between this new boundary and the Russo-German frontier sketched in our second chapter, we have delimited a territory of hardly less extent than the area of England and Wales. Up till now, Russia has been draining her strength by holding down half this country against its will; but if the whole country is organised as a national state in partnership with her, it will be transformed into a magnificent bulwark against her neighbours on the West, and give its whole energy to swell the economic and military resources of her Empire.

Russia, then, has every motive of self-interest for permanently conciliating the Poles. Our *advocatus diaboli*, however, will not throw up his case. "To the common sense of liberal Western Europe," he will say, "your argument would be a truism, but it is truer still that 'Instinct is Lord of All.' Russia has not the

but just as our Western frontier of Poland detached numerous isolated enclaves of German population from the German national state (Ch. II., Sect. D), so its new Eastern boundary will leave Polish enclaves of equal importance entangled in the Ruthene section of Galicia which we are proposing to exclude from the Autonomous Polish Unit. These Polish advance-guards in Eastern Galicia and those German advance-guards in Western Poland are precisely parallel to one another in historical origin and contemporary character. Just like the Germans, the Poles overflowed into the domain of their more backward neighbours: they have Polonised the urban centres—such as Lvov, Tarnopol and Stanislau—as thoroughly as the German immigrants have Germanised the cities of Posen and Thorn, and they have also established themselves in force in the suburban countryside; yet it would be geographically impossible to include this Polish "Dispersion" in the Polish Autonomous State without transferring with them a far more numerous Ruthene element. We must mete the same measure on both frontiers: if the Poles are to gain at the Germans' expense on the West, they must reconcile themselves on the East to corresponding losses in the Ruthenes' favour. This is only another instance of that irreducible minimum of national injustice which is involved in the most equitably drawn political frontiers. The Polish minority is doomed to disappointment as inexorably as the German, but like the German it must be granted in compensation a European Guarantee of its national individuality under the alien government which geography imposes upon it.

understanding to grasp a liberal policy. If she were merely unscrupulous, she would begin to act righteously as soon as it paid her to do so; but she is stupid as well, and from the combination of these two vices no good can spring."

This criticism compels us to abandon the field of Russia's objective interests, and to reopen our discussion on the more fundamental plane of her subjective character; for unless we can vindicate that, the New Poland we have so elaborately built up will prove a house of cards, and may carry the other nations of Europe with it when it collapses in ruin.

B. *The National Evolution of Russia*

Germany's reproach to England for having joined forces with Russia against her, is couched in terms like these: "You have decided to fight us because you hate and fear our Militarism. You believe we aspire to 'World Empire' and mean to take your inheritance from you by force; and naturally you imagine, as every nation must, that your own downfall would be a setback to civilisation. We will not be at the pains to argue with you, but we point out that, if you succeed in crushing us with Russia's aid, you are laying up a worse fate both for yourselves and for the world. Russia, on the most favourable interpretation, is only made of the same stuff as ourselves, but in an inferior quality and of a coarser grain. Her ambitions and her methods of forwarding them reflect our own, and our strength is the only bar to their realisation. The Cossack will ride over our corpses to the conquest of the world, and when you see him enter Copenhagen and Stamboul and

Koweit, you will regret the annihilation of German culture."

We could dismiss Germany's "Panslav" bogy with a smile, if it had not found a response in this country, but "After Germany, Russia" is a phrase that already comes too glibly upon people's lips. Is the supreme objective of Peace, for which we are sacrificing everything now, illusory? And does the lifting of one war-cloud merely draw a heavier one above the horizon? If the soul of Russia is like the soul of modern Germany, with the evil heightened and the good expunged, there seems no issue for the World. Germany has challenged the comparison, and we will take her at her word and test it.

If we compare the governments of the two empires, the German contention is clearly right. The purposes and methods of the Russian and German bureaucracies are roughly the same; but whereas the German government is efficient and, on the whole, has public opinion behind it, the Russian is out of touch with the nation, obscurantist and ineffective. Judging, then, by the functioning of the administrative machine, Germany is far superior to Russia, and it may be argued that administrative efficiency is an adequate criterion of comparative civilisation, because it presupposes that faculty of orderliness and looking-ahead, which we emphasised at the beginning as civilisation's essence.

This argument would be valid if the government and the governed could be equated; but even in the democratically-organised states of Western Europe the two factors do not coincide, and in the Centre and East they do not approximate to one another. On the one side stands the German Government, exploiting all the national accuracy and forethought born of civilisa-

tion to bring about its own specialised, and, as we judge it, uncivilised end of world-conquest, just as a trust exploits security of property and rapidity of communications to gnaw the wealth of the community in which it shelters. On the other side the great German nation, renouncing its ideals and surrendering that very essence of civilisation, the power of free choice and of looking ahead with one's own eyes, has indentured itself to the service of the Government's bad cause. The success of the German Government in its present policy has been an indictment of the German Nation in the present phase of its character. You need employ no violence against a willing accomplice, nor conduct an obscurantist campaign against a demoralised *intelligenzia* which has the lie already in its soul.

We have seen that Germany's history has reversed the normal order of European evolution. Prussianism is in the ascendant: it is the dominant, inspiring force of the nation's growth, and any success Germany may achieve under its banner will impress the iron mould more deeply upon her soul. The Prussian militaristic bureaucracy is a living power. Russia, on the other hand, has reproduced so far precisely the phases of Western Europe, though, like Serbia and her other Balkan protegées, she has suffered from a very late start.

Her history began little more than two hundred years ago. In the seventeenth century she was a stagnant mass, still dazed by the shock of Mongol conquest that had struck her down four centuries earlier, half orientalised by the Mongol suzerainty that had followed the impact, and cut off from the outer World by the lack of a seaboard. She stood to Europe as Macedonia stood to Hellas at the beginning of the fourth century B.C., and she found her Philip in Peter the Great.

Peter gave Russia that "strong government" and "consolidation" without which a nation cannot begin to grow. He forcefully shook her into wakefulness by Europeanising her organisation and breaking her a doorway on to the Baltic through which the current of European influence should thenceforth flow in. The foundation of the new capital, Petersburg, typifies both his actual achievement and the orientation he gave to the future. At first the leaven seemed only to be fermenting on the surface (Peter did not strike his acquaintances in England and Holland as an apostle of culture), but the stir of the eighteenth century kneaded it deeper in. On the West, the Swedish dominion over the Baltic was finally broken, and Russia securely established along its whole Eastern shore: Southwards, the Empress Catherine of German birth, whose long reign marks the acme of the "strong government" phase, opened another door on the North coast of the Black Sea, and in this quarter Russian advance identified itself with the march of civilisation. Prosperous commercial ports replaced the Turkish villages on the seaboard, and the taming of the nomad Tatars on the steppe threw open the hinterland to agricultural development for the first time since the break-up of the Ancient World.

The eighteenth century in Russia corresponded to the Tudor period in England, and to the regime of Richelieu and Colbert in France: "L'état, c'était le Gouvernement," and the Administration had an imposing record of progress to show for its masterful all-pervasiveness. As in France, there followed an age of transition, charged with an atmosphere of foreboding like that which drew "Après moi le déluge" from Louis XV.

The nineteenth century has brought the Russian

bureaucracy to bankruptcy. It has no longer risen to the problems of internal growth, and it has suffered grave military discredit abroad. The Crimean campaign was its " War of the Spanish Succession," the unexpectedly disastrous struggle with Japan its " Seven Years' War." Its prestige has suffered blows from which it can never recover, but the outworn chrysalis has held together long enough to do its work. During this same nineteenth century the Russian nation, an inarticulate Tityos lying prone across half a continent, has awakened to the clearest consciousness, and expressed itself in a literature as distinctive and as momentous for the spiritual history of the World as the literature of eighteenth-century France.

Nor is this a house built on the sands. The Russian *intelligenzia* draws its living water from a deep well-spring of national life. When you read a Russian novel you pass out of the cosmopolitan environment of Industrial Europe into " Holy Russia," an environment of river and forest and snow and sun, and a tradition of religion and of social customs, utterly unfamiliar to you before, but you habituate yourself to it with unlooked-for ease, because the sense of life that pulses through it is as convincing as the sound of the sea, when it falls, after months of absence, upon your ears. The Russian nation has found its soul: the next phase will inevitably follow, and effete " strong government " give place to the captaincy of the nation over its own destiny.

The present war is a very important moment in this transformation. It, too, finds a parallel in the history of France, namely, the successful intervention in the cause of American Independence, that gave liberalism entrance into the fortress of official policy. The

Russian Government cannot unfurl its banner in a similar cause, without considerably changing the legend embroidered upon it before it is laid away again. A change of outlook will mean a change of personnel: Russia may find a Turgot and a Necker who, profiting by the experience of their French forerunners, will solve the problems of which they despaired; and there may even now be fighting in her army's ranks a stronger and more purposeful Lafayette.

The friction and misunderstanding, then, that at present exists between the Government and the People of Russia is not, as German opinion suggests, a sign of dissolution but a symptom of growth. If the nation here assented to the bureaucracy's standpoint, that would indeed be a proof of national depravity. But the Russian bureaucracy belongs to the past: Liberalism is in the ascendant, and will prevail.

We have now compared Germany and Russia by bringing out the respective tendencies that are asserting themselves in each; and this is the only true principle of estimating national values. The symbolism of political cartoons, in which the figure of John Bull, a squire in "Regency" costume, stands for the British Nation, and Uncle Jonathan, a business man with the beard and coat of the 'sixties, for the United States, is actively misleading. It takes a vivid impression of a nation at some critical moment in its history, when the attention of the World is centred upon it, and perpetuates it with the implication that that is the nation's eternal essence. The device produces the same comic effect as the snapshot of a race-horse galloping, but the humour consists just in the static presentment of a kinetic reality, and thus depends upon a distortion of "historical" truth. National character is not static, because a nation

is alive. The essence of it is not the phase it happens to occupy at the moment, but the whole movement of its growth, and we can forecast a movement's tendency with most probability, though, of course, any calculation of the future is *ex hypothesi* conjectural, by a survey of such phases of it as have already been actualised.

Met in this way, Germany's challenge turns to her own despite. Our conclusion makes us more eager than ever for Germany's discomfiture in this war and more zealous in our alliance with Russia, for we feel that the triumph of Russia, as well as the triumph of Great Britain and France, will be in harmony with the true advancement of European civilisation.

C. *Devolution*

We have compared the past history of Russia with that of other European nations, and analogy has inclined us to augur for her a liberal future. Yet we shall not satisfy our German critic till we have offered him some concrete programme of the lines on which this prospective liberalism can, should, and will be realised.

The chief obstacle to the progress of self-government in Russia has been the shortness of her history. The second, and hardly less formidable, factor is the immensity of her territorial extent. Before the invention of modern communications, a vigorous absolutism seemed the only force capable of holding together such a widespread mass of humanity. But now the mechanism of telegraph and railway can take the place of "strong-government's" centripetal action, and local individuality receive free play in the political sphere

without risk of ultimate disruption. The new organisation of Poland will react on the rest of the Empire of which it is to form a part, and the first step towards self-government will be devolution on an extensive scale.

(i.) The Baltic Coast populations,[1] from the North-East frontier of Prussia to the Gulf of Finland, are none of them Russian in nationality, and, till their successive absorption in the Russian Empire during the course of the eighteenth century, they have all had a distinctive history of their own.

(*a*) The Lithuanians, occupying the provinces of Kovno, Vilna and Suvalki, are not Slavs, but speak a separate language of the Indo-European family. Its closest relations are with Slavonic on the one hand and Teutonic on the other, and its development, like that of its speakers, has been arrested in a phase more archaic than any other living form of Indo-European speech.

The Lithuanians have remained Roman Catholics since their voluntary conversion from tribal heathendom in the fourteenth century A.D., and they were in political partnership with the Poles between that time and the Partitions, so that neither language, religion nor tradition bind them to the Russian people. Though geographical considerations have made it advantageous to both parties that this little country[2] should come within the frontiers of the great Empire, the Imperial Government has no call here to take cognisance of other than such Imperial business as communications and

[1] See the map of European Nationalities (VII.).

[2] The number of Lithuanians in the Russian Empire is estimated at 1,659,000. There are further about 107,000 Lithuanians in East Prussia.

defence, and might satisfactorily leave the whole internal administration of Lithuania to Home Rule.

(*b*) The Letts, inhabiting Courland and Livland on either bank of the Düna, lie next to the Lithuanians in the Northward direction. They speak a variety of the same language, but their history has been different. They were converted to Christianity by the sword of the Teutonic Knights, and at the Reformation submissively followed their masters into the Protestant camp like the Masurians in Prussia. After the dissolution of the Order, this territory was partitioned between Sweden and Poland, and, when it became one again under Russian government, the German landed aristocracy, descended from the secularised knights, played for a time a prominent part in the history of the Empire, owing to their superior education and acquaintance with European life.

(*c*) The Northern part of Livland, from a line drawn East and West between the Lake of Pskov and the Gulf of Riga, together with Esthland, the sister province along the Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, has shared the political and religious history of the Lettish districts; but the population here speaks a language of entirely different origin, a dialect of the great Ugro-Finnish group.

The bond of common Protestantism and German culture may override these differences of native speech, and incline the people of Courland, Livland and Esthland to consolidate all three provinces into a single self-governing area; or, inasmuch as public education in the national language is one of the chief objects of devolution, the Lettish-speaking and Esthonian-speaking sections may elect to organise themselves apart.

The alternatives can be decided by the plebiscite alone.[1]

We have now passed in review four nationalities—the Poles, Lithuanians, Letts and Esths—lining the whole Western fringe of the Russian Empire, on whom Home Rule should be devolved in varying degrees, corresponding to their respective material importance as political units, and to the strength of their national self-consciousness.

Before the present war, such a policy would have seemed to the Russian government little less than a dissolution of the Empire. For a century the autocracy of the Tsar had been leagued with the autocracies of Central Europe in the struggle to repress all nationalist aspirations wherever manifested. But the vitality of Nationalism proved so great that it swallowed up in itself Autocracy's point of view, and ever since Bismarck effected his concordat between these two political forces, the contest of principles in Europe has been gradually shifting its ground and changing its character. It has ceased to be waged between ruler and people on the issue of "strong government" and self-government,

[1] Figures of census taken in 1897—

	Courland	*Livonia*	*Esthonia*	*Totals*
Letts	534,000 (79%)	562,000 (43.4%)	—	1,096,000
Esths	—	518,000 (39.9%)	366,000	884,000
Germans	56,000 (8.25%)	98,000 (7.6%)	16,000	170,000
Others	84,000 (12.75%)	117,000 (9.1%)	32,000	233,000
Totals	674,000	1,295,000	414,000	2,383,000
Totals estimated in 1906	714,000	1,411,000	452,000	2,577,000

and the nations themselves have come to man the opposing camps, with their former despots at their head as their chosen leaders, while the issue now at stake is whether the strong nation shall use the freedom that it has won for the oppression of its neighbour, or whether all nations, great and small, shall live orderly side by side as members of a wider commonwealth.

This issue is being fought out in the present war, and Russia has joined battle on the side of national liberty. If her efforts, in co-operation with those of the Western powers, decide the struggle in favour of our common cause, and we achieve the much-desired re-settlement of Central Europe on the national basis, at the expense of German and Magyar chauvinism, Russia will have neither the will nor the power to tarry longer from setting her own house in order. She has sinned against the National Idea in the past no less than her present antagonists, and if all the nationalities in her Empire have rallied round her government at the present crisis, it is because they are willing to forget the past in the hope of a happier future. Russia cannot now afford to disappoint this hope, even if she is tempted to do so.

The spark of Nationalism has continued to smoulder in the hearts of these border nations, during the century that they have been ground between the hammer and anvil of rival imperialisms, and each oppressor has fostered it in turn to point a thrust in the long bout of fence against his accomplices. But now Russia, by putting forth all her strength to remove the pressure from the one side with "blood and iron," has pledged herself to relieve it by her own free grace on the other. The raising up of these prostrate nations in the blackest hour of their despair will transform them from a fringe of disaffection into a girdle of loyalty, and will be the

best guarantee that Russia will not have spent her strength in vain; but if the settlement, at the close of this war, fails to alleviate their condition by Russia's good-will, the liberal spirit of Europe which will have triumphed in the victory of the Allies, will inevitably accomplish their redemption in spite of Russia, and perhaps to her undoing. Russia has put her hand to the plough, and cannot turn back.

(ii.) The same considerations should induce Russia not merely to grant Home Rule to a ring of nationalities within her frontier, but actually to abandon all hold upon a population whose national centre of gravity lies definitely on the further side of it. In the present campaign the Russian armies have occupied the Austrian Crown-land of Bukovina, pinioned between the Carpathians and the North-East angle of Roumania; but with the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy the province should pass, not to Russia, but to the neighbouring Roumanian state, to which its inhabitants belong by nationality.

Roumania is at present considerably the most prosperous and well-populated [1] of the Balkan States, and would take the next place in importance to Hungary in our proposed Balkan League; but she is in the unfortunate position of possessing a large "irredenta" both in Hungarian and in Russian territory, which has so far alienated her sympathies both from the Dual Monarchy and from the Russian Empire, and prevented her arriving at an enduring understanding with either. Should the European settlement, however, secure a satisfactory *modus vivendi* for the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary, including her Rouman citizens, and so enable Hungary and Roumania to co-operate in the

[1] Population about 6,850,000 in 1910.

new zollverein, the quarrel between these two states would be at an end, and Roumania's resentment would concentrate itself upon Russia, much more to Russia's detriment than before, because Roumania would have the whole Balkan group behind her. It would therefore be worth Russia's while to satisfy, if possible, Roumania's just claims by conceding to her not merely territories conquered in this war, but a province long incorporated in her Empire.

Roumania covets Bessarabia,[1] the district between the Pruth and the Dniestr. This country is valuable to Russia simply for its coast-line, which gives her access to the Northern arm of the Danube delta. The interior is unimportant to her, for though her chief Black Sea port, Odessa, lies only a few miles up the coast East of the Dniestr "liman,"[2] the railways linking it to its hinterland, even to the new Russian territory in Galicia, all pass outside Bessarabia, beyond the Dniestr's Left bank. The interior, however, is the part of the province where the Rouman element is strong, while the steppe towards the coast is inhabited by the relics of Tatar nomads, by German colonists planted there to teach them agriculture, and by a large Slavonic element, Russian colonists and Bulgarian refugees, who have drifted in during the course of the century.

This gives us a reasonable basis for division. The new frontier between Russia and Roumania should start

[1] Ceded by Turkey to Russia in 1812. The population registered in the Russian census of 1897 was 1,938,000, including

921,000	Roumans	(47.5%)
103,000	Bulgars	(5.3%)
60,000	Germans	(3.2%)

but Rouman authorities reckon the Rouman element to be three quarters of the population. See Map V.

[2] Estuary.

at the junction of Pruth and Danube, proceed N.N.E. between the Pruth on the West and the Galatz-Bender railway on the East, leaving Bender to Russia, but assigning Kishinev to Roumania, and hit the Dniestr at the elbow of its South-Eastward bend between Kriulyany and Grigoriopol. Then it should follow the course of the Dniestr up to a point just below Chotin, whence it should take a line rather South of West till it hits the left bank of the Pruth again, just above Tchernowitz. After that, it should follow up the Pruth till it strikes the present boundary of Bukovina towards Galicia, and should take a South-Western course identical with that boundary till it reaches the Hungarian frontier along the summit of the Carpathians.

This compromise, while it satisfies justice, would not in itself content either party. Roumania, for economic reasons, wants more coast-line, in spite of her recent acquisitions from Bulgaria, and strategic considerations would disincline Russia from introducing this enormous bend into her new frontier. The transaction must be clinched by an economic arrangement. Even if Roumania acquired the coast between the Danube delta and the Dniestr Liman, it would profit her very little, since Odessa, which is, of course, for ever beyond Roumania's political grasp, offers the natural outlet, not only to Bessarabia, but to Moldavia and perhaps even Transylvania as well. What Roumania really needs is the use, free from tariff, of this port and of the railway leading to it from Yassy and Tchernowitz. It would serve Russia's own interest to grant her this as well, for Odessa would almost double the volume of her trade, by focussing all the traffic from her Western hinterland in addition to that from the North, while in return Russia could obtain from the Balkan

Zollverein the free use of a railway to a port on the Ægean coast, where she could lade and unload her goods on the open sea.

We have now dealt with the whole fringe of alien nationalities within the Western frontier of the Russian Empire. A fringe is all that they are: their territories are insignificant slices carved from the Empire's enormous bulk, and their populations weigh light in the balance against the Russian-speaking masses that lie away to their East. The Russians have far less excuse than the Magyars for the oppression by force or fraud of their fellow-nationalities, because the most quixotic generosity could not endanger the Russian element's preponderance.[1] The mere weight of the Russian population is sufficient to assure for ever the Russian character of the Empire, and the balance of numbers is continually shifting further in its favour year by year, as colonial areas fill up in the Great North-East. The only really difficult problem of devolution within the Empire concerns the relations between the different branches of the Russian Nation itself.

The Russian race falls into two great divisions, distinguished by considerable difference of dialect :—

[1] The following table, showing the comparative strengths of the most important nationalities within the Russian Empire, was compiled from estimates made in 1906 :

Great Russians	55,673,000	*Total North Russians* 61,559,000	*Total Russians* 83,940,000
White Russians	5,886,000		
Little Russians	22,381,000		
Poles	7,931,000		
Lithuanians	1,659,000		
Letts	1,436,000		
Finns	2,496,000		
Tatars	3,738,000		
Bashkirs	1,493,000		
Kirghiz	4,084,000		

The total population of the Empire was estimated at 149,299,000 in the same year.

(i.) The whole North of the country is occupied by the " Great Russian " group, which is composed of three sub-sections :

(*a*) The Northern, corresponding to the area of the former republic of Novgorod, where the Great Russian dialect is spoken in its most extreme form.

(*b*) The Western, coinciding with the region once subject to Lithuania, where the so-called " White Russian " variety of the dialect is current.

(*c*) The Eastern, round the original core of the Muscovite principality, where the dialect shows divergences from the pure Northern type similar to those that prevail in White Russia.

These three modifications of the Great Russian speech have remained mere parochial peculiarities, and have not aroused any separatist feelings between the populations that respectively speak them. The third, or " Moscow," type has established itself as the organ of official administration and of educated intercourse, because the principality of Moscow was the nucleus out of which the New Russia grew up as the Mongol storm subsided. The sudden birth of a wonderful literature in the nineteenth century, and the gradual spread of primary education since the beginning of the twentieth, have secured it for ever from challenge by the other local patois.

(ii.) " Great Russian," then, is a single language, and all the populations that speak it form a single national unit; but when we come to the second or " Little Russian " division of the race, we find ourselves in face of a real cleavage. The extension of the " Great Russians " coincides on the whole with the forest-zone of the country. The Little Russians lie South of them, deployed in a long line on the borderland between forest

and steppe, which extends from the headwaters of the Vistula and Dniestr systems in the Carpathians towards the E.N.E., till it strikes the upper course of the Don near Voronesh.

This wide-flung ribbon of population has a strong national feeling of its own. The "Great Russian" can claim that it was he who freed the race from the Moslem yoke, and that the living Russia of the present, with its glories of arms and of letters, is solely his creation; but the "Little Russian" looks back to the day before the Mongol appeared in the land, when the Dniepr, not the Volga, was the holy river of Russia, and Kieff, half way down its course, her holy city, the meeting-place of the "strong government" and the world-religion that came up to her from opposite quarters, out of the Baltic and the Black Sea. He regards himself as the true heir to this primitive tradition, and his loyalty to it is all the keener because so many centuries lie between the Golden Age and his present obscurity.

Little Russia, unlike Muscovy, never recovered from the Mongol catastrophe. She escaped from allegiance to the Moslem only by submission to the Lithuanian and Polish Catholic; and even when the Polish Empire was broken up, she did not win her unity from the re-settlement, but was divided with the rest of the spoils between the governments of Moscow and Vienna. Yet the problem of Little Russian nationalism might still have been solved. The Ruthenes of Galicia were only a small fraction of the race: the major part of it, including the national centre, Kieff, and the whole of the Dniepr basin, was once more gathered into the fold of a national Russian state; and if Moscow could have been liberal enough to accept Kieff as her peer, the Little Russians would soon have forgotten their

particularism, and only remembered that they and their Great Russian brethren were all members of One Orthodox Church, and citizens of one Holy Russia. But unfortunately the rulers of Moscow, that true heart of Russia where all her races and dialects meet, had migrated Northwards to the Baltic, and the new regime of Petersburg, established at the farther extremity of the Great Russian area and exposed to the full influence of German ideas, had initiated a policy of uniformity as baneful as that of Joseph II. in the Hapsburg lands, but unrelieved by the touch of genius that characterised Joseph's activity. Russia was to be "Great Russian," and the Little Russian division of the nation was to be neither conciliated nor assimilated, but ignored.

This unconstructive policy has been pursued mechanically for more than a century. The Little Russian language has been treated as a patois on the same footing as White Russian or the dialect of Novgorod, and has rigorously been denied any official status. All public education and administration has been conducted in the Moscow variety of Great Russian, the natural medium in the North, but in Southern Russia almost a foreign tongue. The results of this system have been unfortunate. Little Russian nationalism, effectively prevented from manifesting itself in external forms throughout its native home, the Ukraine,[1] has been irritated by this wanton provocation to an unnatural tension of consciousness, and has found a new stronghold across the Galician border.

The Little Russian or Ruthene population of the Austrian Crown-lands has its grievances. Though

[1] "Ukraine" (meaning "borderland," the same word as the "Krain" of the Slovenes) is the term used to cover all districts of Little Russian population within the present frontiers of the Russian Empire.

the Ruthene peasant proprietors constitute the bulk of the population in Eastern Galicia,[1] the big estates are still nearly everywhere in the hands of a Polish upper class, a relic of the Polish domination before the Partition of 1772, and in the 'eighties of the last century the Austrian government abandoned the Ruthene majority to the mercy of the Polish minority, when it was bidding for the support of the Polish vote in the parliament at Vienna.

The Poles had the game in their hands, because both wealth and education were at that time their monopoly, and they took steps to confirm their racial predominance. They compelled the Austrian government to recognise Polish as the official language of the whole province, and it has taken the Ruthenes a generation to secure a modicum of instruction in their own language at Lemberg[2] University. Resentment at their betrayal to the Poles raised a movement among them in favour of Russia, and a "Moskalophil" party grew up, whose programme was that reunion with the national Russian state which is now being realised; but the Moskalophils have always been in a minority, and no indictment against Russian policy in the Ukraine could be more damning than the almost universal rejection of Russian overtures by the Ruthenes of Eastern Galicia.

In modern Austria "official language" has not the same sinister connotation as in the neighbour states of

[1] The Ruthene territory amounts to about two-thirds of the whole area of Galicia, even if we make a liberal allowance for the Polish enclaves embedded in it: on the other hand, the Ruthene element is only a minority of the total population of Galicia (3,382,000 in 1900, as against 4,252,000 Poles), because the Ruthene country is more mountainous and less developed than the Western districts occupied by the Poles.

[2] The German form of Russian Lvov, Little Russian Lwiw, Polish Lwów.

Russia, Prussia and Hungary. Like German in the remaining Austrian provinces, Polish is "official" in Galicia in the sense that it is the vehicle of "internal service" in the administration of the country. In the "external service," however, that is, in all relations between the provincial government and the individuals subject to its jurisdiction, Austrian public law prescribes in Galicia as elsewhere the employment of the private party's native speech, if it is recognised as customary ("Landesüblich") in the district.

A Ruthene thus enjoys the right to conduct all his business with the Polish administration in his own Ruthene tongue. If he is a peasant, he can bring an action in Ruthene before the public courts: if he is a deputy, he can debate in Ruthene in the provincial diet. If he can secure a majority in his village or municipality, he may make Ruthene the medium of his local self-government. If he travels on the Galician railways, he finds every official notice down to the inscription on his ticket printed in Ruthene as well as in German and Polish. In every one of these points his status presents a remarkable contrast to the position of his brethren beyond the Russian and Hungarian frontiers. Even in the sphere of higher education, where the Polish regime has laid itself open to most criticism, the number of Ruthene secondary schools in Galicia has at least risen, though slowly, since 1867, while in Hungary the non-Magyar secondary schools have steadily shrunk in numbers during the same period. On the whole, we may say that the Ruthene majority in the Eastern part of Galicia is treated as equitably as is consistent with the racial supremacy of the Polish minority in the region, and that here, as elsewhere, Austria has been Europe's pioneer in the settlement of the problem of nationality.

In Galicia, then, the Little Russian language is deprecated but in no sense banned. A society has flourished for many years at Lemberg which fosters the living literature, collects and edits the peasant-poetry of the past, and studies the philological characteristics of the dialect, with a freedom unheard of East of the frontier. The Tsar's government has held the mistaken point of view that the encouragement of traditional culture inevitably gives rise to new-fangled political aspirations, and has thereby provoked this literary group at Lemberg to become in fact the mouthpiece of a Little Russian nationalist party, which has the allegiance of a majority among the Austrian Ruthenes. This party dreams of a national state in which all fractions of the Little Russian race shall be united, and its feeling against Petersburg is so bitter that, in spite of the *entente* at its expense between Vienna and the Poles, it is ready to march under Austria's banner, and allows its canvassing in the Ukraine to assume the form of Austrian propaganda.[1]

This bizarre situation has suddenly been terminated by the present war. In the event of the Allies' success, we have seen that Galicia will pass to the Russian Empire. The whole of the Little Russian race will finally be united within Russia's frontier, but the annexation of the Galician Ruthenes will create the same situation for her as that of the Galician Poles.

[1] It is true that to win the loyalty of the Ruthenes the Central Government at Vienna has had to reverse in some measure its Galician policy, and that it has thereby shaken the loyalty of the Poles, who were outraged to find the racial balance in Galicia being redressed from above. To drive Pole and Ruthene in double harness is really a hopeless task, and it is probable that Vienna only attempted it at the instance of Berlin. Since her bungling policy began to reconcile Russian and Pole, Germany has sought to embarrass Russia in another quarter by exploiting the problem of the Ukraine.

She cannot afford to be less liberal at Lemberg than Austria has been. She will have to take account of her new Ruthene citizens' demands, and this will raise simultaneously the question of the Ukraine.

The Nationalists will doubtless claim the utmost, namely, the consolidation of the whole area speaking the dialect into a single political unit endowed with very extensive Home Rule, but such a solution has almost insurmountable difficulties in its way.

(i.) The Little Russian area is woefully lacking in geographical compactness. It would include the Ruthene section of Galicia, and the present Russian governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff, Poltava, and Kharkov, together with the Southern parts of Chernigov and Voronesh; but, as we have said, this is not so much an independent region as a border intermediate between two others.

It is true that it has acquired a peculiar economic importance, because it more or less coincides with the famous "Black Earth" zone, where during the last century agriculture has been developed on a vast scale under modern methods, bringing in its train a network of railways, and therewith the beginnings of an industrial growth. The new wheat production has not confined itself, however, to the Little Russian fringe: it has pushed out South of it into the Black Sea steppe, which, since the break-up of the Ancient World, had been a "no-man's land" swept by one wave after another of nomad barbarians, till in the latter half of the eighteenth century the Russian government wrested the title to its sovereignty from the Porte, and began to replace the handful of Nogai Tatars, that had wandered there under Ottoman suzerainty, by a steady influx of agricultural colonists.

From the outset this new population has been very heterogeneous. The Germanophil government of Catherine II. copied the Hapsburg experiment of sowing civilisation by scattering plantations of German settlers, and in " New Russia," as in Hungary, the balance was largely made up of refugees from the various Christian populations subject to Turkish oppression. The colonisation of the district received an immense impetus from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, since when the peasants in every province of Russia have been leaving their ancestral villages and drifting into all the undeveloped areas to take up freehold allotments there ; but, inasmuch as the Great Russian population of the Empire is vastly stronger than the Little Russian in numbers, the Great Russian immigrants into the steppes outweigh the Little Russian in the like proportion. When New Russia has been completely filled up, the Little Russian element will not be found to predominate, and so, when the various elements subsequently fuse themselves into one type, the " New Russian " blend will not assume a specifically " Little Russian " colour.

What is true of the Black Sea steppes is still truer of the coast upon which they open. Odessa, the new port founded in 1792, is an indispensable factor in the economic system of the " Black Earth " zone, for the whole grain export passes through its harbour ; but it has no special links of tradition or dialect with the Little Russian nationality, and is essentially a common outlet and meeting-place of all races in the Empire, including the Poles, while the isolated Crimean peninsula which adjoins it on the East has remained the stronghold of a civilised agricultural and vine-growing Tatar population.

New Russia, then, has no social bonds of cohesion with Little Russia, and could never be absorbed into it ; but

a self-governing Little Russian unit which did not extend to the coast would geographically and economically be almost unthinkable. It would possess none of the prerequisites for self-sufficiency.

(ii.) Yet even if Little Russia were able, by assimilating the coast or otherwise, to consolidate herself, a more serious difficulty would still remain : she would be too unwieldy a block for the architecture of the Russian Empire. There are two possible plans on which a federal group can be built up.

(*a*) Where the whole population to be federated is homogeneous in nationality, and the only problem is caused by its bulk, it is best organised in a large number of self-governing units, which, being *ex hypothesi* identical in quality, will probably work together in harmony, if only their parity in size and importance is secured as well. This structure has approved itself in the history of the U.S.A., and will probably be adopted as the basis of the New China.

(*b*) American history, however, has also shown that this system of equal units is extremely dangerous where the total population is divided by differences of nationality. In fact, so soon as the least divergence of national self-consciousness creeps in, it will transform the divisions between units, which formerly had merely administrative significance, into spiritual lines of cleavage, and since the units are equal and share no particular centre of gravity, there will be no constructive force to counteract this centrifugal tendency. A gradual divergence of this kind within such a structure cost the United States a civil war before they could remedy it : in a case where the national differences are violent and traditional, and where the architect has still a clean slate, to adopt this principle would be deliberate folly.

When common interest or necessity induces several different nationalities to attempt combination in a single organic political group,[1] success can only come through inequality, by subjecting a number of lesser satellites to the attraction of a central planet, and the inequality must be signal. If the satellites approach the planet too nearly in mass, or the planet shrinks into too even a ratio with the satellites, they will all, when a certain point is reached, fly off at a tangent, and probably collide fatally with one another before they severally disappear in space.

The unity of the Russian Empire is to the interest of nearly all the nationalities that are members of it; but that unity can only be maintained by grouping the rest[2] round a Russian national state of immense preponderance. We have said that the Russian nation need have no fear of being swamped by its fellow-nationalities, but that remains true only so long as the nation itself remains united. The little Russian element forms nearly a third of the whole race,[3] and if it were to break off from the main body and attempt to follow an orbit of its own, it would fatally dislocate the balance of the whole Imperial system. It would approximate sufficiently in mass to the Great Russian remnant to struggle with it for predominance, and this fratricidal strife would wear down the strength of the two fragments, and prevent them from concentrating their energy to keep

[1] As contrasted with a loose, passive concert like the proposed Balkan Zollverein.

[2] Without prejudice, of course, to their own local self-government.

[3]

Great Russians . . .		61,559,000 (=70.5%)
Little Russians:		
In the Ukraine	22,381,000	25,763,000 (=29.5%)
In Galicia .	3,382,000	
Total of Russian Nation .		87,322,000

the minor bodies in their courses. The result would be at worst the complete break-up of the Russian Empire, and at best a protracted political paralysis.

If this catastrophe is to be avoided, the Little Russians must abandon their particularism, and allow themselves to be reabsorbed in the indivisible body of "Holy Russia." But this can only come about if the splendid traditions of a thousand years are no longer obscured by the bitter experience of a century. The Tsar's government cannot grant the Little Russians autonomy; but it can see to it that the sacrifice of sentiment which the refusal demands shall entail no loss of honour or of material advantage, and that the Little Russians shall take up their citizenship in the new national unit gladly as the Great Russians' peers, and not sullenly as their inferiors. The Little Russian dialect must at last be given just recognition. It must not merely become the official language of those provinces where it is the native speech, but it must be allowed equal currency with the Moscow dialect in the central executive and in the common parliament, not indeed of the whole Russian Empire, but of the Russian national state that will be its core.

This Russian core will be an experiment in centralised self-government on a larger scale than any yet attempted.[1] It will embrace the whole country from Archangel on the White Sea to Odessa on the Black, from Petrograd on the Baltic to Astrakhan on the Caspian, and from the summit of the Carpathian mountains to the further slope of the Urals. On the East and South it will be bounded only by the vacant areas along the Trans-

[1] The action of the existing representative organ, the Imperial Duma, is restricted, and it cannot in any sense be considered as the governing power in Russia: ultimate authority is still in the hands of the bureaucracy.

Siberian Railway, which still await effective colonisation, and by the military districts of the Caucasus and the Asiatic steppes, whose primary need at present is the unbroken maintenance of strong government, and which will not become able to govern themselves till many years have habituated them to a civilisation established from without. The region ripe for immediate self-government is nevertheless immense, and the population contained within the limits indicated, which will be represented in the parliament of the national Russian unit, falls little short of a hundred millions. There are, however, several factors eminently favourable to the successful organisation of this huge mass of human beings.

(i.) The geographical unwieldiness of the country is counterbalanced by the extraordinary facility of communication. The great navigable rivers have always afforded magnificent natural highways: the Volga steamer was as important a factor in nineteenth-century Russia as the Mississippi steamer was in the contemporary development of the U.S.A., and the network of railways which, as in America, has first supplemented, and now begun to supplant, the river-steamer's use, especially in the new cornlands of the South, can extend itself over the length and breadth of the land without encountering any barrier of mountains.

(ii.) The Great Russian race has taken full advantage of the geographical elasticity of its habitat, and, expanding from its original centre of dispersion in the North-Western forests, has kept pace with the political extension of the Muscovite state's frontiers. In its contact with the alien races that it has thereby encountered, it has displayed a vitality and assimilative power comparable to that of the Anglo-Saxon race in America.

The little patches of Ugro-Finnish population that still survive in the heart of Great Russia,—Karelians between Novgorod and Tver among the Valdai hills, Cheremisses and Mordvins between Nijni Novgorod and Kazan on the Middle Volga,—testify to the vanished majorities of these tribes, which have adopted the speech and nationality of their Russian conquerors as far as the White Sea. The same process is being continued to-day at the expense of the more widely spread Finnish groups of the North-East,—Votyaks and Syryens and Voguls and Ostyaks,—protected though they are by the rampart of the Northern Urals.[1]

The nomadic, Turkish-speaking communities, Bashkirs and Chuvashes,[2] that adjoin the Volga-Finns on the South-East, wandering with their flocks among the Southern Urals and along the border of the steppes, are suffering the fate of those pathetic little Red Indian reservations in Canada and the U.S.A., round which the tide of European immigration surged higher all through the nineteenth century, till some inconsequent act of lawlessness broke the moral obligation that had so far preserved their bounds, and abandoned them to submergence beneath the flood. But the mere engulfing of inferior races is not the greatest triumph of the

[1] The remnants of Finnish population still awaiting absorption by the Russian race, including the Ural groups, but excluding, of course, the 2,353,000 Finns of the Grand Duchy who have a civilisation and a national consciousness superior, on the whole, to the Russian, make up a total of 2,353,000 (identical, curiously enough, with the total of civilised Finns in Finland). There are furthermore 143,000 civilised Finns in Russian territory adjoining the Grand Duchy who are unlikely to be assimilated.

[2]

Bashkirs	1,493,000
Chuvashes	844,000
Total	2,337,000

Russian nation: it has known how to reconcile a rival civilisation.

Christian and Moslem have met as enemies on many fields, and the result of the struggle has often brought them into the relation of conquerors and conquered. Yet whichever party has triumphed, a great gulf has generally remained fixed between the two, and enforced political union, instead of passing over, as in so many other cases, into organic political unity, has only accentuated their mutual antipathy. Russia alone has managed to solve the problem. The Tatars of the Volga-Khanates,[1] conquered by her in the sixteenth century, were communities of peasants and merchants with a tradition of culture, derived from Persia and Baghdad, as strongly characterised as that which Russia herself had drawn from Constantinople and the West; yet now the Tatars, while remaining true to their religion, have become Russian in soul, and have found both the opportunity and the inclination to play a full part in the social and political life of the Russian nation. This is a victory not of race but of civilisation, or rather, what is better still, it is the blending of two civilisations into a new harmony.

It is clear, then, that the Great Russian element has the power to weld the whole hundred millions into a consolidated nation, and in the process not only Finns, Bashkirs and Tatars, but the more compact Little Russian masses as well, will ultimately lose their peculiar individuality. It would be idle for the Little Russians to complain at the prospect. If their language is henceforth given as good an opportunity for self-assertion as the Moscow dialect, and still yields ground before the latter, the cause will no longer be human

[1] Kazan and Astrakhan.

violence and injustice, but the simple, unalterable fact of the other tongue's superior vitality. The Little Russian need not be ashamed of accepting for his own a language which during the last century has become the vehicle of a literature of world-wide importance, beside which the traditional peasant ballads sedulously published at Lemberg sink into almost comic insignificance.

The new Russian nation will look not towards the past but towards the future, and the national character that will emerge will be finer than any of its component elements; for Little Russian and Tatar will nobly leaven the Great Russian lump, and "Scratch the Russian and you find the Tatar" will invert its meaning, and turn from a national reproach to be the national motto.

This homogeneous national state will finally achieve devolution, not through antagonistic, or at any rate unsymmetrical, nationalistic sub-parliaments, but through strongly developed county councils. In 1864, towards the end of the great decade of reform, Alexander II. called into existence elective assemblies based, like the mediæval "Estates" of Western Europe, upon distinctions of social caste, and graded in two scales: the provincial zemstvos, representing whole governments, and the district zemstvos and municipal dumas, representing their sub-divisions.

These councils did not produce many concrete results by the feverish activity that marked the first years of their existence. In 1890 their powers were severely restricted, and it seemed as though confinement to the purely consultative sphere would reduce them to complete unreality; but the revolutionary movement of 1904–6, precipitated by the disastrous war with Japan,

awoke in them an unexpected energy. During the chaos into which the Empire fell for three years, they took the initiative. Repeated congresses of delegates from the local dumas and zemstvos evolved, in conference with the autocracy, the constitution of October 1905, and the elective machinery of the first national dumas was modelled on the local plan. The provincial, district, and municipal councils have not let their recovered power slip again from their hands, and a phase of really constructive activity undoubtedly lies before them.

This, then, is the Russia of the future, which we can discern through the chrysalis of eighteenth century autocracy, from which the Russia of the present has been so painfully extricating herself. It is not a mere dream of the imagination. The regime in possession fascinates our attention, just as the royal murders in Serbia occupied the whole vision of the Magyar professor. The repressive, unscrupulous police-government keeps us unpleasantly aware of its existence by the startling echoes of its misdeeds that filter through into our press, and the hysterical, often criminal, intrigues of the revolutionists, who claim to represent the *intelligenzia*, reveal a dearth of constructive ideas that almost justifies the government's attitude. Yet beneath this sordid surface a less melodramatic political activity has been at work for a generation without attracting the world's notice. The exploitation of the " Black Earth " zone, the conciliation of the Moslems, and the evolution of the zemstvos are signs of the times.

D. *Expansion*

We have not, however, completely answered the Germans' case. "Granted," they will say, "that Russia has this liberal future before her, that national self-government will be attained by the different races within the Empire, alien and Russian alike, and that the old ideal of 'Repression at home and aggression abroad,' will be sloughed off together with her obsolete eighteenth-century 'strong-government': if we grant you all this, you must allow us to turn against you your own weapon of historical analogy. You have illustrated the tendency of Russia's growth by a comparison with eighteenth-century France. But France, after she had achieved national self-government in the Revolution, proceeded to rob territory from other nations like the most vulgar-minded despotic conqueror. Perhaps you may ascribe this conduct not to France herself, but to the personal ambition of Napoleon; or you may say that, though the French nation a century ago did adopt unmodified the Bourbons' dynastic point of view, the Industrial Revolution has intervened meanwhile and entirely changed the attitude of self-governing nations towards their foreign policy—that they do not now wage war for territorial acquisition but for economic advantage, aiming to add market to market, not province to province. If you take up this position, we can answer you out of your own mouth.

"Let us return to your comparison of Germany and Russia. You have proved that the present analogies between them are deceptive: strong government in Russia did its work under Peter the Great, and is now a functionless survival, while Bismarck had to rehabituate

a cultured, peaceable people to 'blood and iron' and put strong government in the foreground again, because in Germany its primary task of consolidation had never previously been achieved. But our new militarism did not die with the accomplishment of the task for which it had been called into being: rightly or wrongly, we Germans have cherished it (as you have pointed out) precisely as a weapon in the modern economic battle, to snatch the industrial markets of the World from the nations established in possession of them. If you beat us in this war, we shall have failed, but when we fall, the Russian nation steps into our shoes. Like ourselves they will covet, and justly covet, a 'place in the Sun,' and do you imagine that, however liberal their ideals may be, economic pressure will not in the end force them to stake their all on the same desperate throw for World Empire that we are making at this moment? Think also of the analogies of the Future: economic environment is a stronger force than national disposition."

This is the German advocate's last and most dangerous counter-attack; but we can meet it with a crushing reply, for it rests on an entire misconception of the Russian Empire's economic character. Germany, by the density of her population, the nature of her physical resources, and her geographical position and extent, inevitably came into line with the Western nations of Europe, and was forced into industrial competition with them under exasperatingly disadvantageous conditions. The economic structure of the Russian Empire belongs to a different type altogether.

Beyond the densely-populated, highly-organised little states of Europe, which at present focus in themselves the civilisation of the world by drawing all its raw

products into the crucible of their industry, lies a ring of states in the making, which dwarf Europe by the vastness of their calibre. None of them are full grown yet. Some of them, like Australia and Canada and the Argentine, have all the weapons of civilisation at their command, but not the hands to wield them—empty lands, crying out for the life-blood of population to fill their veins. Some, like India and China, seethe with human life, but have found no spirit to brood over the waters and call order out of chaos, so that their human forces evaporate in anarchy, and the material wealth, that might make their millions of lives worth living, still remains untapped. Only one of them, the U.S.A., has yet developed far enough on its course to give us an inkling of what Time will make of them all.

These cosmopolitan units of the future will not compete with the present national units of Europe: they will grow up to supersede them as human life passes over from the national to the international scale; but they are still young and can afford to abide their time. We have only to look East of the Volga and the Urals to see that the Russian Empire is one of their brotherhood.

When the Trans-Siberian railway was completed, after ten years' work, in 1902, we thought of it as a move in the Imperialist game, which was to bring the Russian military machine within striking distance of the Yellow Sea, and perhaps reduce China to be the Empire's vassal. This idea may, in fact, have been uppermost in the Government's mind, and it certainly was an important link in the chain of events that led to the Japanese War. But the real significance of the railway is far different, and has been in no wise affected by the ruin of Russia's ambitions in the Far East. Its building

marks an epoch in the expansion of the Russian nation as important as that marked by the first trans-continental railways of North America for the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race.

During the seventeenth century, when the French explorers were penetrating up the St. Lawrence into the Great Lakes, and discovering portages to the Ohio and Mississippi that brought their canoes on to the river-system of the Mexican gulf, Cossack adventurers had already crossed the Urals and worked their way along the equally magnificent water-routes of Northern Asia, up the Obi and Angara rivers, across Lake Baikal, and then down the Amur to the shores of the Pacific.

Like Great Britain, however, in Australia, the Russian Government at first found no better use for this vacant land, that had fallen so casually into their hands, than to relegate their convicts to the Siberian mines,[1] and Siberia has become the by-word for a desolate place of torment, like the frozen zone in Dante's Hell. But in the nineteenth century the expanding peasantry of Great Russia began to cross the middle Volga, and a current of Eastward migration set in among them as strong as that which carried the American squatters across the Alleghanies into the prairies of the West. Any one who has read Tolstoy's tale of the land-hungry peasant, who abandoned one plot after another for still larger allotments further East, till at last he struck a bargain with the wandering Bashkirs and fell a victim to his own greed, will recognise the analogy at once, and mentally translate the scene into incidents of the 'forties, when Mormon settlers bought up the hunting-grounds of Red Indian chiefs.

[1] The only wealth of the country they thought of exploiting, beside the fur of its forest creatures.

Here, as in America, colonisation has followed the railway, and now the peasant is establishing himself on either side of the new line, right across Siberia. The experience of Canada has shown what human occupation can achieve in the teeth of adverse conditions, how it can even modify the rigour of climate and temperature by introducing agriculture and breaking up the surface of the soil. Siberia will be the Canada of the twentieth century. Already the well-watered grazing grounds of the steppe, which the railway traverses between the Urals and the Yenisei, are exporting dairy produce to Western Europe, and the plateaux of Irkutsk and Trans-baikalia will yield greater wealth still when their timber and mines are exploited to their full capacity.

The human wealth of the new territories is even more promising than their material prospects. The criminal convict has not proved a bad foundation for the new Anglo-Saxon nation of the Australian common-wealth; but a considerable proportion of the Siberian convicts have been political offenders, that is, the most independent, energetic and intellectual members of the Russian urban class. Governmental selection has en-dowed Siberia with Russia's fittest, and the descendants of these exiles, granted their freedom on condition that they settled in the country for ever, have mingled with the stock of the Cossack trappers and already produced a racial variety characterised by the same enterprising qualities as distinguish the Westerner in the United States.

The territories strung along the railway, then, have as great a future before them as the Western provinces of the Canadian Dominion. As they fill with a vigorous population of Russian speech, they will gradually claim Home Rule, and take their place by the side of "Holy

Russia" herself and the lesser nationalities of the Western border, as independent members of the decentralised Empire. Just as in Canada, moreover, settlement and exploitation will push further North from their base-line along the railway than is at present conceived possible, moving down the course of the great rivers till they reach an impassable limit in the frozen tundras. That, however, will not be the end of Siberia's expansion: she has already stretched out her hands toward the South.

The settlement after the Japanese War left under Russian control the Northern section of Manchuria through which her railway takes a direct line from Lake Baikal to Vladivostock, while the recent revolution in China gave the pastoral tribes of Outer Mongolia an opportunity to throw off Chinese suzerainty and place themselves under Russian protection. It would be a gain to civilisation if these territories were permanently and in formal terms annexed to the Russian Empire. China's sole title to them is their conquest by the Manchu dynasty two and a half centuries ago. She has done nothing to improve their condition all the time they have been in her power, and now that she has undertaken that task of internal reconstruction which will demand a century of devoted concentration if it is to be carried through, they can be nothing but a drag upon her ill-spared strength. In taking them over once for all, Russia would have the precedent of the United States, which compelled Mexico to cede her neglected Northern territories in 1847. They were much criticised at the time for their conduct, but have been completely justified by its results.

Outer Mongolia is sundered from China by the broad zone of the Gobi desert, while its frontier against the

Russian Empire is an arbitrary line, for all its rivers flow either into Lake Baikal or into the Amur. It is that "Cauldron of the North" from whose pasture-plateau wave after wave of nomads used to pour out over the mountain rim into the Asiatic steppes, and devastate the cultivated lands of the South and West upon which they burst. The expansion of Russia stemmed that tide, and now Russian enterprise will penetrate in its turn into the "cauldron," and make of it one of the most productive stock-breeding areas in the World.

Nor is Mongolia the only Chinese dependency that would benefit by transference to Russian rule. South-West of Mongolia lies the Tarim basin, the heart of Asia, girdled on South, East, and North by giant mountains, the Kuen-Lung, the Pamir plateau and the Thian Shan, but open towards the Gobi desert on the East. The population is as alien to the Chinese nation as are the Mongols. In spite of the mountain barriers, all its links are towards the West. It is Turkish in speech, a rearguard of the great race,[1] and it is Moslem in faith, an outpost flung Eastward between the two Buddhist masses of Mongolia and Tibet. In the 'sixties of the last century national antipathy vented itself in a fierce rebellion against Chinese dominion, which for several years secured the country a harassed independence; but the tide soon turned. Turkestan was reduced once more to subjection by the weight of Chinese numbers, and has been held down by Chinese garrisons during the forty years that have elapsed.

In truth the country is not hard to hold. It did not

[1] Lost in this blind alley when the main body burst out of the "cauldron" and streamed towards the Oxus and the Volga.

need the bloody vengeance of the Chinese armies to crush the people's soul; it was being crushed already by the losing fight against the physical environment. The Tarim basin is undergoing a long-drawn-out process of desiccation. Every year the streams that flow inwards from the snow-covered mountains penetrate less deep into the basin's centre, and are stifled by the desert after a shorter course; while the sand, blown forward by the constant North-East wind in great wave-ridges many miles long, engulfs every year a fresh village, and buries another patch of cultivation. The battle against the desert is beyond the native's strength, but both he and his country are worth saving, and a vigorous European government, with the material apparatus of modern civilisation at its command, could stem the sand waves by embankments and plantations, eke out the snow-water's gift by subterranean irrigation, and in some measure restore the Basin to the prosperity of two thousand years ago, when the cultures of Greece, India and China found in it their blending-ground. Only Russia can accomplish Turkestan's salvation, and Great Britain would willingly allow her a free hand there, if she undertook in return to make Kuen-Lung the limit of her Southward advance, and to leave Tibet, that lies beyond it, under the undisputed influence of the Indian Empire.

Here is Russia's field of expansion for the twentieth century. She has to fill these immense empty territories with the white population their temperate climate invites, and the achievement of the task will be a race against time. The population of the Empire may now total 150 millions, but it is still the most thinly-inhabited of the European states, while South of the Gobi desert lies China, with perhaps three times as many millions

crowded on to a space less than a quarter of Russia's extent.

The first ripples of Chinese migration are already striking upon the East Indies, Australia and the Pacific sea-board of North America, and the brutality with which these states are repelling this peaceful, casual invasion shows how terribly they dread the pressure to come. Forcible exclusion will succeed for the present, because China still lies in the grip of a thousand years' political paralysis; but the power of movement is already returning to her limbs. The fundamental factor of world-politics during the next century will be the competition between China and the new common-wealths. China will strive to reorganise her national life, and to bring all her immeasurable latent strength to bear on the effort to win her "place in the Sun" (a more titanic struggle this than Germany's present endeavour): the others will make haste to swell the ranks of their white population till they can muster enough defenders to man the wide boundaries of the inheritance they have marked out for themselves, and become strong enough either to fling back China's onset or to deter her from making it at all. All the threatened nations—Canada, the U.S.A., the South American republics, New Zealand and Australia—will draw together into a league, to preserve the Pacific from Chinese domination. Japan will probably join their ranks, for she is the Great Britain of the China Seas, and, just like ourselves, would be menaced most seriously by the emergence of a World-power on the continent opposite her island country. Russia, who has not even a strip of sea to protect her, but is China's immediate continental neighbour along a vast land-frontier, will actually be the chief promoter of this

defensive *entente*, for she will be exposed to the first brunt of the Chinese attack.

Under these circumstances it is quite inconceivable that the German forecast should come true. The great Russian army of 1914, when it has fulfilled its task of crushing militarism in Central Europe, will have no more temptation to proceed to the warlike conquest of the world than the American armies had, after they had vindicated the Union in the 'sixties. Like them it will disband, to answer the call of economic conquest from the steppes and forests of the great North-East. Nor will the Russian peasants, in the generation to come, flock into urban centres and exchange agriculture for industry, as the German peasants have been doing since 1871. Russia will send every surplus child bred in her home villages to build up the new Russian villages in Siberia: she cannot spare a man for the towns. Yet if Russia does not contemplate an industrial career, then, however triumphant be her issue from this war, she cannot possibly become a menace to the Industrial nations of Europe. Grant that her strength increases till she has it in her power to overcome their united forces, she will still have no motive for doing so. The only spoils of victory would be the great tropical dependencies these nations maintain, primarily as sources of raw material and to a lesser degree as markets for their own production: to a nation without manufactures there would be no value whatsoever in their possession.

These considerations finally dispose of that bug-bear which haunted British foreign policy during the nineteenth century, the danger to India of Russia's Eastward advance. The Indian Empire is the vastest, the most populous, and the most difficult to govern of all tropical dominions held by European powers: it is

also the best tropical market for European industry that there is, and we are the most industrialised nation in Europe : and yet, so far as we can estimate the economic results of our position there, the balance of trade is steadily going less in our favour. It is accordingly most unlikely that Russia will ever stake her fortune on an attempt to burden herself with the administration of India, which in her case would bring no economic reward whatsoever, and would cripple her in the vital task of building up her bulwarks against China.

The Indian Empire, moreover, is no passive conglomeration of populations, that can be transferred like slaves from one master to another. That was more or less the condition of the peninsula a century and a half ago, otherwise we should never have established our rule over it, with the absurdly small resources of which we could dispose ; but in the meantime "strong government" has here performed one of its most brilliant achievements in all history. The three hundred millions of Indian people are divided by religious barriers in the extreme form of caste, by differences of language that coincide with the traditional race-hatred of conquerors and conquered, and by geographical diversity as great as that between the Kashmir valleys and the Deccan ; yet under the fostering ægis of British rule they are being liberated successively from chaos and from particularism. They have at last begun to find a common self-consciousness, and to give sure promise that India will take its place in the end as a great self-governing nation of the new calibre. So far from being in danger of another foreign conquest, India is beginning to dispense with that trusteeship into which the British conquest of the eighteenth century has gradually developed, and when she is mistress of her own destiny,

it is she that will be the danger to others. The problem of Indian emigration is as serious as that of Chinese, and the Khyber Pass, instead of being traversed by Russian armies marching South, will become the high-road of Indian coolies migrating Northwards to labour on the irrigation of the Oxus and Jaxartes basins, and settle upon the lands their industry will have reclaimed from the desert.

Russia, then, has no booty to gain from the other nations of Europe. "But if this is so," the German will ask, "why has she thrown herself into the present struggle with the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy? Why does she regard it, as she evidently does, as a supreme crisis in her history, an issue of life or death? What is the meaning of her passionate intervention on Serbia's behalf?" The answer to these questions demands a separate chapter.

CHAPTER IX

RUSSIA'S NEEDS

WE have seen that the Russian Empire will never become an industrial and commercial power; but like every other unit in the new international World she has need of a free outlet to the high seas, through which she may transmit to foreign markets the raw produce of her vast continental hinterland, and supply herself with the manufactured goods of industrial countries in return.

Such outlets she has never yet obtained. Till the eighteenth century her only port was Archangel on the White Sea, and this perhaps sufficed her during the era of stagnant isolation: at any rate the English Merchant Adventurers found it worth their while to trade there, though it is ice-bound two-thirds of the year.[1] In the year 1700, the Baltic was a Swedish lake, and the Black Sea a Turkish one. Peter and Catherine broke the maritime monopoly of these two powers, and gave Russia a sea-board on both waters. Odessa and Riga have grown in a century and a half to be magnificent ports, and would suffice in themselves for the needs of a Russia much more highly developed than the present. But they are no more in direct communication with the Oceanic highways of international commerce than are the ports of Milwaukee and Chicago on the Great Lakes. By an unlucky fatality, both the natural coastlines of Russia only introduce her to land-locked seas, and the narrow passage that connects each of them with the great ocean-spaces beyond has in either case

[1] From about October to May.

remained till this day outside the frontiers of the Russian Empire, and must continue so to remain for cogent reasons.

(i.) The population of the shores in question, between which these narrow seas flow, namely, of the Danish peninsula and islands on the one hand and of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles on the other, is alien to Russia in nationality, and would in neither case wish to become part of the Russian Empire.

(ii.) Even if these populations did consent, through hope of economic advantage, promise of political privilege, or the like, to throw in their lot with Russia, the situation thus created would be still more unfair and disadvantageous to the smaller states that share with Russia these inland waters, than it is to Russia as it stands at present. It would place their commerce completely at Russia's mercy, whereas at present Russia is already formidable enough in strength and size to make the powers in control of the straits respect her own commerce under ordinary circumstances.

The solution indicated by these considerations is that the command of the entrances to both these seas should be held in trust, without prejudice to the national self-government of the populations through which they flow, for all parties, without distinction, that are interested in their use—primarily for all states possessing ports on the inland seas in question, and secondarily for all political and economic groups the World over that trade upon the sea, since commerce is an international concern and will become so more and more as our civilisation develops.

We shall be able to discuss more effectively how this can be done, if we deal with the two regions separately and in detail.

A. *The Liberation of the Baltic*

The mouth of the Baltic consists of several winding channels, that force their way between Sweden, the Danish islands and Jutland. They are all of them narrow enough to be commanded in places by fortress-artillery on shore, and their length and intricacy make them an ideal area for mines, which, as the present war has shown, can be laid down effectively enough to block all traffic through them, even by a navy that is not in immediate possession of their coasts. In fact the power to close or open these entrances to the Baltic really passed from Denmark, which had neither the interest nor the strength to treat Russia unjustly, to Germany, which had the very strongest interest in obtaining the power to do so, as soon as the cutting of the canal from the Elbe estuary to Kiel Haven gave the German fleet the means of transferring its whole force from the North Sea to the Baltic and back again by a private passage under its own exclusive control. This new asset gave Germany such a decisive advantage over Russia, who had to divide her strength between three separate squadrons in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East, that the latter Empire abandoned naval competition for the control of the Baltic, and sought to find egress to the North Atlantic by another way.

We have noted that Archangel, the earliest port Russia had, and still her only port on the open ocean, is practically valueless because it is ice-bound the greater part of the year. But if you follow the coast Westward beyond the mouth of the White Sea, and then round the North Cape, which is the North-West corner of the Eurasian continent, you come within the influence

of the Gulf Stream. Its impetus carries it past the British Isles up the West coast of Norway, keeping the climate temperate and the sea perennially free from drift ice at least a dozen degrees further Northward than along any other meridian.[1] Unfortunately for Russia, Norwegian colonists, following the warm current and availing themselves of the easy coast-wise navigation from fjord to fjord, had already occupied the whole of this open littoral before the backwoodsmen of Novgorod had made their laborious way overland to their illusory sea-board at Archangel. The whole coast-strip as far as the North Cape and round its corner to the Varanger Fjord has become and remained Norwegian in nationality, and is now an inalienable portion of Norway's territory.

Between this important region and the Russian frontier a broad barrier was interposed by Finland, so long as she remained a Swedish province, but the settlement of 1814 endorsed an accomplished fact by bringing Finland within the Russian Empire as a self-governing national state under the Imperial crown, with much the same status as the constitutional kingdom of Poland. During the whole century that has elapsed, there has been a silent contest on Russia's part to press her way over Finland's carcase to a Norwegian port on the open Atlantic, and on the part of the Scandinavian powers, backed by Great Britain, to maintain the existing arrangement of constitutions and frontiers.

To fortify the Scandinavian peninsula against Russian encroachment, the Vienna Congress linked its two dis-

[1] On the further side of the Atlantic a cold current setting down the Greenland coast carries the vanguard of the drift ice so far South that it endangers shipping plying on the routes between Europe and New York.

cordant nationalities together by a personal union. This experiment had a more successful history than the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which the same Congress welded together as a bulwark against France; but it collapsed finally, none the less, nine years ago,[1] while on the other side Russia has been levelling her path by a systematic attempt to crush Finnish nationality out of existence.

In their politics and social life the Finns are one of the most highly-civilised nations of Europe. The smallness of their population [2] and the unindustrialised character of their economics have simplified the problems set them to solve, but within their modest dimensions they have solved them to perfection. The tradition of their culture, and their Lutheran religion, both come from Sweden, and the townspeople on the coast are still largely Swedish in race and language; but since the political connection with Sweden has been broken, the native Finnish speech, which belongs to a non-Indo-European family, though enriched with many primitive Teutonic loan words, has raised its head and proved itself to possess enough vitality to become the vehicle of national development.

With Russia Finland has no inward bonds of union whatsoever, neither of religion nor of language nor of tradition nor even of geography, for she lies away in a corner, and her sea-board, besides fronting merely upon the Baltic, is much less accessible from the Russian hinterland than are the outlets upon the Baltic, White Sea and Black Sea which Russia possesses elsewhere.

[1] In 1905.

[2] The census taken in 1901 showed a total of 2,713,000, including
2,353,000 Finns
350,000 Swedes
10,000 others.

Finland has simply been the victim of Russia's ambition for an open port on the Norwegian coast, because the eventual railway to that port must run through her territory. It is a precise repetition of the relations between the Magyars and Croatia. A small nationality has been inalienably endowed by Geography with the fatal function of standing between a powerful nation and a sea-board to which she ardently desires access: the stronger power has been so stupid and barbarous as to imagine no better means of satisfying her wants than the destruction of the little nation that stands in the way of their realisation; and the latter, fighting desperately for life, is looking round for some strong helper who will bring the oppressor to his knees, set her free from all connection with him, and shatter for ever his projects, for which she has suffered so terribly.

There would be poetical justice in such a consummation, for it would be the natural outcome of the bullying power's behaviour; but it would not solve the problem at issue, but only bring forth evil from evil, reversing instead of eliminating the injustice and sowing the seeds of future war.

We have seen that if we win this war, and the Dual Monarchy collapses, Croatia will probably achieve complete political freedom from Magyar tyranny, but that she must not, in such an event, be allowed to use her advantage merely to take the offensive in the racial feud: she must give Hungary facilities for realising all her legitimate political desires by entering into economic co-operation with her. But the same issue of the war, for which we hope, will not effect the forcible liberation of Finland, and this imposes all the more urgently upon us the duty of securing that, when the settlement

comes, Finland shall obtain as much and more from the justice, good sense and liberalism of our victorious ally Russia, as she would have obtained from her compulsory resignation in the event of defeat.

The war has already taught Russia that her Scandinavian policy has been a blunder. The Eastern boundary of disaffected Finland is only a few miles from Petrograd. Germany's complete naval command of the Baltic gives her the initiative along the Finnish coast, and though the innumerable islands and skerries are a favourable field for the Russian coast-defence torpedo-craft, the extent of coast to be patrolled and the sympathies of the population with the enemy make the landing of German troops quite a feasible project. Once a German expeditionary force was operating successfully in the country, there is little doubt that the war party in Sweden would gain the upper hand, and send two hundred thousand men across the Bothnian gulf to support it, and this pressure on the other flank would have as weakening an effect upon the Russian offensive along the Vistula as the advance of the Russian armies in the latter quarter has had upon the German invasion in the West.

We trust that the danger is now past, and that Sweden will preserve her neutrality, but we must take care that her peaceful policy brings gain and not loss to her interest and her honour, by including in the European settlement some such terms as follows :

(i.) The perpetual integrity and independence of both Norway and Sweden shall be guaranteed by Europe.

(ii.) In return for this, Norway shall allow Russia to lead a railway of Russian gauge across Finland and up the left bank of the Torneå River to some perennially open port on her North-West coast, either Tromsö or

Hammerfest or both, according to the lie of the land,[1] without interposing a customs-barrier at any point along this route between the Russian frontier and the open sea.

The Russophobe party in Sweden might still be inclined to take the view that Swedish "national honour" could only be satisfied by obtaining a European guarantee of autonomy for Finland within the Russian Empire, in addition to that of integrity and independence for Sweden herself. "The national self-government of Finland," they will say, "is secured to her under the terms by which she was incorporated in the Empire in 1814, yet it is gradually being nullified, by the machiavellian policy of the Imperial Government, to the same dead level of absolutism to which constitutional Poland was reduced at a stroke in February 1832. Finnish liberty can only be rescued by intervention from outside."

The facts in question are unfortunately true, but the foundation upon them of such a proposal would be open to very grave objections. In the first place it would certainly be Utopian to expect that a victorious Russia would submit to the imposition of a guarantee which would reflect upon her conduct in the past and thus imply her humiliation in the present. The case of Finland is radically different from that of Norway and Sweden. The two latter countries are entirely external to the Russian Empire, and the guarantee we are demanding for them in no way affects Russia's internal structure. It might be argued that it is levelled specifically at Russia in fact if not in name, and would seriously limit her freedom in these two countries' regard;

[1] The last section of this railway will in any case be a difficult engineering problem: see map of European Nationalities (VII.).

but the formulation in general instead of individual terms is of great importance for the psychology of national pride, and after all this potential check upon Russia's free action against Norway and Sweden is only to be imposed in return for a substantial concession on their part to Russia's vital economic interests of facilities which by their very nature would give Russia, in addition to her fair economic gain, a wholly unwarrantable political leverage in this quarter, unless such a result were deliberately guarded against by a provision of the kind proposed.

Guarantees will never be stable so long as they are one-sided, for their ultimate sanction is not the will of the guarantors, but the mutual advantage of the parties affected. This explains how our previous requirement of a guarantee for the New Poland is consistent with our present standpoint towards the Finnish question. Both Poland and Finland are to be members of the Russian Empire; but if the European Concert guaranteed the constitutional autonomy within this larger group of the united Poland, it would only be imposing an obligation upon Russia in return for the simultaneous extension of her imperial boundaries by the reunion in the new constitutional state of the Poles at present subject to Prussia and Austria. Indeed, these fragments of the Polish nation would be so unwilling to enter the Russian Empire without a European guarantee to reassure them, that it would actually be in Russia's interest to suggest such a guarantee herself even if no other party took the initiative, in order to make sure of rallying to her flag the whole Polish nation. In that case she would be conceding autonomy to half a nationality already subject to her, in order to obtain the willing co-operation of the whole. Finland, however, has

no "irredenta" beyond the Russian frontier which could be made the basis of a bargain for the improved status within that frontier of the whole nationality, and therefore a guarantee extorted from Russia in Finland's favour would not be set off by any corresponding gain on Russia's part. The element of reciprocity would be lacking, and the swallowing of such an unsweetened pill would implant a dangerous resentment in the heart of the Russian nation.

Yet even supposing that Russia would not only submit in this question to the dictation of Europe but would also recover from the resentment it at first aroused, we learnt from our discussion of the Hungarian and Tchech problems that the intrusion of an international scaffolding in the structure of an independent political unit, so far from being a salutary principle, is a dangerous extemporisation. It is only to be employed as a *pis aller* when some particular national house is too seriously divided against itself to stand on its own foundations and cannot be allowed to collapse without involving the whole European block in its ruin.

The assumption underlying the federation of a number of different nations within a single political group like the Russian Empire is that, while they are severally involved with one another too closely to disengage for themselves a completely independent political existence, they possess a common interest and a common unity which sharply sunder their development as a group from that of all other groups or units outside their common frontier. If Russia and Finland cannot adjust their differences entirely between themselves without the intervention of an external guarantee, the Empire in which they are nominally federated becomes an unreality, for the guarantee will prise its

joints asunder like a wedge. Even if the initial friction between Russia and Finland were overcome, the reference of their quarrels to European arbitration would aggravate them on every occasion, and the tension would extend itself to the relations between Russia and Sweden, who would almost inevitably assume the rôle of Europe's inspector, watching to see if Finland were enjoying her guaranteed rights.

The Finnish guarantee, then, would only spoil instead of perfecting those good relations between Russia and the two nations of the Scandinavian peninsula, which our original proposals were designed to create. We must trust the future of Finland to Russia's good faith and good sense. In opening to her a free railway across Finland to a free port on the Norwegian coast, we eliminate her chief motive for trampling the Finnish nation to death, and this is all that we can do. We have already convinced ourselves that the ultimate solution of the national questions of Europe, and therewith the establishment of European peace, depends not upon mechanical adjustments, but upon a change of heart in the nations themselves. If we cannot obtain a reversal of Russia's attitude towards Finland by negotiating her Atlantic railway, we cannot artificially produce the desired result by forcing her to submit to a guarantee.

There is every reason to expect, however, that the issue between Finland and Russia will find its solution as a secondary consequence of the Atlantic railway and the guarantee to Scandinavia, and if so, our arrangements will have secured to all parties concerned what they really want: to Norway, Sweden and Finland their national self-government, and to Russia her direct commercial access to an open Atlantic port. But the crucial problem of the Baltic remains to be solved.

"Your proposed railway to the Atlantic," a critic would object, "will only provide a clumsy and circuitous channel of communication between Russia and the outer World. Russia will always find the most direct, and by far the cheapest, passage for the flow of trade between her own frontiers and the commercial highways of the Atlantic, not by railway transit overland to a foreign port on the open Ocean, but by shipment from the ports on her Baltic coast down the water-passage that communicates with the North Sea through the Baltic's narrow mouths. These entrances of the Baltic, the natural outlet for the vast hinterland of Russia, are at present at the mercy of the German navy.

"I can answer off-hand the first of the two questions which gave rise to this chapter: Russia has entered upon this struggle against Germany with all her national might to realise an object vital to her national existence, the liberation of the Baltic Sea from German control. Her relations with Scandinavia and Finland will certainly require settlement, and you are right to devote attention to them: nevertheless, they are of altogether secondary importance. If our hopes are fulfilled, and the Allies win this war, Russia's most just and most urgent mandate to the Peace Conference will be the removal from the strategical points of vantage in the Baltic of this German pirate, who menaces the peaceful commerce of all other nations with ports upon the Baltic coastline.

"The satisfaction of Russia's demand is the problem before you, and till you have solved it, you will not have quenched the well-spring of dissension between the German and Russian nations. Again and again it will spring up into war, while even your Atlantic railway will turn from an alleviation into a new danger. Russia,

if she is compelled once and for all to resign to Germany the naval command of the Baltic, will not submit to the lack of any naval sally-port whatsoever upon the Western seas, but will attempt to repeat on her railway to the Norwegian coast the policy she devised at the beginning of the century in Manchuria. She will seek to turn her free port into a fortified naval base, and the danger of Tromsö or Hammerfest developing into an Atlantic Port Arthur may finally wreck the good understanding between Russia and Great Britain, and involve the latter power in a war for the stronghold's destruction as costly as the sieges of Sebastopol and of Port Arthur itself. Such may be the consequences of indecision now. In the question of the Baltic the future peace of all the European powers is at stake."

We cannot neglect our critic's warning, for the considerations by which he supports it are unanswerable, but we shall be in a better position to give him satisfaction if we can persuade him first to set forth on his own account what he considers the indispensable minimum of conditions necessary to ensure the liberation of the Baltic in the sense Russia intends. We will remind him, however, before we let him speak, that such terms inevitably involve a serious alteration of the *status quo* to Germany's detriment, and that it is therefore doubly important in this instance sympathetically to bear in mind her national point of view, and scrupulously to avoid all wanton offence to her honour and interest. He will probably accept our proposal with assurance, and launch out into his disquisition with studied moderation.

"In the first place," he will begin, "the independence and neutrality of Denmark must be guaranteed by Europe, and the guarantors must further subsidise

her to a sufficient extent to enable her to carry out her international duties effectively. Her task is to fortify the three channels [1] between the Danish islands and the peninsulas of Jutland and Sweden, that connect the waters of the Baltic with the North Sea, and also the approaches to these channels at either end, with such formidable batteries on land and torpedo flotillas on sea, that she will be able to 'move on' any fleet that attempts to blockade them or seal them up with mines.

"Denmark would have every reason for fulfilling this task honourably and impartially. The national independence guaranteed her in consideration of it is the only remaining object of her foreign policy, when once she has recovered her national unity by the restoration of Schleswig; and the only event that could endanger that guarantee would be another attempt by a single power to impose its dominion on the rest of Europe by war. If any power planned such a stroke, Denmark would be the last state to enter into collusion with the criminal, and the knowledge of her incorruptibility would go far to discourage the design.

"But Denmark cannot perform this function successfully so long as the Kiel Canal is at the disposal of the German navy, and therefore some permanent arrangement must be made that will put it in Denmark's power, in the event of war, at once to hinder German warships from passing through it."

He will admit the fact which we have already established, that the whole province of Holstein, through which the Canal runs, is German in nationality, and cannot be cut away from the United German state, and he will therefore hesitate to propose the simplest solution, which would be to bring the territory on either

[1] Great Belt, Little Belt, and Sound.

bank of the Canal within the Danish frontier. Nor, he will agree, would it be just in itself to deprive Germany of all profit from a great engineering work achieved by her enterprise and at her expense. " But we shall judge the issue better," he will explain, " if we distinguish in our minds between the Canal's economic and strategic consequences.

" Geography," he will continue, " has put the German nation in possession of a low-lying isthmus between the estuary of the Elbe and the Baltic Sea, and the nation, by its own energy, has taken Nature's hint, and extracted full value from the asset. The artificial canal across the natural isthmus provides a much shorter and easier route than the Danish straits for commercial traffic between the Baltic and the North Sea, and German Commerce has the right to take every advantage of this that it can, by giving its own shipping rebates on the toll, rights of precedence in the order of passage, or any other privilege that commends itself to German economic theory, while alien commerce has no right to complain of less favourable treatment in the Canal, so long as the Danish channels are open to it. If all the states that possess a sea-board on the Baltic were to claim that by economic justice they ought to enjoy equal rights with Germany in the navigation of the canal that has been cut by that nation through its own soil, Germany could of course with much greater justice demand freedom of trade through the ports of Belgium and Holland, which have been rescued from the sea by the Netherlanders' dykes, on the similar ground that they are placed more conveniently for her manufacturing districts in the Rhineland than are the German ports on the estuary of the Elbe. Both claims would be unfounded.

"Nations, like individuals, enter into competition with one another very unequally equipped, in respect both of natural and of acquired advantages: like individuals, they must accept the conditions as they find them, neither making their own lack a justification for robbing by force their neighbour's superfluity, nor using their own strength to tyrannise over their neighbour's weakness. So far as the Kiel Canal gives Germany an economic pull in the commercial competition of the Baltic, she has a right to make use of it: Russia, if we win the war, must not be allowed to take this advantage from her: but so far as it puts it in her power by naval force to paralyse whenever she likes the entire commerce of other nations whose only outlet is through the Baltic, and the commerce of the whole World in so far as it wishes to do business with the nations in question, it is a stumbling-block to Justice and a menace to Peace.

"We must devise a scheme, then, by which (*a*) the province of Holstein shall remain within the German frontier, and (*b*) the economic control and profits of the Canal shall be left in Germany's hands, but (*c*) the strategic control shall be taken from her."

Having thus explained his standpoint, he will proceed to formulate his proposals. "We can destroy Germany's naval command of the Canal completely by putting any single vital point along its course into the possession of some alien military power. We must choose a point which, while of decisive importance for the Canal, affects as little as may be Germany's interests in other quarters. This rules out the Western terminus, for the power which commands that cannot help commanding likewise Germany's chief artery of Ocean traffic, the estuary of the Elbe. We are accord-

ingly left with Kiel, and the right power to hold Kiel in trust for Europe is clearly the 'policeman' Denmark.

"Denmark must maintain, at Europe's expense, a ring of the heaviest fortifications covering Kiel itself and the last section of the Canal where it enters Kiel Haven, enabling her at any moment to block the Canal against armed German attack, and, if the attack presses her too hard before help arrives, to blow up if necessary canal-mouth and fortifications together, and to mine all the sea approaches, thus putting the Canal out of gear for an indefinite period. This fortified area in Danish hands must be secured by a margin, broader than the range of the most powerful siege artillery, which shall be under the military authority of the Danish, and not of the German, general staff.

"The boundary of this zone [1] should start from the Dano-German frontier you have already delimited between Eckernförde Bay and the Eider, at a point just West of the Schleswig-Rendsburg railway, and should proceed Southwards parallel to the railway, crossing the Canal at a point just West of Rendsburg. Thence it should run South-East to the Brahm See, then East to the Bothkamper See, then North-East through the Post- and Selenter-Seen in a direct line to the Baltic, leaving the town of Preetz outside.

"The administration of the Canal itself, its upkeep and its traffic, both outside the zone and within it, must in any case remain in the hands of the German government, and if possible the population of the zone should be included, no less than the rest of Holstein, within the political organisation of the German Empire for all purposes of civil self-government, in spite of the exceptional status of the territory in the military sphere.

[1] See map facing p. 48.

But if such absolute separation between the military and the civil control of a district is in practice impossible, and military exigencies require that both administrations should be united in the hands of the same government, then there is no choice but to detach this strip of Holstein altogether from the body of Germany, and allow a plebiscite of the population to decide between direct incorporation in Denmark, or 'Home Rule' under the Danish government, always leaving in the hands of the German nation full property-rights over the Canal throughout its whole length."

With these suggestions our critic will conclude, and it will be our turn once more to pass judgment. We may first commend his fairness and moderation, and admit our conviction that he has herein stated the strict minimum of precautions necessary to ensure all the entrances to the Baltic Sea against any forcible attempt on Germany's part to seize the strategical command of them. As far as the freedom of the Baltic is concerned, it will under such an arrangement make no difference whether Germany reverses her aggressive policy or continues in her present courses. But the Baltic question is only one factor, however important, in the problem of European peace. For that problem's general solution the future mood of Germany is of more direct and vital importance still, and no Baltic settlement, however perfect in itself, is worth the cost of driving Germany into exasperation in the hour of her spiritual crisis, when other influences have so fair a prospect of inclining her into the paths of peace.

The Kiel Canal is really a military weapon, like a conscript army or a 42-centimetre gun. It is a part of Germany's national armament, and while we hope that one of the results of the settlement will be a scaling-

down of armaments all round, by a voluntary agreement among the nations that possess them and an honourable performance of its respective obligations by each nation that becomes a party to an agreement of such a kind, no one would seriously propose that the limitation of troops to so many millions of trained men or of guns to a maximum calibre of so many centimetres should be enforced by international police-commissions established at all the recruiting depots and factories of war material with authority to control the output and with material power to give sanction to their commands.

The imagination of such a thing is chimerical, and even if it came within reach of realisation, it would absolutely violate one of the most essential principles of a settlement on the basis of national self-government, that there must be no interference from outside with a nation's internal affairs. The cutting off of the Kiel enclave, though on the one hand it is a more feasible project to execute, is on the other a far grosser violation of national liberty and unity. It involves, at least in part and probably altogether, the detachment from the German state of a considerable body of population, including the citizens of Kiel, a great port and distinguished university town, not because they desire this severance in order to incorporate themselves in another national group, nor even because the facts of geography make it impossible to fulfil their national desire. They are Germans in speech and in sympathy, the district forms an integral part of the German province of Holstein, and the sole motive would be the establishment of a "balance of power" in the Baltic, an object in which they have no concern themselves, but which is demanded by the interest of the Russian Empire, a political group with which they are in no way connected.

This would be to inflict an injustice on one nation to the special advantage of another. It would be parallel to the Dual Monarchy's treatment of the Southern Slavs, to Russia's recent behaviour towards Finland, and to all the other smouldering grievances of nations, which have combined to ignite the present war. Just as those had caused war in the past, so, even were they all eliminated in the settlement, this alone would be a new and most efficacious stimulus to war in the future.

The spectacle of Kiel under the military control of Denmark would be a perpetual incitement to Germany to take up arms. The more intricate fortifications Denmark threw up, and the heavier guns she placed in position behind them, the more grimly Germany would toil to construct artillery heavier still, and to open lines of attack that would more than counter the Danish lines of defence, and the more bitterly she would hate the "Concert of Europe" that provided the Danish staff with the material means for carrying out its commission, and that brought pressure to bear upon the Danish government whenever the latter indicated its wish to resign an international office which involved it in unrequited responsibility and danger. We should witness a competition of armaments and an aggravation of national antagonism more naked and direct than any we have experienced yet: the crisis would be precipitated by the harsh treatment of the German population at Kiel, provoked by their natural recalcitrance towards Danish administration and their eager collusion with the German spy-bureau, or else by the imminent completion of a Russian programme for building up, behind the Danish bulwark, a Baltic fleet more than strong enough to cope with the German naval force in these inland waters now isolated strategically from its

sister squadron in the North Sea. Either or both of these causes would drive Germany to throw down the gauntlet once more to the rest of Europe, not this time in hope but in despair.

The remedy, then, for the German command of the Baltic entrances would almost certainly be worse than the malady itself, and we find ourselves placed in a dilemma: if we leave the Kiel Canal in the hands of the German navy we cheat Russia of one of the chief objects for which she fought this war, and fail to remove a stumbling-block to her peaceful progress in the future: if we take the Canal out of Germany's strategic control, we cannot avoid measures that must exasperate her, and create a new obstacle to her spiritual conversion. We have, it seems, to choose the lesser of two evils.

In this choice of dubious alternatives we have one clear beacon. Mechanical manipulations of geographical frontiers and political statuses possess, we agree, but a secondary virtue: the sure foundation of Peace lies in the direct production of a healthy state of consciousness in all the nations of Europe. If we adopt the former alternative, and do not alter the present status of the Canal, we afford the German nation the most favourable conditions for throwing off the disease which now vitiates its spirit; but a reformed Germany would no longer desire to use for aggressive purposes the weapon left in her hands, and so this psychological change, when once it came about, would automatically remove the grounds of dissatisfaction on Russia's part which the policy entails. To remove them immediately we must adopt the other alternative, and turn Germany out of Kiel, yet we can only do so at the price of aggravating instead of alleviating her diseased nationalism, while Russia's satisfaction, instead of providing a natural cure

for Germany's sickness, would obviously promote it still further, in exact proportion to its own intensity.

We conclude, accordingly, that we shall best serve the cause of ultimate peace if we oppose ourselves to such a drastic blow at Germany's national strength and pride as the military confiscation of Kiel. Our judgment is tentative, but at least it seems to have logic on its side, for it is surely inconsistent to say to Germany in the same breath: "Europe expects of you that you will change your heart, because that is her only hope of securing Peace for the future," and "Europe regrets that she is obliged to take measures for the security of her Peace, in case you should not change your heart after all." If we approach Germany in this insincere spirit our overtures are sure to prove futile.

Russia, then, must be persuaded to forego her demands in part. The guaranteeing of Denmark and her armament at international expense are both excellent proposals. She is one of those small nations that contribute much to European civilisation, and her conservation will be a benefit to all Europe as well as a partial solution of the Baltic question. But the transfer to Denmark of Kiel, though necessary for the immediate solution of that question in its entirety, must be rejected, because it would impose upon Germany a humiliation much less justifiable and much more acute than that which we are proposing to spare Russia in the case of Finland.

B. *The Liberation of the Black Sea*

We have answered one of the questions with which we started this chapter: Russia is fighting Germany now for the liberation of the Baltic from German naval

control. We have tried to arrive at a compromise, by which this control shall be vested in the hands of some neutral power with effective sanction behind it, and this to an extent which will finally satisfy Russia without alienating Germany once and for all. We can now pass on to our second question: Why is Russia also putting forth her strength against Austria-Hungary on behalf of Serbia?

Russia's dominant motive is simple. She has looked on for more than a generation while the Dual Monarchy oppressed a small, weak, divided nationality, the Southern Slavs, till the oppression has culminated in an implacable war of annihilation against this nation's largest fragment, the state of Serbia.

The treatment the Southern Slavs have received arouses the indignation of every fair-minded spectator who acquaints himself with their case, but the Russians are not detached spectators. The Southern Slavs are their closest kinsmen; they speak a variety of the same tongue, and turn their eyes towards Russia for salvation. The Germans, blinded by the menace to their own aspirations, can only see in the Panslav movement an engine of Russia's imperialistic ambitions. Herein they greatly err: Panslavism was not born of Russia's pride and covetousness, but of the Tchech's and Southern Slav's deep distress. It comes from their lips as a cry for help, not from Russia as a solicitation to revolt; and it is in answer to this cry that the Russian Nation has at last risen with a unanimity undreamed of either by friends or foes, and is sweeping westwards with the spiritual exaltation of a Crusade to break her brethren's bonds.

Here, just as in the case of Belgium's neutrality and France's loyalty to her allies, German policy has shown

itself singularly obtuse to the psychology of nations. It has disastrously neglected the factor of Russia's disinterested national enthusiasm in its estimate of military forces. Human motives are always complex, and Germany was led into this miscalculation by concentrating her attention on a real, though subordinate, aspect of Russia's intervention in the Balkans. The concerted action in those quarters of Austrian and Turkish rule does not merely challenge Russia's knight-errantry by blighting the growth of the small Balkan nationalities: it directly injures her economic interests by blocking the exit from the Black Sea, while every step the Balkan nations gain with Russia's assistance is a further step forward for Russia herself on the road to the open Mediterranean.

The Germans argue that Russia is preparing patriarchal despotism under the cloak of fraternal co-operation; and that, if they are beaten in this war, the only result for the Balkans will be to substitute Russian for Austrian domination.

"We will not deny," they say, "that Austria, in declaring war, intended to seize the railway to Salonika, and annex the whole territory through which it runs as far as the Ægean; but if Russia wins, she will annex the whole Eastern coast of the Black Sea, and both shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, while she will incorporate Roumania and Bulgaria in her empire, in order to lead through them a railway of her own to the Sea of Marmora or the Ægean."

The persistent aloofness of both Roumania and Bulgaria towards Russia's advances, ever since the Treaty of Berlin, and the reserved attitude they have taken up in the present crisis, prove that the German argument is not altogether groundless.

If the prophecy really came true, it would be a grave misfortune both to Germany and the Balkan states themselves, and a violation of national rights and wishes fatal to the endurance of Peace, but we have already sketched a series of arrangements calculated to make Russian and German hegemony in the Balkans alike impossible.

(i.) The grouping of the six Balkan states into a "zollverein" which may develop into a defensive alliance.

(ii.) The maintenance of this zollverein's economic links with Germany through Trieste, and the creation of new links with Russia through Odessa.

(iii.) The complete settlement of racial disputes between the Balkan League and the Russian Empire, by the cession of North-Western Bessarabia to Roumania.

None of these arrangements will stand in the way of Russia's real objective, towards which hegemony over the Balkans would be merely a means,—the Liberation of the Black Sea.

The entrance to the Black Sea has been the strongest naval position in the world through all history, but never more so than at this day, when waterways can be blocked by mines capable of destroying instantaneously the most magnificent battleship.

The first section of the passage is the Bosphorus, a winding strait eighteen miles long, and varying from 700 to 3500 yards in width, with a strong outward current flowing through it, and steep bluffs overhanging it on either side. At the further end of its European shore the hills sink, and a splendid harbour, the "Golden Horn," runs inland, protected from the more open waters of the Sea of Marmora by the peninsula on which Constantinople stands. The passage

of about 150 miles down the Sea of Marmora, from the Golden Horn to the beginning of the Dardanelles, forms the second section; the Dardanelles themselves are the last. These straits are forty miles long: their average breadth[1] is considerably greater than that of the Bosphorus, but at the decisive strategical point between Kilid-Bahr and Kaleh-i-Sultaniyeh they narrow to 1400 yards, and inside this line their ampler windings provide good anchorage for large warships at Nagara and at Gallipoli. When you have put the Dardanelles behind you, you have still to clear the channel between Imbros and Tenedos islands, before you really reach the open waters of the Ægean.

The free use of this extremely difficult waterway is of vital importance to all states possessing ports on the Black Sea, principally, of course, to Russia, who depends entirely on this route for the export of her wheat and her petroleum, but likewise to Roumania and Bulgaria in their degree. And yet control of the whole passage remains in the hands of Turkey, the least civilised of all the Black Sea states and the only one of them who has no commerce of her own to give her a legitimate interest in the waterway's economic utilisation. Moreover, she takes unscrupulous advantage of its incomparable strategic qualities to push a policy of adventure even more dangerous to the Peace of Europe than the national chauvinism of Germans and Magyars. Turkish chauvinism has no ideas behind it or objectives in front of it, and is conducted with a travesty of opportunism by ignorant and ill-educated men.

The Turks have held this waterway for five hundred years. They seized it first by the right of "strong

[1] Three to four miles.

government," and till 1700 their administration was perhaps the most efficient, and the population subject to it the most civilised, of any that bordered on the Black Sea. But in the last two centuries the balance of civilisation and efficiency has been entirely reversed, and has turned the Turk's continued presence at Constantinople into a scandal. He has not stayed there by his own efforts: he would have been cast out long ago if first Great Britain and then Germany had not feared that his disappearance would merely establish Russia in his place. Russia entrenched under arms on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would certainly threaten German enterprise in Asia Minor and English communications with India; but Turkey entrenched there, besides putting Russia in such an intolerable position that she will end it by war at the first opportunity, has again and again proved herself an insufferable nuisance to England and Germany, her rival protectors.

It is time that we abandoned altogether the discreditable rôle (in which, for that matter, Germany has already supplanted us) of safeguarding the most sinister political interest in Europe, for if, at the conclusion of this war, we attempt to keep the Turks at Constantinople in face of a victorious Russia, we shall bring about the very result we want to avoid. It is a phenomenon of human nature that if people are thwarted from obtaining their due by peaceful settlement, they will take by violence not only their due but much more besides. If we do not want, a generation hence, to see Russia challenge all Europe to war for the mastery of the Straits and of their whole Balkan hinterland, we must secure her the freedom of the Straits without delay. If we satisfy her just demands, she will

not demand more than is just: boilers only explode if you refuse to open the safety-valve.

In the Black Sea, then, as in the Baltic, we have to devise some organ for holding the entrance in trust for the states that have ports on the Black Sea coast, and for the commerce of the whole World. In one way the question is simpler here: there is no back-door, like the Kiel Canal, between Black Sea and Ægean, and we have only the single passage to consider. Turkey has sunk no capital in improving that, and we need have no compunction in throwing her out, neck and crop, without compensation. In another way it is more difficult. Turkey does not merely control the Black Sea as Germany controls the Baltic: she is in actual possession of the strategical points, and there is here no respectable, impartial policeman like Denmark, waiting on the spot, and ready to take up his duties as soon as he is commissioned. Turkey cannot, without a European catastrophe, be entrusted any longer with the points in question, but when we eject her we shall have to organise a brand-new administration in her stead: let us begin by defining exactly the territories to be forfeited.

(i.) To control the Bosphorus, the New Administration must take over both its shores, and also the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea for a certain distance along both the European and the Asiatic side of either entrance to the Straits. The European territory should include the whole district of Constantinople, as far as its boundary against the vilayet of Adrianople, that is, up to a line leaving the Marmora coast midway between Eregli and Silivri, crossing the Adrianople-Constantinople railway half-way between Chorlu and Chataldja, and proceeding North to the Black Sea coast between

Istrandja and Ormanlu. The frontier of the Asiatic territory should start from Deredje, on the Northern shore of the Gulf of Ismid, and run N.N.E. till it hits the Black Sea coast at Kilia.

(ii.) In the Sea of Marmora all the islands, and with them the peninsula of Artaki (Kapu Dagh) should pass to the New Administration.

(iii.) At the Dardanelles it should be given authority on the Asiatic side over the whole district of Bigha (the "Troad"), West of a line starting from the Gulf of Edremid at a point on its North shore on the same meridian as Aivali, and passing first over the summit of Mount Ida and then in a general North-Easterly direction to the Marmora coast East of Demotika. On the European side it should be assigned, not only the Gallipoli Peninsula ("Thracian Chersonnesus") but sufficient hinterland to cover the peninsula's neck, where it is lowest, narrowest, and strategically most vulnerable. The line here should leave the Ægean at Ivridje burun, on the North shore of the Gulf of Xeros, run North-East along the summit of the Kuru Dagh, cross the Sayan Dere just below Emerli, and thence proceed due East, over the summit of Mount Pyrgos to Ganos on the Marmora coast.

(iv.) In the Ægean the Administration should receive the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, which were left in Turkey's possession by the Peace of London, because they play an essential part in the command of the Dardanelles.

The population of these districts is very diverse in nationality. The peasants of the Troad, the largest continuous mass of land within the Territory, form a solid Turkish block, only broken by a few Greek enclaves along the shore of the Dardanelles and of the

Edremid Gulf. The islands, on the other hand, are purely Greek, but their area is small. Constantinople, which, together with its suburbs, accounts for the great majority of the Territory's inhabitants, is the most cosmopolitan City in the World.

When the Turks conquered her in the fifteenth century, she was the focus of Greek nationality and civilisation, and the modern kingdom of Hellas, which regards itself as the Romaic Empire's heir, openly aspires to raise its standard over the capital of the last Constantine. But for four and a half centuries Constantinople has harboured the government of the greatest political power in Islam, and the honour of its long-protracted presence has altered both her orientation and her character. She has drawn within her radius lands further East than the rule of her Romaic emperors ever extended, her population has been enriched by all the races of the Ottoman Empire, and Commerce has combined with Government to swell her numbers; but in this steady growth the Greek element, handicapped by the Porte's disfavour, has not taken its proportionate share. At present it stands at no more than 153,000, perhaps 17.5 per cent. of the total population,[1] so that it is hardly superior numerically, while decidedly inferior in wealth, to the flourishing Armenian colony.

It is true that the present Turkish majority is largely

[1] The present population of Constantinople is estimated as follows:

Moslems	385,000
Greeks	153,000
Armenians	150,000
Foreign subjects	129,000
Jews	44,000
Others	13,000
Total	874,000

artificial. It is mainly recruited from two classes, firstly from "official circles" with their immense households and "retired official circles" in their palaces along the Bosphorus, all of whom would automatically migrate to the new Turkish seat of government, whereever it was established; and secondly, from unskilled labour, demanded in increasing quantities by the docks, and supplied by the surplus of the Turkish population along the Northern coast of Anatolia. This army of stevedores, though it has won itself notoriety by its unruliness and fanaticism, and lent itself to Young Turkish chauvinism by boycotting the shipping of various foreign nationalities (a proof that Turkey is no more fit to be entrusted with the commercial control of the Black Sea Straits than with their military command), is really just as casual and transient an element in Constantinople as the governing class itself.

It is probable, then, that if the Straits Territory were cut off from the Turkish Empire and erected into an independent unit, the Greek element would once more become sufficiently preponderant to colour the whole population, and would devote its political capacity, in which it is undoubtedly superior to the other nationalities, to organising the whole into an autonomous republic on a Greek basis, and with Greek as its official language. Therewith, in spite of occasional friction between Greeks, Armenians and Turks, the question of civil administration would be more or less satisfactorily solved, but that is really a minor problem. The distinctive characteristic of this territory is its international importance. Even in its social and economic life, the 129,000 foreign residents count for more than the native inhabitants, yet it is not its internal condition

but its military importance for the rest of Europe that has led us to mark it off for special treatment. Here our difficulties begin, and we will consider the possible solutions of them in turn.

(i.) We might simply demolish all existing fortifications, and organise no military force in the Territory at all. But to leave the Straits defenceless would be a mere invitation to all powers interested and well armed to scramble for their occupation: we could not offer a more potent apple of discord.

The freedom of vitally important international communications can only be secured by a military sanction so formidable that no individual nation will have the means to challenge it, and it is Utopian to expect that the several nations of Europe will consent to that simultaneous reduction of armaments which is the goal of our hopes. They will not do this till the balance of armaments has already shifted from national to international control and the military force of the individual states has ceased to be (what it undeniably has been until now) the decisive factor in the political destiny of the World.

Artificial compacts cannot, in themselves, limit the contracting parties' freedom of action. In the last resort they will always break the agreement if they can, and try to get their own way by summoning up all the resources they actually command. When Sparta and Argos proposed to settle their differences by a tournay between three hundred chosen champions from either city, the Argive champions won; but the result was reversed when the whole Spartan army rushed in to the rescue of their comrades, and took the more honourable Argive army off its guard. Fair play could only have been secured if the lists had been commanded by

a dozen twentieth-century troops with a machine gun. Contracts are only effective if there is a power in the background that makes it worth neither party's while to break their plighted word.

The necessary preliminary, then, to the reduction of national armaments in Europe is the establishment of other armaments, controlled by some agency acting from an impartial, international point of view, at the strategical keys of Europe—points which have such military strength innate in their geographical disposition, that a comparatively small force stationed there can act more decisively, "to bind or to loose," than the largest forces of which the separate European nations or groups of nations dispose. We have proposed to install such a force at the mouth of the Baltic by guaranteeing Denmark and putting her in possession of the necessary military positions, and we have a similar duty to discharge at the Black Sea Straits.

(ii.) Our problem, then, unfolds itself as the co-ordination of a strong international military organisation with the local Greek civil government of the Straits Territory. Obviously the most desirable solution would be that the Autonomous State should be subsidised, like Denmark, to organise and maintain the military defence of its own territory. It is a restricted and unsatisfactory form of self-government that does not extend to the military sphere, and the friction between the native civil administration and the alien military authorities, which we anticipated in the Kiel enclave, would be more serious here in proportion to the wider territory and larger population affected. But unfortunately, while the interests of Denmark and Europe coincide, those of Europe and the proposed Autonomous Greek State do not. National self-consciousness

makes Denmark wish for independence, and the guarantee, the territorial gains, and the armament-subsidy give her the best means of securing it; but the same inspiration of national feeling will make the Greeks of the Straits Territory naturally and justly desirous of union with, and absorption in, the Kingdom of Hellas.

This is another instance where a minority must suffer. If the Autonomous State had it in its power to vote by plebiscite for union with the Kingdom, a majority would inevitably be secured for that motion, and either Russia or Turkey or both would make the act a *casus belli* against Greece or even against the whole Balkan League, because it would falsify the expectations under which they had originally consented to the liberation and internationalisation of the Straits. Even if war were averted for the moment, it would break out in the end. The acquisition by the Balkan League of this new asset would encourage it to start a policy of adventure (the political sense of the Balkan people is still in its infancy), or worse still, the enlarged Greece would break off from the zollverein, and begin a still more extravagant career on its own account. The Greek population of the Straits Territory must accordingly suffer, and, while enjoying local autonomy, must forego the consummation of its national ideal. Yet we cannot expect the Greek temperament to suffer gladly. We have the experience of Krete to warn us, where Unionist activity made itself a nuisance to Europe for a dozen years, till union was achieved, and the fact that separation was a wantonly inflicted evil in that case and is a necessary evil in this, only makes it more imperative that in this case the arrangement should be unswervingly maintained. The fortification of the Straits is essential

to the peace of Europe, but to place these fortifications in the hands of the native Greek population would be to invite a *coup d'état.*

(iii.) We are reduced to search for some alien external military administration. One plan would be to garrison the territory with a composite force, supplied on some agreed system of proportion by the national governments of Europe. We have recent precedents for this in the joint occupation of Krete by four powers from 1897 to 1909; in the "zones of inspection." maintained from 1904 to 1908 in Macedonia, which were unsuccessful, and did not even achieve their minimum palliatory object of staving off a Balkan war; in the naval landing-parties despatched last year to Skodra, which would probably have succeeded in establishing law and order throughout Northern Albania, if the present war had not brought about their dispersal; and, on a far larger scale, in the common defence of the Pekin legations against the Boxers in 1900, and the composite expedition fitted out to relieve them under single command.

Most of these cases of co-operation, however, were only initiated in face of some urgent crisis, and all of them were designed for a temporary purpose, to carry out a limited task. The concerted defence of the legations, in particular, was enforced by the fear of instant massacre and the hope of speedy succour: the fortifications were improvised, and of no importance except to the refugees they sheltered and to the Boxer fanatics they kept at bay. But we are now proposing, as a permanent part of the machinery of Europe, to put into the hands of national contingents a system of fortifications stronger and more elaborate than any other in Europe, which will be of vital interest

to the policy of the several national governments, to whom these contingents belong.

A fortress demands the entire loyalty of its garrison, the kindling in them of a common spirit as strong as that of a warship's crew. It is essential to its efficiency that it should work smoothly under centralised direction, and that knowledge of its organisation and functioning should be the directorate's monopoly. Yet this loyalty, which shows its colour most crudely in the military sphere but is likewise the background of all social life, is in modern Europe monopolised by the national state, and men cannot serve two spiritual masters. The supreme commandant, supposing that the diplomatic custom were followed as usual, and the appointment devolved automatically upon the *doyen* of the contingent-commanders, would feel that he held the post in trust for his government (a point of view the other governments would not endorse). Each member of his composite general staff, instead of sharing a professional enthusiasm for their common duty, would feel himself to be an *attaché* retained on the spot by his particular government to report upon the secrets of his colleagues. The contingents themselves would feel little respect for their superiors, and would regard the various positions with which they were entrusted as precious additions to the sacred soil of their respective fatherlands.

(iv.) A commandant, staff and personnel that had no prior allegiance, would be relieved from this false position, and it might seem possible, by recruiting citizens of all European states individually, and offering them a life-long career, to build up a service with a tradition and a professional pride of its own. Experience, however, is discouraging. Since national loyalty still holds the field, some form of national service will attract

the nation's best men, and those that choose to bestow their energies elsewhere will probably have a discreditable reason for so doing. Soon after the beginning of British control in Egypt, the Egyptian government attempted, with our sanction, to raise a cosmopolitan force, but dropped the idea after a short trial. The French Foreign Legion in North Africa has a persistently evil reputation, and even the "Papal Zouaves" in the middle of last century were notorious for their bad behaviour, though they were inspired not merely by mercenary motives, but by a spiritual cause which had once no rival in Europe, and was then only in process of being supplanted by Nationality.

To find an auspicious precedent we must go back to the time when Christendom was struggling on the defensive against the advance of Islam. In the thirteenth century each nationality guarded its section of curtain and tower along the walls of Acre,[1] and more than two centuries later national diversity was still, as King Stephen had conceived it, a strength and not a weakness, a spur to emulation and not a paralysing blight, among the cosmopolitan Knights of St. John in their last heroic defence of Rhodes.[2] Yet at that very time the Most Christian King of France was offering his harbour of Toulon to the Turkish fleet, because the Ottoman power was the greatest thorn in the side of his nation's Hapsburg enemy. The National Idea was replacing œcumenical anarchy by parochial peace-and-unity, and it was a symbolic incident when, in 1798, the armada of the French Republic One and Indivisible, on its way to the conquest and conciliation of an enfeebled Egypt, extinguished the rule of the Hospitallers' Order in its final refuge, the island of Malta.

[1] Fall of Acre, 1291 A.D.

[2] Fall of Rhodes, 1522 A.D.

We hope for the birth of a loyalty and an ideal that shall overshadow Nationality in its prime even more completely than the Church overshadowed it in its infancy; but such a spirit is not abroad among us yet, and it is useless to build up concrete cosmopolitan organisations before its coming, for they will have no virtue in them until they have received its baptism.

(v.) For the guardianship of the Black Sea Straits, then, we must fall back upon the services of some single existing national state. Though there is none in this case that has a special interest of its own identical with the general interest of Europe, as Denmark has in the Baltic, we may at least hope to find one with no special interest adverse to the interest of Europe, which we may induce to undertake the impartial conduct of the task for the general advantage.

As the question is primarily a European concern, it would be reasonable to choose a European state for the commission; and, since the Great Powers are *ex hypothesi* ruled out (the whole problem arising from their mutual rivalry), our choice must light upon some minor nation. But here, too, the precedents are disquieting. The Belgian customs-service and the Swedish gendarmerie, introduced into Persia to establish strong government, have not been equal to their task there. They have no natural connection with the country, and no power of influencing its destiny on their own initiative: that power lies with Russia and India, the great armed states immediately beyond its frontiers. The Persian population realises this, and rightly regards the Belgian and Swedish administrators as secondary agents, put in by Russia and Great Britain as a stopgap, to shelve the settlement of their own rival ambitions. The two services therefore lack

that prestige and moral authority which are the only invincible weapons of "strong government" in warring against the chaos of the "Dark Age."

The Dutch Gendarmerie, established last year with such solemnity in the new Albania, has been, through no fault of its own, a still more lamentable *fiasco*, and there is no reason to suppose that if we place another small European nation, for example the Swiss, in command of the Black Sea Straits, the result will prove in any way more satisfactory. In fact, it is almost certain that Switzerland would decline the proposal. It would implicate her most unfairly in every cyclone that swept over the European horizon. She would have constantly to make grave decisions, and individual powers might attempt to force her hand, either by mobilising against her frontiers at home, or combining to bar her troops and officials from all geographical access to the Straits. Her relations with the autonomous Greek population, which would resent the control of a state not immeasurably stronger than itself, would be chronically strained. Neither Switzerland, nor any other small power in Europe, is capable of undertaking the charge.

(vi.) There is one recourse left, which is at least worth tentative suggestion. President Wilson has offered Europe the good offices of the United States for mediation at the close of this war and for devising arrangements that shall prevent war for the future. Europe would do well to take President Wilson at his word, and ask the United States to give her permanent assistance of a very practical kind, by relieving her of the concrete problem under discussion. The proposition would doubtless come to American public opinion as a shock, for it has been a constant maxim of their

foreign policy to incur no political obligations across the Atlantic, and they will be more eager than ever to maintain this principle, now that they have seen what volcanoes underlie Europe's smiling surface.

Great Britain, however, has pursued for a century a policy of precisely similar intention, keeping her eyes fixed upon her Empire and her social problems, and refusing to intervene on the continent across the channel, and yet circumstances have been too strong for her. In the present crisis we have been carried into the storm-centre of the struggle, and America herself, while she has avoided war, has by no means escaped the effects of it. The financial business of New York, no less than that of London, is at a standstill.

She must take to heart the lesson of this catastrophe, and realise that for her, too, the phase of "splendid isolation" has come to an end. The present hurricane has bereft the ship of International Peace of her water-tight compartments: the next breach in her side will put the whole vessel in danger of foundering.

By taking this burden, then, upon their shoulders, the U.S.A. would be performing an act of international generosity which would be the proudest record in their history, but they would also be consulting their true interest, which is fundamentally identical with the interest of united Europe. They would be helping to assure universal peace.

From the objective point of view, there is no doubt that they are admirably qualified to undertake the task. They have no private interest in the Black Sea Straits, and they are one of the strongest powers in the world: their decisions would therefore pass unchallenged by all parties affected, especially as the self-denying side of the Monroe Doctrine and the attitude they are main-

taining in the present war, have won the U.S.A. an imperishable reputation for impartiality. Moreover, they have intimate connections with the population of the Territory. Since the close of last century the most enterprising and able-bodied peasants all over Eastern Europe have been finding their way across the Atlantic, undergoing the industrial metamorphosis, and returning home with smart coats on their backs, strong boots on their feet, and hard money in their pockets, to preach the good tidings of this Eldorado in the West. America is an even more present reality in the minds of the vast uneducated majority in Turkey and the Balkans than are the powers of Europe in the calculations of the semi-educated minority that controls their politics. Yet America has a strong footing among this important class as well, for the only thorough secondary education, up to the modern civilised standard, that the inhabitants of these countries can obtain without resorting to the foreign universities of Central and Western Europe, is given by Robert College, the famous American foundation on the European shore of the Bosphorus, which opens its doors to students of all religions and nationalities,[1] and has been for years a beacon light amid an inconscionable welter of hatreds and particularisms. The relations, therefore, between the American administration and the autonomous population of the Territory would be founded upon a strong tradition of respect and good-will.

We conclude that America is the only power in the world capable of accomplishing this mission, and that the omens are in favour of her accomplishing it well.

[1] This foundation for men is supplemented by the American College for women on the Asiatic side of the Straits. It was originally opened for Christian girls of all nationalities within the Turkish Empire, but Moslems, too, have recently begun to send their daughters there.

The true solution, then, of the Black Sea problem, would be for Europe to throw herself on the United States' mercy, and ask them to accept her commission, until she has built up among her various nationalities that common European patriotism which alone can give her the spiritual force to administer the trust herself. Those acquainted with the American political outlook will probably object that it is Utopian to propose such an issue, however desirable it might be; yet even if the logical conclusion to which our argument has led us is no more than a *reductio ad absurdum* of the prevailing national antagonisms of Europe, it will at least point the moral that Europe can only be saved by her own efforts, and that if she does not find an occasion for setting her house in order in the settlement after this war, she will never be able thereafter to arrest its progressive ruin.

CHAPTER X

THE DISMANTLING OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

We have seen that, by her presence at the Straits, Turkey chokes the egress of all the nations fronting the Black Sea coasts, which in every other respect have severally achieved national self-sufficiency and independence. This, however, is the least of her crimes. The area within her frontiers is a veritable cockpit of nationalities so mutilated that they have never even achieved that unity which is the essential preliminary to a national life.

Turkey in 1914 is sailing in those shoal waters in which Poland foundered in 1795, and if she wishes to avoid Poland's shipwreck, she must promptly lighten her draught by throwing overboard all superfluous cargo. We shall have eased her course considerably by relieving her of that solid bullion, the Territory of the Straits; but she must reconcile herself to making jetsam of less cherished but bulkier properties as well, if she is finally to clear the reefs and make the open sea. We will pass in review these bales of territorial merchandise.

A. *Thrace*

The carving out of the Straits Territory completely severs from the Anatolian body of Turkey the European province of Thrace, left to her by the Treaty of London and the subsequent compromise with Bulgaria that followed the Second Balkan War. The population of Thrace is predominantly Greek, and though there

is a sprinkling of Turkish villages throughout, and a considerable Bulgarian element in its mountainous North-West corner, Greek Irredentism has naturally, and quite justly, kept the whole region inscribed on its book of claims. Most of those claims are already satisfied or else in process of satisfaction, but Thrace is probably destined to remain a bad debt. The decisive factor here is Geography, and it assigns the territory unmistakably to Bulgaria.

The natural route of egress from the Bulgarian hinterland to a door on the Ægean follows the lines of the Maritsa and its tributaries, from their sources and from over the watershed beyond, to their triple junction at Adrianople, and then proceeds due Southwards along the united stream, to the ports of Ainos and Dedeagatch on the East and West flanks of its mouth.

Adrianople was built with the express strategical purpose of blocking this route. It was the bulwark of the venerable Byzantine Empire against Bulgaria in her Spring, and since the Berlin Treaty it has been the bulwark of a Turkey galvanised into life against a Bulgaria miraculously re-arisen from the dead. For a few months in 1913, Bulgaria, for the first time in her history, held the coveted prize in her grip, to lose it again by her own folly, when the Turkish army quietly re-occupied the fortress during the war she had wantonly provoked with her former allies. The compromise which Turkey forced upon Bulgaria in her extremity, confirmed the retrocession of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse (its strategic complement) to the Turkish Empire, and though Bulgaria retained the Ægean coast-strip between the mouths of the Mesta and the Maritsa, for practical purposes her road to the sea was cut off again as effectually as ever.

Near the Western end of that coast there is the excellent harbour of Porto Lagos, backed by the fertile tobacco-growing plain of Xanthi, but this district is separated from the upper valley of the Maritsa by the immense barrier of the Rhodope mountains, and though from the port a narrow-gauge railway might be engineered across them through Gimirdjina, Kirdjali and Haskevi to Philippopolis, it could never, any more than the Bosnian railway, become a main artery of commerce. The main economic route must continue to skirt the course of the Maritsa, and in fact a railway already runs from Sofia over the watershed to Philippopolis, and thence along the Right bank of the river all the way to Dedeagatch, the port westward of its mouth.

This railway was purposely led by the Turkish military authorities through the ring of the Adrianople forts, and thus, though Dedeagatch itself has passed into Bulgaria's possession together with the Right bank of the Maritsa below Adrianople, its railway communications with the Bulgarian interior are cut. It might seem possible to avoid Adrianople by constructing an "all-Bulgarian" loop-line from point to point on the Right bank of the Maritsa well inside the Bulgarian frontier; but the low country suitable for railway engineering between the river and the Eastern bastions of Rhodope is narrow, and the Turkish military authorities quite justifiably insisted in including within their frontier, as rectified by the compromise, a wide radius of territory beyond the Adrianople forts on the Right banks of the Tundja and the Maritsa, on the ground that its possession was essential to the defence of Adrianople itself. This zone stretches right up among the mountain spurs: the loop-line would have to be carried by a

tour de force over the shoulder of Rhodope, and even then it could be cut at once, in the event of war, by a force astride the natural line of communications at Adrianople itself.

This simply proves that Adrianople excellently fulfils its object, and that so long as it remains in Turkey's hands, free communication with the Ægean is denied to Bulgaria. We proposed to meet the problem of Hungary's railway to the Adriatic and Russia's to the Atlantic by putting the politico-military and the economic control in different hands, but a similar solution is in this case impossible, because the Turkish government is too uncivilised and uneducated to refrain on the least temptation from exploiting the brute force we should be leaving at its command. Unless she can prove some strategical necessity more pressing than Bulgaria's economic need for an outlet on the Ægean, Turkey must evacuate Adrianople altogether. Till now she has been able to allege the defence of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, but when we have relieved her of that duty by placing these positions in the keeping of a power, and under the sanction of a concert of powers, that neither Bulgaria nor the united Balkan League would venture to impugn, the case for her presence at Adrianople falls to the ground, and nothing remains but to rescue Thrace at once from that misgovernment which Turkish chauvinism has aggravated during the past year in its impotent thirst for revenge.

The incorporation of Thrace in Bulgaria will not benefit the latter country only: it will vastly improve the condition of the whole population of Thrace. The Greek elements will have to abandon their dream of national reunion, which, in the bitterness of the Second Balkan War, made them prefer the return of Turkish

anarchy, because it is by nature transitory, to Bulgarian government that is too efficient not to strike roots. But meanwhile the Turk has made them suffer for their fine-drawn policy of possessing their souls in patience. He has goaded them beyond human endurance, and given such a toil to the Bulgar that they may actually hail him once more as a deliverer, as they hailed him first in the Autumn of 1912.

Certainly if we can install Bulgarian government in Thrace again with the good-will of the Greek population, it will make the future easier for all parties concerned, but after their atrocious behaviour in the Second Balkan War, this is almost more than the Bulgarians deserve. We must not rely on good feeling alone to settle the Thracian question, but must safeguard the Greeks in the province by the strictest guarantees for their national individuality. In fact, this is the least we can do to satisfy public opinion in the kingdom of Hellas, which has not yet risen to the insight of the country's political good-genius, the premier Venezelos. He, indeed, recognises that the solution of all Balkan problems lies in compromises rationally concluded and honourably observed, and was always willing to leave under Bulgarian rule the Greek population of the Maritsa basin, if Bulgaria in return agreed that the villages of her own nationality in the hinterland of Salonika should pass to Greece. The result of Bulgaria's uncompromising nationalism was the Second Balkan War, by which Greece got more than her due, and Bulgaria lost much of what she could justly claim. The proposed arrangement would at last make the balance even, and allow the two nations to forget the regrettable relations of the past.

The Turkish elements would actually have less cause

for dreading the change than the Greek. The Turk has found by experience that good government by the foreigner and the infidel is a happier lot than the Dark Age of his native regime ; and the Bulgars have been as successful in reconciling and assimilating their Moslem fellow-citizens, of whom there are large numbers in the North-Eastern parts of the country, as the Austrians have been in Bosnia or the Russians in Turkestan. When every Christian peasant in Bulgaria was called to the colours in the Summer of 1912, the Moslem neighbour, whose services the Government did not demand for the Turkish war, undertook to gather in the harvest on the campaigner's fields. There is little doubt that if the Moslems of Thrace pass under Bulgarian administration, their loyalty to their new country will soon be equally intense.

The Bulgarians have no incentive to treat this minority ill : the battle of Lule Burgas settled old scores, and after the joint occupation of Salonika the Greek eclipsed the Turk as the national rival. Protests will come, not from the local Moslems, but from Turkish nationalism across the Straits. Adrianople was for a century the capital of the Ottoman State, and the tombs of the Sultans are there : the sophisticated Ottoman claims them as national monuments, and the city in which they stand as inalienable Ottoman soil. No apter example could be found of the argument from historical sentiment, and we have only to classify this fallacy in order to dismiss it from consideration. The desire of a living population, and not the pride of dead conquerors, must settle the destiny of Adrianople, and it will not settle it in favour of the Turkish Empire. In Bulgaria's hands the tombs will be as well tended as the whole province.

The material advantage that would accrue to all sections of the population alike is not open to doubt. For the first time since the Goths crossed the Danube, the country would be united economically with its natural hinterland, and therewith the prosperity it enjoyed in the second century after Christ would assuredly return: roads and railways would be multiplied, and stock-breeding, vine-growing and agriculture regain their footing on its desolate downs.

After placing the national rights of minorities under guarantee, we may accordingly hand over to Bulgaria the sovereign rights of defence, communications and civil government throughout the province, up to the frontiers we have marked out for the Territory of the Straits, with the one proviso that she shall not fortify her new port of Rodosto on the Marmora coast, nor establish a naval base therein.

B. *Armenia*

We have now cut back the Turkish Empire from its encroachments on alien ground in the West: when we turn to the North-Eastern frontier, we are faced with a political anarchy and a racial chaos that demand more drastic pruning still. The question of Armenian nationality lies at the heart of this tangle.

The Armenians have shown an indomitable national consciousness, and there are several strong factors to inspire it. The first is common religion, a variety of Christianity with certain dogmas peculiar to itself, which distinguishes its professors not only from the Moslems among whom they live but from the international Christian Churches in other parts of the World. A second is common language, a branch of the Indo-

European group that has followed a very individual development of its own, and produced a voluminous, though chiefly ecclesiastical, literature. Finally there is the common tradition of a political independence which endured almost unbroken for twelve centuries, and occasionally played a decisive part in the history of the World.

Unhappily this tradition was extinguished more than eight centuries ago. Since then the only administrative bond uniting the Armenian people has been the organisation of their national Church, and the nation's history has resembled that of the Jews. The Armenians in Dispersion have prospered exceedingly. They have shown an adaptability capable of assimilating European ways of life, not merely the social superficialities achieved by the Young Turks, but the solid foundations of spiritual ideas and technical skill; and they have found the energy to turn their acquisitions to account by rivalling and even outstripping their European teachers in the economic exploitation of the Nearer East. Their recent evolution has bridged the gulf between Asiatic and European, and, like the rise of Japan, tends to prove that the contrast between "Oriental" and "Occidental" does not express underlying difference of temperament so much as difference of phase in an identical process of growth.

Japan, however, in her awakening has mainly utilised the political line of advance, while the political condition of the Armenian peasant who has stayed at home in his native mountain-valleys, has steadily been going from bad to worse. Moslem government has given the advantage to his Moslem neighbours from the Zagros mountains on the South-East, the quite barbarous nomadic Kurdish clans; and during the last

generation of the nineteenth century the regime of Abdul Hamid converted this inevitable tendency towards official partiality into a deliberate policy of inflaming a racial feud, and destroying the Armenian nationality in the conflagration. The Kurdish chiefs were decorated with Ottoman military rank, and their retainers enrolled as Ottoman irregular troops. Rifles were distributed to these "regiments" in abundance, while the Armenian population was prohibited under the severest penalties from carrying arms. Then the Kurds were let loose on the Armenians, as the Albanians were let loose on the Serbs in the valley of the White Drin. Village after village of native peasants has been laid desolate, that the intrusive Kurd may pitch his tents and pasture his flocks over the abandoned fields: the concerted massacres which have shocked us from time to time, are merely accentuations of a steadily pushed process, which is successfully annihilating the most civilised and industrious race in Western Asia, and replacing it by the most idle, squalid and unruly.

The Armenian Dispersion lavishes its wealth in building schools, supporting refugees, and stemming wherever it can the tide of destruction, but it is powerless against the brute force of Turkish government in possession. The situation is even worse under the new regime than under the old, for the administration cannot easily recall rifles recklessly delivered into Kurdish hands, even if it has the will to do so, while Young Turkish chauvinism looks askance at the Armenians' success, and contemplates their disappearance with satisfaction.

The civilised World cannot afford to let these outrages continue, and if the two Central European powers that have so far secured Turkey impunity are defeated

in the present war, the whole territory where this state of things prevails must be severed from the Turkish Empire at once.

The true solution of the Armenian question is fortunately not difficult to discern. There is no possibility yet of national self-government: the Armenian peasantry constitutes only one half of the population in this region, it is defenceless, and it is crushed by persecution. The first requisite is efficient government, inexorably just and irresistibly strong, which will carry out the serious military task of disarming and pacifying the Kurds, and proceed to establish law-and-order throughout the land. Under the shadow of such a government both races would for the first time be free to increase, multiply, and inherit this portion of the earth, according to their respective talents and capacities.

"Strong government" of just the kind required exists already immediately across the frontier, and a large section of the Armenian population has long prospered under it. It has been the fashion in England to depreciate the Russian administration in the Caucasus. "It was imposed," we say, "by relentless warfare against small native mountain tribes struggling for their freedom, and this sacrifice of blood has not been justified by its results. On the one hand order is far from being perfectly established (we remember the racial riots between Armenians and Tatars at Baku in 1904-5),[1] and on the other hand the national development, not only of savage mountaineers, but of civilised Georgians and Armenians, has been stifled

[1] Though they are not a fair example to cite, since they were due to the transitory phase of anarchy which swept during these years over the whole Russian Empire, while against them must be set many decades of continuously efficient administration.

with a heavy hand." But we have only to look at our own "North-West Frontier" in India to see that Russia's work in the Caucasus has been the most brilliant triumph of pacification in the nineteenth century.

The British advance has stopped short at the outer spurs of the Hindu Kush. We have debarred the hill-tribes from making a livelihood by raiding the Plains, and subsidised them in compensation for their loss; we enforce peace upon the road over the Khyber Pass, by which trade passes from India to Kabul—and that is all, though those who have experience rightly account it much. But Russia has boldly penetrated to the Caucasus' heart, cut her military trails through its forest slopes, and built her post road over its central pass of Dariel from rail-head at Vladivkavkas to another rail at Tiflis, where the Transcaucasian line passes on its way from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Then she has connected these two railway systems by a new line skirting the Caspian coast, and turning the range's Eastern flank. Above all, and through all, she has opened up the material resources of the whole territory to economic exploitation.

It is true that Russia's Armenian subjects have suffered, like the other national minorities in the Empire, from her mistaken policy of repression. Just as the Poles found the efficiency of advanced Prussia more terrible than the slackness of backward Russia, the Russian police in turn pressed more hardly than the paralytic Turkish administration upon Armenian nationalism. Twenty years ago, and again for a moment when the Turkish Revolution kindled so many hopes, there were Armenians who planned a national unification within a Turkey

decentralised after enlargement at the expense of the Russian frontier; but, as in Thrace, the Turks themselves have effectually shattered such delusions, and there is not an Armenian now in the Turkish provinces who does not pray for the coming of Russia.

Etchmiadzin, the ecclesiastical capital of the nation, is already in Russian territory, and even while Armenian political idealism still had a Turkish orientation, the actual political centre of gravity was automatically shifting across the frontier. The Armenian husbandman, when the barrenness of the mountains and the ferociousness of the Kurds drive him to seek his fortune abroad, naturally gravitates to the most favourable market for his energies. He has found it in Russian Caucasia, and this is the best testimony of all to the virtue of Russian rule. Tiflis, the ancient capital of the Georgian nation, has become practically an Armenian city, boasting almost as large an Armenian colony as Constantinople, while the population of the native Armenian districts on the Russian side of the frontier is now about a quarter as large again as the Armenian population in the Turkish provinces East of the Euphrates and North of the Tigris, though it occupies a territory of less than half this area.[1]

We must, therefore, attempt to bring within the Russian frontier all Turkish territory where the fundamental population is Armenian, and where this population's prosperity is being ruined by the legalised aggression of the Kurds.

[1]

Armenian population in Tiflis	155,000
Armenian population in Constantinople . . .	161,000
Armenian population in Russian provinces Akhaltsik, Kars, Alexandropol, Erivan, Nachitchevan, Shusa .	750,000
Armenian population in Turkish territory within limits specified	600.000

This territorial settlement [1] of the national question must take due account of the geographical factor, and it would begin by assigning Trebizond to the Russian Empire, because a great caravan route starts from that port across the mountains through Baiburt to Erzeroum in the Armenian interior. The Lazic population of the coast strip, though it is not itself Armenian, is not Turkish either, but akin to the Georgians of the Caucasus.[2] The frontier should accordingly start from Tireboli on the South coast of the Black Sea West of Trebizond, and run due South, excluding Karahissar to the West, till it strikes the upper reach of the Ḳara Su ("Western Euphrates") at a point below Erzingan. Thence it should follow the course of the Euphrates Southwards, as far as Telek, where the river hits the Taurus range running East and West, and slashes its way through the mountain barrier in a long, tortuous gorge, impassable for human traffic.

The Armenian race is not confined to the Eastern bank of the Euphrates. When the Turkish avalanche from Central Asia shattered the old kingdom of Armenia in the eleventh century A.D., a considerable fragment of the nation migrated across the river and beyond the open plateau of Malatia to the broken ribs of Taurus further West, where the Sihun (Sarus) and Jihun (Pyramus) come down Southwards between parallel mountain-lines to the plain of Adana and the sea. Here they founded a kingdom of Little Armenia, which threw in its lot with the Latin principalities carved out by the first Crusade, and took its full share in the losing battle against the returning tide of Islam.

[1] See Map VI.

[2] Difference of religion, however, prevents Laze and Georgian from sharing a common national consciousness. The Lazes are Moslem.

All the Christian states alike were extinguished in the fourteenth century, but the population did not perish with the kingdom, and the Armenians have held their ground to this day in their second home. They have, moreover, been reinforced by that more recent expansion from the original motherland, which has not affected this South-Eastern corner of Anatolia alone, but has endowed the urban centres throughout the whole Eastern half of the peninsula with strong Armenian colonies.

Yet in spite of their vigour and their increasing numbers, the Armenians have not made Eastern Anatolia their own. The Turkish substratum remains the preponderant element West of Euphrates, as the Armenian East of the river, and though the memory of the terrible Adana massacres, perpetrated under the Young Turkish regime in 1909,[1] will cause us to take the most stringent precautions for safeguarding the Armenian nationality in the territories left under Turkish government, it must not blind us to the actual numerical proportion between the two races in this region. Except where professional brigands are subsidised for the task, like the Kurds across the river, it is only very weak minorities that suffer massacre: what tempted the Turkish masses to the crime, and justified it in their own eyes, was the sense that they were in an immense majority, and the hope that one determined stroke of brute violence might rid them altogether of these hated, progressive, alien tares in their uniform Moslem field. In execrating their action, we must not forget that the facts on which they based it remain roughly true.

Having reached the gorge of Telek, the new frontier should leave the Left bank of the Euphrates, and proceed

[1] Less than a year after the proclamation of the Constitution.

first North and then East along the watershed between the Murad Su ("Eastern Euphrates") and the upper Tigris, formed by a ridge of Taurus almost overhanging the former stream, to a point immediately South of Mush. Here it should abandon the ridge, and turn through a complete right angle, taking a course due South along a line West of the Bitlis-Sert road, till it strikes the Left bank of the upper Tigris. After reaching the Tigris, it should follow its course Eastward, past the junction of the Sert River ("Eastern Tigris") from the North, to the point where the united stream turns abruptly South-East, and enters the gorge between the Tor-Abdin and Judi Dagh ranges.

South-East of the basin of Lake Van and the course of the Sert River the Armenian element does not extend, and its limit coincides with the transition from the Anatolian plateau to the Zagros system, of which the Judi Dagh is the most North-Westerly spur. The Armenians are here replaced by another Christian population, of different race and sect, the "Chaldæans" or "Assyrians."

These are descended, as their name implies, from the earlier stratum of Semitic population in the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates. Converted to the Nestorian form of Christianity in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. by missionary propaganda from Edessa, they survived the oppression of the fanatically Zoroastrian Sassanid dynasty, and flourished under the benevolent protection of the civilised Abbasid Caliphate of Bagdad. This era of prosperity was broken in the thirteenth century by the terrible Mongol invasions, which ruined Arabic culture. When Bagdad was sacked, the Christians fled to the fastnesses of Zagros which look down upon

the Mesopotamian plain, and the seat of their patriarch[1] has been established since then at Julamerk, on the highest reach of the Greater Zab. Most of the refugees, however, have not tarried on the Western slope of the mountains, but have crossed the watershed into the Urumia basin, where they form the exclusive population of a compact district on the West shore of the lake. Latterly the Chaldæans have been exposed even more cruelly than the Armenians to Kurdish barbarity, and about half their villages on Lake Urumia have abandoned their allegiance to the patriarch at Julamerk, and accepted the Orthodox creed, in order to secure the protection of Russia. The inauguration of Russian "strong government" is in fact as essential to the survival of the Chaldæans as it is to that of the Armenians, and the only solution is to include within the Russian frontier the whole area inhabited by this race, in addition to the Armenian plateau.

The distribution of the Chaldæans, however, completely cuts across existing political divisions. While Julamerk is in Ottoman territory, the Urumia basin, the nation's centre of gravity, belongs to Persia, and the Turco-Persian frontier follows the summit of the Zagros range. If, then, the whole Chaldæan nation is to be united under Russia's ægis, the Russian frontier will have to be advanced at the expense of Persia, as well as at the expense of Turkey.

Fortunately, there is no obstacle to this, for Azerbaijan, the North-Westernmost province of Persia, within which the Urumia basin lies, has no national connection with the state in which it is at present[2]

[1] Like the Armenian Katholikos at Etchmiadzin, he is the political as well as the religious head of the nation.

[2] During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it several times changed hands between Persia and Turkey.

politically incorporated. While the Chaldæans occupy the Western side of the lake, the valleys that drain into it from the East, one of which contains the important town of Tabriz, are inhabited by an equally compact population of Tatars, who were deposited there by the Mongol dominion of the fourteenth century, and speak a variety of the wide-spread Turkish tongue. These have as little sympathy as the Chaldæans with their Persian masters on the South, whose Iranian language they do not understand, and whose Shiah heresy they detest. All their links are Northward, towards the valley of the Aras, whence the railway is coming to Tabriz from the present Russian railhead at Julfa, and towards the broad steppes that fill the lower basin of the river as far as Baku on the Caspian coast, where half their race is already living contentedly under Russian rule. The whole population of the province appreciates the "strong government" and the economic progress which the *de facto* Russian occupation [1] has begun to give them, and it would still further foster the advance of civilisation here if the gift were assured by the formal annexation of Azerbaijan to the Russian Empire.

At the gorge between the Tor-Abdin and Judi Dagh ranges, the new Russian frontier should leave the course of the Tigris, and proceed Eastward again along the summit of the Judi Dagh, cross the Greater Zab below Julamerk, where it makes an abrupt bend from a South-Westerly to a South-Easterly direction, and continue Eastward along the Giaour Dagh, till it strikes the present Turco-Persian frontier at a point on the same parallel as the South end of Lake Urumia. After

[1] Since 1909, when the anarchy of the Persian Revolution led Russia to send a force across the frontier into Azerbaijan, where the situation was specially acute.

crossing the existing frontier-line it should run South-East, excluding the whole basin of the Lesser Zab. When it reaches the thirty-sixth parallel, it should turn due Eastward along the latter, till it hits the head-waters of the River Kisil Usun, whose course it should follow down continuously to its most Northerly point. Here, where the river turns at a sharp angle to the South-East, the frontier should break away again on a North-Easterly course of its own, and maintain it till it hits the present Russo-Persian frontier a few miles before its terminus at Astara on the Caspian Sea.

The rectification of frontier we have just sketched out to Russia's profit and to Turkey's and Persia's loss, is unimpeachable from the point of view of the territories and populations immediately concerned.

(i.) It transfers nationalities, which, owing to their geographical interlacement and to the lawlessness which it stimulates, are in any case incapable for the present of governing themselves, from a vicious incompetent government whose only policy is to foster anarchy by encouraging the inferior elements to exterminate the higher, to a civilised " strong government " which has already dealt successfully in the Caucasus with a similar problem of even more serious dimensions. This government, if we place it in control, will use its experience to secure the most enterprising, receptive and industrious races in the region from artificial repression by brute force.

After a few generations of good government, the Armenian peasant will have outstripped the Kurdish shepherd entirely, not by another abuse of official favouritism, but by his innate superior qualities. Every patch of soil will have been brought under cultivation in the valley bottoms and on the terraced mountain-slopes

of the plateau, and the flocks of the nomad will have been pushed up into the high bleak hills, where vine and cereal can no longer compete with them. The population will have rapidly increased, and the growth will be to the account of the Armenian and not of the Kurdish section, because it will go hand in hand with the agricultural development of the country. In the cruel winters the Kurd will be glad to descend from his mountain wilderness and harbour his sheep and goats in the comfortable Armenian village below. His children will frequent the local school (the Armenians may be trusted to establish a school in every hamlet), learn the Armenian language, and adopt in time, if they have the ability, the Armenian way of life. Like the Romance-speaking Vlach shepherds in modern Greece, the Kurdish clans will be absorbed in the Armenian nation, and while advancing in individual prosperity with the advance of the whole country, will sink to the relative position they deserve. They will cease to be a dominant race, and lend their name instead to a subordinate economic class.

When this stage has been reached, the national problem will have been solved. Armenia will be ripe to enter the phase of "Home Rule," and take her place beside Poland and Finland as one of the self-governing members of the Russian Imperial Federation.

(ii.) Besides securing the Armenians their spiritual birthright, the proposed frontier has an economic justification. It closely follows the "divide" between the commerce that flows to the Black Sea and Caspian ports on the one hand, and that which goes down to the Gulf of Iskanderun and the Persian Gulf on the other. This will become apparent when Western Asia has been better equipped with railways than it is at present. As

construction proceeds, the frontier will be found to mark a boundary between independent systems, that will only be crossed at a few points by trunk lines.

In spite, however, of these undeniable merits, any proposal for such an extension of the Russian frontier will meet with a storm of protest from at least two quarters.

(i.) Russophobes in Great Britain will have taken alarm already at the idea of ejecting the Ottoman Government from the Black Sea Straits, and this second scheme for docking Turkey on her Eastern frontier as well, and installing Russia in full possession of the Armenian plateau, will put the last touch to their fears. "How," they will ask, "can we expect Turkey to act any longer as the bulwark of our Mediterranean route to India, if we wilfully break her strength?"

It will be sufficient for the moment to take these critics entirely on their own ground, and reply that, from the strategical point of view, size of territory is not the ultimate criterion of strength. It is true that we shall have advanced the Russian frontier half the distance from Kars to Iskanderun, but the other half still remains, and Turkey, rid of her ulcers by the surgeon's knife and enabled to devote all her strength to building up her internal health, will erect a more formidable barrier in this comparatively narrow strip of native territory, than if she pushed a precarious, exhausting domination over intractable alien populations as far as the very summit of the Caucasus.

(ii.) We have a much more serious opponent to convince in Panislamism, which, so far as it concerns us, is the public opinion of the Moslem community in India.

C. *Panislamism*

The Indian Moslems have developed in latter years a strong self-consciousness. Unlike most Mohammedan populations, they are in the position of a minority. The Hindu and Tamil mass threatens more and more to engulf them, and in face of this danger they have put their trust in British rule. They have devoted themselves loyally to the support of our "strong government" in India, and adopted our ideal for the future of the "Indian Empire." With the increase of education among themselves, and of means of communication throughout the world, their interest has extended beyond the limits of India to international politics, and has naturally concentrated on the fortunes of Islam in other parts of the world.

The spectacle that meets their eyes is melancholy. Everywhere Islam is receding and Europe triumphant. The battle for the penetration and possession of Central Africa has been fought out between them in the nineteenth century to Islam's loss. The whole continent is now partitioned among European powers, and even the ancient seats of Moslem civilisation along the Mediterranean coast have passed under European suzerainty, from Egypt to Morocco. In Central Asia, during the same period, Russia, which once obeyed the Tatar Khans on the Volga, has subjected the last independent Khanates along the Oxus, and bridled the freedom of the desert Turkomans.

As they survey the Moslem World, the Ottoman Empire seems to them the only exception to the general *débâcle*. It alone, in the face of all Europe, preserves the old tradition that the Moslem is marked out by God

to be ruler, and the Christian to be his slave ; and what is more important still to an orthodox Indian Sunni, cut off from his fellow-believers by a ring of heathen Sikhs and Hindus, and of heretical Persians, the Ottoman state is the guardian of the holy cities of Islam, and the Ottoman sultan, by legal inheritance, the official head of the whole Faith.

The grandeur of Turkey gives a concrete embodiment to the Indian Moslems' sentiment. They feel themselves to be a strong community, they have deserved well of the British Empire, and in return they justly claim the right to make their voice heard in its counsels. There is no doubt that they will exert their influence in favour of the Ottoman Government's point of view, and uncompromisingly resist any proposal to interfere with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as it stands at present.

We cannot neglect this attitude of Panislamism in India. We must examine the ideals that underlie it, and the view of existing facts on which it is based ; and if we conclude that these ideals will not be realised by the programme of supporting the present Turkish regime, because the real situation in Turkey does not correspond to the facts presupposed, we must frankly declare our belief. We must try to convince Panislamism of its error by argument, just as we have grappled before with the attitude of Germany, or with the Dual Monarchy's *raison d'être*.

The real desire of Panislamism is that the Moslem populations which have so far preserved their independence from Christian dominion should not succumb to the fate of the majority, but should on the contrary so develop their material resources by economic enterprise, and their spiritual wealth by education, as

to raise themselves to a footing of equality with the European nations, and prove to the world that now once more, as a thousand years ago, Islam has an indispensable part to play in the advancement of civilisation.

This is a noble ideal. It is the vision of a national regeneration in every sphere of human life, and because of its very universality, it includes as an incidental element the object of the British Russophobe. The latter, starting from the selfish standpoint of "British interests," is led to demand that "some power with the military capacity to protect its own frontiers" shall interpose itself permanently between the Russian Empire and the Mediterranean: the Panislamic hope of a Turkey renewed in every limb fulfils and transcends this narrow, negative stipulation. Panislamism and Russophobia show signs of making a strange opportunist alliance for the furtherance of their incommensurate aims, and we can answer them both in a single disputation. If the doubts of the Panislamist are set at rest, his British ally may depart assured that his own qualms are thereby satisfied.

We first reply to Panislamism that the policy of the present "Young Turkish" regime is a mistake. Like the chauvinism of Berlin and Buda Pest, it is the obsession of a clique, not the interest of the people; and now that it has been given rein, it will carry the last independent Moslem state into the same irreparable disaster into which the Central European Empires are being plunged by the present war.

The Turkish Government still rules Christian subjects, Greeks in Thrace and Armenians East of Euphrates. If this really ministers to the Indian Moslem's pride, it is a condemnation of his political judgment rather than of his political morality, for the

oppression of Greek and Armenian is almost outbalanced by the suffering of the Moslem peasant on whom falls the burden of holding them down by force.

Turkey has only half the population [1] of the smallest of the six European powers; she is infinitely poorer than any of them, in economic and social development incomparably more backward; yet no European state exacts such a heavy blood tax from its citizens as Turkey, whose people can least afford it. The length of service, both with the colours in youth and with the various classes of reserve in later life, is in excess of most other conscript armies,[2] and mobilisation is far more frequent. On a partial scale, to combat the never outwearied unrest of the subject populations, it is practically chronic, and it occurs on the grand scale whenever the breath of war begins to blow in Europe, even when, as in the present crisis, the interests involved do not naturally affect the Turkish people at all. This happens because the subject populations are ever ready for the final war of liberation, and because the neighbouring states are always waiting for the opportunity to assist them. They know too well the Turkish government's incurable policy of adventure, which will not face accomplished facts, but still dreams of recovering Mitylene and Khios, and perhaps of re-entering Salonika.

Supposing that, through the triumph of the Central European powers, the Porte were to recover all the

[1] No exact statistics have ever been taken, but since the territorial losses of 1912–13 the numbers cannot much exceed 20,000,000.

[2] The terms of compulsory service for the infantry are as follows:

Active service with the colours	3 years.
Active service in the reserve	6 „
Landwehr service	9 „
Landsturm service	2 „
Total service (from 20th to 40th year of age)	20 „

territories it held in Europe before the Autumn of 1912, this success would bring the Turkish peasant nothing but added misery. For him it would be a shouldering of cast-off burdens: he would once more spend years of his life garrisoning Macedonia far away from his family and his Anatolian farm, to perish at last most probably in some futile summer campaign to "Ottomanise" the untamable Albanians. The Turkish peasant is dumb: he has no education or cohesion, and therefore no public opinion: but if he could give expression to his will in a plebiscite, he would vote for being left in peace, and ask for some government which would not herd his folk out of their villages in thousands, and send them without commissariat, munitions of war, or medical succour, to perish in the deserts of Tripoli or on the stricken field of Lule Burgas. Since he is too inarticulate to express this, it is surely the mission of Panislamism, which has the ear of the civilised world and knows how to address itself to it, to speak for him and save him from his own government, instead of encouraging that government to exploit him to the detriment of his neighbours, and the danger of the general peace.

The Porte claims the Indian Moslem's allegiance as the protector of the Holy Cities. But here again let him try his religious sentiment in the fire of reality, and imagine himself in the place of the unhappy Turkish conscript, transported from his temperate upland home in Anatolia to the military posts along that tropical volcanic plateau of "Stony Arabia" over which the Hejaz railway runs from Damascus to Medina, or worse still, dispatched by troop-ship down the Red Sea to the terrible, interminable Yemen campaign from which no soldier ever returns; or let him think of the Yemeni Arab himself. Heir to an archaic civilisation,

isolated to an unparalleled degree by the deserts, he is not normally affected for good or evil by the rise and fall of world-empires; but now he is desperately at bay against the brutal, meaningless aggression of Turkish Imperialism, which has no better gift for him than for the Armenian or the Greek.

The Indian Moslem is misled by his own experience. In India Islam is a nationality. Its professors may have been Arab, Persian, Afghan or Mogul when they came as conquerors to the country, yet now they are one blood, bound together by the common menace of Hindu race-hatred. Conditions are different in the Ottoman Empire. The menace of the Unbeliever is here imperfectly realised, and national antagonisms find an arena within the "Bulwark of Islam." Our educated Indian Panislamist should talk to an educated Panarab from Egypt, if he wishes to discover how Moslems of Arab speech feel towards the political ambitions of their Turkish co-religionists.

The Egyptian will agree with the Indian emphatically, that the rule of the European is a humiliation for Islam, and that British administration, however beneficial or even necessary it may be for the moment,[1] must be no more than a transitory phase in the long history of Egypt and India; but he will tell him that he has experienced one thing worse than British occupation, and that was the tyranny of the Turkish official class, which Great Britain ended just a generation ago. "It is only when I think what we suffered from the Turk," he will conclude, "that I can find it in my heart to tolerate his British successor."

The founder of Islam was an Arab. He wrote his

[1] Though, except for the work of the irrigation engineers, he will have much less good to say of it than the Indian.

Book in his native tongue, and his nation carried the book and the religion it proclaimed to the Atlantic on the one side and to Central Asia on the other. The Empire they founded converted Islam from a frenzy of outcast barbarians into a culture whose poetry, science and philosophy are the foundation of all Nearer Eastern civilisation to-day, just as the culture of the Roman Empire is the spiritual basis of Modern Europe. The Arab empire, moreover, like the Roman, was broken in pieces by a deluge of rude invaders from the North. The Turks, like the Teutons, had vitality enough to realise the greatness of the civilisation upon which they had stumbled, and to submit themselves to its spell; but they too lacked the genius to conjure back to life the exquisite thing they had destroyed. The confused attempts of Turkish dynasties to build up again in brick the Arab palaces of marble constitute the Dark Age of Moslem history. The house of Othman, the supreme creation of Turkish political strivings, is a house built upon the sands. It was doomed to dissolution from the beginning as surely as was the "Holy Roman Empire."

When Sultan Selim I. conquered Egypt in 1517, he caused the last Arab Caliph of the Abbasid line, who sheltered there under Mamluk protection, to bestow the mantle of the Prophet upon him and his heirs for ever. The transaction was as unreal as that scene in the Vatican, when the Pope, the highest representative of Latin civilisation, crowned Charlemagne with the diadem of the Roman Empire which his predecessors had trampled in the dust; and the one inheritance was no less fatal than the other to its recipients. Selim, like Charlemagne, has had many successors of strong will and able counsel, but they have suffered the tragedy

of the Hohenstaufen, and squandered the strength of their empire in pursuing the will-o'-the-wisps of a dead world's ideas.

Meanwhile, the Arab revival has been paralysed by this heroic sham, as Italy was paralysed by the visitations of the mediæval Emperors; and if the encouragement of Indian Panislamism breathes mischievous confidence into this sham once more, it will work as much woe to all Islam, Arab and Indian and Turk alike, as the triumph of its accomplice, the renovated German Imperialism, will work to Europe, if it wins this war.

Yet our Panislamist (or his Young Turk protégé, speaking through his mouth), while admitting all that we have pointed out, will still put up a plea of higher necessity for the existence and policy of the present Turkish regime. It will be very much like the apologia of Prussianism, its ensample. "We confess," he will sadly begin, "that Turkish Imperialism frustrates the material advancement of the Turkish peasant, and stunts the national life of his Arab fellow-subject; but it is their common duty to bear these disadvantages patriotically for the sake of Islam. They must sacrifice themselves to support their government, because the Ottoman Empire is the one sovereign independent state left in Islam, and if this empire falls, the Moslem populations it safeguards will be partitioned, like all their brethren, among the Christian powers. Such an event might, quite probably, increase the economic prosperity and social well-being of the individual Moslem more rapidly, for the moment, than the continuance of the Ottoman administration; but even the Christians have a proverb that 'Man does not live by bread alone.' For a 'mess of pottage' the Moslem subjects of the Porte would be bartering away the birthright of Islam,

making impossible the great ideal of the future, a self-governing Moslem nation that shall hold its head as high as the nations of Europe."

If Panislamism takes up this position, we must undeceive it still further. We do not call "Young Turkey" a sham merely because it taxes the strength of the Turkish peasant in order to maltreat weak Christian nationalities in defiance of strong Christian powers, and to pose grotesquely as the successor of the Arab Caliphate in the captaincy of Islam. In spending the blood-tax wrung from the peasant upon objects entirely alien to the peasant's interest, the government of Turkey would be practising a fraud at least no grosser than that committed by the two Central European Empires against their industrial conscripts. The supreme sham is the "strength and independence" of the Ottoman Empire itself.

The German government takes toll of blood and iron from the German nation, to fashion from them a mailed fist, quivering with a vitality that gives government and nation enleagued not only security to walk their own ways unhindered, but power to take the initiative in evil aggression against their neighbours. The militarism of the Porte, which impresses the Indian Moslem and ruins the Turkish peasant with its wars and rumours of wars, has no effect whatsoever on the destiny of the Turkish Empire. Her army would not have saved Turkey from annihilation sixty years ago, if England and France had not fought the battle against Russia in her behalf, and during the two generations that have passed since then, Turkey, threatened with destruction again and again, has owed her preservation invariably to the mutual jealousies of the European powers, and never to the strength of her own right

arm. In 1877 the defence of Plevna, gallant though it was, did not prevent the Russians from forcing the Chataldja lines: a diplomatic warning from the other powers kept them out of Constantinople when the forts were down, and the Treaty of Berlin rescued for Turkey half her territories in Europe.

The Indian Moslems must face the fact that the Porte is not the champion of Islam, but a parasite upon the national rivalries of Europe. Turkey's fate is not in her own hands, and whatever be the issue of the war that is now being waged between the European powers, it will in any case expose the Turkish sham by putting a decisive end to Turkey's present position.

But the Panislamist who has studied the relations between the Porte and the European nations during the last century, will be justified in forming the very lowest idea of European political morality. The actual survival of the Turkish regime until the present moment is the most crushing indictment of it; and the attitude of all the powers to the calamities Turkish chauvinism has continued to cause, has been so uniformly selfish and cold-blooded, that even an impartial spectator might plausibly ignore Turkey's guilt, and lay the responsibility at Europe's door. In discussing, then, with an Indian Moslem the probable behaviour of these nations towards Turkey after the present war is over, we shall carry greater conviction if we leave any possible factor of idealism out of the question, and assume that all alike will follow motives of the strictest self-interest.

What has Turkey to expect from the respective triumph of the two rival groups of powers?

Ever since the *rapprochement* between France and Russia nearly twenty years ago, Germany has been offering her friendship to Turkey with increasing

earnestness. The two powers have found a common object in their policy towards the *Entente*, and at the present crisis Germany has put ready money, first-class warships, and skilled soldiers at Turkey's disposal, and persuaded her to join in a struggle the issue of which is this concerted policy's success or failure.

If Germany had no other interest in the Turkish Empire than its military value in the battle for the supremacy of Europe, Turkey might win Germany's gratitude and her own advantage by throwing her sword into the balance; but the Turkish sword weighs too light to affect the scales. Its value to Germany is negligible, and if the *Entente* is crushed it will vanish altogether. In her inmost heart Germany looks at the Turkish Empire, not as an ally in the war, but as the prize of victory.

Turkey lies nearer than any other part of Asia to Europe; it contains temperate country suitable for European colonisation, besides semi-tropical country that can grow raw materials for Europe's industry, and supply markets for her finished productions; above all, it is a dominant position in the strategical geography of the World. Germany claims the "Sick Man's" gratitude because she has saved his festering limbs from the amputation which was their natural destiny, but she has only done so because she has a more voracious ambition than his former physicians: she purposes to swallow him whole like a boa-constrictor, and digest him without any preliminary breaking of his bones.

If Germany wins, the Porte may be maintained in being for many years as Germany's cat's-paw, but the Moslem nationalities, over whom the Porte rules, and whose future is the hope of Panislamism, are doomed to extinction. Germany knows that she cannot undo

Great Britain's work in Australia or New Zealand, and transform them into German lands: the vitality of the new Anglo-Saxon nations we have founded there is already too strong. Anatolia offers far better prospects. Its climate is equally temperate, while its population is no match yet for Europeans in numbers, energy, civilisation, or any other factors of survival. Turk and Arab would vanish away before German immigration as the Red Indian faded before the Anglo-Saxon onrush in North America, and the last hope of Islam would be blasted by the first realisation of the Pangerman Idea.

Turkey may be linked to Germany by common antagonism towards the *Entente*, yet for the Moslem nationalities the result of Germany's victory would be annihilation.

"But what," our Panislamist will ask, "if the Allies are victorious? You have already spoken plainly about dismantling the Turkish Empire, and if once you lay violent hands on its integrity, I fear you will not stop till you have achieved its dismemberment. You reassure your Russophobe by promising that his demands shall be satisfied, and reassure us by explaining that the Russophobe's standpoint is identical with our own, but the flames of a war like this melt down the established policies of nations. You hope to forge in this furnace a Concert of Europe. Suppose you succeed, and that England, France, and Russia pass beyond the stage of opportunist alliance and arrive at a profound mutual understanding: the Russophobe's point of view will have become obsolete in a moment, and the union of Europe will be cemented by the partition of the Moslem nationalities. The opiate of 'compensation' dulls the ache of the most irreconcilable ambitions. France resigned her claims on Egypt when England

secured her a free hand in Morocco, and we can easily forecast how the Three Powers will carve the Arabic provinces of Asia into 'spheres of influence,' and actually bring sullen, defeated Germany within the European fold (if their statesmanship rises to the occasion) by offering her the coveted Anatolia as a consolation."

This is a shrewd interpellation, and it does even more than justice to our lack of scruple; but it fails to envisage the fact that this war, though it may have been precipitated by the conflict between incompatible applications of the same crude nationalistic idea, is being fought out on the issue of incompatible ideals. The cause of the Allies does not stand for the triumph of one group of aggressively ambitious nations over another, nor for the coalition of both groups in a criminal conspiracy against the rest of the world: we have identified ourselves with the victory of three great principles—

(i.) That the general peace of the world is our sovereign interest, and that no political or economic advantage of an individual kind is commensurate with it.

(ii.) That peace can only be secured by giving free play to every manifestation of the spirit of Nationality.

(iii.) That national self-government, so far from being inimical to foreign economic interests in the country where it obtains, is able to reconcile otherwise incompatible ambitions by giving them a neutral political medium to work in.

The statement of these principles at last brings us out of the wood. The realisation of self-consciousness and self-government by the Arab and Turkish nationalities in the Nearer East is not merely the ultimate object of Panislamism or the ephemeral

programme of English Russophobia: it is one of the most important foundation-stones of that ideal structure of European harmony and international peace to which Great Britain and her allies stand publicly pledged, and which we cannot betray without forfeiting the sympathy of neutrals in the present crisis, and destroying all confidence in our honour for the future. The Panislamist may assure himself that not even the most brilliant opportunity of immediate material gain would tempt us thus to falsify our whole position, while the fact that adherence to these principles is the sole means of winning the Panislamist's trust and good-will, affords a further proof to ourselves of the proposition from which we started, that our own true interest lies in a "disinterested" effort to secure impartial justice to all our neighbours. It is our part, then, to proclaim our solemn intention of laying this stone true, and to sketch out a plan for fashioning it to fit its destined place.

D. *The New Anatolia*

Anatolia is physiologically a part of Europe, the fourth of those mountain-ribbed peninsulas that reach out from the European mass, and bathe their feet in the Mediterranean sea. It is an immense plateau of the same proportions and climatic character as Spain. An arid central upland is embattled against the coast on North and South by parallel sierras, clothed in forest, and rich in streams which are all engulfed, after a brief course, either by the sea on the outer flank or the steppe within: only towards the West does the plateau sink in long, fertile river valleys to a clement, sheltered coastline.

The aboriginal population of the region is a link

in that chain of "Brachycephalic" stocks which occupies the Eurasian concatenation of mountains from the Alps to the Mongolian tableland. It is distinguished by its sturdy build, hooked nose, and "sugar-loaf" skull. No race in the world's history has succumbed so readily to the impress of foreign nationality and civilisation, while none, perhaps, has shown such a reserve of passive vitality, such a power of perpetuating its fundamental characteristics.

For more than two thousand years[1] the race was exposed to the continually intensified influence of the Greeks, the strongest nationality in the Ancient World, till the Greek language had supplanted all the native dialects, and Greek civilisation become the standard of Anatolian uniformity. During the last eight centuries the Turk from Central Asia, the most vigorous race that has yet entered the world of Islam, has conquered this land from the Infidel and made it peculiarly his own.

The Turkish language, always one of the crudest in the world, and the Greek, once the most exquisite, match one another in nothing but vitality and proselytising power: they have measured their strength in the battle for the dominion of the Anatolian race, and the Turkish speech has won. In Cappadocia (the Eastern part of the plateau) the Greek dialects spoken by the dwindling Christian section of the population are on the eve of disappearance at this moment: their syntax has already conformed to the Turkish structure, and soon no trace will be left of them except a few fossils in the local Turkish vocabulary. Even on the East coast, Greek nationality nowhere now maintains itself with any vigour except at a few ports like Smyrna and Aivali, where it is backed up by the Greek sea-traffic

[1] From about 1200 B.C. to 1060 A.D.

of the Ægean and by the close proximity of Greek islands.

Yet though the Anatolian race has been converted to the speech of its Turkish conquerors as completely as it was converted to Hellenism before, and has adopted the Moslem creed they carried with them, it has informed its new religion and nationality with its own peculiar spirit. The "Ottoman" peasant thus produced has little in common with other populations that hold the same faith and speak the same tongue—Tatars of Baku, Kirghiz nomads on the Central Asiatic steppe, or Kashgari villagers in Chinese Turkestan: we can discern much more clearly his affinity with the Phrygian or Cappadocian familiar to the ancient Greek. He has the same stolidity and lack of initiative (with their complementary virtues), as antipathetic then as now to the Levantine of the Ægean. He has even the same trappings of material life, from his housing-system down to the conical-hat and curly-toed boots that distinguish the Hittites in Egyptian bas-reliefs; and beneath this exterior crust burn the same volcanic fires of religious frenzy which gave the cult of Attis and the Great Mother to Hellenism, and have forced upon Islam, since Anatolia entered the Moslem world, the "revivalistic" ecstasy of the "spinning dervish," so extraordinarily alien to Islam's sober genius.

The Anatolian, then, has a marked national character: he is also ripe for national self-government. To us the Turkish Empire is a symbol of political ineptitude, but three centuries ago our ancestors looked upon the Sublime Porte as the most efficient government in Europe, and admired the solidity of its paved high roads and nobly-arched bridges, the magnificence of its karavansarais, mosques, and arsenals, the professional

skill of its fleets, artillery, and standing army, precisely as Herodotus admired the far less ably organised empire of Darius. Since then the Turk has been outstripped by Europe, but if he has stood still, he has at any rate not lost ground. To govern oneself, moreover, is an easier task than to govern an empire, and if the Turk now confines himself to this, there is no reason why he should not succeed as well as his former subjects in the Balkans.

Anatolia will not become, any more than the Balkans, an industrial country, and the Turk will always be a laborious peasant rather than a keen-witted business man, but the political problems set before him will be simple. For four centuries the country has been in profound peace, and law and order are as firmly rooted there as in any state of Southern Europe, in striking contrast to the anarchy into which race hatred has plunged Macedonia and Albania, so much nearer to the centres of European civilisation. Abdul Hamid first conceived the fiendish idea of spreading this infection to his Asiatic subjects, yet unlike the chronic violence of the "bands" in Macedonia, the massacres of Greeks and Armenians in the Anatolian towns have not become more than hideous violations of a normal harmony.

If official chauvinism, by murder, forcible conversion, banishment, and that terrorism which leaves no real alternative to emigration, were to succeed in its object of eliminating these Christian populations from Anatolia altogether, it would be dealing as fatal a blow to the country's future prosperity as the Castilian government dealt to Spain, when it robbed her of her Moors and Jews. At that period the Porte showed its superiority to contemporary Christendom not merely

in efficiency but in liberality of soul, by giving the Spanish Jews harbourage in its own commercial cities, to their contentment and to the advantage of their adopted home. Since then Ottoman "official circles," in contradistinction to the Ottoman nation, have deteriorated indeed. They are venting their fury for their Balkan defeats not only upon the Greeks of the Thracian frontier, but upon the entirely unimplicated Greek population of the West coast, and now that they have plunged their country into the great European war, they may be expected to instigate fresh massacres of their Christian subjects at any moment.

This governing class, with the hopelessly debauched tradition which has descended from Abdul Hamid to the clique that overthrew him, must be swept away before it can complete its disastrous work. The Armenians and Greeks whom it is seeking to destroy are an indispensable element in the progress of the country. They possess all the qualities of brain that the native Anatolian lacks, and they have further improved their brains by education. To begin with, at any rate, the new Anatolian national government will depend largely upon them for its *personnel*, and they will render faithful service to the alien country of their birth if she grants them the scope which their abilities deserve. They are as able minded as are the classes of corresponding education in Europe, they have always been employed in the subordinate grades of the Ottoman administration, and the greatness of the Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries falls in large measure to their credit. The Anatolian Christian is the chosen vessel for the fulfilment of the Panislamist's prayer, the elevation of the Anatolian Turk to an equality with the nations of Europe.

The people of Anatolia must be given as free a hand as possible to build up a native political tradition on a new basis. The present government has taken the opportunity of the European war to denounce the "Capitulations," and the diplomatic representatives of all European powers have protested against their action. It certainly has no legal justification, and is but a further exemplification of the existing regime's true character. If, however, the immense changes we have proposed are to any extent realised, we must do our part by letting this protest lapse. In reimposing the Capitulations upon a reformed national government of Anatolia we should be committing a grave error, not because the administration of justice will be purged by magic of its imperfections, but because any improvement of it will be impossible so long as these humiliating exceptions to its writ are maintained.

European residents in Turkey enjoy these privileges by a historical chance, but Europeans elect to reside in many worse-governed countries without similar guarantees. If, moreover, that vital artery of international commerce, the Black Sea Straits, be removed, as we propose, from Turkish jurisdiction, the most important European commercial colony which the Capitulations serve to protect will be withdrawn from the operation of Turkish justice.

Anatolia must start its new political life untrammelled, yet political self-government is not the only factor in the progress of a country. If it is to play its part in modern international civilisation, it must also tap its native sources of material wealth, and this can only be done by the generous application of capital. Deposits of mineral ore are valueless till elaborate plant is brought to bear on them by men with skill to work it. The margin

of the central steppe cannot be made to yield corn again, as it did in the eleventh century A.D. before the Turk came, till the mountain torrents have been made to deliver their last drop of water to the husbandman by irrigation-canals below and barrage-storage in the high valleys, and till reaping machinery has been imported from Lincoln or Chicago. Neither grain nor metal can be brought within reach of consumers till mine and field have been put into communication by rail with the port on the coast.

These operations must be carried out before a single atom of wealth can be extracted from the resources they are intended to throw open, and their installation is very costly. They can therefore only be undertaken if some surplus has been saved from wealth previously produced by another source or in another quarter. Such surpluses do not easily begin to accrue, but once they have started, their effect on the production of wealth is so immense that they grow by geometrical progression.

The nucleus of that capital which in little more than a century has transformed the face of the world, was accumulated by the middle class in the nations of Western Europe, after they had put wars of religion and constitutional struggles behind them, and arrived at a strong national government which set them free to turn their best energies into economic channels. The force that resides in capital, the magic power of transforming the earth and of conjuring wealth from its bosom, has placed the rest of the world at Europe's feet; but in Turkey, as in other countries that have lagged behind Europe in political advance, such accumulation has never been made. Aimless wars of adventure have continued to keep the peasant living from year to year

on the verge of ruin, and the Greek and Armenian townsfolk, who had the intellectual and moral capacity for achieving as much as the European middle class, have been singled out for repression by the Turkish government. Turkey must borrow the capital she requires, not from her own citizens, but from Europe; and Europe, finding that she holds a monopoly of this commodity with which Turkey cannot dispense, is not disposed to offer her a market on easy conditions.

The history of exploitation in Anatolia centres round the construction of her railways.[1] Immediately after the Crimean War an English and a French company acquired concessions for lines which started from Smyrna, the natural capital of Anatolia on the middle point of the West coast, and worked Eastwards up the river valleys on to the interior plateau. The French line has now been pushed up the Hermus valley through Ala Shehr (Philadelphia) to Afiun Kara Hissar, and the English line up the parallel Mæander valley to the south through Aidin to Chivril and Buldur.[2] Germany, however, since she supplanted England and France in the Porte's friendship, has blocked the further advance of these two railways by securing the concession for a railway to Bagdad.

The German line starts from Skutari, the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople in a remote corner of Anatolia, and makes its way Southwards past Ismid to the plateau level at Eski Shehr, across a very difficult series of mountain ranges among which the Sangarius winds in gorges. Thereafter the way is plain to Afiun Kara Hissar, and the line proceeds South-East along the inner

[1] See Map VI.
[2] The two lines reached Kassaba and Aidin respectively in 1866. See Map VI.

edge of Taurus through Konia to Bulgharlu, a village at the foot of the Bulghar Dagh, where the Taurus wall begins to turn North-East, and the railway, if it is to continue its course, must pierce it by a mighty tunnel.

As far as this tunnel, the line has been in working order for some years.[1] Its achievement is a triumph of that co-operation between individual capital and national diplomacy by which modern Germany has effected so much. Besides pointing the way to the promised land beyond the Taurus, it absorbs such internal trade as already exists in the section of Anatolia to the North-East, except for the little that goes in and out by the Black Sea coast. Connection with the French rail-head at Afiun Kara Hissar is carefully avoided, so that all traffic which reaches that point from the East is compelled to pass the whole way along the German line to Skutari instead of taking the natural route to Smyrna.

This masterly railway is the most potent instrument Germany has forged for diverting all new wealth tapped in Anatolia into German pockets, and finally turning the country itself into a German-peopled land. Yet this policy is not peculiar to Germany. It is only a particularly successful instance of what all European nations attempt, with more or less singleness of aim and perseverance, so soon as a well-placed loan brings a more backward country into their power. It is usury in the most sinister sense, conducted on a national scale.

Honourable investment aims at an increase of wealth

[1] The concession for the extension to Bagdad was signed in January 1902. The Constantinople-Ismid section was completed as early as 1872, and extended to Konia after 1888 by the Anatolian Railway Company. This was at first a combined Germano-British concern; but the German group soon bought out the British rights, and proceeded to obtain the Bagdad concession. They then organised a new "Bagdad Railway Company" to which the "Anatolian Railway Company" made over the execution of the contract.

which shall bring the investor a just profit out of the surplus thereby created. Usury forces the borrower to pledge all that he has, up to many times the value of the loan, trading on the fact that he cannot do without borrowing at the moment. It hopes, not for his success, but for his ruin, because its quarry is the pledge and not the interest: its object is achieved when it has got the victim into its power, body and soul. The plentifulness of capital and the competition of investors have made usury on the individual scale an almost obsolete evil in modern Europe, but the centralisation of capitalistic control has introduced it into the intercourse of nations. It gives the strong a subtler, more business-like means of oppressing the weak than the clumsy warfare of mere diplomacy and armaments. Since Peace depends ultimately on Justice, our ideal of making Peace secure will not be realised till we have exorcised, not only "blood and iron," but National Usury as well.

It is neither possible nor desirable to confiscate foreign capital in Anatolia. That would be an indefensible breach of faith with the bond-holders, and the worst folly from the point of view of the country's own interests, for it would close to her the coffers of international finance at the moment when she needs to dip more deeply into them than ever. We must devise arrangements by which foreign enterprise shall secure profits advantageous enough to evoke it to the full extent of Anatolia's needs, without enabling it to seize the paramount economic control, and thereby the ultimate political dominion, of the Anatolian national state.

The most powerful foreign authority to which the material resources of the Ottoman Empire are at present subject, is the International Administration of the Public

Debt. Turkey's allies in the Crimean War taught her how to borrow in the European money market, and a reckless period of extravagance followed. When it terminated towards the end of the 'seventies in the Balkan revolt and the disastrous Russian War, Turkey found the purse-strings closed against her, and became unable either to meet her past obligations out of her revenue or to incur others to liquidate them. The result was the Decree of December 1881, which consolidated the whole outstanding debt, handed over the problem of dealing with it to a mixed committee, consisting of delegates from the bond-holders of all the interested nationalities, and put at the absolute disposal of this committee, in which the Ottoman Government itself had no footing, six classes of public revenue for the debt's service.

This international administration has wielded for a generation a power far greater than any single foreign government has yet acquired in Turkey, or could ever acquire without the virtual supersession of Turkish sovereignty; but it has employed it entirely to the country's benefit, just because it does not represent the sinister interest of national rivalry, but the common interest of bond-holders of all nationalities to co-operate with the Turkish people in order to promote the increase of the country's resources upon which all alike have their respective claims. The commissioners have interpreted their mandate in a liberal spirit, and some of the most fruitful economic developments that Turkey has experienced in the meanwhile have been initiated in the spheres under their control, and financed by funds accumulated in their coffers. Whatever political transformations the Ottoman Empire may undergo, the financial authority of the International Adminis-

tration must remain unimpaired, not only out of justice to the foreign bond-holders, but because its continued activity will be the New Anatolia's best bulwark against exploitation by individual nations, and the best guarantee for the continuance of her economic progress on lines primarily advantageous to her own citizens.

But there are other, and less legitimate, forms of foreign privilege in Turkey which might well lapse with the dismantling of the Empire, or at any rate be allowed to drag less heavily upon the freedom of the rejuvenated Anatolia.

(i.) It is not enough to give the new Anatolian government judicial independence by abolishing the Capitulations, unless we give it fiscal independence as well, and that is at present seriously limited by a number of treaties with the various European powers, which fix a maximum *ad valorem* import duty for the Turkish Customs. It might be argued that if European thrift has been hit so heavily by Turkish insolvency, it is only fair that Europe should be given the chance of recouping herself by obtaining favoured treatment in Turkish trade. Yet European merchants have already gained infinitely more by the customs-treaties than European investors lost by the bankruptcy, while the latter interest is actually prejudiced by the present arrangement, for the Customs were one of the six revenues ceded to the Debt Administration, and their augmentation would profit the European bond-holders as well as the Anatolian government. Even in equity, then, the *status quo* has little justification, but legally there is no case for it at all. Most of the treaties lapsed over twenty years ago, and have only been maintained in operation by the cynical refusal of the

powers concerned to discuss their modification. In fact, the Powers' attitude towards Turkish finance has rested latterly on their ability to exercise coercion.

The time has now come to cry quits. In 1907 the first step was accomplished, when Turkey obtained permission to raise the import duty to 11 per cent., in order to pay for the special administration of Macedonia demanded by the Powers themselves. This is a good precedent for compensating the Anatolian government (and its European bond-holders) for the loss of their most important source of Customs revenue in the Black Sea Straits, by setting them at liberty to fix their tariff at whatever rate they choose within the sanctuary of their reduced frontiers. The authority of the Debt Administration gives security that the concession would be used with prudence, and even a mistaken fiscal policy would only injure Anatolia herself, and could be regarded with indifference by Europe, so long as the vitally important waterway to the Black Sea was excluded from its sphere of operation.

(ii.) The foreign railway companies, in framing their contracts with the Government, have stipulated that the latter shall guarantee them a certain minimum of annual profit, calculated at so much per kilometre of permanent way in working order. The Government has to make good any deficits on this amount.

Considering the poorness of the country and the irresponsible character of the Government, which by its provocative foreign policy was capable of disorganising at any moment such trade as there was, it was reasonable that Turkey should shoulder the economic consequences of any political folly she committed.[1] If,

[1] The system was not applied to the earlier railway enterprises in the Ottoman Empire. It was only initiated in 1888, when railway con-

however, under a new regime the annual average of Anatolian trade increases, and the country schools itself to a more reassuring political tradition, the risk to bondholders will gradually sink to the same average as in Europe, and the survival of the "kilometric guarantee" will leave them with an unearned advantage, while retaining the Anatolian government under an unmerited liability. When this stage is reached, the public opinion of the European nations will be at fault, if it does not permit the cancelling of the guarantees before the term fixed by the contracts.

(iii.) The Anatolian nation can most effectively parry the political danger from foreign railway enterprise by establishing a "balance of power" between the companies of the different nations concerned.[1]

At present the German concession threatens to dominate Anatolia. After cutting diagonally across the country from the Straits to the Taurus, it is to proceed through the Cilician tunnel (which is being excavated at this moment) to Adana, the urban centre of the largest and most fertile Anatolian coast-plain, whence two lines already run to the ports of Mersina and Iskanderun.[2] It will thus include the two most important strategical positions in the peninsula, Afiun Kara Hissar, the central node of communications, and the Cilician tunnel, the door through the chief barrier between the country's two most important pieces of coastline.

struction, although urgently needed for the development of the country, had come to a standstill because no foreign investors would risk their capital, and its adoption certainly brought the required capital into the field. The scale of guarantee is fixed independently for each concession, and there is no uniform rate.

[1] See Map VI.

[2] A British enterprise completed in 1886 and bought out by the German company.

It would be feasible to demand that the German company, in return for adequate compensation elsewhere, should resign its claim to the sections of the railway South-East of Konia. It is clear that these sections are not economically desirable in themselves. The first runs through a desolate strip between steppe and mountains, the second is the costly tunnel, which will eat up any profits the Adana section beyond it may bring in. Their importance to Germany is political, and in asking her to resign them in exchange for economically more advantageous openings in another direction the Anatolian government would be safeguarding its own interests without violating the legitimate interests of Germany. The German company would be more than compensated by receiving the monopoly of all construction in the well-watered but at present entirely undeveloped Cappadocian region North-East of the central steppe, as far as the new Russian frontier. A branch has already thrust itself Eastward from Eski Shehr to Angora. Hence it could be carried across the Kizil Irmak River (Halys) and might split thereafter into two arms. One would stretch E.S.E. through Kaisaria to Malatia on the West bank of Euphrates, skirting the ribs of Taurus on the North; the other would work its way North-East through Yozgat and Amasia to the Black Sea port of Samsun.[1]

What nation is to step into Germany's shoes, and

[1] The startling advantage gained by Germany in the Anatolian Railway contract led Russia to obtain an agreement from Turkey reserving to her own enterprise the construction of all railways in Anatolia that should debouch on the Black Sea coast. As yet, however, she has taken no advantage of this concession, and if she gained the proposed extension of her Caucasian frontier to the West and South she might fairly be asked to abandon economic interests in Anatolia outside this new line, in exchange for complete political and economic control inside it.

secure for its own investors the right to buy out the German company's interest in the Konia-Adana section? Every consideration suggests Italy. Italy has suffered even more than Germany by being handicapped in the European race. Her Abyssinian adventure was disastrous; her recent acquisition on the North African coast gives her a very limited field; in the interest of Balkan independence and European peace we have proposed to deny her expansion across the mouth of the Adriatic into Albania, and finally we have asked her to relinquish her aspirations to her Istrian and Triestine "irredenta," in deference to Germany's need for a neutral economic outlet upon the Adriatic. If, then, the Anatolian government, for reasons of its own, decides to remove a certain region from the sphere of German enterprise, Italy has surely the best claim to fill the vacant place, and receive the commission of opening up Anatolia's resources in this particular direction.

Italy, moreover, is already in negotiation with the Ottoman government for a railway concession in the hinterland of Adalia, the only port on the South coast of Anatolia to the West of the Adana district that has practicable lines of communication through the Taurus with the central plateau. One branch of the new Adalia railway would run N.N.W., and meet the English company's railhead at Buldur: another would work across the mountains in a North-Easterly direction, and emerge after many detours at Konia. Konia would thus become the junction of three railway systems. The German lines from the North would meet at this point the two railways leading to Adana and Adalia on the South coast, and it would be an obvious convenience that the latter should be under the same management.

We have suggested the partition of Anatolian railway enterprise among companies of four different nationalities, French, English, German, and Italian, co-ordinating their spheres in such a way as to give no one of them the opportunity of becoming a political power in the land. The bond-holders and the governments behind them, instead of regarding their economic presence in Anatolia as the thin end of a political wedge, must count it all gain that they find scope for their enterprise there at all, and resign themselves to see their hold diminish annually, as the country is gradually raised by their agency towards the level of native wealth which will enable it in the end to dispense with their services altogether. On the day when she has accumulated enough capital to buy out all the foreign companies at a generous price, and enough human skill to administer their enterprises with a national *personnel* of her own, Turkey will have reached her majority, and fulfilled the Panislamist's dream by taking her stand on an equal footing with the nations of Europe.

We have now only to mark out the frontiers of the rejuvenated Anatolian state, before we pass on to Arabia. On the North-West towards the Black Sea Straits and on the North-East towards the Russian Empire, they are already defined : we have still two questions to consider, the sovereignty of the Islands and the frontier towards Arabia itself.

(i.) The islands off the Anatolian coast fall into three divisions.

(*a*) The group along the Northern section of the West coast, which is entirely Greek in nationality, and was conquered by the Kingdom of Hellas in the late Balkan War. It consists of Mitylini, Khios, Psara, Samos and Nikaria. In spite of the Young Turk chauvinists,

these islands must remain united with Greece, since that is the unanimous desire of their inhabitants.

(*b*) Those along the Southern section of the West coast, stretching in a chain from Patmos to Rhodes (the "Sporades") and including the stragglers Astypalia, Karpathos and Kasos besides. This group was occupied by Italy in the course of her war against Turkey in 1912, and she stipulated in the treaty of Lausanne that it should remain in her hands till Tripoli had been completely evacuated by Turkish troops, after which it should be restored to the Ottoman government. Italy has shown no signs of relinquishing her hold, but Europe must make the sanction of the Adana and Adalia concessions conditional upon her doing so. The islands, however, must not pass again into the hands of Turkey. They are as Greek as the Northern group in speech and feeling. The New Anatolia must resign all claims over them to the Concert of Europe, and the Concert must assign them to the Kingdom of Hellas.

(*c*) Just at the corner where West and South coasts meet, the tiny rock of Kastelóritsa lies in the lee of the mainland. Its population makes a considerable livelihood by the Mediterranean sponge-fishing industry, which attracts its sailing-boats as far afield as the North African coast, and it is intensely Greek in national sentiment.

Kastelóritsa is the smallest Greek island: the largest is Cyprus. It, too, lies off the South coast, but further to the East and far out to sea, its outer flank being roughly equidistant from Adalia, Iskanderun and Beirut.

Till Turkey entered the war, the status of Cyprus was similar to that of the Sporades. It dated from a secret agreement, concluded between Turkey and Great

Britain in June 1878, after the close of the Russo-Turkish war and on the eve of the Berlin Congress.

The Russian victory had alarmed Great Britain for the safety of her Mediterranean route to India. She therefore arranged with the Porte that if Russia retained the Armenian fortress of Kars in the settlement, the island of Cyprus should be placed in British hands. The legal sovereignty was to remain with the Sultan, and Great Britain undertook in return to guarantee the integrity of the Sultan's continental dominions in Asia, within whatever frontiers were fixed at the impending Congress.

The terms of the Berlin Treaty brought these provisional stipulations into force. Russia kept Kars, but the British guarantee vetoed her further advance towards the Levantine coast : even should the guarantee prove abortive, the occupation of Cyprus left Great Britain in strategical command of the situation.

At the rupture of peace, however, the Berlin Treaty lapsed with all its corollaries, and Cyprus was formally annexed to the British Empire.[1]

Russophobes will rejoice at the step, because it brings Cyprus completely under our control. "According to your own proposals," they will say, "the resettlement after the present war is to advance the Russian frontier right across the Armenian plateau, at least half the distance towards the Mediterranean shore. This makes the retention of Cyprus more important to Great Britain than ever it was before."

Yet the problems of Cyprus and Armenia are completely on a par. In both the national factor is at

[1] This transfer of legal sovereignty to the actual possessor was parallel to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. It was merely a formal act. Austria, however, was at peace with Turkey when she took the step, and therefore acted in violation of valid obligations.

variance with such strategical considerations, and if in Armenia nationality is to prevail, we must defer to it in Cyprus likewise. The war has set us free to dispose of Cyprus, as well as to retain it. We shall choose the former alternative, if we are wise.

The island has benefited much by our strong government (a process of disinfection which every country needs to go through, when it passes out of Turkish rule), but that phase is now almost past. The population is Greek in language and civilisation, and is becoming more and more so in national aspiration.[1] It cannot be separated permanently from the Greek national state. At some moment Great Britain must gracefully retire, and we should allay irritation if we were to proclaim forthwith under what circumstances we should consent to do so. The natural term to fix would be the moment when Anatolia buys out her foreign railways. When she has so far recruited her native economic strength, she will afford such an effective strategical bulwark for the British route to India that the Russophobe will sleep in peace at last.

Thus all the islands off the Anatolian coast would pass eventually into the hands of Greece, and the continental state might justly complain that if Greece were allowed to fortify them and convert their harbours into naval bases at her pleasure, Anatolia would virtually be subjected to a continuous blockade. The passage from Smyrna itself to the open sea would be liable at any moment to be closed by flotillas acting from Mitylini and Khios on either flank. In handing over, therefore, to Greece the islands nowin Italianoccupation, Europe should stipulate that not only they, but those acquired by Greece in 1912, and also Cyprus whenever

[1] The population was 237,000 in 1901, of whom 22% were Moslem.

she may acquire it, shall be neutralised from the military point of view : Greece on her part must promise Europe to leave them unfortified, and Europe on hers must guarantee their perpetual political union with Greece. When this is done, it will be both needless and useless for Anatolia to covet the possession of the islands any longer.

(ii.) In drawing the frontier between Anatolia and Arabia, we must compromise, as usual, between national distribution and the configuration of the country. The line[1] should start from the Mediterranean coast at Ras al Hanzir, the cape that contains the Gulf of Iskanderun on the South-East. It should run first North-East and then North along the summit of the Amanus range, parallel to the coast of the gulf and only a few miles distant from it, thus assigning Iskanderun itself to Anatolia. When it reaches the latitude of the most Northerly point in the gulf, it should turn East, cross the valley of the Kara Su, and proceed North-East again along the summit of the Kurt Dagh. Thence it should follow the divide between the Pyramus and Euphrates basins in the same direction, till it reached the latitude in which the Euphrates makes its great bend from a Westerly to a Southerly course, below Samsat. At this point it should turn due East and head for the Euphrates, striking it just at the bend.

This line leaves a fringe of Turkish population outside, but the districts this minority inhabits are geographically dependent on the great Arabic city of Aleppo, and cannot be sundered from it politically.

[1] See Map VI.

E. *The New Arabia*

We have now to deal with the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, which forms an indivisible geographical unit.

Since the beginning of the present geological period, the heavy rain and snow falls of the Armenian plateau have been furrowing out the Euphrates and Tigris systems for their issue, and grinding away the surface of the mountains to deposit it as silt at the head of the Persian Gulf, under the Western lee of the neighbour-plateau of Persia. In the course of ages the rivers' action has made the sea give place to an alluvial plain hardly less level than itself, nearly four hundred miles long and about a third as much in breadth.

If we compare this land of Irak-Arabi (the "Shinar" of the Bible) to the orchestra of a Greek theatre, we shall find the auditorium in the gently-tilted plateaux that rise from the plain in a great semicircle to the West and South. From the point where they ascend above the irrigation-limit of the rivers, these plateaux become waterless desert, producing at best a sparse crop of grasses in the spring, and presenting at worst a surface of shifting sand-hills, or of basalt boulder-fields, the relic of volcanic upheavals. As the barren shelves mount away from the rivers their slope becomes steeper, till finally it culminates in a great retaining wall of mountains which rises higher than all, and then plunges straight down to sea-level on its sheer Western face.

This mountain-rim of the desert falls into two sharply contrasted sections. Syria, in the North, abuts upon the Mediterranean, and the West winds from the Atlantic carry their moisture down the whole length

of the Inland Sea to surrender it in life-giving rain when they strike Lebanon and the "Hill country of Judah" on its extreme shore. Syria shares the climate and vegetation of Southern Europe, but the Hejaz, which continues the line of Syria towards the South-East, is backed by nothing better than the Red Sea, a sultry creek separated from the Atlantic by the vast breadth of the Sahara. Here the desert has no redeeming Western fringe, and the strip of coast beneath the mountain wall, along which lie the ports of the Holy Cities of Islam, is the most cruel country in the whole region.

In this stern theatre has been played the world-drama of the Semitic Race. Bred in the keen air of the pitiless plateaux, which gives men the fire of vitality without the fuel to maintain it, the Semitic nations in wave after wave have surged down into the arena of Irak, or beaten upwards against the breakwater of the Syrian mountains, to scatter themselves in spray over all the Mediterranean shores. The last and mightiest of these cataclysms was Islam, whose tide in the seventh century A.D. swept out from the Hejaz over the world; and, though it has long since receded from its furthest marks, it has settled permanently over this original Semitic area, and given it its final colour both in religion and nationality.

In spite of a few surviving outcrops of earlier strata, the present population of the region is as homogeneous as its permanent geographical structure. Arabic speech and Moslem faith provide an adequate basis for a new national life, and materials for the superstructure itself are ready to hand. The civilised urban class of the Syrian towns has sent representatives of considerable political ability to the Ottoman parliament, and is no less capable than the Anatolian Turk of carrying on the functions of self-government on its own account. Its

own constructive efforts will be immensely reinforced by the co-operation of talented and highly-educated volunteers from Arabic lands like Egypt and Algeria, whose populations have enjoyed the benefit of European "strong government," and will welcome the opportunity of propagating its fruits without its thorns in this new independent focus of Arabic tradition. Moreover, the "New Arabia" will not be the spiritual centre of the Arab race alone. By taking over from the Ottoman Empire the guardianship of the Holy Cities, it will inherit from it the primacy of the whole Moslem world. The sovereign of the new state will become the official head of Islam, and Arabia would do well to elect as its first constitutional sultan some prince of the reigning Ottoman house, who would inherit by birth the personal claim to the Caliphate won by his ancestor Selim, and transmit it to his heirs. This junior branch of the Ottoman line would soon eclipse its cousins who continued to rule over Anatolia, and the Arab would oust the Turk again from the dominant place among Mohammedan nations.

Yet however much assistance the new nation may receive from the loyal sympathy and service of all Islam, the task before it is not easy. The Arabians will inherit more evil than good from the Ottoman Empire.

Europe must, of course, free them from the bondage of the Capitulations and the customs-treaties, with the same liberality for which we have appealed in the case of Anatolia; but they will have to shoulder a heavy burden in their proportionate share of the Ottoman national debt, and will pay for the follies of a ruling class for which they are even less responsible than the Anatolian peasant.

The revenues ceded, by the decree of 1881, to the international Administration of the Debt must be left, as heretofore, under the Administration's control, in spite of the break in political continuity. The surveillance of an expert European executive over the chief factors of native finance will indeed be as great a boon to the New Arabia for many years to come as it has been to the moribund Ottoman Empire during the last generation. The native government will be able to devote itself to internal problems of nationality, which are ultimately of more importance and immediately more within its scope.

(i.) The Christian minority falls into several groups, of which the Maronites in Lebanon are considerably the most important. Descended from the older Syriac race, they have preserved their dialect and religion ever since the Arabs brought Islam into the land. In the eighteenth century they entered into full communion with the Roman Church, and came thereby into relation with France, already the leading Catholic power. The French influence was confirmed by the result of the Crimean War. In 1864, not many years after peace had been made, there was a rising of the Maronites in defence of their prescriptive autonomy, and France insisted upon the erection of an autonomous Lebanon-vilayet, which was placed under a Christian governor nominated by the Porte, but was also guaranteed by Europe. The Maronites constitute about three-fifths of the population in this favoured area.[1] Thanks to their native history and to the French missions, they are at once the most vigorous and the most intelligent element in Syria, and however optimistic we may be

[1] There are about 300,000 of them in the Lebanon, and perhaps half a million in the whole of Syria.

of the New Arabia's success, we must on no account allow the Lebanon to lose its special status.

Not only must the Maronites' autonomy be preserved : it must be extended, if possible, in a more rudimentary form to the remnant of Monophysite "Jacobites" scattered through the provinces of Urfa, Diarbekr and Mardin, and to that fraction of the Nestorians that has ventured to leave its mountain refuge in Zagros and the Urumia basin, and to settle among the Moslems in the lowland district of Mosul on the Tigris. Unlike the Maronites, these fragments of more Easterly communities are sadly broken in spirit, but their social condition has been greatly improved of late years by the splendid American missions. The revival already manifesting itself among them may even spread to the neglected and isolated little sect of Satan-worshippers who dwell West of Mosul in the Sinjar hills, and secure for them a similar recognition.

(ii.) While there is no friction between the Christian peasant and his industrious Moslem neighbour of Arabic speech, both alike are harried by alien mountain clans. It will be one of the first duties of the new government to pacify these with a strong arm, for hitherto they have defied the distant authorities at Constantinople.

In Syria itself the Druses, Arab in speech but heretical in faith, have so far proved irreconcilable Ishmaelites. They are strongly entrenched in the trough between Lebanon and anti-Lebanon, and their settlements in the Hauran place them astride the pilgrim railway from Damascus to the Hejaz.[1]

In the extreme North-East corner of the country, beyond Mosul, the Kurdish shepherds in the intricate valleys of the Greater and Lesser Zab are more formid-

[1] The total number of Druses in Syria is about 145,000.

able still, and their reduction presents the problem of the Caucasus or the North-West Frontier of India on a small scale. The task here will be lightened by the fact that by far the larger section of the Kurdish race falls within the sphere we have assigned to Russia, so that the section left to Arabia will already be hemmed in by the strong Russian military frontier in the North and East, when the Arabian gendarmerie attempts to penetrate it from the South-West. Even so, the operation may prove beyond the new state's powers, in which case Europe must give Russia the mandate of acting here on Arabia's behalf, with the strict understanding that temporary military occupation of a district gives her no permanent political claims to it.

(iii.) When Christian communities have been reconciled by some measure of devolution, and when Kurds and Druses have been chastised, the new Arabian administration will find itself in effective possession of the whole Northern portion of its territory, from the Syrian coast to the head of the Persian Gulf. This is the only part that counts from the economic point of view, but the uninviting South cannot simply be left to its own devices. It is no use establishing law and order in the cultivated lands and among the mountain fastnesses in their midst, if the Bedawin of the desert are still suffered to raid them at their pleasure, and unless the government effectively polices the pilgrim routes to the Holy Cities, which lie in the very heart of the South, it will forfeit altogether the esteem of the Moslem world. Its duty is to achieve these two objects with the least possible expenditure of effort.

A pilgrim railway, surveyed by Moslem engineers, built by Moslem labour, and financed by the offerings of the Faithful, was completed from Damascus as far

as Medina in 1908,[1] and will be carried forward as soon as possible to Mekka: a further line will link Mekka with the port of Jidda on the Red Sea coast, a way of approach already much more frequented than the Damascus route. The railway does not merely make the journey easier for the pilgrims: it greatly simplifies the government's task of securing their safe passage, for it gives organised troops a strategical advantage that more than counterbalances the Bedawi's superior adaptation to his native desert.[2] To keep its garrisons at Jidda, Mekka and Medina in touch with their Syrian base, the government need only patrol the railway, and throw strong military detachments into the nearest oasis-towns, like Teima and Kaibar, on the railway's Eastern flank. Further North it should occupy the oasis of Jof, half-way between Akaba and Basra, where the Northward trail from Nejd emerges out of the Great Nefud sand-waste into the steppe land between Damascus and Euphrates. A chain of forts held in Al Hasa, the province along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf, would protect Koweit and Basra from South-Western raiders.

Having thus secured the routes to the Holy Cities and the borders of the Northern provinces, the new state would be well advised to treat the remainder of the Arabian peninsula as we have recommended the Albanian government to treat its mountain clans: it should take the responsibilities of sovereignty as lightly as it can.

Nejd, the heart of the plateau South of the Great Nefud, is divided at present into several principalities—

[1] It was begun in 1901.

[2] Compare the use made of railways in the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Soudan.

Hayyil, Kasim, Er-riad—whose rulers govern the population of the oases, and exercise a shadowy control over the Bedawin tribes, which would starve if they could not supplement the miserable produce of their flocks with the dates of the oases' palm-groves. The country is built on so vast a scale, and the means of life and communication are so scanty, that permanent occupation, even by a power that had unlimited blood and treasure to waste upon an unprofitable adventure, would certainly prove an impossibility, and the prophet Mohammed himself was the first and last sovereign to attempt it, till the seizure of the Holy Cities by the Wahabi sectaries led Ibrahim Pasha, the brilliant son of Mehemet Ali, to make a compaign of reprisal. For a few years the whole of Central Arabia was held down by Egyptian garrisons,[1] but the strain was too great, and upon the first weakening of Mehemet's prestige, his Arabian Empire vanished into thin air. The new Arabian government will be promoting its own interest best if it leaves Bedawi-sheikh and oasis-prince to keep each other in check, satisfied that so long as it holds Jidda, Basra and Damascus in its own hand, all Nejd is ultimately amenable to its sovereignty. Except through these three gates the region can have no intercourse with the outer world, and can neither sell its dates and camels abroad, nor import arms or other goods of civilised manufacture, without the government's knowledge and sanction.

The same policy of non-intervention should be applied to Asir, the Red Sea province immediately South of Hejaz. The population is strongly tinged with Shiism, in spite of its proximity to the hearths of Moslem

[1] The Egyptian occupation of Nejd lasted altogether, in varying degrees of effectiveness, from 1818 to 1842.

orthodoxy, and is in a state of perpetual revolt against the present Ottoman regime. Further South still, the Arabian State should resign altogether its claims to sovereignty over the Yemen.

Yemen is the Southernmost section of the plateaux: the Western retaining-wall of mountain rises here to its greatest height, and like the corresponding Abyssinian highlands beyond the opposite coast, it comes within the range of the equatorial rains. Fed from the Indian Ocean, the monsoons discharge themselves against the Yemen from the South, and produce a wealth of moisture and vegetation in striking contrast to the desert belt fifteen degrees broad that separates this area from the Syrian region within the influence of the Mediterranean.

The Yemen has been no less isolated from the rest of the peninsula in its political history, than in its geographical character: whenever the opportunity has occurred, it has placed itself under a native dynasty of its own, and it will doubtless wish to do so once more. The most satisfactory arrangement would be to give the country complete internal self-government under the protectorate of Great Britain. Our authority has been established for seventy-five years at Aden, the chief port of the region just outside the entrance to the Red Sea, and our influence is already paramount in Hadramaut, the province immediately East of the Yemen along the peninsula's Southern coast. The Southern frontier of the New Arabia would accordingly start from the Red Sea coast at about latitude 17, opposite the Farsan islands; it would follow an imaginary straight line in a North-Easterly direction, skirting the Northern edge of the Roba-al-Hali, the greatest desert in all Arabia, and would run right across the

peninsula to the Persian Gulf, reaching it at latitude 25 near the head of the Bahrein bay between Al Hofuf and the peninsula of Katar.

In mere extent of territory the state whose frontiers we have now delimited would contain an enormous preponderance of irreclaimable land inhabited by intractable populations, yet as we prophesied in the case of Armenia, the continuous action of good government will shift the true centre of gravity more and more decisively from the "desert" to the "sown." Arabia has a more splendid economic asset than any that Albania, Armenia or even the Anatolian plateau possess.

The great alluvial plain of Irak is potentially one of the most favourable environments for human life in the world, and has actually rivalled the valley of the Nile and the great Chinese rivers in bringing the earliest civilisation to flower, but its value to Man depends upon Man's own mastery of it. Left to themselves, the Tigris and Euphrates allow half the plain to crumble into the dust of the desert, and turn the other half into malarial swamp, as unfriendly to human habitation as the unreclaimed Egyptian delta. Only civilised forethought and organisation, regulating the river-system by a network of canals, can distribute the water in better proportion, and enable Irak to realise its destiny as a cornland of marvellous capacity.

From the dawn of history in the fourth millennium B.C., until Babylon was crushed by the leaden yoke of Darius' empire, the irrigation of Irak was perfect and its fertility the wonder of the world. Again under the Abbasid caliphs, who ruled from this centre a realm broader than Darius', and revived the glories of Babylon in their new city of Bagdad on the Tigris, the province enjoyed a second lease of prosperity nearly

five centuries long, till the Mongol invasion devastated it in the thirteenth century A.D. Since then Irak has lain desolate, like a symbol of Islamic civilisation itself. The canal-system is derelict: only a few of the main arteries are kept in working order. The population has dwindled: there are more Bedawin in the land than husbandmen. Nature has assumed her primitive face, as it was when Oannes, the Sumerian culture-god, first arose from the sea; but Nature cannot be left unchallenged by the twentieth century, with its vast material power and its still vaster increase of population that threatens to outstrip that power's capacity to provide for it. The Young Turk government has already negotiated a contract for irrigation work on a modest scale, and the New Arabia must throw herself into the task in the grand manner. There is the possibility of recovering for cultivation as many acres in Irak as British engineering has won back in the Punjab during the two generations we have ruled there. The chief need will be human labour, to dig the channels, cast up the embankments, and till the new fields created by these operations, and a vast reservoir of men exists in the twenty-four million Moslems of Bengal. They are already hard pressed for some avenue of expansion, and their religion would accommodate them without difficulty to the country.

When the fertility of Irak has been restored, it must be put in communication by railway with Arabia's chief ports.

(i.) Bagdad has heretofore communicated with the Mediterranean by circuitous routes to the North-West, which cling to the tiny ribbon of moisture and vegetation deposited across the Northern section of the steppe by the Tigris and Euphrates, in their descent from the

Armenian mountains towards the Gulf. The harvests of Irak, when they are reaped once more, will fully repay the construction of a railway from Bagdad to Damascus, which will cross Euphrates and run due West over the steppe. The distance is under five hundred miles, less by one-third than the course the German company has surveyed from Bagdad to Iskanderun, and Damascus, lying on the inner rim of the Syrian retaining wall near the middle point of its extent, is the natural railway-centre of Arabia. Besides being the starting-point of the pilgrim-line to Medina, it is already connected by a full-gauge railway with Haifa, the harbour under Carmel's shadow, and by a narrow-gauge line over Lebanon with Beirut, the greatest port on the Syrian coast.

(ii.) Immediately after it has put Euphrates behind it, this new Bagdad-Damascus railway will detach a branch to the South, which will pass through Kerbela, skirt the Eastern foot of the plateau parallel with Euphrates' course, touch the Shatt-al-Arab at Basra, and find its terminus on the Persian Gulf at Koweit.[1]

(iii.) Direct connection between Bagdad and Europe will be established by a line[2] following up the Right bank of the Tigris as far as Mosul. There it will change direction from North-West to West, and run across the head-waters of the Khabour, between the Sinjar and Tor-Abdin hills. After passing through Harran, it will strike the Euphrates, cross it by a bridge at Jerabis, and continue in the same westerly direction through the hilly country between Aleppo and Aintab, up to the wall

[1] This line will be identical with the last section of the projected German railway to the Gulf.

[2] This embodies another part of the German company's idea.

of Amanus, which it will have to penetrate by a tunnel before it can make a junction with the Adana-Iskanderun line in Anatolian territory.

A branch line between Jerabis and Aleppo is already completed, and the last link in the chain, the direct connection between Aleppo and Damascus along the plateau East of Lebanon, has been in working order several years.

(iv.) Owing to the lack of any accessible port on the North Syrian coast, the cutting of the Amanus tunnel will probably bring a large area in Northern Arabia, as far as Mosul, within the commercial hinterland of the favourably situated Anatolian ports, Mersina and Iskanderun. If this happens, Aleppo will forfeit to Adana much of its importance as an urban centre, unless it can find a new harbour of its own. At present its nearest outlet towards the South is Tarabolus, reached through a convenient gap in Lebanon by a branch line that leaves the Aleppo-Damascus railway at Homs: unless Aleppo can open up more direct communication with the sea, and establish a port for itself either at the mouth of the Orontes or slightly further South at Ladikia, its future will seriously be compromised.

Our programme for the economic development of Arabia is far more ambitious than any plans we have sketched for Albania or Anatolia, and since only a small fraction of the work has so far been accomplished, the amount of foreign capital required by the country in the immediate future will be more than proportionately larger. The system on which this capital is to be raised and applied deserves careful consideration. Are the enterprises to be entrusted to syndicates grouped on the basis of nationality, and the country partitioned out into economic "spheres of influence," on the analogy of

Anatolia? There are strong reasons for rejecting such a proposal.

In Anatolia most of the work in contemplation has already been put in hand on the national-syndicate system, and the majority of these contracts have been carried to their conclusion: the still unexploited areas are appropriated by claims like the Italian, which cannot be disregarded. Arabia is in a different position. Even the most important operation, the irrigation of Irak, has not yet been taken up in earnest. No railway enterprises have been pledged to foreigners, except the few stretches in Syria already constructed by a French company, and the Amanus-Mosul-Bagdad concession acquired by the German group. The latter would certainly be an important fact if it were a *fait accompli*, but so far only an insignificant section has been built, and most of the course remains unsurveyed. Arabia, then, has still a comparatively clean state.

There is always a lurking danger that commercial "spheres" may develop a political character. This would be serious enough in Anatolia, but in Arabia it would be absolutely fatal to a good understanding between the nations concerned, because in this quarter their political ambitions and jealousies are infinitely more intense.

If the French railways and missions succeeded in transforming Syria into a dependency of France, the British position in Egypt would be severed from the Persian Gulf by a strong military power, which could lead a branch from the Hejaz railway to Akaba, and establish there not merely a port in rivalry with Suez, as Arabia will doubtless do herself, but a naval base to dispute the control of the Red Sea. If, on the other hand, Great Britain eliminated France, which she could

hardly do without a permanent breach in the two nations' friendship, and extended her influence from Damascus to Bagdad and then to Koweit, she would be cutting across the path of Germany. Even if Great Britain and Germany effected a compromise, they would both be threatened in turn by an attempt on Russia's part to penetrate to the Mediterranean from the Armenian plateau through Diarbekr, Jerabis and Aleppo. Here are seeds of war indeed, and their detection shows that we must discover some other basis than the national group for the conduct of these enterprises.

A precedent is given by the action of four powers in 1910 with regard to the Sse-Chuan railway concession in China. The governments concerned first arranged among themselves what proportion of the loan should be allotted to the investors of their respective nations, and then allowed the private financiers of these nations to subscribe in this ratio [1] the total capital required.

In the case before us the Concert of Europe should go a step further. It should not only determine the share of the several nations beforehand, but should draw up a compulsory formula for the charters of all the companies to be constituted. The chief principle of this formula should be that each company must contain shareholders of all the nations concerned in the proportion agreed upon. If any company is floated in defiance of these terms, its contract with the Arabian government should not receive the Concert's sanction, and in case of disagreement between the two contracting parties, the Concert should withhold its own support, and likewise restrain individual powers from intervention.

Even the contracts already concluded with national

[1] The four powers were Great Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S.A.: the amount of capital to be issued was £6,000,000, and they agreed to take equal shares.

groups, like the French railway in Syria or the German concession to Mosul, Bagdad and Basra, should be internationalised on the same principle. The Arabian government should buy out the present bond-holders on favourable terms with capital supplied by the new international loan.[1] In compensation the two nations which these bond-holders represent should be allowed to subscribe to the general stock of this new loan an excess upon the shares respectively allotted to them equal to the capital of the two national companies thus iquidated.

The new Arabia will not lack investors: her economic prospects are too good. Yet if their enterprises are organised on some such scheme as this, she will not have to make the cruel choice between political independence and material well-being. She will see her national self-government and her national wealth prosper together, and will close to the nations of Europe another arena of deadly strife.

[1] The loss incurred by Arabia in this transfer should be made good by the Powers of Europe in the interests of European peace.

CHAPTER XI

NATIONALITY, EXPLOITATION AND STRONG GOVERNMENT IN PERSIA

A THEORIST in Nationality might single out Persia as the most instructive illustration of his subject, for all the alternative elements out of which national self-consciousness can be kindled are present here together, and each of them is developed to a high degree.

Iran is a plateau embattled with mountain ranges, and holding a salt desert in its heart. It is built on the same plan as its Anatolian neighbour, but on a vastly larger scale. South-Westward the Zagros barrier lifts itself tier above tier from the plain of Irak and the Persian Gulf: on the North the still loftier Elbruz rampart looks down upon the Caspian Sea and the low steppes of Central Asia.

This strong fortress has been garrisoned by a population of as individual a character as itself. The Iranian race has inherited a variety of the Indo-European speech, more akin to the Hindu dialects than to Slavonic or any other European language, and the sense of unity has been roused among all the Iranian-speaking dwellers on the plateau by the pressure of alien races on either flank. Semites seething against Zagros from the Arabian deserts, and the Hunnish, Turkish and Mongol nomads from the far North-East, who about fifteen hundred years ago drove the last Iranian shepherd-tribes off the steppe, have made the boundary between lowland and plateau, nomad and cultivator, identical in the end with the border between race and race.

The Iranians have twice expressed the racial antipathy which generations of border-warfare and the vicissitudes of empire and subjugation have aroused, in the creation of a national religion. While the native religious developments of the European nations lost their savour, and succumbed one by one to a universal religion of Semitic origin, the Iranian, like the Hindu, found a prophet in his own country, and, unlike the Hindu, possessed the insight to pay him honour. Zarathustra probably lived under the great Darius, in the latter half of the sixth century B.C., about two generations before the incarnation of the Buddha. The reformed faith which he founded grew, like the Yawehism of the Hebrew prophets, to be the distinctive mark of his nation, and the restored national kingdom, which put an end to the interlude of Greek predominance in the third century A.D., incorporated its religion in a highly-organised national church.

For four centuries the national church and state of Iran battled with the œcumenical religion and empire of the Roman world without any decisive issue. Then the avalanche of Islam overwhelmed them both, and Iran was utterly submerged. Zoroastrianism was proscribed [1] and the new-born Arabic civilisation dominated the nation even more strongly than the Greek had done before, yet Persian nationality had enough vitality to assert itself again. When Turk and Mongol broke their way into the Moslem world, the Arab went down before them, but Iran, over whose corpse they trod their road to Bagdad and Anatolia, found in the general ruin an opportunity for her own revival.

The schism concerning the succession to the

[1] Its faithful votaries found refuge in Western India, where they still survive as the prosperous Parsee sect.

Caliphate, which rent Islam in the second generation of its existence, had been trenchantly settled against the house of Ali by the sword, but a minority of steadfast heretics handed down the tradition of Ali's claims, and Persia gradually became the stronghold of their opinion. In the sixteenth century A.D. a native Persian dynasty, the Sufi, which adhered to this sect, swept away the Turkish princelings who had divided Iran between them since the Mongol era. The plateau was united once more in a national state, and once more again the renaissance of Iran expressed itself in religion. The heresy of its kings became the belief of the nation, and under the banner of "Shiism," Persia kept at bay the hated Turkish powers which hemmed her in on every side and uniformly professed the orthodox "Sunni" faith: Ottoman Turks on the West, Uzbeg Khans upon the Oxus in the North, and the Uzbegs' Mogul cousins, who had carved themselves a mighty empire in India upon Persia's Eastern flank.

The feeling has lasted on both sides to this day. Persia is outcast from the legitimate family of Islam, and at the same time she has developed the most vigorous national consciousness in the Moslem world, for the very reason that racial distinction is in this case emphasised by religious cleavage, instead of being overridden by the sense of religious community.

This magnificent national history has not failed to enshrine itself in tradition. It is true that the Avestas, the sacred scriptures of Zoroastrianism, have been lost to the Persian nation, and become the heritage of an Indian sect. The memory of the Achæmenid kings, whose figures impressed themselves so deeply upon the mind of the Greeks, has likewise perished among their own successors. Their Empire always remained a

second-hand imitation of the Semitic world of Babylon, and stood in Iran for the hegemony of one province,[1] and that not Zarathustra's homeland, over the rest. Yet in the eleventh century A.D. the great Arabic civilisation that had been growing up at Bagdad awakened another Semitic echo on the Iranian plateau, which led to the birth of a native culture.

The new Persian literature then called into being has become the common inheritance of the whole Moslem world. It draws its inspiration not only from Philosophy and Love, but from the national memory of the great Sassanian dynasty which fought with Rome before Islam came, and it has created from this source a noble style of historical epic and historical prose. The ban upon Persian heresy has never been extended to Persian letters, and they have remained the foundation of Moslem humanism.

Persian nationality, then, is strong in every element, and, reviewing the facts, we can see that this national vitality has ultimately been due to the large size and effective physical frontiers of the country, which have fitted it by nature to be an independent focus of human life. Yet size and impenetrability are only relative factors, and modern mechanical power has revolutionised the scale of the world. Persia, once a centre of wealth, civilisation and empire, has sunk to be the buffer-state between mightier units, and will find its significance for the future as the economic high road for these units towards their own inevitable goals.

During the last fifty years, Persia has seen the robber tribes on her Northern frontier replaced by the Russian Empire, a unified political organism stretching North and North-East all the way to the Polar Circle. As

[1] Fars, or "Persis."

this vast country fills with a European population, and develops its pastoral, agricultural and mineral resources, its shadow will spread further over Persia, and its weight press more heavily upon her. This is the point where the great plains of the North-East approach most nearly to the open Ocean : there is no barrier but the Iranian plateau between, and to modern railway engineering that presents no obstacle. Persia, in fact, occupies the same unfortunate position towards the Russian colonial area as Norway and Finland towards Russia in Europe, or the Southern Slavs towards the Kingdom of Hungary: she lies right athwart its necessary line of economic communication with the sea.

At present there are not ten kilometres of railway-track in all Persia, but growing Russia cannot suffer this for ever. Sooner or later she will have to be given a free hand to build a railway across the plateau to the Persian Gulf. She will build it with her own capital, because Persia has none to subscribe, and in her own gauge, because the freights carried will consist almost entirely of through-traffic from the Russian interior, and she will pay no tariff, for otherwise the Persian Government might sit idle at the receipt of custom, gathering in unearned increment from the eligible geographical position of the country.

This Russian railroad will probably [1] branch off from the present Transcaspian line at Merv, cross the Heri-Rud into Persian territory at Sarakhs, wind its way up among the mountains and onto the plateau through Meshed and Nishapur, and run W.S.W. along the habitable strip between the Southern slopes of Elbruz and the central salt-desert (Kevir) to the point where the Kara Chai river from the West loses itself in

[1] See Map VI.

the plateau-steppe slightly North of Kom. Thence it will follow the river's course up into the Zagros till it reaches Hamadan. Here it will be joined by a line from Tabriz, working through Maragha and Sakkys over the extreme Southern watershed of the Urumia basin, West of the Demirli Dagh, and directly linking Hamadan with Europe through the Caucasus.

The united line, which will thus concentrate traffic for the Indian Ocean from all quarters of the Russian Empire, will negotiate the Zagros defiles along the well-known caravan route, past the mountain of Elwend, past the battlefield of Nehavend where the Sassaniah made his last stand against the Moslem invader, past the rock of Behistun, whereon Darius inscribed the triumphs of his "strong government," to the town of Kirmanshah. Here a branch will take an easy course South-West to Bagdad, linking together the Persian and Arabian systems, while the trunk line will turn South and South-East, and follow the river Kercha through the foothills beneath Zagros' outer bastions, to Dizful in the plain of Khuzistan. Then it will bifurcate again, sending one arm Southward down the Karun river to the moderately good port of Mohammera on the Shatt-al-Arab, almost opposite Basra, and another in the original South-Easterly direction beneath Zagros and along the "Burning Coast," to the magnificent harbour of Bushire, on the Persian Gulf.

This railway would relieve Russia of the last shackle upon her commerce: her door on the Pacific, and the new doors we have demanded for her on the Norwegian coast and through the Baltic and Black Sea Straits, would be supplemented by an outlet upon the Southern Ocean.

Russia, however, is not the only foreign empire that has vital interests in Iran.

The region contains a great zone of mineral-oil deposits, extending North and South from Baku on the Caspian as far as Khuzistan on the Persian Gulf, which, taken as a whole, is perhaps the richest petroleum field in the world. The Northern section of this zone, at Baku and in Azerbaijan, has long been opened up under Russian auspices, but the Southern section, like most natural resources within the Persian frontier, has never yet been tapped. When, therefore, the recent adoption of petrol as fuel for warships vastly increased the total demand, and made the question of its supply a pressing concern to the governments of naval powers, this virgin field in Persia acquired sudden significance. Only last year a company was formed to exploit it on a very big scale, and the British government bought a major interest in its share-capital.

This company may play as important a part in British foreign policy during the immediate future as the East India Company played in the eighteenth century, and it gives us a stake in Persia at least as great as Russia's railway-interests. Great Britain has already concluded a railway agreement with Russia for a line that will link India, first with these oil fields, and ultimately, through the Russian system, with Europe.

The road (of Indian gauge) will start from Karachi, the port of the Indus-basin, and run along the Mekran coast through Gwadar and Jask to Bunder Abbas, the Persian port on the Hormuz Straits. Hence it will turn inland, and mount through the tiers of the Fars mountains, which continue the line of Zagros along the border of the Gulf. When it attains the level of the plateau, it will take a line due North-West, between the mountain-

lakes and tangled peaks of Fars on the left, and the Koh-rud range (a parallel outwork of Zagros towards the Kevir) on the right, till it reaches Ispahan, the second city of Persia. From this point it will probably take its way through the mountains to Khunsar, and thence down a river-defile to Kom, which will be its junction with the Russian railway.

These immense enterprises will not bring advantage merely to the foreign powers which are pressing for permission to carry them out: they offer the only hope for the restoration of Persia's own economic prosperity. The terrible Mongol invasions, which ultimately gave her the means of recovering her national independence, cost her the material wealth which centuries of strong Sassanian and Arab government had built up. In the thirteenth century A.D. Khorassan, her Northernmost province, was one of the most flourishing industrial countries in the world: the Mongols in a few campaigns reduced it to a desolation from which it has never recovered, and the shock of the calamity brought upon the whole nation a chronic economic paralysis which it will not throw off by its own efforts.

From a purely economic point of view, then, the oil and railway concessions will be mutually advantageous to both parties in the contract, to Great Britain and Russia on the one hand, and to Persia herself on the other; but in discussing the future of Anatolia and Arabia we recognised the fact that, when a backward nation delivers into the hands of an advanced nation the monopoly over its exploitation, the influx of the foreign state's capital almost inevitably leads on to the establishment of its political sovereignty over the exploited area. The Mongol invasion brought one boon only at the cost of another: will the Anglo-

Russian "penetration" merely invert the situation, and compel Persia to sacrifice her political existence to the redemption of her economic well-being?

Persia's economic revival can only be accomplished under the shield of strong government, for the functioning of modern civilisation depends on the power of looking ahead, and that in turn rests upon the uniformity of human environment artificially produced by law-and-order. Therefore, if this economic revival is the common interest of all the parties involved, they will all be of one opinion that the immediate practical object to be achieved is the establishment of strong government in Persia. The crucial question is this: Can Persia perform the essential task herself, or will her failure compel the two foreign powers to undertake it for her?

Persia has rich elements of national life, but so far she has built nothing out of them. The long-drawn revolution of 1906-9 was an attempt to replace the corrupt, incompetent autocracy of the Shah by constitutional machinery of self-government, and it excited high hopes. It has only ended in a fiasco. The chrysalis was broken, but disclosed no vigorous organism within, and such tissues as there were have been battered by exposure to the rude air.

The banishment of the Shah was the signal for all unruly elements to break their bounds. The aboriginal clans of Zagros, Luris on the Kercha and Baktiyaris above Ispahan, who have never truly been assimilated by the Iranian race, returned to their ancient profession of robbery and have brought commerce to a standstill on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road,[1] the chief existing artery

[1] A concession obtained in 1897 by the Baktiyari chiefs themselves, and transferred by them to Messrs. Lynch and Co., who opened the road for traffic in 1900.

of communication between the Gulf and the Plateau. The immense, straggling Southern provinces that border on the Gulf have been cut off by this zone of unrest from the central government's support, and under ambitious viceroys have taken the path towards secession. The national parliament at Teheran, torn by faction and threatened with extinction by reactionary rebels, has been driven to place its cause in the hands of hardly more estimable military adventurers, and to buy the good-will of Baktiyari chiefs and Southern governors by never refusing their demands.

This is not an encouraging record, and it looks blacker still in contrast with the British and Russian achievements. A century ago the Persian Gulf was infested with Arab pirates: the British Navy has swept them out of every creek, surveyed the coast, laid down buoys at the harbour entrances and in the channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, and opened the whole of Southern Persia to international trade. Fifty years ago, all Northern Persia was overrun by the Turkomans of the steppe, who made their livelihood by systematic raids, plundering, burning and carrying captive without resistance: Russia has razed the Turkoman strongholds, and built the Transcaspian railway through their steppe, close along the Persian frontier, thereby bringing Northern Persia into easy communication with Europe and converting it into the most orderly region in the country. The two foreign empires have already done more for strong government in Persia, without setting foot within its borders, than the Persian nation has accomplished for itself.

Recently we have taken a momentous step forward. The agreement concluded by Sir Edward Grey with the Russian Government in 1907 assigned to each power a

political sphere of influence inside the Persian frontier:[1] the intervening zone was left as common ground, where both powers were at liberty to pursue their interests side by side.

This policy leads straight to partition.

"That is after all a lesser evil," its defenders will say, "for the Persian nation has tried the experiment of governing itself, and proved incapable: it is therefore its own interest to submit to being governed by its big neighbours, whose capability is proven."

We must answer that it is useless to cure present evil by laying up evil for the future. Inasmuch as all the potential factors of nationality are conspicuously present in Persia, a very few years of strong government, whether it be introduced from within or from without, will suffice to kindle the spark and raise the flame. Economic prosperity will do for Persia what it has done for Poland: it will bring the native population into better proportion with the area of the country, and confront the two vulture empires with a nationalist movement of vast dimensions.

"But," the defendant will reply, "the ultimate interests and desires of the Persian nation are not the real issue. By its present incompetence it has forfeited any claim to future consideration. Political dismemberment may become very irksome to it, but it will at any rate not endanger the peace of the world: on the

[1] See Map VI. The South-Eastern boundary of the Russian Sphere starts from the meeting-point of the Russian, Persian, and Afghan frontiers, makes a straight course to Yezd, a town South of the Salt Desert on the inner flank of Fars, and then turns North-West, heading directly for Kasr-i-Shirin on the Turco-Persian frontier. This leaves Ispahan and Khuzistan within the neutral zone. The North-Western boundary of the British Sphere starts from Gazik, near the Perso-Afghan frontier, and runs through Birjend and Kerman City to Bunder Abbas on the Hormuz straits.

contrary, a common interest in keeping Persia quiet will provide Russia and Great Britain with the very bond that they have lacked heretofore, and if this happens at Persia's expense, Persia will only be one of your 'minorities that must inevitably suffer.'"

This really begs the question by assuming that a scheme of territorial partition can be devised that will give equal satisfaction to the individual interests of Russia and Great Britain. That is the necessary preliminary to their having an interest in common, yet the authors of the present agreement, at any rate, do not seem to have been very sanguine as to its possibility. All the points where the interests of the two empires are really vital have been left by them within the debatable zone. Neither the routes along which the Russian railways must pass to the head of the Gulf, nor the oil fields in which the British Admiralty has since acquired a predominant commercial interest, have been appropriated by their respective claimants.

It is easy to see the reason for this: there is no means of disentangling these interests on the basis of territorial sovereignty. If Russian sovereignty is to follow Russian railways over the plateau to the sea, Russia will obtain a port of her own on the Indian Ocean, which she will be able to fortify, if she likes, as a base for a new fleet, and Great Britain could not possibly tolerate a naval rival in Indian waters. If, on the other hand, British sovereignty follows British trade along all the coasts of the Gulf, and up into the oil fields of Khuzistan at its head, Russia will finally be cut off from her outlet upon the Southern Sea by the territory of a rival power: she will enjoy her free railways to the coast and her free port in which they are to terminate, merely on Great Britain's sufferance, and such a position would be no

less intolerable for Russia. The partition of Persia initiated by the current agreement can never be carried to a conclusion on peaceful terms: if it proceeds further than at present, it will fulfil the Russophobe's worst forebodings, and plunge the two empires into desperate war.

We find ourselves in a serious dilemma. Everybody's interest demands strong government in Persia, the Persians have failed to create it themselves, and Great Britain and Russia, who have accomplished much, cannot complete their work, because they will bring on the world, if they try, a disaster infinitely worse than Persian anarchy. Either the assignment of spheres of influence in Persian districts of secondary importance was intended only as a temporary, palliatory measure, or if it was not, it must be interpreted stringently in that sense henceforth. Is there any reasonable issue?

The immediate occasion of Sir Edward Grey's convention was the breakdown of an attempt to put life into Persian self-government by administering a European tonic. First the customs were handed over to Belgian officials,[1] then Mr. Shuster, an American expert, was put in control of public finance, and finally Swedish officers were introduced into the country, to organise a native gendarmerie. We have already explained why this experiment was bound to fail: the new *personnel* was excellent, but the sanction behind it was utterly inadequate. The Persian nation can only be educated in self-government by an authority in the land strong enough not merely to make short work of the native anarchy, but to maintain an independent, and if necessary a commanding, attitude towards the two great foreign interests of Russia and Great Britain, which will inevitably be the dominating factors in the economic development of

[1] Gradually introduced during 1898–1900.

Persia, and will grow not less but more important proportionally as the whole country advances along the path of good government and prosperity.

Such an authority can only be established by the sanction of all Europe. Already we have found the solution of many problems in the intervention of a European Concert, but in no case has the need for it been so urgent as in this, or the danger to which European peace is exposed by the lack of it more irremediable. We cannot much longer postpone the supreme problem of our whole discussion: how this Concert of Europe can be brought into permanent, active existence. Meanwhile, no such Concert exists to help us, and till we have called it into being, we must palliate the situation in Persia as best we can.

(i.) The private understanding between Great Britain and Russia must be superseded by a collective agreement of all the European powers, defining the frontiers of Persia, and then guaranteeing her independence and integrity within these limits.

(ii.) The system of administering public services by a *personnel* drawn from lesser European nationalities must be persevered with, and, if possible, extended in range, and the states of Europe must make themselves responsible collectively both for the good behaviour of these officials and for their just treatment.

(iii.) The financial support, without which no attempt at political reform can be carried forward, must come in future from all Europe, and not, as heretofore, from the Two Powers.

An arrangement must be made by which the European governments shall give facilities to the Persian government for borrowing in their respective money markets such capital as it may require for public purposes, in the

same proportion as shall have been agreed upon for commercial investments in Arabia. If private investors hesitate to take up any particular loan, but the governments approve the purpose for which it is being issued, the latter should either guarantee the loan to their investing publics, or else subscribe the capital in the agreed proportion out of their own public funds on moderate terms. It is only fair that if the nations of Europe enjoy the advantage of being the world's capitalists, they should accept the responsibilities of the position as well, the more so as their failure to intervene may lead to a breakdown involving the world in war and themselves in ruin.

(iv.) The railway and oil enterprises will inevitably pass under Russia's and Great Britain's exclusive control, and draw many other subsidiary commercial concessions in their wake. But it would clearly be beneficial, as tending to counteract the commercial predominance of these two powers, if all economic developments independent of these were thrown open to international finance, on the same principles as we proposed in the case of Arabia.

These suggestions do not claim to be more than stopgaps. They are designed to give the Persian nation the best chance possible of keeping pace in its growth towards maturity with the progress of British and Russian power in the country. It is the vital interest not only of Persia herself but of the two neighbour empires that she should finally become strong enough to hold her own against them both, and so to maintain the balance impartially between them. Yet the haven is still below the horizon, and while the ship of Persia is struggling painfully towards it, her safe passage depends entirely on the self-control, good will, and good understanding of Russia and Great Britain. Such an understanding will best be

brought about by a satisfactory settlement of the Persian frontiers, under the sanction of Europe.

(i.) Great Britain at present commands the Persian Gulf, because till now she has been the only efficient power in the neighbourhood; but when the New Arabia and Persia begin to come into line with the nations of Europe, and when the Greater Russia East of the Ural finds its economic outlet through Persian ports, the freedom of the Gulf will become as urgent a necessity for the states bordering on its coast and for international commerce as the freedom of the Baltic and the Black Sea. Unless Great Britain modifies her policy to meet the new situation she will become as intolerable to her neighbours in the Gulf as Germany and the Ottoman Empire have become to theirs in the Black Sea and the Baltic.

Our only justification for commanding the Gulf is that we police it. As soon as Arabia and Persia are capable of undertaking the task, we must retire in their favour, only stipulating that they shall maintain a flotilla neither less nor more than sufficient to patrol the coasts, and shall not build, or allow to be built, any base for a battle fleet upon their shores.

The evacuation of the Gulf would involve the cession of Bahrein Island to Arabia, and the abandonment of our protectorate over the Sultanate of Oman. Oman is a straggling territory with a long coast-line, isolated from the rest of the Arabian peninsula by the great Roba-al-Hali desert in its hinterland. It controls the entrance to the Gulf at the Straits of Hormuz, and the liberation of the Gulf would not be a reality unless this state were neutralised and guaranteed by all the powers.

(ii.) In fixing the frontiers of Persia herself, we should relieve her of all territory alien in population, and incor-

porate it in political organisms really capable of dealing with it. This will directly lighten the task of self-government in the genuinely Persian territory.

We have already proposed that the Tatar population of Azerbaijan should be annexed to the Russian Empire, and we may supplement this by handing over to the Indian Empire the Baluchi and Brahui populations in the extreme South-East, since the major part of these races is already included within the Indian frontier.

The new frontier-line[1] would leave the coast of Hormuz Straits half way between Bunder Abbas and Jask, and take a North-Easterly direction, assigning Bam on the left of Persia and Bampur on the right to the Indian Empire, till it reached the present meeting point of Indian, Persian and Afghan territory. Thence it would follow the present Perso-Afghan frontier till it arrived at the Western margin of the Seistan hamun ("swamp"), but instead of crossing the swamp and including a slice of Seistan beyond it, it would bear Northwards along the swamp's Western edge, till it came to the point where the present frontier traverses it again near its Northern extremity.

In exchange for these direct territorial compensations, both Russia and the Indian Empire must give assurances to Persia and the European powers that they will abandon all claim to the wider "spheres of influence" that they have assigned to themselves by private agreement with each other.

(iii.) While we have been drifting towards the partition of Persia, a country in which Nationality is potentially strong, and where all the cross-currents of British and Russian interests in the Middle East meet as in a mälström, we have been at pains to preserve the external

[1] See Map VI.

integrity of a state which occupies a considerably less important economic and strategical position than Persia, and which lacks all internal cohesion.

Afghanistan is a typical example of those mushroom Oriental empires that spread their shadow in a day and vanish in the night. Its nucleus is the upper Kabul valley, which offers the best route across the Hindu Kush range from the Oxus-plain of Central Asia to the Indus-plain of the Punjab. The dynasty entrenched in Kabul City commands the South-Eastern issue of the pass, and, taking advantage of their geographical position, the amirs of Kabul have extended their suzerainty over a territory on both sides of the great mountain-barrier, slightly larger in its total area than the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The mountains cover the major part of the country, and the population of four and a half millions, spread thinly over it, beggars the Dual Monarchy itself in its motley diversity: Pachtu-speaking Afghans in the South-East, scattered through the vast tangle of valleys that feeds the West bank of the Indus and the North bank of the Helmund; Persians in the West, in the Seistan basin and at Herat; Mongol-descended Hazaras in the fastnesses of Hindu Kush itself; Turkish-speaking Uzbegs in the plain between the mountain-barrier and the Southern bank of Oxus, and Iranian Tajiks on the Pamir plateau, whose snows feed the head-waters of Oxus and the Northern tributaries of the Kabul. This last population is so isolated from the world by the great mountain-bastions on which it struggles to live, that it has not even been touched by the advance of Islam, and remains a primitive island of Indo-European paganism in the midst of the Moslem Ocean, like the pagan Lithuanians who resisted Christendom till the fourteenth century A.D.

This precarious empire, founded in the latter half of the eighteenth century in a reaction against Persian aggression, would have fallen to pieces again in the "eighteen-forties," had not the British government in India interfered. A generation of half measures followed, which cost several disasters and brought no tangible results, while all the while the Russian Empire's advance towards Afghanistan's North-Western frontier continued without intermission up the Oxus and Jaxartes. The relation between Afghanistan and the Indian Empire was finally settled by Lord Robert's masterly campaigns in 1879 and 1880. The Afghan government submitted its foreign policy to British control, and was granted in return a subsidy (which has never been claimed) and a territorial guarantee. Accordingly, when the annexation of Merv in 1884 brought Russia into direct touch with the Afghan marches, she found not merely the Amir but the British government barring her further advance, and after an interval of extreme tension between the two principals, a definitive frontier between Afghanistan and the Russian Empire was laid down by an Anglo-Russian boundary commission in 1885.

The conventions with Afghanistan in 1880 and with Russia in 1885 are still looked upon in this country as the main bulwark of India's defence, but it is most improbable that this bulwark will continue to be effective. We may keep the Kabul government under our thumb, and even prevent foreign powers from tampering with its subjects, but we cannot save the government from destruction at the hands of those subjects themselves.

Strong governments come into existence in order to give cohesion to populations which cannot effect it for themselves, and they only remain strong so long as they

promote the interests of the populations they govern by carrying this cohesion still further. During the last thirty-four years the government of Kabul has maintained itself by British support in the interests of the Indian Empire: its slow petrifaction, which from the point of view of British diplomacy has been such a satisfactory sign of the growing stability of the situation, has become in its subjects' eyes a patent indication of its bankruptcy. A few months ago ominous rumours found their way into the papers that the Amir's writ had ceased to run among the chief Pachtu tribes of the South, the only populations in the whole territory that are bound to the government by racial kinship. A family quarrel in the dynasty or the emergence of a "mad mullah" (the Afghans are fanatical Moslems) may burst the diplomatic bubble in a moment, and explode the carefully tended buffer-state between the Indian and Russian Empires in a blaze of anarchy.

Sooner or later the explosion is bound to come, and if it is to discharge itself harmlessly into the air, Great Britain and Russia must arrive at a frank understanding beforehand as to how they will dispose of the ruins. It is possible that the eventual dismantling of Afghanistan is already the subject of a secret treaty between the two powers; but if it is not, it is an essential measure of precaution that they shall provide for it by a public treaty as soon as possible, in some such terms as these:

(i.) Since Afghanistan is merely a geographical area corresponding to no national reality, it is expedient that, so soon as the present government becomes incapable of discharging its functions, the territory should be partitioned between neighbouring states capable of governing it efficiently.

(ii.) That the partition should follow natural physical

frontiers, taking account as far as possible of racial boundaries.

On these principles the frontiers might be corrected roughly as follows :

(*a*) The city of Herat would fall to Persia. It is Persian in nationality; it lies in an open valley close to the present frontier of Persia, and could therefore be administered without difficulty by the Persian government; and its position commanding a route up the Heri Rud which turns the Western flank of the Hindu Kush, is so important strategically, that neither Russia nor Great Britain can allow it to pass into the other's hands.

The new Persian frontier would leave the Western margin of the Seistan hamun at its Northern end and follow the course of the Harud River N.N.E. to its source. Thence it would take a line due North across the valley of the Heri Rud, cutting the river itself at right-angles about 75 miles above Herat, and proceed on its course till it reached the summit of the Hindu Kush. Here it would turn sharply to the West, and follow the watershed between the Heri Rud and the Murghab systems, till it hit the present Perso-Afghan frontier again on the bank of the Heri Rud at Julfikar, just at the point where the present Russo-Afghan frontier impinges upon it.

(*b*) The remainder of the country would be divided between the Russian and Indian empires. Their new common frontier would start (beginning at the Western end) from the most Easterly point of the Persian frontier on the summit of Hindu Kush, and proceed Eastward along the mountain-chain, following first the watershed between the upper courses of the Murghab on the Russian side and of the Heri Rud on the Indian, and thereafter that between the Oxus basin on the Russian side and the Kabul basin on the Indian. It would mount

onto the Pamir plateau between the very head-waters of the latter systems, till it reached the present frontier of Chinese Turkestan.

This division would unite the Turkish-speaking elements to their brethren in Russian Central Asia,[1] and assign the Pachtu populations to India, which already includes their kinsmen in the North-West frontier province. The Iranians of the Pamirs would be split between the two states, but they would hardly be aware of their misfortune, for racial bonds become meaningless in face of such mountain barriers, and the struggle for life against the physical environment ousts all other interests.

We cannot propose the naval evacuation of the Gulf and the dismemberment of Afghanistan without encountering a last desperate assault from the Russophobe.

We have repeatedly challenged his general policy, but here we are trampling under foot the perfected details of his strategical dispositions. It is a fundamental principle of his faith that the Indian Empire must be sundered from foreign powers by a zone of neutral territories on land and of British waters on sea: having established such a zone, he is indifferent to what goes on beyond its limits. This passive, mechanical attitude is really untenable in face of the momentous changes that are happening both in India herself and in the countries beyond the neutral pale.

British statesmanship in the nineteenth century regarded India as a "Sleeping Beauty," whom Britain had a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke, so it hedged with thorns the garden where she lay, to safeguard her from marauders prowling in the desert without. Now the princess is awake, and is claiming the right to

[1] They have been severed from them merely by the accident of Afghan conquest in the eighteenth century.

dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have transformed themselves into respectable gentlemen diligently occupied in turning their desert into a garden too, but grievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge. When they politely request us to remove it, we shall do well to consent, for they will not make the demand till they feel themselves strong enough to enforce it, and in the tussle that will follow if we refuse, the sympathies of the Indian princess will not be on our side. Now that she is awake, she wishes to walk abroad among her neighbours: she feels herself capable of rebuffing without our countenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her, and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge that confines her to her garden.

If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to secede from the spiritual brotherhood of the British Empire, but it is inevitable that she should lead a more and more independent life of her own, and follow the example of the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths by establishing direct relations with her neighbours. If these relations are to be good, India must neither encroach provocatively beyond her proper bounds, nor retire timidly behind them. Her interest in the Persian Gulf will continue to be important but cease to be paramount, and she must be careful to yield her neighbours in that quarter their just "place in the Sun": in Afghanistan, on the other hand, she must advance beyond her zariba, and boldly put herself into touch with the Russian Empire on the other side of it.

The real function of Kabul is not to divide India from Central Asia, but to link her to it. For Bengal and the Punjab, as for Khorassan, the natural route to Europe is the Transcaspian railway. The Indian trunk-road system cannot halt forever at the Khyber Pass: some day it must

push up the valley to Kabul, and over the great passes commanded by Kabul to Kunduz and Balkh on the Oxus-plain; and where the high road leads, the railway will ultimately follow. The Hindu Kush will one day be pierced by a tunnel more stupendous than those which already penetrate the Alps and are penetrating the Taurus, and express trains will run straight through from Calcutta to Krasnovodsk.

The Russophobe will shake his head over the omen. By these passes, he will recollect, the great conquerors of India have marched in, from Alexander the Great to Babar the Lion. Yet such precedents are no longer valid. Then India was in the position of the civilised man unarmed, while her invaders from the North-West possessed arms and nothing else, so that the spoils of war were their only livelihood: now the civilised rule of Russia in Central Asia is fast obliterating the contrast between life on opposite sides of the Hindu Kush, and a new Russia is growing up there which places its treasure, no less than India does, in the "works of peace." What we said of Germany at the outset is no less true of the Russian Empire: the destiny before her is to become a "community of workers," and she has already put behind her the phase of being a mere "nation in arms." Russia and India will make each other's acquaintance across the passes of Hindu Kush, and acquaintance will ripen into friendship as each grows to maturity. They will meet on an equality, and develop on parallel lines.

If, however, we must contend with the Russophobe on his chosen ground, we can show that from the strategical point of view it makes little difference whether the political frontiers of Russia and India march with one another along the summit of the Hindu Kush, or whether they are artificially separated by a buffer-terri-

tory of varying width, stretching all the way from the border of Persia to the Chinese Empire.

The whole breadth of Afghanistan is so effectively barricaded by Nature, that it could not possibly become the theatre of war between the powers on either side of the barricade. As the frontiers lie at present, Russia could overrun in a moment the Northern glacis of Afghanistan that extends to the Oxus, before we could bring up forces from Peshawar, and she would only be stopped by the line of Hindu Kush. If the frontier were rectified to follow that line itself, she would be in a position to commence operations against it immediately war broke out, but on the other hand our own front, instead of being the other side of the Khyber Pass, would be there along the mountain crest, and all the passes would be blocked by elaborate fortifications. Under such conditions the chances of a successful advance from the North-West would be even smaller than in the former case, and the likelihood of war breaking out would proportionally be diminished.

Wherever, then, the diplomatic frontiers may be drawn, the Hindu Kush is the inevitable strategic frontier between Russia and India along this front, and it is so formidable by nature that no attempt to force it would ever be made from either side. The real military road between Russia and India only begins where the Hindu Kush comes to an end.

An invading Russian army would concentrate much further to the West, along a front extending from the Caspian Sea to the Heri Rud, and would advance across the plateau of Persia, resting its left wing upon Herat and swinging its whole line round upon that pivot, till it faced East instead of South and brought its right wing into position along the Western edge of the Seistan

basin. Here its progress would be impeded by the long and difficult barrier of the Hamun, and this would be the point where it would encounter the Indian army of defence.

This front has long monopolised the attention of the Indian General Staff, and in order to make the critical area accessible to the Indian army, they have built a narrow-gauge railway, the costliness of which may be estimated by the difficulties its engineers had to overcome. It starts from the Indus-plain in the North of Sind, climbs N.N.W. through the Bolan pass to Quetta, and then negotiates the Chodjak pass beyond, which brings it into the basin of the Helmund River, the great feeder of the Seistan swamp from the East. This railway is the key to the defence of India, because from its terminus Indian troops can be poured into Seistan from the East quicker than Russian troops, starting from the Transcaspian railway, can reach it from the North-West. Seistan is, and will remain, the military door between Russia and India, though little commercial traffic is ever likely to pass through it, and conversely the passes of Kabul, though they will probably become the most direct economic thoroughfare between India and Europe, will never lend themselves to the passage of armies.

Our proposed partition of Afghanistan, therefore, does not affect the strategic defence of India in the slightest degree, except that it brings the whole of Seistan up to the Hamun under the direct control of the Indian government, and so gives it the power of extending the Quetta railway to the East bank of the Harud River, if it likes, and of masking the present line of defence by an exterior line thrown more than three hundred miles forward. From the limited point of view of strategy as well as from the more general point of view

of economic expansion, Persia, not Afghanistan, is the mine beneath the feet of Russia and Great Britain, which threatens, if either makes one false step, to explode between them and perhaps to shatter them both.

It would be foolish to blind ourselves to this danger: true wisdom bids us face it and seek its cause. When we look steadfastly, we see that this fearful cloud upon the future, no less than the war that is at this moment crucifying Europe, is due to the lack of an international power, stronger handed and wider minded than the individual national states.

If a Concert of Europe could arise, skilled enough to build up national self-government in Persia, Russia and Great Britain would never come into conflict over their interests there, and even if the Concert could not muster the initiative for this, but were merely strong enough in authority to maintain its external guarantee of Persia's neutrality against all comers, Russia and Great Britain, though they might quarrel over interests inextricably tangled by Persia's anarchy, could not push their quarrel to war. Their only practicable battle-ground lies athwart Persian soil, and by the European guarantee this arena would be closed against them.

The present war would probably never have been fought if the violation of Belgian neutrality had automatically mobilised against Germany the active intervention of every other European state. If we learn no lesson from the present catastrophe, and allow the national state hereafter the same unbridled licence that it has enjoyed before, then this war will not be the last and most terrible in the world, but the prelude to a cycle of increasing horror, till the nations of Europe are ground to powder, and the national idea perishes simultaneously with European civilisation itself.

CHAPTER XII

NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

WE have completed our survey of national problems in the area affected by the war.

We entered upon it with an ideal before our minds—the sovereign national state of the West. How far have we found this ideal applicable to the rest of Europe and to the Nearer East?

As we proceeded Eastwards, the national atom proved less and less capable of adoption as the political unit. In Central Europe, we discovered, the Tchechs will be unable to work out their national salvation as an independent state: the economic factor necessitates their political incorporation in the German Empire.[1] In the Balkans the political disentanglement of one nationality from another is only possible if all alike consent to economic federation in a general zollverein.[2] In the North-East, geographical conditions decree that national individuality shall express itself by devolution within the bond of the Russian Empire.[3]

In all these cases the political unit reveals itself not as a single nation but as a group of nationalities; yet even these groups cannot be entirely sovereign or self-contained. Like the chemist's molecules, they are woven out of relations between atoms, and are bound in their turn to enter into relation with one another.

The nationalities of the South-East coalesce in a Balkan Zollverein; the Zollverein as a whole is involved

[1] Ch. VI. [2] Ch. IV. Section C. [3] Ch. VIII.

by mutual economic interest with its neighbour molecule, the Russian Empire;[1] similar necessity produces similar contact between the Russian Empire and Norway or Persia. The simple uninational molecules of the West and the complex multinational molecules of the East and Centre all dispose themselves as parts of a wider organism—the European system.

Every organism needs a special mechanism to execute its functions. Each of its members may be instinct with its own vitality, yet there must be a vitality external to them all to co-ordinate them severally with one another. The provision of a Russian railway to the Atlantic sets up a complicated interaction between Norway and the Russian Empire beyond the individual control of either unit. Norwegian sovereignty cannot secure Norway's independence against Russia: Russian sovereignty cannot secure Russia's right-of-way through Norway. If these two molecules are to interact harmoniously, their functioning must be regulated by some force superior to them both.

In the course of our survey we have often had to postulate such a force, but so far we have left its scope and character quite indefinite. We have glibly summoned "Europe," the "Concert of Europe" or a "European Guarantee" to our aid, and passed on our way rejoicing.

We can no longer screen ourselves behind such formulas. They were invented at the Congress of Vienna just a hundred years ago, to embody the same vision of an international organism which still floats unsubstantiated before our minds. This century is the measure of their failure: they have not maintained the organism in being—they never

[1] Ch. VIII. Section C.

brought it into being at all—and successively they have been cast upon the scrap-heap. One generation passed, and the "Concert" was shattered by the convulsion of 1848; a second, and Europe was divided into two camps by the "Triple Alliance"; [1] now the third has passed and "Guaranteed Neutrality," the most solid of all the international links our great-grandfathers forged, has snapped at the first shock of battle between the marshalled hosts.

Guarantee! The formula coined in 1814 rings ironical to-day. Belgium was guaranteed in order to secure the stability of Europe, yet on account of that guarantee Great Britain and Germany, two of the greatest sovereign units in the European complexus, are at this moment engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Germany violated the Belgian guarantee deliberately in her attempt to destroy the European system by war. The effect of the guarantee may still prove momentous: it has drawn us into the war, and our intervention may turn the scale. Yet even if the Allies are victorious, and the new Europe is fashioned by them after their own hearts and not by Germany after hers, this will not save the credit of the guarantee itself. Germany may be punished for her work, but the work cannot be undone. Europe must drink the cup of war to the dregs—the pain, the hate, the waste, the pure evil that is not diminished one drop by cause or consequence. The guarantee was invented to avert that catastrophe from Europe. The catastrophe has happened and the invention is bankrupt.

The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration. That

[1] Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1882, three years after they had joined each other.

has been the motive of this book. "And yet," the reader will say, "you return to the discredited fetish once more? With the crash of the Belgian guarantee about our ears, you propose to regulate by guarantee the future relation of Norway and the Russian Empire, and replace the snapped link by a hundred others more brittle than itself?" The objection is just, and we must meet it.

We must beware of putting our new wine into old bottles. While guarantees hold, they conserve their charge: when they break, the destruction is worse than if they had never existed. Unless we can ensure that the sovereign states of Europe respect European guarantees hereafter in other fashion than Germany at the present crisis, we must modify the formula or else discard it altogether.

Can the mechanism of the European system be safeguarded against its individual members? Several means have been mooted to this end.

(i.) One means is "Disarmament." We discussed it in connection with the Russo-German frontier in Poland [1] and with the military control of the Kiel Canal,[2] but in both cases we found it Utopian. A war may be just or unjust, defensive or aggressive, yet when once a nation is at war, its existence is at stake: Germany is fighting for her life no less than the powers she has attacked. Armament is self-preservation, and self-preservation is the last sovereign right that a sovereign state will surrender.

(ii.) "Disarmament by Compulsion" thus presupposes the complete suppression of individual sovereignty, and no one seriously proposes it as a means of "breaking in" the untamed sovereign state: "Voluntary

[1] Ch. II. Section D. [2] Ch. IX. Section A.

Disarmament" is the catchword, yet the difficulty involved is just the same. Nations may promise to disarm, but war is a question of life-and-death: at the whisper of war they will break their word, and who is to call them to account?

(iii.) "Limitation of Armaments" would prove even more ineffectual. It would save men's pockets in peace time, but it would not save Peace itself. The essence of the idea is to make the reduction proportional: *ex hypothesi* there would still be the same balance of forces, and therefore the same calculations on the part of sovereign governments, upon which the possibility of war depends.

Armament is self-preservation, and living creatures, whether individual men or individual states, will safeguard their existence with all their soul and all their strength. There is no other limit than their capacity, and limitation of armaments in peace time would mean at most that each nation would arm to the uttermost after war had broken out, as Great Britain is doing now, instead of arming to the uttermost before its outbreak, as Germany and most other European powers have done hitherto.

In practice it would not even mean that. Artificial limitation would set a premium upon dishonesty. One extra submarine concealed in a canal, one extra howitzer in a cellar, and the stipulated balance would be upset, the calculations invalidated, and the offending state ensured against defeat. "After all," the offenders would say to themselves, "what is to determine our rightful proportion except our own willingness to spend our strength? Our neighbours wrote themselves off at nine guns, we at ten: if we can make the effort to build an eleventh, that alters the real proportion between

our own and our neighbours' capacity, and entitles us to the extended licence."

When the cross-bow was invented, the Pope called a conference, and limited the employment of this lethal weapon to warfare against the infidel: a few years passed, and the people of Christendom were destroying one another not only with cross-bows but with gunpowder.

(iv.) "International Armament" is propounded either as a supplement or an alternative to the three means we have dealt with already. This also we discussed when we threshed out the problem of the Black Sea Straits,[1] and we found it as impracticable as the rest. There is a spiritual force—"group-feeling," "public spirit," "patriotism," or however we name it—without which no human organisation can live, but upon which military organisation is particularly dependent. In the contemporary world the national state [2] alone generates this spirit with an intensity sufficient to organise armies: that is why the national state is the most magnificent and the most dangerous social achievement in existence. The creation of an international army equal to its task would be proof that the task was no longer necessary: it would mean that the national unit had forfeited its moral sovereignty, and that its members had sunk their narrower citizenship in the citizenship of the world.

The four solutions thus assume one and all the very conditions they are intended to bring about, and we can neither force the individual state to abandon its sovereignty nor threaten it with the competition of a

[1] Ch. IX. Section B.

[2] Including under the term complex molecules of several complete national units.

sovereignty superior to its own. If we are to maintain the mechanism of European society by compulsion, we must swear in as special constables the individual members themselves.

This policy may answer under very favourable circumstances: Denmark may take charge of the Baltic Straits and faithfully execute her commission,[1] yet as soon as we pass to the Black Sea Straits the method breaks down. We foresaw[2] that here our chosen candidates would fail us, and that we should have to consign the task to Russia. To instal Russia at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles or to leave Great Britain in control of the Persian Gulf or Suez Canal is much like posting a brigand to guard his professional haunts. "Set a thief to catch a thief": apply it to guarantees and we are driven back upon the old system, neither more nor less—the system that one of the wolves in sheep's clothing has just discredited by violating the guaranteed independence of Belgium.

We have asked our question and must accept the answer. It is useless to fortify our new European organism by guarantees of the old order, because we cannot fortify such guarantees themselves against the sovereign national state. Whenever it chooses, the sovereign unit can shatter the international mechanism by war. We are powerless to prevent it: all we can do is to abandon our direct attack, and look for the causes which impel states to a choice as terrible for themselves as for their victims.

"You ask," the Germans say, "why we broke our contract towards Belgium? It would be more pertinent to ask how we were ever committed to such a contract at all.

[1] Ch. IX. Section A. [2] Ch. IX. Section B.

"The heart of modern Germany is the industrial world of the Rhineland and Westphalia. The Belgian frontier and the Belgian tariff-wall rob this region of its natural outlet at Antwerp, yet the contract expressly forbids us to right this economic and geographical wrong by uniting the sea-port to its hinterland.

"The chief need of modern Germany is a source of raw produce and a market for her finished products in the tropical zone. Belgium has staked out for herself the one important region in Africa which was not already occupied by France or Great Britain. She can do nothing with it, while we—but this contract expressly forbids us to kick the Belgian dog out of the manger.

"Because of this Belgian guarantee we must go in want of almost everything we need, yet meanwhile our great neighbours on either flank have conspired to take from us even the little we possess already. The struggle with France and Russia on which we are now engaged has been impending for years, and on our part it is a struggle for existence, but even here the same remorseless contract operates to paralyse our efforts. On the scale of modern warfare the Western battle-front must extend from Switzerland to the North Sea, yet the greater part of this immense zone is neutralised by natural and artificial obstacles on either side. From Switzerland to the Ardennes there will be stalemate: the decision will be reached in the open country between the Ardennes and the coast. Here, as soon as war broke out, France and our own fatherland had to concentrate the terrific energy of their armaments, yet we had contracted away our initiative in this vital area, for it lies within the frontiers of the Belgian state. The government we had guaranteed might prepare the ground

for France and ruin it for ourselves, yet because of the guarantee we must look on passively at the digging of our grave.

"Why, then, had we suffered ourselves to be bound hand and foot? We had not: our grandfathers had entailed the bonds upon us. When they signed the contract in 1839, they knew not what they did. At that time Germany had no industry, Belgium had no colonies, and the Franco-German frontier between the Ardennes and the Jura was not closed to field operations by two continuous lines of opposing fortifications. Had their signature been demanded in 1914, they would have refused it as indignantly as we should have refused it ourselves. To us no choice was offered, and if we have asserted for ourselves the right to choose, who dares in his heart to condemn us? Who will impose a changeless law upon a changing world?"

This is Germany's argument about Belgium. Her facts may be true or false, the arguments she builds on them valid or fallacious.[1] That is not the point. Behind arguments and facts there looms an idea that can inspire an individual nation to make war on Europe. We must do justice to this idea, if it is not to play the same havoc again.

Humanity has an instinctive craving for something eternal, absolute, petrified. This seems to be a fundamental factor in our psychology: it has obtruded itself equally in spheres as diverse as religion and politics, but it has been especially dominant in diplomacy.

[1] For instance, the argument does not justify in the least the proceedure by which Germany actually asserted her freedom. If the situation had altered so vastly that she felt herself no longer bound by the guarantee, she ought to have denounced it formally in time of peace. By professing observance of it up to the last moment, and only breaking it by the declaration of war, she obtained a grave military advantage. That was downright dishonesty.

Whenever the European organism proves its instability by breaking down, we start in quest of a perfect mechanism, a "permanent settlement." We are invariably disappointed, but invariably we return to the quest again. The Congress of statesmen at Vienna followed this will-o'-the-wisp in 1814: in 1915 the belligerent democracies are preparing to lead themselves the same dance. "Europe is in a mess," we are all saying: "Let us tidy her up 'once for all,' and then we can live comfortably ever after."

We might as well expect a baby to "live comfortably ever after" in its swaddling clothes, or say to a snake, as we watch it slough off its old skin and wriggle out radiant on a Spring day: "Now that you have got through that tiresome business, you won't need to do it over again when next Spring comes round." We are always mistaking the dead clothes for the living creature. A year hence, and it will be the new skin's turn to shrivel, but year in and year out the same snake will be living his life under each skin in turn. In treating one of these annual skins with preservatives, we are not doing our snake a service. When the season arrives, he will have either to burst it by an exhausting effort or die inside it conquered and stifled. The one thing he cannot do is to live in it another year.

So it is with the European organism. It is as full of life, as perpetually in transformation, as the individual national molecules of which it is woven, yet we confuse it in turn with each of its transitory garments. If we are to find a satisfactory issue out of the present crisis, we must begin by correcting our standpoint.

The impending settlement will not be permanent, and the better it fits the situation, the less permanent will it be. As soon as the war is over, we have to devote all

our energy of thought and will to the racial and economic problems of Europe : we have to solve each one of them, and solve it to a nicety, yet when the work seems done and its result stands embodied in map and treaty, we must confess that we are unprofitable servants, and recognise that we are only at the beginning of our task.

Our real work will be to regulate this immediate settlement so that it varies in harmony with the subsequent growth of Europe and modifies its structure and mechanism to meet the organism's changing needs.

We have now discovered the flaw in guarantees of the old order. They were framed for rigidity, and therefore were doomed to crack. Our new guarantees must be elastic : they must be forged of steel not cast in iron.

How can we frame guarantees of this malleable character ? We may shed light on the problem by analysing into classes the actual guarantees we have proposed in our survey.

(i.) Firstly, we have proposed guarantees of political independence and integrity in the case of the three Scandinavian states,[1] the Slovene Unit,[2] the Greek islands off Anatolia,[3] Persia,[4] and the Sultanate of Oman.[4] The autonomy guaranteed to Poland within the Russian Empire[5] comes under the same head.

(ii.) Secondly, we have proposed to guarantee economic rights-of-way to one state across the political territory of another. Instances of this type are the Russian railway through Norway to the Atlantic[6] and through Persia to the Indian Ocean ;[7] Poland's title to free trade down the Vistula, and to the enjoyment

[1] Ch. IX. Section A.
[2] Ch. V.
[3] Ch. X. Section D. Strictly speaking, we proposed to guarantee the Kingdom of Greece to the extent of this portion of its territory.
[4] Ch. XI.
[5] Ch. VIII. Section A.
[6] Ch. IX. Section A.
[7] Ch. XI.

of a free port at Danzig;[1] and Germany's similar claim to an unhampered outlet at Trieste.[2]

Both these classes of guarantee are adapted from the international machinery invented during the Nineteenth Century. The first class is an extension of the political guarantee given to Belgium in 1839, the second of the economic right-of-way secured to her through Dutch waters, in order to furnish the commerce of Antwerp with a free passage down the estuary of the Scheldt to the open sea.

Our standpoint towards these two classes is inevitably prejudiced by their associations. We envisage them as embodied "once for all," like their nineteenth-century precedents, in a contract, and like nineteenth-century diplomacy we tend to regard such contracts as so many girders in a "permanent settlement."

(iii.) There is a third class, however, which has no precedent in the past, and which will react upon our standpoint in the very opposite direction: our proposed guarantee of alien minorities within the national state.

We have resorted to this formula more often than to either of the others. The German populations transferred with Schleswig to Denmark and with the Eastern frontier-zone to Autonomous Poland;[4] the Poles abandoned to Germany in West Prussia;[4] the Germans and Slovaks who cannot be disentangled from Hungary;[5] the Christian elements in Anatolia[6] and Arabia[7]—these are a few out of many instances, and each one of them is a refutation of "finality."

The fact that such minorities must inevitably be left on our hands compels us to recognise that beyond a

[1] Ch. II. Section D.
[2] Ch. V.
[3] Ch. II. Section C.
[4] Ch. II. Section D.
[5] Ch. IV. Section A.
[6] Ch. X. Section D.
[7] Ch. X. Section F.

certain degree the economic and the national factor are not commensurable. Here is an essential imperfection in the best settlement we can possibly devise.

The fact that these minorities require a guarantee reveals a deficiency still more grave than the other, inasmuch as it is not environmental but psychological. It means that hardly a single national society in Europe has yet become capable of national toleration. Just as people were persecuted for their religious beliefs in the sixteenth century and for their political opinions in the nineteenth, so they are still in the twentieth century almost universally exposed to persecution for their national individuality. In this sphere the social evolution of Europe is exceptionally backward, and the problem of nationality will never be solved till this psychological incongruity is removed.

This at once reduces to their proper proportion both the immediate geographical settlement of the problem which we have elaborated in this book and that guarantee of alien minorities which we have found to be its necessary supplement. In this light, the contracts in which such guarantees are enshrined appear as the transitory scaffolding they are. Weakened by the morbid hypertrophy of nationalism which has been preying upon her for years, exhausted by the convulsion of war in which the malady has culminated, Europe must walk on crutches now or else collapse; yet she will not be a cripple for ever. Relieved by these guarantees from the immediate strain of unmitigated national friction, she will be able to concentrate all her energy upon her spiritual convalescence. As soon as she has trained herself to national toleration, she will discard the guarantees and walk unaided.

So far from constituting a "permanent settlement,"

our third type of guarantee is an intimation that the problem still remains unsettled. The work will not be complete until we can dispense with the instrument, but the instrument will not accomplish the work unless it is wielded by a craftsman's hand. Not only are guarantees of our third type merely the means to an end beyond themselves: the contract in which it is embodied is in this case the least important part of the guarantee.

When we guarantee a national minority we have of course to define certain liberties which it is to enjoy—liberties, for instance, of religion, education, local self-government [1]—and all the parties to the Conference must contract responsibility for the observance of such stipulations; yet when we have done this, we cannot simply deposit our document in some international "Ark of the Covenant" and go our ways. The essence of the guarantee is its subsequent interpretation.

The relation between the different elements in a country is continually changing. One church dwindles while another makes converts; one race advances in culture while another degenerates; Man's indefatigable struggle to dominate his physical environment alters the natural boundaries between localities: a barrier that once seemed insurmountable is pierced, and leaves one formerly insignificant in relative prominence.[2] Each of these modifications demands an adjustment of the guarantee, and since they are an infinite series, the guarantee itself requires ceaseless manipulation if it is to perform its function aright.

This need cannot be satisfied by the original *fiat*

[1] See the programme for the re-organisation of Hungary in Ch. IV. Section A.

[2] An obvious example of this is the tunnelling of the Alps.

of the International Conference: it can only be met by the appointment of a standing international committee with executive powers, empowered, that is, to administer and interpret the contracts to which the members of the Conference have originally subscribed.[1] Our third type of guarantee has thus presented us with the clue we sought. The letter of international law has proved ineffective hitherto because it has lacked the inspiration of a living spirit, and this spirit can only be breathed into it by a human organ of international authority.

Supposing that such an organ were called into existence, what kind of international relations would naturally fall within its scope? We can analyse its probable sphere of activity into several departments.

(i.) The first branch would of course be those guarantees of national minorities which have just taught us the necessity for its existence.

(ii.) The second branch would include the two subjects of guarantee we dealt with first, namely "Political Independence" and "Rights of Way." We can see now that their administration by a representative international executive would eliminate that defect of rigidity which has always proved fatal to them heretofore.

Between them these two branches would cover all the machinery we have suggested for our regenerated European organism. Are there any further spheres of

[1] It would be premature to discuss the constitutional relation between this representative international organ and the individual national states from which its delegated authority would be derived. We cannot yet conjecture how much discretion its sovereign constituents would be willing to grant it. Its reference would probably include a free hand to "interpret" in the widest sense, but on the question of emending the actual letter of the contract, our executive organ would almost certainly be required to refer back to its principals.

national interaction over which our international organ might properly assume control? It would be logical to assign to it, if possible, all relations between sovereign national states which are peculiarly subject to change.

Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms—Growth and Decay. Some sovereign units are continually waxing in population, material wealth and spiritual energy: such are Great Britain and Germany, France and the Russian Empire. Others, like the Ottoman Empire or Spain, are as continually waning in respect of the same factors.

This ebb and flow in the current of life causes, and must cause, a perpetual readjustment of the relations between units in the two complementary phases. Units in the positive phase inevitably absorb the fibres and trespass upon the environment of those which have passed over into the negative rhythm. We cannot arrest this process any more than we can abolish change itself: what we can do is to regulate it on the lines of civilisation, instead of letting it run riot in a blind struggle for existence.

The current radiates in an almost infinite variety of interactions. Great Britain, Germany, and India are discharging surplus population into the empty lands of the New World; Great Britain and France are applying surplus wealth to evoke the latent resources of countries with no surplus of their own; Great Britain and Russia are putting forth spiritual energy to inspire primitive peoples with the vitality of civilisation.

Our international organ can handle no more than a fraction of this world-wide interchange.

(i.) We may exclude at once from its competence every interaction that is confined within the limits

of a single sovereign unit. Within the British Empire, for example, it is patently impracticable to "internationalise" the problems of Indian emigration to Vancouver or the Transvaal, of the closure of the Australian labour-market against labour from the British Isles, of commercial exploitation in Nigeria or Rhodesia, of autonomy in Ireland or the Asiatic Dependencies. The Empire may handle its own problems well or ill, but it will never consent to waive its sovereignty in respect of them. We should regard the proposition of international intervention as a menace to the Empire's existence. We should undoubtedly fight rather than submit to it, and every other sovereign state would do the same under similar circumstances. In purely internal affairs international authority will never obtain a footing at the expense of the individual unit.

(ii.) We may likewise exclude interactions between two or more sovereign states in spheres that fall entirely within their respective sovereignty. The Dominion of Canada or the U.S.A. would never submit to international regulation the question of Japanese immigration along their Pacific seaboard. If Russia wished to float a loan, she would never allow our international organ to decide where and in what proportions it should be placed: she would insist on keeping her hands free, and making the best bargain for herself both from the financial and the political point of view. Italy and the Argentine would never relinquish their respective sovereign rights over the Italian labourers who cross the Atlantic every year to reap the South American harvests. International authority would be flouted as uncompromisingly in these instances as in the former.

(iii.) There are some units, however, so raw in their growth or so deeply sunk in their decay as to lack the attribute of sovereignty altogether—units which through want of population, wealth, spiritual energy, or all three together are unable to keep the spark of vitality aglow. Such dead units are the worst danger that threatens the peace of the world: each one of them is an arena enticing the living units around to clash in conflict, a vacuum into which the current of life swirls like a mälström. In these "no-man's-lands" where no sovereignty exists, our international organ can and must assert its own sovereignty against the sovereign states outside.

(*a*) In every such area the standing international executive should regulate immigration from over-populated sovereign units—German colonisation, for instance, in Anatolia,[1] or Indian settlement on the alluvium of Irak.[2]

(*b*) It should likewise regulate the inflow of capital. We have discussed this question at some length in connection with the economic exploitation of Anatolia [3] and Arabia.[4]

(*c*) In areas where the pressure of spiritual energy is so low that the population cannot save itself by its own efforts from political anarchy, the international executive should be prepared to step in and organise "strong government."

The problems of Persia [5] and the Black Sea Straits [6] will here occur to our minds, and we shall recognise that this is at once the most indispensable and the most formidable task that our international executive has to

[1] Ch. X. Section C.
[2] Ch. X. Section E.
[3] Ch. X. Section D.
[4] Ch. X. Section E.
[5] Ch. XI.
[6] Ch. IX. Section B.

take in hand. We shall frankly repeat our confession that active political construction of this kind will be beyond the capacity of any international organ which the immediate settlement may bring to birth after the present war. Europe will not be reborn in the fulness of her strength like Athena : she will strengthen herself in pain and sorrow, advancing laboriously from small things to great. The assertion of international sovereignty in Persia and at Constantinople will not be the first step in international organisation : it is the goal of our hopes, the extreme horizon that our vision can wrest from Utopia.

We have now established the nature of that international force which is to regulate the relation between sovereign national molecules, and we can abstract our conclusion in two formulas.

(i.) There is no virtue in lifeless contracts, unless they are administered by a living organ with executive, or in other words with sovereign, authority.

(ii.) On the other hand this international sovereignty must scrupulously confine itself to the adjustment of the equilibrium between individual units, and to the apportionment among them of untenanted areas.

It cannot encroach upon individual sovereignty in any way that effects, or is deemed to affect, the sovereign right of self-preservation : in particular, it cannot aspire to the regulation of War, and it is waste of ingenuity to propound any international machinery for this purpose. The best-conceived arbitration or conciliation is bound to break down, when once a sovereign state has made up its mind that the surrender of its will on a particular issue is equivalent to annihilation. No international authority could ever prevent parleys like

those of last July from resolving themselves into a conflict of arms.[1]

The reader may feel this distinction of spheres casuistical. "I admit," he may say, "that each combatant has staked his existence on the result of the struggle, but surely he has staked it for a cause? The issues of the war are certain concrete problems—Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire—all of which conspicuously fall within the sphere you propose to internationalise. Have you not been making a distinction without a difference? If you cannot regulate war itself, how can you regulate the relations that precipitate it? In July 1914 your 'international organ' would have proved just as ineffective in the sphere you reserve to it as in any other."

Yes, we must answer, if it had only been called into existence that very month: no, if it had already been in commission during the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, or had been there to take in hand the Balkan problem in 1875, the moment when the revolt of Bosnia against the Ottoman Government opened that chain of events which has culminated actually in the present catastrophe.

Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire—the present war is not really being waged to settle these problems: it is being waged because they have been settled already, and settled on such unjust and injudicious lines that all parties concerned have found it worth while to stake their existence for the reversal of the settlement. No one need have been involved by such problems in a struggle for life. They were all problems of expansion, and their solution ought at

[1] All the belligerents maintain that they took up arms for self-preservation; and they all speak truth—it is a truism.

worst to have disappointed the expectation of immoderate gains: it ought never, as it has done, to have threatened the parties with the loss of what they possessed already before the problems were probed.

Why has the contrary occurred? Because, just for lack of that international executive with the sovereign authority we postulate, these issues that were not vital have been fought out, like issues of life and death, by war—not by the war of arms which has descended upon us now like some recurrent plague, into which we relapse at rarer and rarer intervals as we advance in civilisation, but by the unobtrusive, unremittent war of diplomacy which is being waged year in and year out between the sovereign states of Europe, and which has increased appallingly in violence during the last generation.

In this disastrous diplomatic warfare our opponents in the present war of arms have been uniformly the aggressors. If Austria-Hungary is now struggling for existence, it is because she deliberately embarked nearly forty years ago upon a diplomatic campaign of aggrandisement against South-Slavonic nationality.[1] If Germany is fighting back to back with her in the same ghastly struggle, it is because Germany has wielded diplomatic weapons still more ruthlessly against her other European neighbours.

For the terrible embitterment of the diplomatic contest Germany herself is entirely responsible, but she has inevitably exposed herself to reprisals as severe as her own provocative blows. She opened the battle over Morocco by forcibly intruding upon a sphere where she had no shadow of claim to expansion:

[1] In Ch. IV. Section B we have traced the history of this campaign at wearisome length.

thereby she drew France and Great Britain into diplomatic alliance against her, and laid herself open to the humiliation of 1911, when Franco-British diplomacy mobilised its financial forces and drove her to retreat by cutting off her supplies. In Turkey she might easily have satisfied her needs without any battle at all. The untenanted area was vast, the claims staked out on it were singularly narrow : when German enterprise circumvented the enterprise of Great Britain and France, and secured all the railway-concessions in the virgin hinterland of Anatolia, French and British diplomacy grumbled but did not attempt to open hostilities. Yet instead of reaping her harvest in peace, Germany again precipitated a diplomatic conflict by extending her ambitions to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.[1] The moment she aspired to absorb the whole Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and Russia entered into diplomatic co-operation, and opposed her purpose with all their might. Germany's Arabian venture has jeopardised her Anatolian gains, and if she is defeated in the present struggle, she will probably be excluded from the Ottoman area altogether.

The diplomatic warfare over three secondary issues, which ought never to have been settled by fighting at all, has thus left none of the combatants unscathed. On the contrary, the wounds inflicted then have festered till their poison has threatened each combatant with the pains of dissolution, and made that quack-physician the diplomat call out in panic for the knife of that quack-surgeon the war lord.

This diplomatic warfare is the objective of our new international organisation. Upon diplomacy we can and must make a direct attack. If we can draw this

[1] Ch. X. Section D.

monster's teeth, we shall no longer be troubled by its still more monstrous offspring—War.

"Attack diplomacy!" the reader will exclaim: "Stated in these terms, your scheme takes on a more revolutionary aspect. You are really demanding that the sovereign national state shall delegate to your international executive its entire sovereignty in the diplomatic sphere. When it grasps your intention, will it not shrink from the sacrifice after all?"

Our answer can be no more than a prophecy, and we shall frame it best on the analogy of that association among individuals of which every sovereign state consists.

In the philosophy of the individual society it is a common-place that liberty and political organisation increase in a direct ratio to one another. Mankind has never lived in the "State of Nature," for if our progenitors had not evolved the Herd already, they would never have been able to evolve the Soul. The life of Ishmael, which sovereign states are leading still, is a discredited myth in the individual's history: nevertheless, when first he comes within our ken, he has not committed himself entirely to the "Social Contract."

The most primitive individual societies we know are still in the phase of transition. In almost every sphere of life their members have already discovered the value of political co-operation, but there is one anarchic tradition they have not yet brought themselves to abandon—the "Blood-feud." Yet the Blood-feud too is doomed, and we watch it die out as the individual's political sense develops. The increasing political regulation of all other relations between man and man eliminates occasions for the shedding of blood, and

instead of being an everyday necessity, murder becomes a last resort. The individual begins to think of it as a dreadful exception to the normal reign of Law: he misses here the liberty which Law has elsewhere given him, and longs here also to abandon unlimited rights in order to cast off the burden of unlimited duties. Then the Blood-feud dies out, and Law wins undisputed sovereignty within the state.

Why should not the State itself repeat the history of the Individual? If the evolution of individual societies was compatible with the survival of the Blood-feud, surely we need not despair of organising sovereign states into a still greater political association merely because they are unwilling to abandon the sovereign right of War; and if once this international organisation is accomplished, surely we can look forward with hope to the eventual disappearance of War also. States like individuals must eventually discover that the Blood-feud is a burden, and that the sovereign right to wage it is not Liberty but a mockery of it: we shall be past teaching indeed, if the present catastrophe is not a sufficient object-lesson for us. If sovereignty means freedom of choice, when were the nations of Europe ever less free to exercise their will than in the summer of 1914? No choice was open to them. One and all they were compelled to turn aside from the pressing task of social reconstruction upon which their heart is set, and take up in self-defence—poor sovereign puppets—that task of mutual destruction for which they have no heart at all.

The political philosophy of Modern Germany vehemently repudiates this analogy of ours. It refuses to regard the State and the Individual as homologous organisms. "The Individual—his function is to merge

himself in the society to which he belongs : the State—that is the political Absolute. For the State there is no law, no vision of a wider society."

This dogma may be true or false : that the future will show, yet this much we can proclaim at once : If it is true, then European Civilisation is a failure.

" The function of Society," says Aristotle, " is not to make life possible, but to make it worth living." This saying, at least, applies not only to individuals but to states. Hitherto the national states of Europe have been absorbed in the preliminary struggle to secure their existence. If they can profit by the present crisis to liberate their energy for higher ends, then the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand : if inspiration fails them in this hour, then we are witnessing " the beginning of great evils for Hellas," and the Sovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of Greece.

APPENDIX

NOTE ON THE MAP OF "NATIONALITIES IN EUROPE"

This map is an attempt to symbolise in visual form the thesis of the book.

It does not chart the physical varieties of the human race that occupy this portion of the Earth's surface,[1] nor even (a much simpler task) the domains of the different languages spoken indiscriminately by groups and individuals of the most diverse racial types within the same area. It aims at expressing something at once more familiar and more subjective, and therefore less susceptible of scientifically accurate demarcation — the grouping of the European populations in self-conscious national units. A definition of "Nationality," elicited from a series of concrete instances, was offered in the course of the first chapter, and the discussion in greater detail of successive problems, to which the remaining chapters are devoted, is inspired by at any rate one persistent object, a closer and deeper understanding of the "National Idea." The commentary that follows will perhaps serve both to explain the intention of the map, and also to recapitulate, by a few representative examples, the results arrived at in the book itself.

(1)[2] Under the *British Nationality* on the one hand

[1] For "racial" maps in the true sense consult W. Z. Ripley's *Races of Europe*.

[2] The figures refer to the corresponding numbers placed opposite certain names in the map.

are included, besides the predominant English-speaking population of Great Britain, the considerable Welsh and Gaelic minorities, because, though their Keltic speech is entirely alien, and the Welsh, at any rate, have a special literary and religious group-consciousness of their own, they are all entirely fused into one political organism.

In Ireland, on the other hand, the conquering English tongue has triumphed far more universally than in the larger island, and has almost reduced the native Keltic dialect to extinction, yet religion has been potent enough to implant in three quarters of the Irish population a national consciousness totally distinct from the British, although the vast majority of the *Catholic-Irish* nation speaks English as its native tongue. In this island the only adherents of the British nationality are the Protestants of Ulster, and they are the most fanatical partisans it possesses, because they are a minority, or as their enemies call them a "garrison," planted on the territory of another nation, and continually threatened with ejection or forcible assimilation at the hands of the latter.[1] This explains why the distribution of stipples in the British Isles is considerably different from that which would be presented on a linguistic map, where the Erse-speaking Irish Catholics, for instance, would be distinguished from their English-speaking co-nationalists, while no distinction would be made between the latter and the Uster Protestants of identical speech but violently antipathetic national feeling.

(2) *Belfast*, though the capital of Ulster, has attracted by its immense mercantile and industrial development a large urban immigration from the rural districts of Catholic Ireland, so that a strong minority of its present

[1] Compare the position of the Germans in Bohemia.

population (349,000), monopolising solid blocks of streets, is intensely Nationalist. It is of course impossible to separate out this Catholic population of Belfast from the rest of Ulster by any territorial frontier, and they are one of those minorities that must inevitably remain unsatisfied.

(3) A Welshman resident in Jersey once told the author that he was able to carry on a Keltic conversation with the *Breton* peasant women who came over from the mainland for a fair ; yet though the Welsh and Breton dialects are so little differentiated, there is no common consciousness whatever between the populations that speak them.

The Breton is as good a Frenchman as the Welshman is a "Britisher." The Welshman is distinguished within the general British mass not so much by his language as by his Nonconformity, which he shares with an important class of the whole English-speaking population : the Breton is a clerical, like his French-speaking Vendéan neighbour, not because of his Keltic speech, but because he is a peasant and inhabits a district remote from the centres of French national life.

(4) The French-speaking Belgians or *Walloons* have, unlike the Keltic-speaking Bretons, been left blank, because, though they have several times in the past been incorporated by conquest in the French state, they have never till lately shown any active desire for its membership.[1] If they ever break away from the Flemings, their secession will be due far less to sympathy with the neighbour nation with which they share a common language, than to the antipathy of

[1] In contrast to the French-speaking population of a district like Franche-Compté, which till the seventeenth century lay outside the political frontier of France, yet has been completely welded into the French nation.

socialists and free-thinkers towards the conservatism and clericalism of Flanders. The heroic struggle for freedom against the Germans is more likely, however, to fuse Walloons and Flemings into a really living Belgian nationality.

(5) The *Flemings*, who, together with the Walloons, constitute, or will constitute in the future, the Belgian nation, speak a "Low-German" dialect hardly distinguishable from the Dutch, but since the decline of mediæval Flemish civilisation in the sixteenth century, French has ousted the native idiom as the medium of education and literature. The Flemish literary revival is a movement of very recent growth: the Dutch, on the other hand, began to raise their patois into a "culture-language" during the same sixteenth century, and have won it a permanent place beside French and High German.

The gulf between Fleming and Dutchman has further been accentuated by Religion: the Dutch became ardent Calvinists, while the Flemings were captured by the Counter-Reformation. Thus there remains no factor capable of inspiring a common national consciousness, and it is unlikely that such will arise in the future, unless the "Young-Flemish" revival really pervades the whole Flemish people, and brings linguistic consciousness to the forefront.

(6) The *Dutch* themselves (as well as their Flemish neighbours) are claimed by Pan-Germans as truant members of the German nation, because they speak (like ourselves [1]) a "Low-German" dialect. It is true that the peasant of the Zuider Zee polders and the peasant on the Baltic coast preserved a close dialectical

[1] "Bread, butter, and cheese
Are good English and good Fries."

kinship before the days when national elementary education began to standardise language according to political grouping; yet while the classical scholars and Calvinistic theologians of Holland elevated their tongue into one of the literary languages of Europe, their Baltic cousins succumbed to the Lutheran movement from High Germany, and adopted the High German dialect of Luther's Bible as the vehicle of their culture. Moreover, this divergence of religious doctrine and literary medium has been a mere concomitant and symbol of a totally dissimilar development of national life. Nothing could be more different than the history of Holland and Prussia during the last three centuries. Prussia has worked out her traditions and destinies on the cramped plain of Northern Germany, Holland hers in all the Indies and the Equatorial seas. To call Dutch and North Germans one nation because they originally spoke an undifferentiated patois, is to juggle with words.

(7) The portion of the German Reichsland included in the mediæval province of *Alsace* is left blank, because the nationality of the Alsatians can only be decided by the population itself, and it has never yet had the opportunity to formulate its will.

(8) The *Swiss* are the supreme example of the phenomenon of Nationality as independent of Religion, Region and Language. On a map of religious or linguistic "distribution" they would not figure as an entity at all: on a map of Nationality they deserve distinction as much as, or more than, any other European group.

(9) The *Corsicans* are left blank, though they speak an Italian dialect, because it is certain that they would be no less irked by an administration controlled from Rome as by the present government organised by

France: they would perhaps choose, if they could, to be left to their insular anarchy, and would certainly repent their choice before long, if they did. National, as opposed to local, sentiment is hardly more strong in Sardinia and Sicily than in Corsica, and it is more by chance than conscious will that two out of the three islands have become united with the continental speakers of their language in the Italian national state. Sicily has revolted more than once since Garibaldi won it for Italy in 1860.

(10) *Trieste* is a city with an Italian nucleus and a fringe of Slovene suburbs, inhabited by the industrials and dock-hands whom the commercial development of the port has attracted from the countryside. The Italian element has kept its hold upon the civic administration by preventing the new Slovene quarters from incorporating themselves in the municipal area. The population of "official" Trieste is 133,000, and is predominantly Italian: the population of Greater Trieste, that is, of the whole urban complexus centred in the port, totals nearly a hundred thousand more. Reckoning on this wider basis, the Slovenes can claim over 18 per cent. of the total population, and the proportion is always shifting in their favour. Their admission to joint control of the municipality is only a question of time, and Trieste is essentially a "bi-national" city.

(11) The *Slovenes* themselves are left blank. Common Slavdom may incline them to enter the South-Slavonic union, but their dialect differs from that of their South-Slavonic neighbours, and has never developed a literature. Their culture is German and Italian, and there are strong German and Italian elements in the population of the country. If these

influences prevail, the Slovene Unit will prefer to stand by itself.

(12) The *Slovaks* along the Northern border of Hungary speak the same dialect as the Tchechs in Austria, but their history has proceeded on entirely independent lines. Their case is the same as that of the Croats and Serbs. The stress of common persecution awakened the consciousness of South-Slavonic nationality, and the same causes may produce the same effects upon Tchechs and Slovaks. There is no indication, however, that this has happened yet, and the two peoples are therefore distinguished on the map.

(13) *Pószony* (Pressburg) is a Hungarian town situated on the North bank of the Danube, at the point where the " Little Carpathian " range descends to the river. It is the meeting-place of German, Magyar and Slovak, but the German element predominates in the population [1] of the town itself.

(14) The *Masurians* are Poles in language, but culture, religion and tradition link them to their German neighbours in East Prussia, and make their national feeling unpredictable. They are therefore left blank.

The " *Wends* " of Lusatia are left blank for the same reason. They are the remnant of a Slavonic tribe, the Sorabs, cut off by German expansion from their kinsmen further East.

(15) The *Pomaks* inhabit the Rhodope Mountains in Thrace. Linguistically they are Bulgarian Slavs, but like their South-Slavonic kinsmen in Bosnia they have been converted to Islam, and the bond of religion has prevailed over the bond of speech. During the campaign of 1912 they were violent partisans of the Turks, and their guerilla bands harassed the communi-

[1] 62,000 at the census of 1900.

cations of the Bulgarian army. National consciousness will probably be kindled in them, as in the Bosniaks, by the spread of education, but under present circumstances it would be misleading to represent them as Bulgars, and accordingly they have been left blank.

(16) The *Tatars in Bulgaria* are descended from refugees transplanted by the Ottoman Government to the South bank of the Danube when Russia annexed the Bessarabian steppes. Since the Turkish frontier retreated still further in 1878, the Tatars have been left stranded under Bulgarian rule, but though they are sundered from the Bulgars by speech as well as religion, they have become completely reconciled to the new situation. While the Bulgar-speaking Pomaks in Rhodope were fighting for the Turks, the Turkish-speaking Tatars in Bulgaria were tending the fields of their Christian neighbours who had been mobilised for the Turkish war. They are another instance in which language is no criterion of national feeling.

(17) In *Constantinople* the Turkish element at present possesses a majority over all the other elements combined, but it will sink to the level of the Greek, Armenian and "Frank" colonies, as soon as the city is liberated from Ottoman Sovereignty. Constantinople is essentially a cosmopolitan trading-centre like Shanghai, and has no nationality of its own.

(18) In 1913 Greece and Bulgaria fought for the ownership of *Salonika*, yet on grounds of nationality neither of them has any claim to rule there, for the Greek and Bulgar elements in the city are negligible. Two-thirds of the population[1] are Spanish Jews, welcomed by the Ottoman Government after their

[1] Approximately 80,000 out of 150,000. Exact statistics have never yet been taken.

expulsion from the Peninsula in the sixteenth century. The commerce of the port is entirely in their hands, and their Spanish patois is the current language of the shops and streets.

(19) The *Albanians* are left blank, because their group-consciousness is limited to the canton. The Roman Catholic Mirdite feels no kinship with the Moslem from Elbassan or Berat, and their native speech counts for so little with the Orthodox Christians of the South that they employ the Greek language in their churches and schools, and reckon themselves Greek in nationality, though at home they talk as good Albanian as their Moslem or Catholic neighbours. The Albanian language has entirely failed to kindle a sense of common nationality among those who speak it, and this failure is striking, because it is a very individual tongue, and its speakers are sharply distinguished by it from the Greeks and Slavs who border upon them.

(20) *Zara* [1] is the only place on the South-Slavonic littoral, with the possible exception of Fiume, where Italian can still be reckoned as an indigenous language. Elsewhere it has sunk to be no more than a *lingua franca* —a secondary speech acquired by sailors and traders who speak Slavonic as their native tongue.

(21) and (22) In both *Krete* and *Cyprus* the majority of the population is Orthodox in religion, Greek in language, and accordingly Greek in national feeling, but in both islands there are strong Moslem minorities —perhaps 20 per cent. in either case—which have no sympathy at present with Hellenism, though in language they are as Greek as their Christian neighbours.[2]

[1] Population 32,000 in 1900.

[2] In Krete Greek is universally spoken: in Cyprus, however, a few of the Moslem villages speak Turkish.

(23) More than half the population of *Smyrna*[1] is Greek, the remainder is cosmopolitan. Geographically, the city is the chief commercial centre of the Anatolian peninsula, and is marked out to be the capital of a diminished Turkey. The Smyrniots are one of the richest, most cultured, and most influential Greek communities in the World, but if Smyrna were annexed to the Kingdom of Hellas and detached from its continental hinterland, they would be ruined.

(24) The *Maronite* and *Druse* communities in the Lebanon speak Arabic like their Moslem neighbours, but difference of religion and a tradition of local autonomy have combined to implant in each of them a corporate feeling of their own. Druse and Maronite villages are so intricately intermingled that it has been impossible to distinguish one community from the other on the map.

(25) The *Georgians* are a Caucasian people who remained loyal to the Orthodox Church when all their neighbours adopted Islam. They developed a strong sense of nationality during their struggle for independence against Persia and Turkey, the great Moslem powers, but about a century ago they placed themselves under the protection of their Russian co-religionists, and since then they have rapidly become Russianised. Their nationalism has thus been conditioned by religion and not by language, and they have no feeling of brotherhood with their Lazic neighbours, who speak an identical dialect but are devout Moslems. The Lazes on their part sympathise with the Turks, and when the Ottoman armies penetrated beyond the Russian frontier in January 1915, the Lazic population flocked to their standard.

[1] Total population about 250,000.

(26) *Tiflis* was the capital of the Georgian national kingdom, but under the Russian regime it has attracted a large Armenian population, and has even become the chief Asiatic focus of Armenian national life.

(27) The *Kalmucks* of the Cis-Caucasian steppe are distinguished from their nomadic neighbours by both language and religion. They are a community of Mongol Buddhists which sought refuge within the Russian frontier when the Manchus conquered Mongolia in the seventeenth century. The Russian Government transplanted them to this distant quarter of the Empire, to hold the Turkish-speaking Moslem tribes in check.

INDEX

SOME references (*e.g.* Great Britain, France, Germany, Prussia, Russia) occur too frequently to be registered in the Index; others—for instance, geographical names defining lines of railway or frontier—are too trivial.

The Arabic numerals denote pages. Roman numerals or capital letters of the alphabet denote chapters or sections of which the reference is a dominant subject.

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